attorney general. Held, that the case was not rightfully brought to the supreme court, and that the petition in error must therefore be dismissed. 2. Held, further, that an appearance for the state by any person not authorized by law to appear for the state would not make any difference; and query: would an appearance by even the county attorney or attorney general under such circumstances make any difference. Opinion by VALENTINE, J. Dismissed. All the justices concurring.-Reisner v. The State.

JUROR EVIDENCE.-1. That one has formerly been a juror in the same cause is by statute ground of principal challenge, and to bring one within this statute it is not essential that the case shall have been at such former time fully tried and verdict returned or the jury discharged because unable to agree. It is enough if the case has been partially tried and a portion of the testimony received and heard by the jury. 2. While parol testimony is admissible to change or contradict the terms of a written contract, yet a parol contract may be made between parties contempora neously with the execution of the written agreement, providing it is separate and independent and its terms in no way conflicting with or cont: adictory of the written stipulations. Thus where A sold B a sewing machine at a stipulated price and received a negotiable note in payment therefor; Held, that it was competent for B to prove a contemporaneous parol agreement that A would furnish him work for said machine at a stipulated price and within a stipulated time and a b. each of said contract by A and set off the damages sustained by said breach against the money due on the note. Opinion by BREWER, J. Reversed. All the justices concurring.-Weeks v. Medler.

REWARD-WAIVER OF DELIVERY.-Where a prisoner in custody in Montgomery County, in this state, for an offense under the laws of the state committed in that county, was transferred for safe keeping from the ja!l of such county to the jail of Franklin County in this state, and while confined there escapes from the jail and S, the sheriff of Montgomery County, offers a reward of $50 for the delivery of the escaped prisoner to him at Independence, in said Montgomery County, and D and C, acting on the knowledge that a reward had been offered, and with a view to obtain it, capture and secure the prisoner and take him back to the county seat of Franklin County, and there meet the sheriff of said Franklin County, who demands the prisoner by virtue of his office, and D and C deliver up the prisoner to the sheriff as his legal custodian and claim the reward offered, and soon thereafter S comes to such county seat and receives the prisoner from the sheriff of Franklin County and takes him back to Independ

ence:

Held, that D and C are entitled to the reward, notwithstanding the interposition of the sheriff of Franklin County and notwithstanding that S came to Franklin County and received the prisoner there, instead of having him delivered at Independence. Affirmed. Opinion by HORTON, C. J. Affirmed. All the justices concurring.-Stone v. Dysort.

EQUITY TRIALS -HUSBAND AND WIFE'S MONEY COMMINGLED VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE.-1. In a case in which a jury is not a matter of right, the court may submit certain questions of fact to a jury, and itself thereafter, from the same testimony, make special findings upon matters not submitted to the jury, and base its decree upon both the answers of the jury and its own special findings. Carlin v. Donegan, 15 Kas. 495. 2. From the mere fact that upon the sale of a piece of property belonging to the wife, the husband received the price, it does not necessarily follow that a debt of the latter to the former was intended to be or was created. And where upon such a sale the husband with the knowledge and assent of the wife re

ceived the price, mingled it with money of his own, and invested the joint funds in a business enterprise in his own name and conducted solely by himself, and this without any account or statement of indebtedness, or any agreement or understanding that the money should be treated as a loan or afterwards returned to her, and such business enterprise proved a failure, and thereafter in another community he entered into business in his own name and accumulated some property: Held, that a conveyance to his children of the property thus accumulated made some eight or nine years after the receipt of the money from the sale of the wife's property, and some five or six years after the death of the wife, could not be sustained as against recent and existing creditors as a payment of a debt created by the receipt of such money, but must be regarded as a voluntary conveyance. 3. A voluntary conveyance can be sustained as against existing creditors only when under all the circumstances of the case property retained by the grantor furnishes reasonable and adequate provision for the discharge of his debts. Opinion by BREWER, J. Affirmed. All the justices concurring.-Hunt v. Spencer.

