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says he, "have been made privy to our proceedings but general Preston, his son colonel Warren, and a few other leading men so far embarked in the work, as a syllable hath not dropped from any of them. This I gather by Ormonde's being friendly invited hither to dinner on Thursday last, though he would not, (as we suppose by reason of the caution thence given him,) commit his person to us, without his guards of horse and foot; by which advertisement we missed of our last opportunity."

Such was the state of affairs, when about 14th June, a considerable reinforcement, with a supply of money amounting to £3000 collected by lord Taaffe, enabled the marquess to march to Dublin. The garrison in that city however had become stronger than his army, and was in excellent condition, so that he could not with prudence risk his strength in any decided operation, and was barely enabled to hold his position and watch for the turn of affairs, while through his officers he obtained possession of Drogheda, Dundalk, and other principal places. His hopes were, indeed, so far lowered, that instead of pressing for the arrival of the king as heretofore, he now advised his awaiting the event of the siege of Dublin, which (judging from the general tone of his letters,) he must have considered as nearly desperate at the time. The events of this interval we can only sum with the utmost brevity, and have already in various memoirs mentioned the principal of them. It was generally known that Cromwell was on the eve of embarking for Ireland, an event of which the marquess was far from appreciating the whole importance, as he observed in his letter to the king, that he feared his money more than his troops; little considering that in truth it was only comparatively speaking-that any force then on the field in Ireland, could be entitled to be considered as an army; and that any sum of money, in the then existing state of the country, could only enable him to bring a larger mob to the field.

After many inoperative movements, chiefly made with a view to form a blockade of the city, about the 3d of July it was deemed advisable to complete its investment. Lord Dillon of Costilogh was left with 2000 men and 500 horse on the north of the city, while the marquess crossed the Liffey and encamped at Rathmines: while this movement was in progress, a squadron arrived from England in the bay, carrying a reinforcement to the garrison of 2000 men, commanded by colonel Venables, with a large supply of money, and all necessaries. On this, the marquess with the advice of his council, came to a resolution to draw away their troops and retire to Drogheda, and the other principal places in the possession of his majesty's officers. The resolution was ill received by the officers and soldiers, and it was generally affirmed through the troops, that the taking of Dublin would be a matter of little difficulty, if they could first deprive the garrison of the small plot of meadow, which was the sole means of support for their horses; and this it was thought might be effected by seizing possession of a castle in the vicinity which could easily be fortified so as to resist any attack likely to be made upon it from the town. The marquess sent Preston, Purcel, and others of his general officers, to inspect the place, and on their report gave orders for its fortification, which was committed to major general Purcel with 1500

men. This party received orders to move at nightfall to the work, and when it became dark enough to conceal their operations, they set out on their way, but were misled by their guides, who were subsequently alleged to have betrayed them, and did not arrive at the spot till an hour before day. The marquess sat up all night in the anticipation of some attempt from the town, and engaged himself in writing his despatches. At daybreak he mounted his horse and rode to the castle of Baggatrath, which he did not think so strong as the report of his officers led him to expect, and was surprised to find the work scarcely begun, which by his directions was to have been completed at that hour; he also perceived several strong parties of the enemy drawn out under their own works, obviously aiming at concealment. It then became a matter of consideration, whether he should discontinue the work, but he decided upon advancing to support the working parties. He gave orders for this, at the same time assuring his officers that an attack from the town might be expected, as he thought Jones would incur any risk to prevent their possession of the castle. Having given the most express directions, and told each general the precise position he was to take, the marquess having been up all the night, returned to obtain an hour's sleep before the exertions of the day. He had not slept an hour, when he was started from his sleep by the discharge of musquetry. Arming himself quickly, he galloped out in the direction of the firing; he did not go far when he met the working party, which was the right wing of his army, coming towards him in foul disorder. Jones had marched out upon them, and they were soon broken, Sir W. Vaughan to whom the marquess had given the command in the morning, (in his displeasure against Purcelf) being killed fighting at the head of his men. A considerable number of them scattered on towards their homes in the Wicklow mountains, to which Carte observes they knew the way "too well."

