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company by such an agreement. Opinion by BID. DLE, C. J.-0. & M. R. R. Co. v. Hatton.

VENDOR'S LIEN-VOLUNTARY ABANDONMENT OF. -Ordinarily the taking of a mortgage to secure the payment of unpaid purchase money, is an abandonment of the vendor's equitable lien on the real estate; and, when such equitable lien is voluntarily abandon. ed, it is lost forever. But it can not be said that a vendor of real estate, who has been induced to accept a forged mortgage on the realty to secure bis unpaid purchase money, has thereby fairly and voluntarily abandoned his equitable lien on such real estate. Opinion by HOWK, J.-Fouch et al. v. Wilson et. al.

BOOK NOTICES.

it should not have been issued, the governor may revoke it, whether issued by himself or his predecessor. 3. Where such warrant has been revoked by the governor, no inquiry will be made, in a proceeding on habeas corpus on behalf of the alleged fugitive, as to the grounds of such revocation, although, at the time of the revocation, the fugitive may have been custody of the agent of the demanding state. Judgment affirmed. Opinion by OKEY, J.- Work v. Conington.

FIRE INSURANCE-INTEREST-DOWER.-A policy of fire insurance was issued to the plaintiff on a dwelling house “to B's heirs,” who were the owners thereof subject to an assigned dower interest therein of their mother, the widow of B. The application, which was made part of the policy, was made by the widow, and contained a representation tbat the property was in the occupancy of the applicant, and was not incumbered. It was stipulated in the policy that, “ if the premises insured herein be incumbered in any way, this policy shall be void, unless the true title of the insured and the incumbrance on the premises, be expressed in the application.” In an action by said heirs upon the policy to recover the loss insured against, the property having been consumed by fire, the company claimed that the dower interest of the widow was an incumbrance that avoided the policy. Held, that whether the dower right of the widow was an incumbrance or not, within the above stipulation, she having an insurable interest in the property, the application is to be regarded as referring to that interest, as well as to the interest of the heirs of B, and hence, that the representation in the application that the property was not incumbered was true. Opinion by BOYNTON, J.Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Britton.

ABSTRACT OF DECISIONS OF SUPREME

COURT OF INDIANA.

November Term, 1877.

Hon. HORACE P. BIDDLE, Chief Justice.

WILLIAM E. NIBLACK,
JAMES L. WORDEN,

Associate Justices.
GEORGE V. HowK,
SAMUEL E. PERKINS,

AN ENGLISH VERSION OF LEGAL MAXIMS, with the

Original Forms, Alphabetically Arranged, and an Index of Subjects. By JAMES APPLETON MORGAN, A. M., Cincinnati; Robert Clarke & Co. 1878. The title of this work explains fully its scope; it is simply a collection of legal maxims, with the English translation of each, numbering altogether 2882. This is the largest collection of legal maxims to be found in any work known to the writer, embracing as it does just 1,000 more than are to be found in the last edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionary under the title "Maxims,” and including many that are otherwise accessible only in old law-Latin and law-French volumes. The collection may well be called exhaustive, though, by a rather amusing oversight, the author has forgotten to give in the body of the book, the opening passage of Justinian which he adopts as his maxim on its title page: Juris præcepta sunt hæc; honesta vivere, al. terum non lædere, suum cuique tribuere, which cer. tainly as well deserves the name of a legal maxim as the one given as No. 650-- facilis est lapsus juventutis. The various maxims are alphabetically arranged, and consecutively numbered, and with each is given, without any comment, the correct English version. The work, it will be seen, is not a treatise, but a compilation; it is, as compared with such a book as Broom's Legal Maxims, what a dictionary is to ? grammar, The work of translation is well done, regard being had at once to brevity and to clearness.

Altogether the book is a useful one, honestly made up as shown by the absence of any needless repetition of maxims, and deserves to be well received by the profession. It might have been made more useful, however, by a fuller index than the one furnished. A book like this is mainly useful to enable one to find a maxim apposite to a particular proposition of law, and which, perhaps, one partly remembers, but can not quite recall. When one has 3,0100 maxims alphabetically arranged, this is of course impossible unless one happens to remember the first word of the maxim sought. To obviate this disadvantage the author has added an index of subjects, covering, however, only about seven and a half pages, referring back to the maxims appropriate to the various subjects. This part of the work has not been very thoroughly done; for instance, so familiar a maxim as omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori æquiparatur will be sought in vain in the index under the titles “Ratification,” “Confirmation,” “Principal and Agent," or any other title the writer has been able to discover.