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT IN A DEED OF TRUST.— 1. Where the creditors of a firm, composed of B and others, then in failing circumstances, entered into a written agreement with the firm, that if the firm would assign all their property (describing it) to a trustee, in trust for their benefit, and that if B and wife would also give to such trustee a mortgage on two lots (describing them) conditioned to make good any deficiency that might occur in the assets of the firm for the payment of such creditors, they would extend the time of payment on their claims one, two and three years, and the firm conveyed to the trustee in trust for their creditors their assets, and B and wife executed to the trustee the mortgage, and made said written agreement a part thereof, and provided therein, if the trustee should well and truly discharge his trust, collect, dispose of and properly apply the assets to the liabilities of the firm, and that if any portion of the indebtedness remain unpaid, and the firm, after reasonable notice of the sum so unpaid should fail to pay the same, then B and wife were to pay such deficiency, and in case of their failure to pay, the trustee was to sell the mortgaged premises and detain from the proceeds the amount unpaid: Held, that said written instrument or conditional deed of trust, executed by B and wife, so far as the premises conveyed are concerned, is not to be construed in the nature of a guaranty, but as a trust for the benefit of the creditors, and even if the trustee fails to well and truly perform his trust, the court will execute the trust; and any losses occurring by the wrongful action of the trustee, may be charged to him and deducted from the amount otherwise due on the trust deed, after the assets of the firm are disposed of. 2. Notwithstanding the requirement of reasonable notice to be given to the firm of the amount of their liabilities unpaid, before B and wife, are required by the trust deed to pay such deficiency, where a written notice to two members of the firm is given by the trustee within ten days after the assets of the firm had been disposed of and a like written notice is given to the other members of the firm within twelve months thereafter, and prior to the commencement of the suit to foreclose the trust deed and obtain personal judgment; Held, further notice not necessary. 3. The express stipulation in the trust deed to the effect that the said B and wife promise and agree to pay the deficiency of the firm on certain conditions stated in said deed, authorizes a personal judgment to be rendered against them both, if a substantial compliance with conditions precedent are shown. Opinion by HORTON, C. J. Reversed. All the justices concurring.-Jamison v. Bancroft.

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.

[In response to many requests from lawyers in all parts of the country, we have decided to commence again the publication of questions of law sent to us by subscribers. We propose to make this essentially a subscriber's department-i. e., we shall depend, to a large extent, upon them to edit this column. Queries will be numbered consecutively during the year, and correspondents are requested to bear this in mind when sending answers.]

QUERIES.

31. DOES SECTION ONE, or any part of the recent statute, in regard to exemptions in force July 1st, 1877, repeal Section fourteen of the act in regard to garnishment? See Revised Statutes of Illinois.

32. HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTIONS.-The homestead law of Missouri provides (sec. 7, p. 698, Vol. 1, Wag. Stat., 1872); "Such homestead shall be subject to attachment and levy of execution upon all causes of action existing at the time of the acquiring such homestead, except as herein otherwise provided, and for this purpose such time shall be the date of the filing in the proper office for the records of deeds the deed of such homestead, and (in case of existing estates) such homestead shall not be subject to attachment or levy of execution upon any liability hereafter created." Now, suppose there is a judgment against A, and after the rendition of the judgment he acquires a homestead by inheritance, is it liable to execution as though A had acquired it by deed? S.

BOOK NOTICE.

REPORTS OF CASES AT LAW AND IN CHANCERY ARgued and Determined in the Supreme Court of Illinois. NORMAN L. FREEMAN, Reporter. Volume 82. Printed for the Reporter. Springfield: 1878. The present volume contains 728 pages, and embraces the remaining cases submitted at the January Term, 1876, the cases submitted at the Juue Term, 1876, and a portion of the cases submitted at the September Term, 1876. About 150 cases are reported, among which we notice the following decisions of interest:

MARRIED WOMEN - LAND PAID FOR WITH PRODUCTS. Bongard v. Core. Opinion by WALKER, J., p. 19.-1. A married woman may own real estate and personal property under the statute and have her husband act as her agent in transacting the business growng out of such property, such as preserving and transferring the same, without subjecting it to the payment of debts. 2. The products of the land of a married woman, the rents of her real estate, the increase from her stock, the interest on her money, etc., are all hers as absolutely as the capital or things from which they arise. 3. If a married woman buys land and pays for the same from the products when sold, even though her husband acts as her agent in its control and management, bestowing a portion of his time, the land will not become his, and the products thereof will not be liable for his debts. 4. Where a crop raised upon the land of a married woman is taken in execution as the property of her husband, and the proof tends to show that she employed and paid for the labor that produced the same, through her husband, the fact whether he was her agent in the matter should be submitted to the jury, and it is error to refuse an instruction upon the hypothesis of his agency.

