Page images



upon a correct exposition of the law by the court.

Where a decision of our court of last resort, long acquiesced in, has become a rule of property, it is best that it be adhered to; but I insist that our criminal law, and especially our law of homicide, should be made as perfect as the enlightenment of the age will allow, and especially that all palpable errors of construction, which, if adhered to on the circuit, endanger life or liberty, should be overruled and corrected as soon as possible.


[blocks in formation]




October Term, 1877.
Hox. T. A. SHERWOOD, Chief Justice.


Associate Justices.

JOHX W. HENRY, REQUISITES OF BILL OF EXCEPTIONS.- Affidavits attached tothe record, in support of a motion for a new trial, but not made part of the bill of exceptions, nor marked filed as a paper in the case, can not be considered in this court. Opinion by NORTON, J.-State v Treace.

ON AN APPEAL FROM the St. Louis Court of Appeals, in a criminal ca-e, which fails to show any indictment, arraignment, trial or verdict, the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded. 63 Mo. 200; 61 Mo. 232: 49 Mo. 236; 63 Mo. 295. Opinion by NORTON, J. - Sinte v. Pickles,

INDICEMENT - LARCENY – PosseSSION OF RECENTLY STOLEN Goods.-If the conviction of defendant was had solely on the fact that he was found in possession of a stolen watch two and a half months after it was stolen, the court might reverse, but in this case there is other evidence of guilt. Opinion by NorTON, J. State v. Robbins.

INDICTMENT-SUFFICIENCY.- An indictment charging“ wilfully, felonoiusly, on purpose and of his malice aforethought, unlawfully, did shoot at,"

"" with a pistol, wbich said pistol was,” &c., etc., "with intent,” etc., etc., charges an assault under section 291, W. S. 449, and is not bad because the word “assault” is not used. It uses the language of the statute defining the offense. Opinion by Norton, 1.-State v. Phelan.

DEED OF TRUST-EFFECT OF AGREEMENT BY THE GRANTOR MADE AFTER EXECUTION OF TAE DEED AS TO AX EASEMENT.-Where, subsequent to the execution of a deed of trust, the grantor therein made an agreement with the owner of contiguous lands, by which certain fencing was constituted a partition fence, after a sale under the deed of trust, such agreement is not binding on the purchaser at the trustee's sale, who takes all the interest the grantor had in the land at the date of the execution of the deed. Opinion by NORTON, J.-Sims v. Field et al.

INDICEMENT-JOINT OFFENCE OF TWO OR MOREAGREEMENT OF COURSEL.-Sec. 20, p. 1089, W. S., furnishey no ground for quasbing an indictment against one of two joint offenders, even where the other was not indicted until another term of the court. The grand jury that indicted one of them might not have had evidence sufficient against the other, and their failure to indict works no injury to the defenda ant. Where counsel agreed that a form of verdict ditferent from that which appears on the record was the form in wbich the verdict was actually rendered, but which agreement is not a part of the bill of exceptions, and does not appear to have been brought before the trial-court, or passed upon by it, this court must disregard such amended verdict. Opinion by NORTON, J.-State v. Steptoe.

ASSUMPTION OF NOTE.-Where A. executes notes to B. in payment of real estate, and afterwards sells such real estate to C., who assumes and agrees to pay said notes, B. can maintain a suit against C. for the payment of the notes. 31 Ind. 31; 41 Ind. 439; 43 Ind. 315. Opinion by BIDDLE, C. J.-Campbell v. Patterson.

RELATIONSHIP BY MARRIAGE.—The first wife of the plaintiff was a sister of the father of the justice before whom the case was tried, but was dead when the action was brought. Held, the justice was not related to the plaintiff either by blood or marriage. Relationship by affinity ceases with the dissolution of the marriaye which created it. The fact that plaintiff had children by his first wife living at the time the suit was began did not change the case. WORDEN, J.- Trout et al. v. Drauhorn.

PRACTICE-NUNC PRO TUNC ENTRY.-It is now well supported by authority that a court may order a nunc pro tunc entry upon evidence which satisfies it that the entry should be made. Courts may make such amendments of the record upon any competent legal evidence, and they are the proper judges as to the amount and kind of evidence requisite in each case to satisfy them what the actual proceeding before the court was, and what was the proper entry to have been made on the record. Where the court was thus satisfied that an order was made and omitted of record by the clerk, it should have directed the entry prayed for to be made Opinion by PERKINS, J.- Schoonover v. Reed.