W.

SEDUCTION-CONDONATION OF CRIME.-In an action for criminal conversation with plaintiff's wife, an answer showing condonation by the plaintiff of his wife's crime is not sufficient. Condonation as to the wife is not condonation as to the defendant. 4 N. H. 511; Bigelow's Lead, Cas. on Tort. 238. Opinion by PERKINS, J.-Clouser v. Clapper.

CONTRACTS VOID AS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.-, Where a school trustee contracted to have lightning rods placed on a school house in order to have rods placed on his own premises free of cost: Held, that the contract was void as against public policy, and a note given in payment for such lightning rods could not be collected from the school township. Opinion by NIBLACK, J.-Wingate v. Harrison School Township, etc.

RAILROADS-POWERS OF CONDUCTORS. -A railroad company which holds itself out to the public as a common carrier of passengers, establishes its routestations, and advertises its running arrangements, thereby pledges itself to the public to run accordingly. The duty of the conductor is to run the trains according to the public arrangements, and he has no power to change them. A passenger has no right to infer that a conductor has any power, from his general duties as conductor, to change such arrangements, and no reason to suppose that he could bind the railroad

In The Western (G. I. Jones & Co., 1878) we have a magazine which reflects credit on its writers and its publishers. The May-June number, which is just received, contains many very readable and instructive articles, and this without the presence among the contributors of any writer whose fame is more than local.

1862.

The longer papers are: Michael Angelo as a Prophet,

QUERIES. translated from the French of Michelet, and Freder- 26. 1st. IS THE COMMON LAW, with respect to crime, ick Barbarossa. Shakespearina in the Public; abolished in this state. 2d. Can one be indicted at School Library (of this city); The Equality of the School common law for libel in this state.

U. S. H. System and An Improved English Alphabet, are the re- [See Brennan v. Tracy, 2 Mo. (App.) 540. — ED. maining artieles of interest. For poetry we have The Cent. L, J.] Kneeling Nun, The Soul's Complaint of the Body, and (not unexpectedly) Spring. Book Reviews, Current 27. WHERE A LINE FENCE between two adjoining landNotes, and a Digest of the Noticeable Articles in the Mag- holders is divided into two equal parts, and thereafter azines and Reviews conclude the May-June number.- each land-holder keeps his allotted share in repair, and The International Review for May-June is fully up to finally builds a new fence, what kind of an ownersbip the standard, and what we have before said of this ad- does he hold? Is he a several, joint or common tenant mirable magazine it is not necessary to repeat. The ar- of that fence, especially how is it in the state of Ohio? ticle on the United States Provisional Court for the

INQUISITOR. State of Louisiana, by Chas.

A. Peabody, will be read with interest by lawyers. This was an extraordinary court and it is well that its history should be made pub

NOTES. lic. When Richelieu inquired of tbe King whether the power which he was tendering him was to be absolute, A PLAN of a judicial system for the consideration he could not have wished for more power than was of the coming constitutional convention of the state of given to the judge of this provisional court-Judge California has been prepared in pamphlet form by Peabody-by President Lincoln, who by the order es- Mr. Solomon Heydenfeldt, a well-known and able tablishing it, was vested with authority to "hear, try lawyer of that state. His proposal as to the election and determine all causes, civil and criminal, including of judges is so novel and at the same time such a decauses in law, equity, revenue and admirality and par- cided improvement on the present system that it is ticularly all such power and jurisdiction as belong to with great pleasure that we are called upon to reprint to the district and circuit courts of the United States, this section of his proposed constitution in full. It is conforming his proceedings, so far as possible to as follows: the course of proceedings and practice which

ELECTION OF JUDGES. has been customary in the courts of the United SECTION 13. Justices of the supreme court shall be States and Louisiana-his judgment to be final and elected by the qualified electors of the state at large, conclusive.” But, it must be remembered, this was in and justices of the county courts shall be elected by

Yet even then this unlimited power was looked the qualified electors of the respective counties in upon with suspicion. Dining with Judge Peabody which they are to serve, subject, however, in both one day, shortly after this court had been terminated cases, to the following regulations: by act of congress, Mr. Seward was talking with Chief First. For each justice of the supreme court or Justice Chase across the table about the trial on im- county court to be elected, the governor of the state peachment of President Johnson, then recently ter- shall nominate to the two houses of the legislature the minated, and being in excellent spirits, spoke with force names of two fit and proper persons, who shall be and emphasis of manner as well as language. Mr. Mc. known as judicial proponents. Collough, then secretary of the treasury, being present,