VENDOR'S LIEN-WAIVER-ESTOPPEL.

Andrews

v. Coleman. Opinion by SCHOLFIELD, J., p. 26. 1. Where a vendor of land conveys the same to a married woman, and takes a deed from her husband for

other land with covenants of warranty, in part payment, and the husband's promissory note for the balance of the purchase-money, this will be a waiver of his lien as vendor, and he must look to the husband alone for payment. 2. Where a party conveys land to the wife of another, he will be estopped from questioning her title and claiming that the husband is the owner. This will be ample recognition that the husband in procuring the deed was acting as the wife's agent.

PAROL EVIDENCE - CONTENTS OF TELEGRAM = AGENCY-RATIFICATION.-Cairo & St. Louis R, R. v. Mahoney. Opinion by CRAIG, J., p. 73. 1. In the absence of proof of the loss or destruction of a telegraph despatch and a notice to produce the same, parol evidence is not admissible to prove its contents. 2. In a suit by a surgeon against a railway company for treating an employee injured while in the service of the company, it is proper to prove by parol the fact of the injury to the servant of the company, and that the station agent notified the superintendent of the fact by telegraph. 3. Where a surgeon has been employed by a station agent for a railway company to attend an employee injured while in the service of the company, although he may not have express authority to do so, yet slight acts of ratification by the company will authorize a jury in finding the employment was an act of the company.

EVIDENCE-ACCOUNT BOOKS. — Patrick v. Jack. Opinion by SCOTT, J., p. 81.-Evidence that the account books of a deceased person were the only books kept by him, is equivalent to proof that they are books of original entry; and where it is further proved that settlements had been made by them with others, and they had been found correct, this is a substantial compliance with the statute, and they are admissible in evidence.

EXEMPTION-WAIVER BY EXECUTORY CONTRACT. -Recht v. Kelly. Opinion by SCOTT, J., p. 147.-1. A waiver of a debtor's right to claim personal property from execution, when attempted to be made by an executory contract, is ineffectual, and will not be enforced. 2. A clause in a promissory note expressly waiving the "benefit of all laws exempting real or personal property from levy and sale," being contrary to public policy, is inoperative, and confers no right to levy upon and sell personal property which is exempt. CRIMINAL LAW ATTEMPT TO COMMIT CRIMEWHEN INDICTABLE.-Cox v. People. Opinion PER CURIAM, p. 191.-1. Solicitations to commit crime are indictable, where their object is to provoke a breach of the public peace, or where perjury is advised, or the escape of a prisoner is encouraged, or the corruption of a public officer is sought. But if the offense be not consummated, and if it be not of such a character that its solicitation tends to a breach of the peace, or the corruption of the body politic, the mere solicitation is not of itself, indictable. 2. A mere effort by persuasion, to produce a condition of mind essential to the commission of the crime of incest, without any step taken towards the commission of the offense, is not an attempt to commit the crime, within the meaning of the section of the criminal code providing for the punishment of whomsoever attempts to commit an offense prohibited by law, and does any act towards it, but fails or is intercepted or prevented in its execution.

PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-DEGREE OF CARE AND SKILL REQUIRED.-Barnes v. Means. Opinion by CRAIG, J., p. 379.-1. While, perhaps, persons who hold themselves out to the public as physicians and surgeons, would not be required to possess the highest degree of skill, which the most learned might acquire in the profession, yet they are bound to possess, and in their practice to exercise, that degree of skill which is ordinarily possessed by physicians in practice. And when an injury results from a want of ordinary skill,

or from a failure to exercise proper diligence and caution in the treatment of a case, the physician must be held responsible. 2. In this case, a person had a leg broken. The fracture of the larger bone was oblique, and near the upper part of the lower third of the limb. The fracture of the smaller bone was nearly transverse, and was from two or three inches above the ankle joint. A surgeon was called within twenty minutes after the accident. In consequence of the want of care or skill on the part of the surgeon, the broken leg was shortened three-fourths of an inch. A Judgment against the surgeon for $1,000 damages is affirmed.

CONFLICT OF LAWS-RIGHT AND REMEDY, HOW GOVERNED.-Burchard v. Dunbar. Opinion by SCHOLFIELD, J., p. 451.-1. The law of the place where a contract is made will control in ascertaining the rights and liabilities of the parties, but no further. When these are ascertained, the law of the place where its enforcement is sought, will govern as to the remedy. When, by the law of another state, the liability of a party to a contract, executed in that state, is of an equitable character, it can be enforced in this state only in a court of equity, although, by the laws of the state where it was executed, it could be enforced in a court of law.