RAILROADS - INTOXICATED PASSENGERS.-A rail. road company is not bound to receive any person as a passenger who is drunk to such a degree as to be disgusting, offensive, disagreeable or annoying, and a person so drunk as to be likely to violate the common proprieties and decencies of life, has no right to a passage while in that condition. The comfort and convenience of passengers generally must be protected and proper desorum observed. Slight intoxication is not sufficieut ground for refusing a person passage in a public car, although his behavior may not be in all respects strictly becoming. Opinion by BIDDLE, C. J.-P. C. & St. L. R. R. Co. v. Vandyke.

WILL EXPLAINED BY DEED.-Testator, with his wife, made a deed for certain real estate to his son, with the following habendum: “ To have and to hold said premises to the said Walter Simpson during his natural life, and at his death to his children in fee simple.” This deed was retained by the testator until his death, when it was delivered by his exccutor to Walter, who had it recorded. On the day the deed was made, the testator executed a will containing, among others, the following item: “And to my son Walter Simpson and his children, I give and bequeath the tract of land described in a deed to him to be held as therein provided." Held, the will might refer to the deed for the purpose of determining the kind and quality of the estate to be taken by the devisees, as well as for ascertaining the land devised, and reading the deed in connection with the will, it is clear that Walter Simpson took the land for life only, and left, therefore, at his death, no estate in the same which could be subjected to the payment of his debts. Opinion by WORDEN, J.-Fesler, Administrator, o. Simy. son et al.




to any

[ocr errors]


March Term, 1877.
HON. HORACE GRAY, Chief Justice.


Associate Justices.

AUGUSTUS L. SOULE, PRACTICE-MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.-Where, in a criminal case, tried in the supreme court,exceptions have been taken to the rulings of the presiding judge, which have been overruled in this court, and a rescript sent down by this court, and entered in the superior court dispoing of those exceptions, being the only matters in the case which had ever been brought before this court, a motion for a new trial, on grounds not affecting the correctness of the decision upon the exceptions, can not be made in this court, but can only be made in the superior court, which has entire and exclusive jurisdiction of the case. Opinion by GRAY, C. J.-Com. v. Scott.

BOND TO DISSOLVE ATTACHMENT-SURETIES.-In the original action brought by the plaintiff, the property of both defendants was attached. They thereupon gave a bond to dissolve the attachment, upon which this action is brought. The plaintiff in the original action discontinued against one, and judgment was entered against the other defendant. Held, that such discontinuance did not discharge the sureties, there being nothing in the language of the bond, or the circumstances under which it was given, to indicate that it was intended to be restricted to a judgment against both the original defendants. See Leonard v. Speidel, 104 Mass. 356; Campbell v. Brown, 121 Mass. 516; Sanderson v. Stevens, 116 Mass. 133; Tucker v. Whit?, 5 Allen, 332, and Richards v. Storer, 114 Mass. 101, distinguished. Opinion by ENDICOTT, J.-Poole v. Dyer.

JURISDICTION-WRIT-FORM OF ACTION.-1. The words "debt or damages demanded," in Stat. of 1875, Ch. 106, § 1, regulating the jurisdiction of the Municipal courts of Boston, as in other statutes of the commonwealth defining the jurisdiction of courts, by like words refer to the ad damnum in the writ, and not to the amount claimed in the declaration, or proved at the trial. Chamberlain v. Cochran, 8 Pick. 522; Hapgood v. Doherty, 8 Gray, 373; Trees v. Rusbworth, 9 Gray, 47; Ladd v. Kimball, 12 Gray, 139; Ashuelot Bk. v. Pearson, 14 Gray, 521. 2. An objection, that the writ alleges the cause of action to be in contract or tort, but does not allege that the plaintiff is in doubt as to which it is, and the declaration does not pretend that it is in tort, is, so far as it relates to the writ, an objection for a defect of form in process, upon wbich the decision of the court below was final; and, so far as it relates to the declaration, could not be taken otherwise than by demurrer. Gen. Stat., Ch. 114, $ 10; Ch. 115, $ 7; Ch. 129, $ 2, cl. 6, $$ 7, 12; Barlow v. Learitt, 12 Cush. 403. Opinion by Gray, C. J.-Clay 0. Barlow.

ground of self-defense, it is not error for the court to permit the plaintitf to open and close the case. Per CURIAM.-Dragos v. Whisner.