Second. Each house shall refer the nominations so rallied him playfully on his freedom of speech and made to its judiciary committee, who shall investigate manner, as showing lack of reverence; and, referring and report as to the qualifications and fitness of the to the presence of the Chief Justice, asked him if he persons so nominated, whereupon each house shall, by had not forgotten that he was in the presence of the ballot, vote either to confirm or reject either or all of Supreme Court of the United States, that august tri- the proponents. bunal. Mr. Seward, appreciating the pleasantry in the

Third. In case of rejection of a proponent by either best of bumor, affected to spurn the idea that he was house, the governor sball make another nomination. to be influenced by the presence of the Chief Justice of Fourth. When the nomination of two proponents the Supreme Court, and asked what there was in that sball be confirmed by the two houses of the legislature, presence that should restrain him. His court, said he, the two proponents so confirmed shall be the candidates has some power in time of peace, no doubt, but it was for election, and the only qualified candidates for eleclimited to an appellate jurisdiction always, and that in tion before the qualified electors entitled to vote for the a very small class of cases, and in those it was bound by justice to be supplied, and the one receiving a malaw prescribed for its guidance; and, turning to Judge jority or plurality of the votes cast to fill the office shall Peabody, he said, “Why, Peabody, all the power of be declared to be elected, and shall be commissioned in his court is not a circumstance to what you bad in

due form under the great seal of the state. Louisiana, and I made you judge there. Why should

Fifth. Where more than one justice of the supreme I be a wed by the presence of the Chief Justice, I would court, or more than one justice of the county court for like to know ? Chief Justice Chase had always told the same county are to be elected at the same time, the Judge Peabody, familiarly, while the court was in ex- nominations to be made by the governor shall be twice istence, that he did not approve of the act of the Pres

the number to be elected, without any other designaident in giving him such unlimited powers as he had,

tion, direction or qualification. and that he would never have consented to give to any SEC. 14. The justices of the supreme court shall hold one such powers, if he bad been consulted.

office during good behavior.

In New Zealand you must not be “cheeky" to the QUERIES AND ANSWERS.

court. The February number of the New Zealand

Jurist contains a report of the committal to jail for [In response to many requests from lawyers in all parts one month of a barrister practising before the Supreme of the country, we have decided to commence again the publication of questions of law sent to us by subscribers.

Court, for contempt of that distinguished tribunal. We propose to make this essentially a subscriber's depart

The counsel had objected to the statement of the case ment-. e., we shall depend, to a large extent, upon them

made by one of the judges in delivering the judgment to edit this column. Queries will be numbered consecu.

of the court. The following conversation ensued: tively during the year, and correspondents are requested

The Chief Justice-It is absolutely impossible to go on to bear this in mind when sending answers.)

with these interruptions. I will not sit here with your

interrupting the proceedings, Mr. Barton. Mr. Barton -If your Honors make decisions which are based upon data contrary to the facts proved in evidence at the trial, I must be allowed to correct the mistakes of the court as to those data. Your decisions should be intelligible to the parties and public, but especially to the parties. The Chief Justice-You must keep your seat and hold your tongue. Mr. Barton—I will assert my right and my client's right, so long as I am in court. The Chief Justice-I will tell you now to keep your seat and hold your tongue-that is the order of the court. After a few more words the court closed the discussion rather abruptly with another order, tbis time to the jailor to hold the barrister for one month in his keeping “ without special instructions as to diet or otherwise.The Jurist, in commenting upon the case, remarks that in the various cases reported in the books, the punishment inflicted has never carried imprisonment with it except as an alterpative to nonpayment of a fine. It is a notable fact, moreover, that cases of this kind appear to be almost entirely confined to small colonial courts, the judges of which appear to be influenced by very different feelings in asserting their judicial dignity from those which manifest themselves on the English Bench. Lord Denman remarked, in Carus Wilson's case, 7 Q. B. 981: “We must always feel most unwilling to interfere in this way; indeed, the practice has almost been discontinued for a century, as there is no judge who would not be extremely grieved at finding himself compelled to exert the power.The strongest and the latest illustration of modern practice will be found in the celebrated Tichborne case, where Dr. Kenealy, probably showed more deliberate disrespect to the judges than was ever shown by counsel before. The views of the judges on the point are expressed by the Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in his charge to the jury: “But how were we met? By constant disrespect, by insult, by covert allusions to Scroggs and Jeffreys, and judges of infamous repute-as though, by the way, if the spirit of Scroggs and Jeffreys still animated the Bench in the administration of justice, the learned counsel would not have been pretty quickly laid by the heels and put to silence! But in that way were we met, and by suggestions that we were interfering with the liberty and the privilege of the bar.

