it should not have been issued, the governor may revoke it, whether issued by himself or his predecessor. 3. Where such warrant has been revoked by the governor, no inquiry will be made, in a proceeding on habeas corpus on behalf of the alleged fugitive, as to the grounds of such revocation, although, at the time of the revocation, the fugitive may have been in custody of the agent of the demanding state. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by OKEY, J.- Work v. Conington.

FIRE INSURANCE-INTEREST-Dower.-A policy of fire insurance was issued to the plaintiff on a dwelling house "to B's heirs," who were the owners thereof subject to an assigned dower interest therein of their mother, the widow of B. The application, which was made part of the policy, was made by the widow, and contained a representation that the property was in the occupancy of the applicant, and was not incumbered. It was stipulated in the policy that, "if the premises insured herein be incumbered in any way, this policy shall be void, unless the true title of the insured and the incumbrance on the premises, be expressed in the application." In an action by said heirs upon the policy to recover the loss insured against, the property having been consumed by fire, the company claimed that the dower interest of the widow was an incumbrance that avoided the policy. Held, that whether the dower right of the widow was an incumbrance or not, within the above stipulation, she having an insurable interest in the property, the application is to be regarded as referring to that interest, as well as to the interest of the heirs of B, and hence, that the representation in the application that the property was not incumbered was true. Opinion by BOYNTON, J.Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Britton.

SEDUCTION-CONDONATION OF CRIME.-In an action for criminal conversation with plaintiff's wife, an answer showing condonation by the plaintiff of his wife's crime is not sufficient. Condonation as to the wife is not condonation as to the defendant. 4 N. H. 511; Bigelow's Lead, Cas. on Tort. 238. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-Clouser v. Clapper.

CONTRACTS VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.—, Where a school trustee contracted to have lightning rods placed on a school house in order to have rods placed on his own premises free of cost: Held, that the contract was void as against public policy, and a note given in payment for such lightning rods could not be collected from the school township. Opinion by NIBLACK, J.-Wingate v. Harrison School Township, etc.

RAILROADS-POWERS OF CONDUCTORS.-A railroad company which holds itself out to the public as a common carrier of passengers, establishes its routestations, and advertises its running arrangements, thereby pledges itself to the public to run accordingly. The duty of the conductor is to run the trains according to the public arrangements, and he has no power to change them. A passenger has no right to infer that a conductor has any power, from his general duties as conductor, to change such arrangements, and no reason to suppose that he could bind the railroad

company by such an agreement. Opinion by BIDDLE, C. J.-O. & M. R. R. Co. v. Hatton.

VENDOR'S LIEN-VOLUNTARY ABANDONMENT of. -Ordinarily the taking of a mortgage to secure the payment of unpaid purchase money, is an abandonment of the vendor's equitable lien on the real estate; and, when such equitable lien is voluntarily abandoned, it is lost forever. But it can not be said that a vendor of real estate, who has been induced to accept a forged mortgage on the realty to secure his unpaid purchase money, has thereby fairly and voluntarily abandoned his equitable lien on such real estate. Opinion by Howk, J.-Fouch et al. v. Wilson et. al.

BOOK NOTICES.

AN ENGLISH VERSION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, with the Original Forms, Alphabetically Arranged, and an Index of Subjects. By JAMES APPLETON MORGAN, A. M., Cincinnati; Robert Clarke & Co. 1878. The title of this work explains fully its scope; it is simply a collection of legal maxims, with the English translation of each, numbering altogether 2882. This is the largest collection of legal maxims to be found in any work known to the writer, embracing as it does just 1,000 more than are to be found in the last edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionary under the title "Maxims," and including many that are otherwise accessible only in old law-Latin and law-French volumes. The collection may well be called exhaustive, though, by a rather amusing oversight, the author has forgotten to give in the body of the book, the opening passage of Justinian which he adopts as his maxim on its title page: Juris præcepta sunt hæc; honesta vivere, alterum non lædere, suum cuique tribuere, which certainly as well deserves the name of a legal maxim as the one given as No. 650-facilis est lapsus juventutis. The various maxims are alphabetically ar

ranged, and consecutively numbered, and with each is given, without any comment, the correct English version. The work, it will be seen, is not a treatise, but a compilation; it is, as compared with such a book as Broom's Legal Maxims, what a dictionary is to a grammar, The work of translation is well done, regard being had at once to brevity and to clearness.