The centre consisted of lord Inchiquin's infantry, commanded by colonel Giffard, with whose assistance the marquess drew them up in good order: to guard their flank he posted two regiments under colonel O'Reilly and another in an adjoining field, desiring that they should not stir until his return-he had not gone far when they were attacked, O'Reilly slain and the men routed. The troops of Jones had come out in separate parties, and been led on rather by the incidents of the attack than according to any settled plan. Of these a large body of horse had got round into the rear of the marquess's centre, and were making their way through a lane by the flank of Gifford's foot, to join a strong body of infantry which was at the same time advancing in front. The marquess commanded a discharge of musquetry, which threw them into such disorder, that their disorganization would have been complete if the flanking parties had kept their ground; but the English horse rallied and joined their party in front; and at the same time, another large body both of horse and foot, which had followed the same direction, appeared on the same fields, and drew up

The fact was afterwards confessed in 1653.-See Carte, II. p. 79, for the particulars. + Borlase.

in the rear of Gifford's men. The Irish became so much discouraged that it was impossible to lead them to the charge, and they showed such decided signs of breaking that the marquess saw his last resource was in the conduct of the left wing; leaping a ditch, he made his way with much difficulty, and found them also wavering, and checked by a strong body of English, so that he could not move them (as he had designed) to the relief of the centre. They were in a state bordering on flight, and the marquess saw that nothing but a decided impulse forward could prevent this result; he therefore rushed in among their ranks and with most of the officers, made every posible exertion to rally their departed courage and lead them to the charge; but they were past recovery, and the urgency of the marquess only terrified them the more, so that when he, in order to give the necessary impulse, galloped forward waving his sword toward the enemy, as if by common consent, they turned about and commenced their flight without any pursuer. The marquess turned, and galloping among the fugitives contrived to stop some hundreds, but it was like the attempt to put a dead man on his feet, they only followed the marquess till they obtained a sight of the enemy, and turned back in a tumult of terror. The marquess did not give up till after repeated efforts of the same kind and with similar success, convinced him of the mortifying truth, that his army had no substance, and that the hope of the day was gone. He then sent a dispatch to lord Dillon, on the other side of the Liffey, giving notice of the event, and ordering the forces off to the garrisons of Drogheda and Trim, against the chance of their being (as he expected) soon attacked by Jones. The marquess was struck by a musket shot, but saved from material injury by his armour. This battle presents a singular accumulation of mischances and errors, so that on a superficial view it seems difficult to conceive the presence of any presiding discretion, in the disposition or appreciation of the means of resistance or offence. The army of the marquess assailed without method or previous design, seems to have melted off like a mist before wandering bodies of soldiers, who seem themselves to have been going astray, and who cannot be strictly said to have attacked them. The whole difficulty is greatly diminished by looking at the primary fact, that the marquess had from the commencement no intention to hazard a battle, and from a consciousness of the inadequacy of his force had determined to abandon the siege. The plan which he had actually adopted, was within the reach of an easy effort, and would have given him a considerable advantage, amounting nearly to a blockade of the city. When this, for which he adopted the ordinary means, was frustrated by the treachery of the guides, (for this seems proved,) the consequences followed; and he had not the means to evade them. The discomfiture of his army, was not to be attributed to any defect of command or disposition; it was wholly panic, and the absence of any military fitness in the composition of his troops: they were a mere mob; like all mere mobs, eager to fight; and wanting the requisite discipline, still more eager to run away.

The effect of this disaster at Rathmines caused a great and universal depression. The loss of the ordnance and arms, was a fatal stroke that could not be repaired. "Men," as Carte observes, were much