Liberty of the bar! Till this time I should not have thought it capable of abuse; but we have unfortunately witnessed its abuse. Of that abuse a fitting corrective is to be found in the censure of the Bench, which I know will meet, as it ought to meet, with the universal concurrence of the bar of England.” It is a barrister's duty, the Jurist concludes, to correct the court as to matters of fact. Great latitude has always been allowed to counsel in such cases, and necessarily so. The fate of a prisoner de. pends on the manner in which the facts of his case are presented in the jury; if any fact should be incorrectly stated or omitted by the court in summing up the evidence, the prisoner's counsel should be prompt and resolute in correcting the error or omission. If a conflict should arise between him and the court in discharging his duty, he should recollect the words of Erskine: “Your Lordship may proceed in what manner you see fit: I know my duty as well as your Lordship knows yours. I shall not alter my conduct.”

early in 1873, to be capable of use against them as a terrible weapon of oppression. Numerous improvements were made in the law during the latter part of that year, and from then until now the creditors have ma e the most complaint. In 1876 the House passed suddenly, and almost without warning, a bill to repeal the act; but the movement stopped there, and was at the time regarded as too hasty. The friends of the Jaw have latterly lost hope about it, since no reforms could be suggested that were generally acceptable. The objections to the Bankrupt Law may be stated in a few words. It does not adequately help a poor and honest debtor, but a bad use may be made of it by a rich and dishonest insolvent. To the creditor the law proves highly unsatisfactory, because the dividends from bankrupt estates are usually a very small percentage; hence, also, it has become cheaper, when a man owes money, to accept from him almost any kind of compromise. The radical trouble is in the bank. ruptcy proceedings themselves. They are too eumbrous and too costly. An assemblage of lawyers and receivers and assignees and legal functionaries of all kinds gather around tne estate, and pick off every par. ticle of value. Time is wasted in taking testimony, in summoning witnesses, in climbing to upper stories to meet legal gentlemen who are not prepared to go on with the case, and who ask its postponement. Every. where in the bankrupt's course there are charges, fees, disbursements to be paid out of the estate, till at length men of business begin to look upon the whole system as a swindle perpetrated at the expense of the mercantile community.” On the other head, the Nation says: “There can be little doubt, though the law is far from perfect, that its repeal will be followed by a worse state of things than now exists with regard to insolvent estates. In the absence of a general law applying to the whole country, the only statutes that come into operation are the state insolvent laws. These necessarily differ considerably from each other in detail; and in the light recently thrown upon the divergence of views as to the relation of debtor and creditor, existing in different parts of the country, it may be predicted that in the future there will be more radical differences than ever. In lending states the law will be made to favor the creditor; in borrowing states, the debtor. But besides this, insolvent laws have no effect beyond state boundaries, and no such thing as a complete discharge of a bankrupt is possible under them, except after tedious and wasteful proceedings in, the courts of every state in which he owes debts. Such a condition of things puts a premium on fraudulent preferences, and all sorts of dishonest practices. One naturally asks, therefore, why, in the face of all these objections, the repeal is still insisted on. The answer to this is, we believefirst, that unwise amendments, made a few years ago, destroyed the efficiency of the law; and, second, that there is in the United States at large an aversion to a general bankrupt law, which, in ordinary times, is always strong enough to prevent the retention of any statute on the subject. • Our people,' as the Washington politicians say, 'do not like bankrupt laws.' We fear if this feeling were traced to its source, it would be found to spring from a suspicion that debtors are better off without than with such laws. The pres. ent act was passed at the close of the war, and its object was rather to enable debtors to get a complete discharge than to help creditors. Having secured this object, the weight of the law begins to be felt, and a movement is set on foot for its repeal. This sort of bankruptcy see-saw has been going on from the very beginning of the government, bankrupt laws being passed and repealed—not in pursuance of a far-seeing and comprehensive policy, but as a temporary makeshift from time to time, as legislation or the want of it makes itself uncomfortably felt."