NOTES.

2.

A BILL introduced last week by Senator Christiancy of Michigan, to re-organize the Court of Claims and to include within its jurisdiction all such claims as are now brought before Congress or the Executive Departments, provides that the court shall hereafter consist of nine judges, and that the business shall be divided into three classes, to be disposed of by separate subdivisions of the court, composed each of three judges. If the three judges of one of these courts of first instance concur in a judgment it shall stand as the judgment of the full court, unless reversed upon appeal to the Supreme Court, but if only two of said judges concur the case must be re-argued and heard by the full court sitting in banc, and a majority of the whole number of judges will be necessary to find a judgment against the United States. The provision in regard to private claims presented by bill or petition to either branch of Congress, provides in substance that the claims may, by vote of either House, be remitted to this court for examination, but must be returned, together with the testimony, to Congress for action.

"Crowner's Quest." Three Annual Reports of Emil Dietzsch, Coroner of Cook County, Chicago, Ill. (Legal News Co., Chicago, 1878) is somewhat of a novelty in the line of official reports. A pamphlet of 64 pages, it contains the records of the duties of the coroner of the city by the lake for 1875, 1876 and 1877. The reports deal first with statistics. There were 541 inquests the first year; 606 the second, and 555 the third. Of these the suicides were respectively, 69, 55 and 66-a majority of these being Germans. This fact the coroner traces to different causes in the two reports. In his second report he says: "The well-known national beverage of the Germans, lager beer, may have some influence upon their psychological peculiarities. The habitual use of beer seems to have a tendency to direct their psychological ailments into the form of a metamorphosis, from phlegmatic ease to melancholy, and, finally, suicidal mania." In his third report he refers to this subject thus: "Perhaps it may be easily explained why suicide is more frequent among Germans than any other nationality in the country. The capacity for feeling seems to be more strongly developed

among them, and if to this be added adverse outside circumstances, which must often be ascribed to the ignorance of the English language, and to the unaccustomed manners and usages of this country, they will more frequently become suicides than others." Passing from figures to causes, and from causes to remedies, the coroner of Cook county has something to say that is worth listening to. He very properly laments that state of the law which allows, in a great city like Chicago, "quacks and medical mountebanks" to ply their trade without molestation and without supervision. Having endeavored to have a bill passed to provide for the examination of physicians and druggists, and having failed, he may justly complain. “If a city," he well says, "has the right to examine steam boilers in the interest of the public welfare and safety, then certainly the state has the same right to decree that competent persons only shall participate in the sale and handling of hightly active poisons and medicines." The frequent exercise of the pardoning power by the governor of Illinois is criticised, and rightly so we think. The maladministration of officers of corporations contributed to the coroner's labors; five suicides were caused by broken banks. The reports show an alarming increase of murder and manslaughter cases, which Mr. Dietzsch ascribes to several causes, viz.: the extent to which the right of self-defense is carried; the rottenness of the jury system, especially in the purlieus of the criminal courts, and the morbid sentamentalism of the public. This last, it appears, makes it practically impossible to convict a female of the crime of infanticide in Cook county. Here we are shown a dark picture of life in Chicago, but wherein can we say that Chicago is worse than other cities in the land? "Those who in other countries would justly be called murderers, and tried as such, escape but too often free and unconvicted on the pretense of self-defense, or ridiculous technicalities in the proceedings have saved him: and once more the man with the sign of Cain on his forehead hurries through the streets of the city, but after the grass of one spring has grown over his dark deed, his former friends, who first glanced at him reproachfully, greet him again. Soon he is again accepted into the community of the citizens, all is forgotten and everything is lovely; for, by this miserable modern philosophy, which more and more gnaws at the safety of humanity, every thing is visited and morally dishonored by this dangerous lethargy." Here is another picture of the jury system: "When Charles Whyland was shot on Thanksgiving Day, at the St. Elmo, in the heart of the city, I had to travel the next day from 9 o'clock a. m. till 3 p. m., in the business portion, before I could find twelve good citizens who were willing to serve as jurors at the inquest. The number of professional jurors will increase as long as the intelligent members of the community shirk all such duties, and soon we shall read in the city directory: 'John Brown, X., Clark street, Juror.' Either, as in South Germany, it should be a great honor to be a member of the jury, which honor is only bestowed upon decidedly honorable citizens, who have to act ungrudingly, or else the jury system should be abolished, for it will in these enlightened days become more and more difficult to find jurors who are not informed upon the murders which occur in their country, and who have not formed more or less of an opinion upon this or that, which is so recklessly claimed by some of the shrewd lawyers of the country as an objection." We only regret that our space does not permit us to go further into these reports. Men who like the coroner of Cook County for 1874-1877, gather from their experience as officers the data for suggestions, and who seek to impress their fellow-citizens with the dangers which are confronting them and society, are the men for such positions, and can be spared only with loss to the community.