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easier to be supplied, than money to pay, or means to support them. The cities refused to lend money, and the sums which had been assessed by the commissioners of trust, not having been paid, were also now withheld. Under these circumstances, it was a last resource to come to an agreement with O'Neile; this was easy: O'Neile had been not only disappointed by the parliamentary officers who employed him, but he was sensibly mortified by the contemptuous rejection of the English commons who openly censured their officers for having recourse to so unworthy an ally. Owen was at the head of the most efficient body of native soldiers in the country, and by his aid there was a hope of still retrieving the fortune of the war. The landing of Cromwell, August 16th, 1649, put an end to this hope, and quickly altered the character of the war; he brought with him 8,000 foot, 6,000 horse, and £200,000, with considerable stores of all the materials and implements of war. The report of his arrival had been rendered doubtful by long delays: the engrossing interests of that revolution, which ended in his elevation, and the unwillingness of men to serve in Ireland where they had hitherto been allowed to starve, had protracted the existence of the miserable conflict of parties which had so long wasted the country by a lingering course of faction, fanaticism, and intrigue; the civil atmosphere was now to be cleared by a thunder-storm, such as alone could drive down and dispel the unwholesome vapours, which were inconsistent with the natural course of civil existence, and, for a season, restore this country to that uninterrupted progress, in which it has never been allowed to advance by the ordinary law of national growth. The chief events which immediately followed Cromwell's arrival, are already noticed in this volume. We shall now therefore pursue the subject no farther than as it immediately concerns the marquess. Being written to by the king to send him an account of the state of affairs, and to give his opinion as to the prudence of his coming to Ireland; the marquess distinctly stated in his answer, the prosperous condition of the parliamentary force, and the utter prostration of the king's: but, nevertheless, advised his coming, as a last resource in a desperate case, and as a course consistent with his honour. The king had, however, in the interval between his letter to the marquess and his receiving the answer, been listening to the proposals of the Scots, and had come to a change of purpose. The marquess, deserted by every aid on which he had placed a vain reliance, having virtually no party, and only seconded by a few gallant leaders, of whom the chief were Inchiquin, Castlehaven, and Clanricarde, continued for some months longer, to strive against the irresistible current of a new and overwhelming power. He journeyed from place to place, tried to infuse courage into the panic-stricken, and constancy into the wavering; he contrived by means ruinous to himself, to raise small sums of money, which he distributed with a free hand wherever there was a garrison or a fort still willing to hold out for the king. But the struggle was vain; deserted by the fears of the many, by the treachery of a few, and denounced by the clergy of the Roman church, who saw the triumph of their cause in the downfal of the party with which they had hither

*Life of Lord Broghill.

the

to contended; but above all, counteracted by the weakness of the king; the marquess began to perceive the utter hopelessness of the contest. In the treaty concluded at Breda, between Charles and the Scottish commissioners, he gave his consent to the breach of that peace which marquess of Ormonde had with such difficulty brought about; and by this act cut the last thread of the frail tie which gave the marquess a doubtful party in the island. The king was fully conscious of the injury thus committed, and in his letter of excuse, in which he pleads the necessity of his situation to the marquess, he advises him to take care of his own person, as the last service of importance left him to fulfil; and declares, “I shall take it very unkindly, if I find you do not withdraw yourself so timeously, as to preserve your safety for better times." Thus induced, and seeing no further object in remaining, the marquess addressed himself seriously to prepare for his departure. His last effort was an address to the commissioners of trust, in which he asserts, that his majesty's late declaration against the peace, had been enforced and that he was resolved to assert its validity, provided the "bishops would revoke all their acts and declarations against his authority, and give assurances of not attempting the like for the future. 2dly. That the commissioners of trust should declare the bishops' declaration and excommunication to be an unwarrantable usurpation upon his majesty's authority, and in them a violation of the peace; and if the bishops would not give, or observe the assurances before expressed, that they should endeavour to bring the offenders to condign punishment. 3dly. That the like declaration should be made by all magistrates and officers, civil and military. 4thly. That the lord-lieutenant should reside freely in any place he should choose, within the limits not possessed by the rebels; and 5thly, should be suffered to put garrisons according to the articles of the peace, in all places as he should judge necessary for the defence of the kingdom; wishing at last that some course might be taken for his support, in some proportion answerable to his place, yet with regard to the state of the nation, he being deprived of all his own fortunes, upon which he had wholly subsisted ever since he came into the kingdom."

To the first and main proviso of this letter, the bishops replied, that the king, by his late declaration, had cast the kingdom from his protection, and thereby withdrawn his authority; and that the last resource they had left, was a return to their old oath of association: they also declared, that they would not revoke their excommunication and declaration, nor give the pledges demanded by the marquess.

The marquess then called a general assembly at Loughrea, which met on the 15th of November, 1650. To this assembly he communicated his intention to leave Ireland, and proposed for their consideration the question as to the best means for the preservation of the kingdom. This assembly was numerous, and composed of the most respectable of the nobility and gentry, who, though bereft of all their natural influence, were themselves true to the loyal cause; the same feeling was also preserved by a considerable section of the clergy, of whom the hostile class was merely a majority; and these joined the assembly in declaring against the acts of their brethren. A desire was expressed by the assembly that the marquess should formally reply to

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