shipped his cavalry, part of the German troops, the American loyalists, his provision train and heavy baggage, on board such vessels as were in the river, and prepared to march through New Jersey with the main body of his army.

While these preparations were making with as much secrecy as possible by the British commander, Washington sent out from Valley Forge a detachment of two thousand men under the Marquis de Lafayette, the object of which was to cover the country between the Delaware and Schuylkill, to interrupt the communication with Philadelphia, to obstruct the incursions of the enemy's parties, and gain intelligence of their motions and designs. Lafayette marched to Barren Hill, and, while stationed there, a large part of the British army came out by a forced march in the night, with the intention of attacking him by surprise, and cutting off his detachment. Owing to the negligence, disobedience, or treachery of a picket guard, Lafayette was nearly surrounded by the enemy before he was informed of their approach; but by a very skilful manœuvre, quickly conceived and performed in a masterly manner, he gained a ford and drew off his whole detachment across the Schuylkill, with the loss of only nine men killed and taken. The enemy retreated to Philadelphia.

To obstruct the progress of the British troops, in case. they should take the route over land to New York, General Maxwell was ordered to cross the Delaware with a brigade, and to act in concert with General Dickinson, who commanded the New Jersey militia. It being more and more evident, that Sir Henry Clinton was preparing to move by land, the opinion of the general officers was required, as to the operations in consequence of that event. The principal point to be considered was, whether the army should pursue the

British, fall upon their rear, and bring on an engagement. Opinions were various; but nearly all the officers were opposed to an attack, on account of the superiority of the enemy in force and discipline. General Lee, who had been exchanged, and had recently joined the army, argued vehemently against such a step. Some of the officers agreed with him; others, who were unwilling to advise a general action, thought that the enemy should at any rate be harassed in their march, and that an engagement, though not to be sought, should not be avoided if circumstances rendered it expedient.

The news of the evacuation of Philadelphia, which took place in the morning of the 18th of June, was received while the subject was still under discussion. General Arnold, who had not yet entirely recovered from the wound he received at Saratoga, was ordered to march with a small detachment into the city, and to retain the command there. General Lee and General Wayne, each at the head of a division, took the road to Coryell's Ferry, with orders to halt on the first strong ground after passing the river. Washington followed, and in six days the whole army had crossed the Delaware, and arrived at Hopewell, five miles from Princeton. Detachments in the mean time had been sent to impede the enemy's march. Morgan's corps of six hundred men was ordered to gain their right flank, Maxwell's brigade to hang on their left, and General Scott, with fifteen hundred chosen troops, to gall their left flank and rear. To these were joined the New Jersey militia under General Dickinson, and a party of volunteers from Pennsylvania commanded by General Cadwalader.

After the British had crossed the river and landed at Gloucester Point, they marched by the way of Had

Y

slowly till Being en

donfield and Mount Holly, and moved on they came to Crosswicks and Allen Town. cumbered with a long train of wagons and bat-horses, and confined to a single road, their line extended nearly twelve miles. It was necessary, also, to stop and build bridges over every stream and the marshy ground, as the bridges had all been destroyed by the Americans. These interruptions retarded their progress. Nor was it till he reached Allen Town, that Sir Henry Clinton decided what direction he should take from that place. It was his first purpose to proceed to the Rariton, and embark his troops at Brunswic or South Amboy for New York. But, finding Washington almost in his front, and deeming it imprudent to hazard a battle while his army was so much encumbered, and on such ground as his antagonist might choose, he turned to the right, and took the road leading to Monmouth and Sandy Hook.

At this time Washington's army had advanced to Kingston. In a council of war, convened at Hopewell, the question was again discussed, as to the mode of attacking the enemy. Sir Henry Clinton's force was supposed to consist of nine or ten thousand effective men.* The Continental troops under Washington amounted to a little over twelve thousand; and there were about thirteen hundred militia. General Lee still persisted in the same sentiments as at first; and, as he was now next in rank to the Commander-in-chief, and an officer of

* This was the estimate, but the number must have been considerably larger. The number of British troops in Philadelphia was upwards of nineteen thousand, making a difference from the estimate of more than nine thousand. There were not transports enough in Philadelphia to accommodate this number, nor does Sir Henry Clinton in his despatches mention having sent such a body of troops by water. Nor had they gone to the West Indies. The troops for that station sailed afterwards from New York.

long experience, his opinions and arguments had great weight in the council. He seemed averse to any kind of interference with the enemy; but he acceded to a proposal, in which he was joined by five others, that fifteen hundred men should be sent to hang on their rear. Six general officers, namely, Greene, Lafayette, Steuben, Wayne, Duportail, and Paterson, were for sending twenty-five hundred men, or at least two thousand, which should be followed by the main army at such a distance as to afford support, if it should be necessary. It was clearly the wish of these officers to draw the enemy into a general engagement, if it could be done under favorable circumstances. Indeed Greene, Lafayette, and Wayne declared their sentiments to this effect in writing.

Thus embarrassed with the divided opinions of his officers, Washington had a delicate part to act. There can be no doubt, however, that his own judgment strongly inclined him to seek an engagement, from the time he left Valley Forge. The reputation of the army, and the expectation of the country, in his view required it; and he believed the chances of success at least sufficient to authorize the attempt. After the council at Hopewell, therefore, he asked no further advice, but proceeded on his individual responsibility. He immediately ordered a detachment of one thousand men under General Wayne to join the troops already near the enemy, and gave to General Lafayette the command of all the advanced parties, amounting now to about three thousand eight hundred men, including militia.

In his instructions to Lafayette he said; "You are to use the most effectual means for gaining the enemy's left flank, and giving every degree of annoyance. For these purposes you will attack them as occasion may require by detachment, and, if a proper opening should be given, by operating against them with your whole

command." Foreseeing that these orders, executed with the spirit and ardor which characterized Lafayette, would soon lead to an action with a large part of the enemy's force, Washington prepared to sustain the advanced division, keeping within a distance proper for that purpose.

General Lee's seniority of rank entitled him to the command of all the advanced detachments; but, disapproving the plans of the Commander-in-chief and believing they would fail, he voluntarily yielded his claims to Lafayette. After this arrangement had been made with Washington's consent, and Lafayette had marched towards the enemy, Lee changed his mind and applied to be reinstated. As Lafayette could not with any degree of justice or propriety be recalled, Washington resorted to an expedient, which he hoped would preserve harmony, although it might not be entirely satisfactory to either of the parties. He put Lee at the head of two additional brigades, with orders to join the advanced detachments, when he would of course have the command of the whole; but directed him at the same time to give Lafayette notice of his approach, and to afford him all the assistance in his power for prosecuting any enterprise, which he might already have undertaken or planned. He wrote also to Lafayette, explaining the dilemma into which he was thrown by the vacillating conduct of General Lee, and expressing a conviction that he would cheerfully acquiesce in a measure, which the exigency of the occasion rendered necessary.

While the main army moved forward to Cranberry, and the advanced parties were hovering around the enemy's flanks and rear, Sir Henry Clinton changed the disposition of his line, placing the baggage train in front, and his best troops in the rear. With his army thus