Lex LocI-SET-OFF.-1. The right of set-off in an action is governed by the law of the place where the action is brought. 2. In an action brought in Ohio by the indorsee against the maker of a promissory note payable to order, executed in Kentucky, and indorsed before due, the maker can not set-off a debt due to him from the payee, noi withstanding the Kentucky statute, which declares such notes “assignable so as to vest the right of action in the assignee," but provides that such assignment shall not "impair the right

* off-set the defendant has or might have used agains tthe payee." Opinion by WELCH, C. J.-First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Hemingray.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE_WITNESSES.-1. An action for specific performance against the heirs of the vendor, and against his grantee who took the legal estate with notice, is not an action for relief on the ground of fraud, within the meaning of section 15 of the the code, and the grantee can not protect himself by tbe limitation therein prescribed. 2. The proviso in section 313 of the code, as amended March 23, 1875 (72 0. L. 77), applies oply to a case for setting aside a will, or the deed of a deceased person. The heirs, legatees and grantees, who are declared competent witnesses by the proviso, are such as derive title from the same person; and where a person does not claim under a willor deed, he must, to come within the proviso, claim as beir of the testator or grantor whose will or deed is sought to be set aside. Opinion by WHITE, J.Masher v. Butler.



December Term, 1877.-Filed December 19, 1877.
Hon. LUTHER DAY, Chief Justice.

Josiah SCOTT,

Justices. T. Q. ASHBURN, TRUST.-Where the grantee of land holds the purchase-money in his hands after it becomes due, by agreement with the grantor, to indemnify himself from Joss by reason of an incumbrance on the land, and remains in possession of the land, and enjoyment of the rents and profits thereof until the incumbrance is removed, he holds the amount due to the grantor as his trustee, and it he uses the money for his own benefit, he is chargeable with interest on the money from the time it became due until paid. Opinion by Day, C. J. -McCrea v. Martien.

PROMISSORY NOTE-WHEN DEMAND AND NOTICE UNNECESSARY-TRUST.-1. Demand and notice is not necessary as against an endorser, who, at the date of the maturity of the note, has sufficient property of the maker in his possession held as security against his liability. 2. A party holding one of a series of notes secured by chattel mortgage, who obtains possession of the property mortgaged, holds it in trust for the owners of the notes; and if he purchase such property at a sale made by himself, he will be held to account for the fair value of the same. Opinion by WRIGHT, J.--Beard v. Westerman.

JURISDICTION OF POLICE COURTS CRIMINAL PRACTICE.-1. Police courts have jurisdiction to hear and determine, on information, under section 167, of the act “ To provide for the organization and government of municipal corporations,” cases of petit larceny, and all inferior offenses which are not required by the constitution to be prosecuted by indictment, when the offense is committed within the limits of the city, or within four miles thereof. 2. Under the code

[merged small][ocr errors]

of criminal procedure, the accused may demur to an information, where the facts stated therein do not constitute an offense punishable by the laws of this state. 3. An information, under section 8 of “an act entitled an act to amend section 8 of an act entitled an act for the prevention of gaming” (700. L. 191), describing the offi nse in the words of the statute, is not uncertain, and states facts su tficient to constitute an offense. Opinion by ASHBURY, J.-Davis v. Stale.

DIVORCE, ALIMONY-LIABILITY OF HUSBAND.1. Where a wife is living separate and apart from her husband, and, in a suit against him for divorce and alimony, has obtained a decree fixing the amount of alimony to be paid by the husband for her sustenance during the pendency of her petition, and the husband is not in default in respect to the payment of the alimony so allotted, he is not liable for necessaries subsequently furnished at her request, during the pendency of her petition. 2. Persons dealing with the wife, under these circumstances, do so at their own peril, and are chargeable with knowledge of the allottment and payment of the alimony. 3. The adequacy of the alimony decreed in such case can not be collaterally drawn in question, especially by a stranger to the suit. Opinion by SCOTT, J.-Hare's admrs. v. Gibson.

cording to a contract between A. and B, whereby A. was greatly damaged by the loss of his grain, held, That it was not error to allow A, on the trial, to show the worth of wheat at the county seat of the county where the case was tried, and in which the grain was to have been cut, when such county seat was the nearest market to where the grain grew. 3. In an action before a justice of the peace, the verdict of the jury should be in writing, and signed by the foreman of the jury; and held, not necessary that all the jurors should sign their names thereto. Opinion by HORTON, C. J. Affirmed. All the justices concurring.--Hanson 0. Lawson.