The expected repeal of the Bankrupt Act is viewed in a different manner from different stand-points. The New York Tribune in an editorial on the subject says: No legislation on this subject that will suit everybody is possible. The grounds of dissatisfaction have, however, frequently changed. Sometimes it has been in the interest of creditors, sometimes of debtors, that the repeal has been demanded. At first intended chiefly to help the debtor class, the law was found,

The Central Law Journal. McVeil, 13 Wall

. 236 ; ex parte Easton, 95 U. S. 68, 5 Cent. L. J. 469; and The Sottawanno,

21 Wall. 558. SAINT LOUIS, MAY 17, 1878.

The Court of Appeals of New Jersey, in CURRENT TOPICS.

Williamson v. New Jersey Southern R. R.,

have just decided, reversing the decision of In a case recently decided by the Supreme the chancellor below, that the engines, cars, and Court of Pennsylvania, viz: Central R. R. v.

rolling stock of a railroad, are to be regarded as Green, 5 W. N. 297, an action by a colored

chattels, which have not lost their distinctive woman to recover a penalty under the statute

character as personalty by being affixed to of that state for exclusion from a railroad car, and made part of the reality, and that a mortthe court held that the statute in question was gage executed by a railroad corporation on intended to secure to colored persons the its road-bed, and franchises, together with its same rights in traveling as are enjoyed by engines, cars and rolling stock, so far as reothers, but does not give them superior priv- gards the latter class of property, is a chattel ileges, nor warrant an interference with reas

mortgage within the meaning of the statute of onable police regulations of railroad compan- that state concerning chattel mortgages. The ies, one of which is to designate the car which court examined at considerable length and travelers shall enter, without being obliged distinguish the cases of Coe v. Pennock 6 tu give any reason for the selection. This is Am. Law Reg. 27; Pennock v. Coe, 23 How. the rule of the road. Any ordinary traveler 117; Gee v. Tide Water Canal Co., 24 How. takes his seat in such car as may be pointed 257; Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall, out to him by those in charge of the train. In 609; Railroad Co. v. James, 6 Wall. 750; doing so he recognizes the undoubted right Scott v. C. & S. R. R., 6 Biss. 529; and Farof the company to designate the car which he mers' Loan and Trust Co. v. St. Joe. R. R. 3 shall enter.

Dill. 412, and say that where, in the state

courts, the question has been directly preIn the United States District Court, for

sented whether the rolling-stock of a railroad, the Eastern District of Michigan, in the case

included in a mortgage of its road-bed and of The St. Joseph, 10 Ch. L. N. 269, it was

franchises is real or personal property, the held that an undertaking whereby a propeller, great weight of authority is in favor of its in consideration of its freight for the carriage being considered as personalty. Stevens v. of goods, agrees to collect of the consignee B. & C. R. R. Co., 31 Barb. 590 ; Beardsley advances and charges thereon, and repay them

v. Ontario Bank, Id. 619; Bermont v. P. & to the party from whom it receives the goods, M. R. R. Co., 47 Id. 104; Randall v. Elwell, is a maritime contract upon which a libel in

52 N. Y. 521; Hoyle v. Plattsburgh R. R. Co., rem will be sustained. A somewhat similar

54 N. Y. 314; Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. v. contract claimed the attention of the court in

Howard, 21 Wis. 44; B. C. M. Co. v. GilMonteith v. Kirkpatrick, 3 Blatch. 279, which

more, 37 N. H. 410; Coe v. Columbus was a suit by common carriers, from Albany R. R. Co. 10 Ohio State, 372; City of Duto New York, against the consignee, for their

buque v. The Ill. Cent. R. R. Co., 37 Iowa, own freight, and advance charges paid by

56. In that state the point was directly decithem at Albany when they received the goods.

ded by the supreme court, in State Treasurer The court held that, under the usage of the v. S. & E. R. R. Co., 4 Dutch., 21, where it trade, as proved in the case, the right to re

was held that the phrase “ road and equipcover the advances stood upon the same foot- ments in a railroad charter did not include ing as the right to the freight. A further

its rolling stock; and in the opinion of Chief question arose in the first case, viz. : the jur- Justice Green, engines and cars were declared isdiction of the court to entertain a libel in

to be no more appendages of a railroad than rem for tolls imposed by a state statute in fa

wagons and carriages were appendages of a vor of corporations organized for the improve highway—both were equally essential to the ment of rivers and harbors. This the court

enjoyment of the road-neither constituted also decided in the affirmative, citing ex parte any part of it. The court adopted the rule laid

