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Vol. IV.]

ELKINS v. MCKEAN.

[No. 1.

THIS was an action on the case to April term, 1873, of the court below, brought by Elizabeth McKean against George W. Elkins and others, trading as Elkins, Bly & Co.

There were three counts in the declaration:

1. That defendants were manufacturers and vendors of carbon oil for illuminating purposes; that James A. McKean, the husband of plaintiff, purchased a quantity of oil to be used in a lamp; that defendants, knowingly, wilfully, and of their mere negligence, manufactured and sold, for illuminating purposes, oil that was highly inflammable, explosive, unsafe, and dangerous, knowing it to be such; that James A. McKean purchased the same, and whilst using it in a lamp in a proper and prudent manner, the oil exploded and caught fire, the burning oil was scattered over McKean, and so burned him that he died.

2. That the defendants being such manufacturers and vendors of oil, did knowingly, fraudulently, and maliciously put upon the market, &c., certain carbon oil, representing it to be of a safe and reliable quality of the fire test of 110°, well knowing that the oil so sold by them for illuminating purposes was in fact highly inflammable, explosive, and dangerous; that McKean, relying upon these representations, purchased from vendors of the defendants a quantity of the oil, and whilst using it in a lamp, the oil took fire and exploded the lamp, and he was burned, and died from the burns.

3. That the defendants, being manufacturers of such carbon oil, put upon the market oil, and sold a certain carbon oil marked as 110° fire test; that it was the duty of the defendants, their agents, and servants, to take reasonable and proper care that the oil should be safe and not inflammable or explosive, or give notice that it was thus dangerous, yet they knowingly, carelessly, and negligently sold the oil, knowing it to be unsafe and dangerous; that McKean, in the course of trade, purchased the oil from those to whom the defendants sold it, not knowing that it was dangerous, and in using it he was burned, and died.

The plea was, "Not guilty."

The case was tried December 1st, 1874, before Kirkpatrick, J.

The plaintiff testified that her husband, on Tuesday, the 11th of February, 1873, went into his cellar to turn off the water, having a lighted lamp in his hand; it was an opaque white glass lamp with a blue rim; after he had been in the cellar about ten minutes, witness heard cries for help and went to the cellar; she saw him on fire, his clothes burned; he was in the cellar about midway between where the water was to be turned off and the stairs; the lamp was still burning; he died the next day. The oil had been purchased by McKean on the preceding Saturday.

It was proposed to ask the witness what her husband said as to the cause of the accident at or within a few moments of the time when she found him covered with flames in the cellar and apparently dying, as a part of the res gesta and with a view to show that the burning and death were caused by the explosion of the oil in the lamp carried by the deceased, and to establish its defective and dangerous character.

Defendants objected to the offer as irrelevant and incompetent for the purpose set forth in the offer. The evidence was admitted and a bill of exceptions sealed for the defendants.

VOL. IV.]

ELKINS v. MCKEAN.

[No. 1.

Witness proceeded: "I asked him how it happened; I asked him if he had tripped on anything. This was in the cellar, when I went down. He said he had not, that he was walking along the cellar calmly and peaceably and he heard a noise, and before he could realize what it was, the whole top flew off the lamp and the oil came down all over him.

The coroner of Alleghany County testified that he was present at a test made of illuminating oil, which he procured for the purpose, after the accident occurred, at the store of Steele & Hart; it was furnished by Mr. Steele himself from a tin can; it was put into a "pop-bottle; " there was a boy in the store at the time. He testified also that the lamp was at the coroner's inquest proved to be that which McKean had, and in which the oil exploded; that it was a white lamp with a blue streak around it.

The fire marshal of Pittsburg accompanied the coroner to procure the oil for the test; he testified as the coroner had done.

Robert Fedder, the boy spoken of by the coroner as being in Steele & Hart's store, testified that in February, 1873, McKean bought oil at that store; the witness sold it to him; he filled a lamp, such as is described above, and such an one as he also saw at the coroner's inquest; he got it from a can in the store used for holding oil; Steele & Hart had bought the store from Caskey, and the oil that was in the can was bought from them with the rest of the store; when the coroner and the fire marshal got the oil for a sample from Mr. Steele, it was taken from the can which was the only can they had in the store; there had been no oil put into the can from the time he had filled McKean's lamp up to the time the oil had been given to the coroner; it was the same oil that was in the can when Steele & Hart took the store; there was one oil barrel in the store, but it had no oil in it; the barrel came from Caskey's; the brand "Elkins Bly & Co.," and "110° fire test," was on the barrel; the oil that was in that barrel was put into the can, and no other oil had been put into the can for about two or three weeks before he filled the lamp. Steele & Hart had no oil in the store but what they bought from Caskey; they bought Caskey out about the 16th of January.