[merged small][ocr errors][merged small][merged small]

VACATION OF VOID JUDGMENT.-A void judgment may be vacated and set aside at any time, on motion of the defendant, without advising the court that the defendant has a valid defense to the action in which the pretended judgment is rendered. Opinion by HorTON, C. J. Reversed. All the justices concurring:Hanson v. Wolcott.

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ACTIONS DISTINCT IN TRESPASS.-1. Under section 2 of chapter 113, General Statues, 1096, a civil action to recover damages can not be joined and trial with a criminal prosecution instituted for a violation of said section; nor can the complainant, in the criminal prosecution provided for in said statute, recover in such proceeding any judgment for wrongs done to his property. The civil and criminal actions therein provided are not in anywise dependent upon each other. Eitber or both methods may be resorted to as may be deemed best. State v. Armell, 8 Kansas, 288. Opinion by HORTON, C. J. Reversed. All the justices concurring. Manville v. Feiter.

JUSTICE COURT - COMPUTATION OF TIME.--1. In cases tried without jury, in which there has been no arrest or attachment, the justice may withhold judgment if he desires until the fourth day after the close of trial. General Statutes, p. 799, section 115. But in the computation of the time under said section both the day of trial and the day of entering judgment must be counted. 2. If the justice fails to enter judgment by the fourth day as above, but does enter it thereafter, the error may be corrected by petition in error, and, being an error appearing in the final judgment, may be taken advantage of without exreption. Opinion by BREWER, J. Reversed. All the justices concurring. Stewart v. Waite.

JURISDICTION OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE — EviDENCE-VERDICT.--1. A justice of the peace has original jurisdiction of the subject matter of an action filed with him to recover damiges in the sum of $192 for a breach of a personal contract to cut and reap certain rye and wheat. 2. In an action brought lov A. against B. to recover damages for the failure of B. to cut and reap certain rye and wheat belonging to A, ac

THOSE who attend this court and courts of law are not very good judges of a horse. I remember two or three years ago I tried a cause at Cambridge. It was an action of trover for a horse. The property being clearly made out, I proposed that the defendant should enter into a rule to deliver the horse; but that was refused; and they chose to stand the verdict; upon which I directed the jury to find all the damages laid. The special pleaders, with all the exaggeration incident to them, not having any idea of the value, only put£500 the into declaration; and the jury finding a verdict for that sum, the defendant paid it with all satisfaction, the horse selling afterwards for £2,200.-Lord Loughborough.

AMONG lawyers and jurists, the list of deaths during the past year is large. It includes the names of Emory Washburn, of Massachusetts; ex-Chief Justice Shepley, of Maine; Judge 0. C. Skinner, of Illinois; Judge Henry W. Williams, of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; David A. Smalley, for eighteen years United States District Judge of Vermont; Edward Kent, formerly Justice of the Supreme Court of Maine; Enoch H. Rosekrans, once a Judge of the Supreme Court of New York; Chief Justice Moses, of South Carolina; Isaac Ames, Judge of Probate of Suffolk County, Mass.; Joseph T. Piatt, of the Pbiladelphia Court of Common Pleas; Chief Justice Draper, of the Province of Ontario; Judge Rawson, of the Supreme Court of New York; and Professor Tyler, Lord Justice Mellish, and Mr. Samuel Warren.

In a case of alleged assault with intent, at the Cork Assizes, Mr. Justice Keogh is stated to bave dealt rather sternly with the jury, in order to obtain a proper verdict. The prosecutrix, who was a servant, deposed that the prisoner dragged her along the road about a quarter of a mile outside Killarney. She was rescued by a priest and a doctor who happened to drive along the road. For the defense, two witnesses were examined, who deposed, tbat, when they passed, the prisoner and the prosecutrix were engaged in friendly conversation. A juror remarked that they bad no cocrobora. tive evidence of the assault. His lordship said he was not in the habit of meeting juries in the city of Cork who required to have a plain proposition hammered into their heads. The jury handed in a verdict of not guilty upon the first count, charging criminal intent, but guilty of a common assault. His lordship refused to take the verdict, and asked them what they meant by it. The evidence was all one way,

nd there was not a scintilla the other way. The prisoner was either guilty on the first count or not guilty at all. He di. rected them to retire and reconsider their verdict. They returned in a quarter of an hour with a verdict of guilty ou both counts. The prisoner was then sentenced to two years' imprisonment with hard labor. He was a returned convict, who had been eight times convicted.