Vol. 6, No. 20.

down in Teaff v. Hewett, 10 Ohio St. 511, as veniently on one train as another, and on one the criterion for determining whether property day as another; still, as before seen, there is ordinarily regarded as personal becomes an- no obligation to do so. But it does not follow nexed to and part of the realty, viz: actual an- that a railroad corporation can carry passennexation to the reality, or something appurten- gers for itself as well the one way as the other. ant thereto; application to the use or purpose to There may be a difference arising from various which that part of the realty with which it is considerations. There

may

be more travelers connected is appropriated; the intention of the and more freight to be carried one way than party making the annexation to make a per- the other. It may be more expensive. There manent accession to the freehold. This crite- may be more risk in the ore passage than the rion was adopted in the New Jersey Court, in other. The up train may go more by daylight, Quimby V. Manhattan Cloth Co., 9 C. E. and the down train more by night. That such Green ; Blancke v. Rogers, 11 Id. 56; and by considerations as these might arise in a casethe Court of New York in McRae v. Central whether in this instance they arise or notNational Bank, 66 N. Y. 489. See, also, helps to demonstrate that a ticket one way is Ottumwa Woolen Mill Co. v. Hawley, 3 Cent. a different thing from a ticket the other. PracL. J. 657, and note.

tically, the doctrine set up by the plaintiff, if

allowed to prevail, would affect the defendants In Keeley v. The Boston & Maine R. R. injuriously. It is well known that through Co., recently decided by the Supreme Judi- tickets are cheaper pro rata than the way or cial Court of Maine, the question was: Does a

local fares. This fact has led to a practice on railroad ticket with the words “Portland to the part of way travelers of buying through Boston" imprinted on it, purchased in Port- tickets and using them over a part of the route, land under no contract other than what is in- and selling them for the balance of the disferable from the ticket itself, entitle the tance, so as to make a saving from the regular holder to a passage, on the road of the com- prices charged. It is easily seen that, if a paspany issuing it, from Boston to Portland ? senger is permitted to ride in either direction The court held that it did not. It has been on a ticket, it increases the chances for held that, if a passenger purchase a ticket carrying

this sort of speculation with a notice upon it that it is “good for one against the interests of the road.” On day only,” in the absence of a statutory reg- another point raised, the court in the prinulation to the contrary, he can travel upon cipal case said: “ It does not avail the argusuch ticket only on that day. State v. Camp- ment for the plaintiff at all, that before this he bell, 32 N. J. L. 309 ; Shedd v. Troy & Boston had passed over the road upon other tickets in Railroad, 40 Vt. 88; Johnson V. Concord a direction the reverse of that advertised upon Railroad, 46 N, H. 213; Boston & Lowell R. their face; nor is it of any importance that R. Co. v. Proctor, 1 Allen 267; 1 Redf. on another conductor, upon another train, at anRailways, 99 and notes. It has been held other time, expressed an opinion to him that also, if the words “good upon one train this ticket would be for either direction good. only" are printed upon a ticket, the holder The contract is not shorn of a particular stipis not entitled to change from

one train

ulation merely because it is not always ento another after the passage is begun. forced. Nor could such conductor in such Cheney v. Boston & Maine R. R. Co., 11 manner bind the corporation, and it could not Metc. 121; Redf.

on Railways, supra. have been understood by the plaintiff that he " This position,” said the court, “is not undertook to do so. The conductor merely exweakened by the suggestion that the company pressed an opinion about a matter which he at can transport the passenger as cheaply and that time had no business with. The plaintiff easily one way as the other. If it were so, it had ample opportunity to purchase another would be no answer. A person who agrees to ticket, and should have done so. Wakefield sell to another merchandise of one kind, might v. South Boston Railroad, 117 Mass. 544.” find it to his profit and advantage to deliver For a further discussion of the powers of conmerchandise of another kind, but he can not ductors of trains, see the case of Ohio & Miss. be compelled to do so. So a railroad could R. R. v. Hatton, published in full in the presoften, no doubt, transport a passenger as con- ent issue of this Journal.

on

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