Altogether the book is a useful one, honestly made up as shown by the absence of any needless repetition of maxims, and deserves to be well received by the profession. It might have been made more useful, however, by a fuller index than the one furnished. A book like this is mainly useful to enable one to find a maxim apposite to a particular proposition of law, and which, perhaps, one partly remembers, but can not quite recall. When one has 3,000 maxims alphabetically arranged, this is of course impossible unless one happens to remember the first word of the maxim sought. To obviate this disadvantage the author has added an index of subjects, covering, however, only about seven and a half pages, referring back to the maxims appropriate to the various subjects. This part of the work has not been very thoroughly done; for instance, so familiar a maxim as omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori æquiparatur will be sought in vain in the index under the titles "Ratification," "Confirmation," "Principal and Agent," or any other title the writer has been able to discover.

W.

In The Western (G. I. Jones & Co., 1878) we have a magazine which reflects credit on its writers and its publishers. The May-June number, which is just received, contains many very readable and instructive articles, and this without the presence among the contributors of any writer whose fame is more than local.

The longer papers are: Michael Angelo as a Prophet, translated from the French of Michelet, and Frederick Barbarossa. Shakespearina in the Public; School Library (of this city); The Equality of the School System and An Improved English Alphabet, are the remaining artieles of interest. For poetry we have The Kneeling Nun, The Soul's Complaint of the Body, and (not unexpectedly) Spring. Book Reviews, Current Notes, and a Digest of the Noticeable Articles in the Magazines and Reviews conclude the May-June number.The International Review for May-June is fully up to the standard, and what we have before said of this admirable magazine it is not necessary to repeat. The article on the United States Provisional Court for the State of Louisiana, by Chas. A. Peabody, will be read with interest by lawyers. This was an extraordinary court and it is well that its history should be made public. When Richelieu inquired of the King whether the power which he was tendering him was to be absolute, he could not have wished for more power than was given to the judge of this provisional court-Judge Peabody-by President Lincoln, who by the order establishing it, was vested with authority to "hear, try and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including causes in law, equity, revenue and admirality and particularly all such power and jurisdiction as belong to to the district and circuit courts of the United States, conforming his proceedings, so far as possible to the course of proceedings and practice which has been customary in the courts of the United States and Louisiana-his judgment to be final and conclusive." But, it must be remembered, this was in 1862. Yet even then this unlimited power was looked upon with suspicion. Dining with Judge Peabody one day, shortly after this court had been terminated by act of congress, Mr. Seward was talking with Chief Justice Chase across the table about the trial on impeachment of President Johnson, then recently terminated, and being in excellent spirits, spoke with force and emphasis of manner as well as language. Mr. McCollough, then secretary of the treasury, being present, rallied him playfully on his freedom of speech and manner, as showing lack of reverence; and, referring to the presence of the Chief Justice, asked him if he had not forgotten that he was in the presence of the Supreme Court of the United States, that august tribunal. Mr. Seward, appreciating the pleasantry in the best of humor, affected to spurn the idea that he was to be influenced by the presence of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and asked what there was in that presence that should restrain him. His court, said he, has some power in time of peace, no doubt, but it was limited to an appellate jurisdiction always, and that in a very small class of cases, and in those it was bound by law prescribed for its guidance; and, turning to Judge Peabody, he said, "Why, Peabody, all the power of his court is not a circumstance to what you had in Louisiana, and I made you judge there. Why should I be awed by the presence of the Chief Justice, I would like to know?" Chief Justice Chase had always told Judge Peabody, familiarly, while the court was in existence, that he did not approve of the act of the President in giving him such unlimited powers as he had, and that he would never have consented to give to any one such powers, if he had been consulted.

QUERIES AND ANSWERS.

[In response to many requests from lawyers in all parts of the country, we have decided to commence again the publication of questions of law sent to us by subscribers. We propose to make this essentially a subscriber's department i. e., we shall depend, to a large extent, upon them to edit this column. Queries will be numbered consecutively during the year, and correspondents are requested to bear this in mind when sending answers.]

QUERIES.