The Central Law Journal. during the year was one hundred and ninety

nine, two more than during the previous year.

The fact that there has been no falling off, but, SAINT LOUIS, JANUARY 18, 1878.

on the contrary, an increase in the number of

students, is exceedingly gratifying, when it is CURRENT TOPICS.

remembered that the course has recently been

extended from two to three years, and an exPROPERTY in the hands of assignees in bank- . amination for admission instituted. Professor ruptcy has been decided by Lowell, J., in the Langdell criticises with some severity the acUnited States District Court of Massachusetts,

tion of the New York Court of Appeals, in the in Re Mitchell, to be liable to taxation under adoption of the new rules to which we have state laws. The tax was resisted by the as

before referred, as to admission to the bar in signees on the ground that they were officers

that state, and points out with force their injusof the court; that the funds in their hands

tice in discriminating against law schools outwere in the custody of the law, and, therefore,

side of that state. The report concludes with not to be disturbed or interfered with by any.

a reference to the difficulties which attend an action on behalf of the state. The learned

examination of students on legal subjects, judge remarked that an “able opinion” to

which, it is to be hoped, may be brought to the this effect had been given by one of the registers attention of those committees of practicing lawin Re Booth, 14 N. B. R., and concluded: “I

yers who have charge of the examinations can not subscribe to that opinion. I can see no

for admission to the bar in many states. interference or obstruction of the court, or of “The whole field of law,” he says,“ is so extenthe law, in taxing to the owner thereof any fund sive, and so much of it is unfit for the purposes that may happen to be in whole or partly in the

of systematic study and instruction, that one registry of the court, or under its direction, as

who attempts to cultivate the whole of it indiswas the case with money here, provided there is criminately will not cultivate any of it to no attempt to affix upon it a lien, or in some

much purpose.

Hence, an examiner who way to disturb the actual custody of the fund.

examines without reference to any particSuch an assessment is merely an official de

ular course of study or instruction (and claration that the owner of the fund should

such is the character of nearly all examinapay his share of the public burdens. I do

tions for admission to the profession) can not know why a ship in the hands of the mar

have no other standard than the state of his shal should escape taxation to the owner,

own knowledgc; and the success of the perthough, undoubtedly, it will be free from levy

sons examined may, therefore, depend less or seizure as long as it remains in his official

upon what they know than upon what the expossession. If the state undertook to tax an

aminer knows. It is impossible that such assignee in bankruptcy as such, that is, to tax

examinations should be at once rigorous and his office and franchise-his right to exercise a

just. They must either admit the undeservfunction under the laws of the United States

ing or reject the deserving; and in the long or in any mode to discriminate against an

run they will be sure to do the former.” assignee, or against the estate of a bankrupt, Coming from the head of the leading law very different considerations might arise. It

school of the continent, these suggestions are is said the assignee is an officer of the court;

entitled to great consideration. and so he is, in a certain sense, and so is every attorney who practices in the court; and this

An interesting and exhaustive discussion of will protect them from taxation as such officers, but not necessarily in respect to funds which

the question of maritime liens is to be found they are to administer for private persons,

in a recent decision of Brown, J., of the United

States District Court for the Eastern District though their administration should be under the control of the court."

of Michigan, in the case of The Benton, 3

Mich. Law., 128. In this case, where a firm of The report of the Dean of Harvard Law material-men of three members, libeled a vesSchool for the past year, shows that institution sel, in which two members of the firm owned to be in a flourishing condition. The whole an interest, it was held that the suit could not number of students connected with the school be maintained. The only case, says the judge,

Vol. 6.-No. 3.