SAINT LOUIS, JUNE 7, 1878.

CURRENT TOPICS.

Where a party has been prevented from complying with the legal requisites to obtain an appeal on account of the default or absence of the judge of the court in which the case is pending, it is held by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in Dobson v. Dobson, 10 Ch. L. N. 297, that the appeal may be taken and perfected after the expiration of the time limited by statute, and such appeal will be treated by the appellate court as though it had been taken within the time prescribed by law. In Clapp v. Graves, West L. M., Nov., 1859, the party applied for an order for appeal at the proper time, but the court did not announce its decision until the time had passed. A motion to vacate the order was denied. Daly, J., said: "It is a general rule when an act is to be done within a certain time, in which the concurrence of the court is necessary, and the party has done all that he is required to do to obtain the decision of the court, he is not to suffer the court's delay." In Pearson v. Rawlings, 1 East. 405, Lord Kenyon said that it is by no means unusual to make entries of judicial acts nunc pro tunc, by leave of court; and Powell in his work on Appellate Proceedings (p. 420) observes that if the court below refuse to make such entry in a proper case, "the Appellate Court would treat the case as though it had been done." In Louderback v. Boyd, 1 Ast., 330, it is held that where a party has been prevented from complying with the legal requisites to obtain an appeal by the conduct or default of the justice, the appeal may be made after the expiration of the time required by the statute, and the transcript be filed after the term. Noble v. Houck, 16 S. & R. 421.

The circumstances under which a court will set aside a sale made under its authority were considered by the New Jersey Court of Chancery in Hayes v. Stiger, 2 Stew. (N. J. Eq.) 196. In this case, the plaintiff asked to be reVol. 6-No. 23.

mortgaged premises sold pursuant to a decree of that court, on the ground that he entered into it under a misapprehension as to the proceedings in foreclosure, which he believed to be perfect, but which he had since discovered were irregular in not joining the wife of the owner of the equity of redemption, whereby the title was burdened with her inchoate right of dower. The court refused relief. The power of a court of chancery to set aside a sale made under its authority and thus relieve a purchaser from his bid is unquestionable, but its exercise, like all other judicial action, must always rest upon some consideration of justice. Fraud will always justify its exercise. Cummins v. Little, 1 C. E, Gr. 48. It may be exercised in case of accident. Seaman v. Riggins, 1 Gr. Ch. 214. So, also, where surprise or misapprehension is occasioned by the conduct of the purchaser, or the officer making the sale, to the injury of a person interested the court will interfere. Woodward v. Bullock, 12 C. E. Gr. 507; and in Campbell v. Gardner, 3 Stock. 423, the court set aside a sale because it appeared that the defendant, who was an aged female, had been misled by her brother, as to the contents of a subpoena served upon her. But this power will not be exercised in behalf of a suitor who seeks to escape from the consequences of his own act induced by mistake of law. Wakeman v. Duchess of Rutland, 3 Ves. 233; Dillett v. Kemble, 10 C. E. Gr. 66; Mott v. Shreve, Ib. 428; nor will the court exert it in favor of a purchaser who seeks to escape from a contract on the ground of misapprehension or mistake of fact, when it appears his error resulted entirely from his own negligence, and that he would have avoided it by the use or ordinary prudence. Parkhurst v. Cory, 3 Stock. 233; Campbell v. Gardner, supra; Smith v. Duncan, 1 C. E. Gr. 240; Haggerty v. McCanna, 10 C. E. Gr. 48. In the absence of fraud, the negligence of counsel will be esteemed the fault of the client. Wakeman v. Duchess of Rutland, Dillett v. Kemble, Mott v. Shreve, supra. The legal effect of a decree of court directing land to be sold, and the character and extent of the title to be acquired by virtue of it, are purely matters of law. A purchaser at a judicial sale who voluntarily abstains from all effort to get correct information, and de

liberately assumes the hazard of making a purchase ignorantly, must, as a general rule, bear the consequences of his own negligence. Cool's ex'rs v. Higgins, 8 C. E. Gr. 308; s. c., 10 C. E. Gr. 117.