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Samuel Steele, of the firm of Steele & Hart, testified that the firm purchased W. J. Caskey's store on the 16th of January, 1873, and amongst other things about thirty gallons of oil in a large tin can; they had purchased from Caskey no oil in barrels, none except that in the can; shortly after McKean's death, witness gave to the coroner oil out of the tin can; there was but one tin can; he gave him a pop bottle" full; witness had purchased a barrel of oil from Arbuckle & Co., on Monday, the 10th of February, the day before McKean was burned; the oil he gave to the coroner was from this barrel, and not from that which he had got from Caskey; that which was got from Arbuckle & Co. was put into the tin can; witness knew nothing of the oil the firm got from Caskey, except that it was in the tin can; the can was empty when Arbuckle's oil was put into it; witness put the oil they got from Arbuckle & Co. into the empty barrel, and returned to Elkins, Bly & Co.; the oil given to the coroner was Elkins, Bly & Co.'s Riverside oil; witness did not know anything of the oil that had been in the can previously to that which he put in from the barrel bought from Arbuckle & Co. Neither this witness nor his partner, Hart, who was examined, could tell the brand on the oil

Vol. IV.]

ELKINS v. MCKEAN.

[No. 1.

barrel which they got from Caskey; that barrel was empty when they got it.

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J. M. Torrence, salesman for Arbuckle & Co., testified: On or about January 11, 1873, that firm sold oil to Caskey; it was the Riverside brand manufactured by Elkins, Bly & Co.; the brand on the barrel was Elkins, Bly & Co.," the name of the oil would be carbon oil; it was called Riverside oil; that was the name of the refinery. The fire test at that time for Pennsylvania was 110°, and it was marked on the barrels; no oil was sold to Caskey after January. Steele & Hart bought a barrel February 10th. Witness took the inventory of Caskey's goods at the time of his sale to Steele & Hart; he then saw a barrel then in the cellar, but did not examine if there was oil in it; he saw the tin can from which they retailed upstairs; the oil purchased by Arbuckle & Co., and sold to Caskey and Steele & Hart, was purchased from Elkins, Bly & Co.; Arbuckle and Co. never drew the bungs; they sold the oil as they received it in perfect confidence, relying on the manufacturers. All the recollection of the witness was from the entry in the book, and he inferred that it was the Riverside brand, because they kept no other. "They may have bought that barrel of oil from somebody else, but our books show a sale of a barrel of oil. I don't claim to have any personal knowledge of the sales at all." Witness did not know that the Arbuckles bought from Elkins, Bly & Co., except by the books; Arbuckle bought directly from the manufacturers. Oil the Arbuckles would sell in January and that they would sell in February would not come from the same lot. The way they purchased oil from Elkins, Bly & Co. was to buy a lot and take it away as they needed it; all their oil was bought from Elkins, Bly & Co. W. J. Caskey testified that in January, 1873, he sold his store to Steele & Hart; amongst other things about one third of a barrel of oil in a tin can; the oil was purchased from Arbuckle & Co.; he did not recollect the brand of the oil; on the day after the death of McKean he was at Steele & Hart's store, and saw some oil taken out of the can; the oil was tested in the way they usually tested it, by drawing a match on it; it ignited, he had often done that before and it put the match out; witness could not tell whether that was the same oil he had sold to Steele & Hart; witness had been getting oil from different places; the last few barrels he had got from Arbuckle; he bought most of his oil from Arbuckle; he had frequently tested the oil he got from Arbuckle by a match, and it put it out; what he got from Arbuckle always stood the

test.

Plaintiffs proposed to show by J. R. Neald, United States Inspector of Steamboats, to show the tests applied (and their results) to the oil obtained from Coroner West and Fire Marshal Butler, and which they obtained from Steele & Hart, alleged to be part of the same sold by them to deceased, and manufactured and sold by Elkins, Bly & Co., defendants, to the said Steele & Hart, and this to prove that the oil manufactured and sold by them, and by which deceased came to his death, was defective and dangerous.

The defendants objected to the above.

First, because the plaintiffs have proved in chief that the oil subjected to test was not the same oil which was in the lamp alleged by them to have exploded and caused the injuries complained of.

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Vol. IV.]

ELKINS v. MCKEAN.

[No. 1.

The objection was overruled and a bill of exceptions sealed for defendants.

The plaintiff gave other testimony in support of her case, not bearing on the question whether the oil in McKean's lamp had been manufactured and sold by defendants as safe illuminating oil. For defendants Emma Bear testified that at the time McKean was burned, his wife, the defendant, came up out of the cellar saying her husband had tripped over a piece of wood and fallen.

The defendants gave evidence also for the purpose of showing that the oil by which McKean was injured was not oil sold by defendants as safe illuminating oil, and that the oil tested for the coroner's inquest was not the oil from which McKean had procured that used in his lamp.

The court charged:

["The first question will be was the death of James B. McKean occasioned by the explosion at the time and in the manner claimed by plaintiff. In regard to this there can be no doubt whatever.]