26. 1st. IS THE COMMON LAW, with respect to crime, abolished in this state. 2d. Can one be indicted at common law for libel in this state. U. S. H.

[See Brennan v. Tracy, 2 Mo. (App.) 540. — ED. Cent. L, J.]

27. WHERE A LINE FENCE between two adjoining landholders is divided into two equal parts, and thereafter each land-holder keeps his allotted share in repair, and finally builds a new fence, what kind of an ownership does he hold? Is he a several, joint or common tenant of that fence, especially how is it in the state of Ohio? INQUISITOR.

NOTES.

A PLAN of a judicial system for the consideration of the coming constitutional convention of the state of California has been prepared in pamphlet form by Mr. Solomon Heydenfeldt, a well-known and able lawyer of that state. His proposal as to the election of judges is so novel and at the same time such a decided improvement on the present system that it is with great pleasure that we are called upon to reprint this section of his proposed constitution in full. It is as follows:

ELECTION OF JUDGES.

SECTION 13. Justices of the supreme court shall be elected by the qualified electors of the state at large, and justices of the county courts shall be elected by the qualified electors of the respective counties in which they are to serve, subject, however, in both cases, to the following regulations:

First. For each justice of the supreme court or county court to be elected, the governor of the state shall nominate to the two houses of the legislature the names of two fit and proper persons, who shall be known as judicial proponents.

Second. Each house shall refer the nominations so made to its judiciary committee, who shall investigate and report as to the qualifications and fitness of the persons so nominated, whereupon each house shall, by ballot, vote either to confirm or reject either or all of the proponents.

Third. In case of rejection of a proponent by either house, the governor shall make another nomination.

Fourth. When the nomination of two proponents shall be confirmed by the two houses of the legislature, the two proponents so confirmed shall be the candidates for election, and the only qualified candidates for election before the qualified electors entitled to vote for the justice to be supplied, and the one receiving a majority or plurality of the votes cast to fill the office shall be declared to be elected, and shall be commissioned in due form under the great seal of the state.

Fifth. Where more than one justice of the supreme court, or more than one justice of the county court for the same county are to be elected at the same time, the nominations to be made by the governor shall be twice the number to be elected, without any other designation, direction or qualification.

SEC. 14. The justices of the supreme court shall hold office during good behavior.

IN New Zealand you must not be "cheeky" to the court. The February number of the New Zealand Jurist contains a report of the committal to jail for one month of a barrister practising before the Supreme Court, for contempt of that distinguished tribunal. The counsel had objected to the statement of the case made by one of the judges in delivering the judgment of the court. The following conversation ensued: The Chief Justice-It is absolutely impossible to go on with these interruptions. I will not sit here with your

interrupting the proceedings, Mr. Barton. Mr. Barton -If your Honors make decisions which are based upon data contrary to the facts proved in evidence at the trial, I must be allowed to correct the mistakes of the court as to those data. Your decisions should be intelligible to the parties and public, but especially to the parties. The Chief Justice-You must keep your seat and hold your tongue. Mr. Barton-I will assert my right and my client's right, so long as I am in court. The Chief Justice-I will tell you now to keep your seat and hold your tongue-that is the order of the court. After a few more words the court closed the discussion rather abruptly with another order, this time to the jailor to hold the barrister for one month in his keeping without special instructions as to diet or otherwise." The Jurist, in commenting upon the case, remarks that in the various cases reported in the books, the punishment inflicted has never carried imprisonment with it except as an alternative to nonpayment of a fine. It is a notable fact, moreover, that cases of this kind appear to be almost entirely confined to small colonial courts, the judges of which appear to be influenced by very different feelings in asserting their judicial dignity from those which manifest themselves on the English Bench. Lord Denman remarked, in Carus Wilson's case, 7 Q. B. 984: "We must always feel most unwilling to interfere in this way; indeed, the practice has almost been discontinued for a century, as there is no judge who would not be extremely grieved at finding himself compelled to exert the power." The strongest and the latest illustration of modern practice will be found in the celebrated Tichborne case, where Dr. Kenealy, probably showed more deliberate disrespect to the judges than was ever shown by counsel before. The views of the judges on the point are expressed by the Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in his charge to the jury: "But how were we met? By constant disrespect, by insult, by covert allusions to Scroggs and Jeffreys, and judges of infamous repute as though, by the way, if the spirit of Scroggs and Jeffreys still animated the Bench in the administration of justice, the learned counsel would not have been pretty quickly laid by the heels and put to silence! But in that way were we met, and by suggestions that we were interfering with the liberty and the privilege of the bar. * * * Liberty of the bar! Till this time I should not have thought it capable of abuse; but we have unfortunately witnessed its abuse. Of that abuse a fitting corrective is to be found in the censure of the Bench, which I know will meet, as it ought to meet, with the universal concurrence of the bar of England." It is a barrister's duty, the Jurist concludes, to correct the court as to matters of fact. Great latitude has always been allowed to counsel in such cases, and necessarily so. The fate of a prisoner depends on the manner in which the facts of his case are presented to the jury; if any fact should be incorrectly stated or omitted by the court in summing up the evidence, the prisoner's counsel should be prompt and resolute in correcting the error or omission. If a conflict should arise between him and the court in discharging his duty, he should recollect the words of Erskine: "Your Lordship may proceed in what manner you see fit: I know my duty as well as your Lordship knows yours. I shall not alter my conduct."