that indicates the possibility of a material-man entertain a libel for an account between part having a lien upon his own ship—that of owners. Hall v. Hudson, 2 Sprague, 66; The Foster v. The Steamboat Pilot, No. 2, New- Marengo, 1 Low. 52; The Steamboat Orleans berry, 215, in which seamen, who were also v. Phoebus, 11 Pet. 175; Minturn v. Maypart owners, were permitted to libel their own nard, 17 How. 477; Grant v. Poillou, 20 ib.

vessel for wages, after sale upon execution 162 ; Kellum v. Emerson, 2 Curt. 79'; Ward


against them from a state court—was promptly v. Thompson, 22 How. 330; 1 Pars. on Ship. reversed on appeal by Mr. Justice Grier in a 116. clear and forcible opinion, (2 Wall. Jr., 592), though the learned judge refused to decide THE rule of law that no action can be mainhow far a part owner might have a lien upon tained by one partner against the other for any the shares of his co-owners for advances made cause growing out of the partnership relation, or services performed. Not only is the enforce- or which requires an accounting to ascertain ment of the lien against one's own property the respective rights and liabilities of the paropen to the objection that a man can not sue ties, is subject to some limitations. In Medge himself at law, but to the further objection v. Puig, decided last month in the New York that he ought not to compel his creditors to Court of Appeals, a contract had been entered pay debts which he has contracted and become into between the parties constituting them himself obligated to pay. Part owners partners in respect of the business contemplaliable in solido for necessaries. 1 Pars. on Ship-ted to be carried on under it, and containing ping, 100. That a material-man has no lien certain stipulations to be performed by the upon his own property has been decided, not several parties for the benefit of the others. For only in admiralty, but in cases under the me- their proportion of the capital stock of the chanics' lien laws of the several states. Logan partnership, the defendants expressly stipuv. The Steamboat Æolian, 1 Bond, 267; Phillipslated by the instrument to do and perform ceron Mechanics' Liens, sec. 39; Babb v. Reed, 5 tain things, and not to do and perform certain Rawle, 151; Stevenson v. Stonehill, 5 Whar. other things, and the plaintiff, on his part, 301; Peck v. Brummagim, 31 Cal. 440. In stipulated to do and perform certain things. the case of The St. Joseph, Brown's Admiralty, The plaintiff brought an action alleging that 202, it was held that the fact that the libel- the defendants had been guilty of various ant was the general agent and superintendent of breaches of the contract on their part, in not the line of boats of which the respondent ves- doing and performing the several things stipusel was one, and held sixty thousand dollars of lated to be done by them by the terms of the stock of the company, was sufficient proof of agreement, and in doing certain other things his having given credit to the company and not which they stipulated not to do. It was objected to the vessel. Has a part owner of a ship a that such an action between partners would lien upon the shares of his co-owners? In not lie, but the court held that it would. In Doddington v. Hallett, 1 Ves. Sr., 497, Lord Glover v. Tuck, 24 Wend. 153, 158, Cowen, J., Hardwicke decided that he had, but the case says that the objection that the articles of agreewas overruled by Lord Eldon in ex partement between the plaintiff and defendant conYoung, 2 Ves. and B., 242, and after some stitute a partnership in consequence of which conflict of authority in New York, the law of the plaintiff's remedy lies in a court of equity, England and the United States is now firmly is thus answered by Collyer on Partnership, 132 pronounced against the existence of such lien. Am. ed. 139: “One partner may maintain an ac1 Pars. on Ship., 114; Patten v. The Schooner tion of covenant against his co-partner, whether Randolph, Gilp. 457; Hall v. Hudson, 2 the covenant be to pay any sum or do any acSprague, 65; The Larch, 2 Curt. 427, revers- tion for the purpose of only launching the parting same case, 3 Ware, 28; Macey v. DeWolf, nership, or whether it be to perform any of the 3 W. & M. 205 ; Mumford v. Nichol, 20 Johns. articles after the partnership has commenced. 611; Green v. Briggs, 6 Hare, 395; Lamb v. An action of covenant will lie, although there Durant, 12 Mass. 54; Merrill v. Bartlett, 6 may be accounts between the parties which rePeck, 46; Berdan v. Gardner, 4 ib. 456; quire unraveling in equity. And where the French v. Price, 24 do. 14; 1 Pars. on Ship. partnership covenants have not been infringed 114. A court of admiralty has no power to for any length of time, the action of covenant

« PreviousContinue »