In Ex parte Schollenberger, 17 Alb. L. J., 427, the Supreme Court of the United States has recently decided a question of federal practice, which has heretofore been very unsettled. A statute of Pennsylvania, similar in its provisions to those of many other states on the subject, requires every insurance company not of that state, as a condition for doing business therein, to file with the insurance commissioner a stipulation that any legal process affecting the company, served on the insurance commissioner, or the person designated by him, or the agent specified by said company to receive service of process for the company, shall have the same effect as if served personally on the company within the state. The court held that original process from the United States Circuit Court served in Pennsylvania upon the designated agent of a non-resident insurance company which had given the above-mentioned stipulation, would give jurisdiction to the court under the act of 1875 (18 Stat. 470), the company being under these circumstances "found" within the district within the meaning of the act. "A corporation," said the court, "can not change its residence or its citizenship. It can have its legal home only at the place where it is located by or under the authority of its charter, but it may by its agents transact business anywhere, unless prohibited by its charter or excluded by local laws. Under such circumstances it seems clear that it may, for the purpose of securing business, consent to be 'found' away from home for the purposes of suit as to matters growing out of its transactions. The act of Congress prescribing the place where a person may be sued is not one affecting the general jurisdiction of the courts. It is rather in the nature of a personal exemption in favor of a defendant, and it is one which he may waive. If the citizenship of the parties is sufficient, a defendant may consent to be sued anywhere he pleases, and certainly jurisdiction will not be ousted because he has consented. Here the defendant companies have provided that they can be found

in a district other than that in which they reside, if a particular mode of proceeding is adopted, and they have been so found. In our opinion, therefore, the circuit court has jurisdiction of the causes, and should proceed to hear and decide them." The practice in the circuit courts generally, has been, it is intimated, to decline jurisdiction in this class of suits. "Upon an examination of the reported cases in which this question has been decided, we find that in almost every instance the ruling was made upon the authority of the late Mr. Justice Nelson, in Day v. Rubber Co., 1 Blatchf. 628, and Pomeroy v. R. R. Co., 4 id. 120. These cases were decided by that learned justice, the one in 1850, and the other in 1857, long before our decision in R. R. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 81, which was not until 1870, and are, as we think, in conflict with the rule we there established. It may also be remarked that Mr. Justice Nelson, as a member of this court, concurred in that decision. Judge Woods, of the fifth circuit, has already decided in favor of the jurisdiction (Knott. v. Ins. Co., 2 Woods, 479) and Judge Dillon, of the eighth circuit, declined to take it only because he felt himself foreclosed by the rulings of other judges, and especially of Mr. Justice Nelson, Stillwell v. Ins. Co., 4 Cent. L. J. 463." See also R. R. v. Whiton, 13 Wall. 285; Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 407; ex parte McNeil, 13 Wall. 243; Fonda v. British America Assurance Co., 6 Cent. L. J. 305.

In the memoirs of George Combe, just published in London, there is quoted a curious and amusing reference of his to Lord Brougham- a reference in which phrenology becomes very descriptive. It concerns a dinner to Brougham, at which Cockburn, in a speech happened to mention the Queen's trial. "Brougham," says Combe, "began his reply like a maniac. He at once took up the Queen's trial, and gave himself up to the unbridled fury of 5 (Combativeness) and 6 (Destructiveness). 'It was no trial: it was a solemn combination of oppressors for the destruction of a victim,' etc, His eyes glared and his voice roared and grated. His countenance was dark and dreadful, as if the great fiend had animated it; and he rolled on period after period in this overwhelming condition, while the 800 auditors sat in mute and breathless astonishment. The storm over, he then said that a great meeting like this should not be spent in uttering compliment and commonplace, but in infusing valuable ideas, and he went over free trade, the Holy Allies, the High School of Edinburgh, and all in a very manly and admirable style. His eloquence is perfectly in unison with his head, and his secret is just to let himself out fearlessly and fully,"