The expected repeal of the Bankrupt Act is viewed in a different manner from different stand-points. The New York Tribune in an editorial on the subject says: "No legislation on this subject that will suit everybody is possible. The grounds of dissatisfaction have, however, frequently changed. Sometimes it has been in the interest of creditors, sometimes of debtors, that the repeal has been demanded. At first intended chiefly to help the debtor class, the law was found,

early in 1873, to be capable of use against them as a terrible weapon of oppression. Numerous improvements were made in the law during the latter part of that year, and from then until now the creditors have ma e the most complaint. In 1876 the House passed suddenly, and almost without warning, a bill to repeal the act; but the movement stopped there, and was at the time regarded as too hasty. The friends of the law have latterly lost hope about it, since no reforms could be suggested that were generally acceptable. The objections to the Bankrupt Law may be stated in a few words. It does not adequately help a poor and honest debtor, but a bad use may be made of it by a rich and dishonest insolvent. To the creditor the law proves highly unsatisfactory, because the dividends from bankrupt estates are usually a very small percentage; hence, also, it has become cheaper, when a man owes money, to accept from him almost any kind of compromise. The radical trouble is in the bankruptcy proceedings themselves. They are too eumbrous and too costly. An assemblage of lawyers and receivers and assignees and legal functionaries of all kinds gather around the estate, and pick off every particle of value. Time is wasted in taking testimony, in summoning witnesses, in climbing to upper stories to` meet legal gentlemen who are not prepared to go on with the case, and who ask its postponement. Everywhere in the bankrupt's course there are charges, fees, disbursements to be paid out of the estate, till at length men of business begin to look upon the whole system as a swindle perpetrated at the expense of the mercantile community." On the other head, the Nation says: "There can be little doubt, though the law is far from perfect, that its repeal will be followed by a worse state of things than now exists with regard to insolvent estates. In the absence of a general law applying to the whole country, the only statutes that come into operation are the state insolvent laws. These necessarily differ considerably from each other in detail; and in the light recently thrown upon the divergence of views as to the relation of debtor and creditor, existing in different parts of the country, it may be predicted that in the future there will be more radical differences than ever. In lending states the law will be made to favor the creditor; in borrowing states, the debtor. But besides this, insolvent laws have no effect beyond state boundaries, and no such thing as a complete discharge of a bankrupt is possible under them, except after tedious and wasteful proceedings in, the courts of every state in which he owes debts. Such a condition of things puts a premium on fraudulent preferences, and all sorts of dishonest practices. One naturally asks, therefore, why, in the face of all these objections, the repeal is still insisted on. The answer to this is, we believefirst, that unwise amendments, made a few years ago, destroyed the efficiency of the law; and, second, that there is in the United States at large an aversion to a general bankrupt law, which, in ordinary times, is always strong enough to prevent the retention of any statute on the 'subject. 'Our people,' as the Washington politicians say, 'do not like bankrupt laws.' We fear if this feeling were traced to its source, it would be found to spring from a suspicion that debtors are better off without than with such laws. The present act was passed at the close of the war, and its object was rather to enable debtors to get a complete discharge than to help creditors. Having secured this object, the weight of the law begins to be felt, and a movement is set on foot for its repeal. This sort of bankruptcy see-saw has been going on from the very beginning of the government, bankrupt laws being passed and repealed-not in pursuance of a far-seeing and comprehensive policy, but as a temporary makeshift from time to time, as legislation or the want of it makes itself uncomfortably felt."