The next question will be was the identical oil which caused his death manufactured and sold by defendants as claimed by plaintiff? If it was not, there can be no recovery and your verdict must be for the defendants, and the burden of showing to your satisfaction that it was the identical oil rests upon the plaintiff; they having alleged it, the burden of proof is upon them. If you should get beyond this question, the next one which presents itself, and possibly the most important question in the case, is, did the defendants wilfully and maliciously put it upon the market knowing it to be, as they allege in their declaration to be, unsafe, explosive, dangerous, and unfit for illuminating purposes; because if they did not, under these allegations contained in this declaration or statement of their cause of action, there can be no recovery, and your verdict must be for the defendants. Here again, too, we must remind you the burden of proof is upon the plaintiff, and the necessity of satisfying you in this important particular is a labor which the law wisely imposes upon them, and from which they cannot escape. If they have not so satisfied you, as I have already intimated, there can be no recovery, and your verdict must be for the defendants."

The following are points of defendants; they were all refused:

2. "If the jury find that the oil in controversy was sold in large quantity to Arbuckle & Co. by the defendants, Elkins, Bly & Co., by Arbuckle & Co. to W. J. Caskey, by W. J. Caskey to Steele & Hart, and by Steele & Hart to the deceased, the plaintiff cannot recover in this action."

3. "There is no evidence in this case which would justify the jury in finding that defendants knowingly and wilfully sold the oil, and that it was highly inflammable, unsafe, and dangerous.'

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6. "Under the pleadings and evidence, the plaintiff is not entitled to

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recover."

The verdict was for the plaintiff for $3,500.

The defendants took a writ of error; they assigned for error:

1. Admitting evidence of the declarations of the deceased.

2. Admitting evidence of the tests applied by the coroner's inquest. 3. The part of the charge in brackets.

Vol. IV.]

ELKINS v. MCKEAN.

[No. 1.

The

4-6. The answers to defendants' points. Duff & Leggat and Marshall & Patterson, for plaintiffs in error. action for McKean's death could be sustained only against those who sold the oil to him. If it had not been for the intervention of a third party, the defendants' negligence would have produced no injury to McKean; the defendants therefore are not liable. Wharton on Negligence, §§ 134, 439, 440; Loser v. Clute, 51 N. Y. Rep. 494; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Kerr, 12 P. F. Smith, 353; Carter v. Town, 103 Mass. 507.

W. O. Crawford, A. L. Pearson & W. D. Moore, for defendant in error. The persons who manage dangerous agencies by which others may be injured are responsible for negligence; Wharton on Negligence 781, 786; although there may be intervening agents. Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 507; Thomas v. Winchester, 2 Selden, 397; Dixon v. Bell, 5 M. & S. 198; Carter v. Town, 98 Mass. 567; Oil Creek & A. R. Railway v. Keighron, 24 P. F. Smith, 316; Barney v. Bustenbinder, 7 Lansing, 210. If one sells a dangerous and explosive fluid without giving notice of its character to a person ignorant of such character, he is liable. Wellington v. Downer Ker. Oil Co. 104 Mass. 64. As to remote and proximate cause they cited Morrison v. Davis, 8 Harris, 175; Lockhart v. Lichenthaler, 11 Ib. 164; Scott v. Hunter, Ib. 195; Fleming v. Bock, 12 Ib. 313; Pittsburg v. Grier, 10 Ib. 54; McGrew v. Stone, 3 P. F. Smith, 441; Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Kerr, 12 Ib. 367.

Chief Justice AGNEW delivered the opinion of the court, January 6, 1876.

This was an action by the widow of James McKean against Elkins, Bly & Co., manufacturers of refined petroleum or carbon oil. McKean died of burns received, either from the explosion of a lamp carried in his hand, or from a fall breaking the lamp and setting the oil on fire. The action was founded on the allegation that the defendants wilfully made and sold the oil for lighting purposes, knowing that it was highly inflammable, explosive, and unsafe, and therefore unfit for use as a light. The case went to the jury distinctly on this proposition, the judge having charged in these words: If you should get beyond this question (to wit, the identification of the oil as made by the defendants), the next one which presents itself, and probably the most important question in the case, is, did the defendants wilfully and maliciously put it upon the market knowing it to be, as they allege in their declaration, unsafe, explosive, dangerous, and unfit for illuminating purposes; but if they did not, under these allegations contained in this declaration or statement of their cause of action, there can be no recovery, and your verdict must be for the defendants." According to this instruction no question of mere negligence, in putting the oil upon the market, arose or was presented to the jury; but their verdict of necessity must be founded upon the evidence of a wilful sale of such unfit oil, with a full knowledge of its inflammable and explosive character. Upon this precise statement the fifth and sixth assignments of error arise, that the court refused to say there was no evidence which would justify the jury in finding that the defendants knowingly and wilfully sold the oil, and that it was highly inflammable, unsafe, and dangerous; and also that under the pleadings and evidence the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Upon a careful review of the whole evi

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