down in Teaff v. Hewett, 10 Ohio St. 511, as the criterion for determining whether property ordinarily regarded as personal becomes annexed to and part of the realty, viz: actual annexation to the reality, or something appurtenant thereto; application to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty with which it is connected is appropriated; the intention of the party making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the freehold. This criterion was adopted in the New Jersey Court, in Quimby v. Manhattan Cloth Co., 9 C. E. Green; Blancke v. Rogers, 11 Id. 56; and by the Court of New York in McRae v. Central National Bank, 66 N. Y. 489. See, also, Ottumwa Woolen Mill Co. v. Hawley, 3 Cent. L. J. 657, and note.

In Keeley v. The Boston & Maine R. R. Co., recently decided by the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, the question was: Does a railroad ticket with the words "Portland to Boston" imprinted on it, purchased in Portland under no contract other than what is inferable from the ticket itself, entitle the holder to a passage, on the road of the company issuing it, from Boston to Portland? The court held that it did not. It has been held that, if a passenger purchase a ticket with a notice upon it that it is "good for one day only," in the absence of a statutory regulation to the contrary, he can travel upon such ticket only on that day. State v. Campbell, 32 N. J. L. 309; Shedd v. Troy & Boston Railroad, 40 Vt. 88; Johnson v. Concord Railroad, 46 N. H. 213; Boston & Lowell R. R. Co. v. Proctor, 1 Allen 267; 1 Redf. on Railways, 99 and notes. It has been held also, if the words "good upon one train only" are printed upon a ticket, the holder is not entitled to change from one train to another after the passage is begun. Cheney v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 11 Metc. 121; Redf. on Railways, supra. "This position," said the court, "is not weakened by the suggestion that the company can transport the passenger as cheaply and easily one way as the other. If it were so, it would be no answer. A person who agrees to sell to another merchandise of one kind, might find it to his profit and advantage to deliver merchandise of another kind, but he can not be compelled to do so. So a railroad could often, no doubt, transport a passenger as con

veniently on one train as another, and on one day as another; still, as before seen, there is no obligation to do so. But it does not follow that a railroad corporation can carry passengers for itself as well the one way as the other. There may be a difference arising from various considerations. There may be more travelers and more freight to be carried one way than the other. It may be more expensive. There may be more risk in the one passage than the other. The up train may go more by daylight, and the down train more by night. That such considerations as these might arise in a casewhether in this instance they arise or nothelps to demonstrate that a ticket one way is a different thing from a ticket the other. Practically, the doctrine set up by the plaintiff, if allowed to prevail, would affect the defendants injuriously. It is well known that through tickets are cheaper pro rata than the way or local fares. This fact has led to a practice on the part of way travelers of buying through tickets and using them over a part of the route, and selling them for the balance of the distance, so as to make a saving from the regular prices charged. It is easily seen that, if a passenger is permitted to ride in either direction on a ticket, it increases the chances for carrying on this sort of speculation against the interests of the road." On another point raised, the court in the principal case said: "It does not avail the argu

ment for the plaintiff at all, that before this he had passed over the road upon other tickets in a direction the reverse of that advertised upon their face; nor is it of any importance that another conductor, upon another train, at another time, expressed an opinion to him that this ticket would be for either direction good. The contract is not shorn of a particular stipulation merely because it is not always enforced. Nor could such conductor in such manner bind the corporation, and it could not have been understood by the plaintiff that he undertook to do so. The conductor merely expressed an opinion about a matter which he at that time had no business with. The plaintiff had ample opportunity to purchase another ticket, and should have done so. Wakefield v. South Boston Railroad, 117 Mass. 544." For a further discussion of the powers of conductors of trains, see the case of Ohio & Miss. R. R. v. Hatton, published in full in the present issue of this Journal.