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nished the officers and soldiers, and enabled them to march; and his lordship, the lords-justices, and most (if not all) of the council had entered into various bonds, some jointly, some severally, for provisions spent by the army, whilst any could be had on their security; and he heard the said marquess at several times offer in public to divers merchants and others that had formerly furnished the army, to engage himself for provisions to subsist it, as far as his engagement would be taken, or as his estate would bear, if provisions could be had thereupon, but little or nothing could be procured on any of their securities before the treaty of cessation began. The state likewise had been necessitated to seize by force goods of considerable value on ship board after they were put on board by license, all duties and customs paid, and the ships ready to sail, and to take many other hard ways to gain relief for the subsistence of the army."
We have selected a few from a multitude of parallel statements, which together represent all the effects of a continued state of civil war, kept up without any efficient means to give a decided turn to the aims of either party, but operating by a slow process of waste and exhaustion to the ruin of the kingdom. On the side of the rebels an armed mob, only qualified for plunder and living on plunder; on the side of government, a starved, unarmed and unpaid army, barely kept alive in a state of utter incapacity for any effort, by the most ruinous and unwarrantable stretches of power. And it is no less evident that this condition of affairs in Ireland, was neither more nor less than according to the well concerted policy of the leaders of the parliamentary confederacy in England, who saw the efficiency of the Irish rebellion for their main designs, to depress the king and to work out a rebellion in England. It exhausted the resources both of the king and of his party, and brought large supplies into the funds of his enemies, who contrived to raise exorbitant sums from both countries on the strength of their assumed authority to conduct the Irish war. From Ireland alone they contrived to draw nearly £300,000 by forfeitures, during the time that the Irish armies were in a state of destitution clamouring for their pay; and while they sent £500 to Ireland, they were enabled to send £100,000 to the Scots to engage them to send an army into England, and £60,000 to the Scottish army in Ulster, whose inactivity plainly makes it appear for what purpose they were maintained.*
After the cessation, the king who began more and more to perceive the full aim of his enemies, was anxious to strengthen himself against them. He sent over to the marquess of Ormonde, desiring such assistance as could be spared. And the question was raised in the king's council as to the expediency of the marquess himself coming over to take the command. But his presence in Ireland was felt indispensable; there he was the main spring of the royal cause, and the only earthly safeguard of the peaceful of any party: as moderate and equitable as he was effective and firm, he was looked to with respect and confidence even by his enemies. The cessation was but a suspension of hostilities between armed soldiers, who watched for advantages and
were ready to fight for their quarters. It was also considered how much it might be injurious to the king, by affording matter for reproach to his enemies, if the absence of the marquess should occasion any calamitous result to those whom his presence alone protected. A small body of Irish troops was accordingly sent over under different leaders, and it was resolved by the king to nominate the marquess to the entire management of the perplexed affairs of Ireland, with the appointment of lord-lieutenant.
In this appointment there was nothing desirable to the marquess; it was the adoption of a lost cause, glory and gain were no longer to be thought of; but on the other hand certain loss, fatigue, reproach, perplexity, and without the intervention of singular good fortune, ultimate ruin. The marquess met the occasion with the heroism of his noble spirit, and expressed his devoted willingness to the undertaking. There was a difficulty in the appointment, as the earl of Leicester was actually lord-lieutenant, and it was judged fit to have his resignation. He was applied to and gave a reluctant consent, and sent his commission to the king, who had the marquess' commission drawn up in the same form, and with the same powers; he was after many delays sworn lord-lieutenant, 21st January, 1644.
During this year the chief object of the king's friends was the levy of forces to assist him against his parliamentary enemies in England. Of the main circumstances the reader may find a sufficient account in our notice of the earl of Antrim, who was now the second time engaged to use his influence for the purpose, and succeeded in obtaining a small force for his majesty. Among the incidents connected with these armaments, we shall here only stop to mention one characteristic incident. One of the ships which the marquess of Ormonde had hired for the transport of 150 men under Sir Anthony Willoughby, was taken at sea by captain Swanly a parliamentary officer, who ordered 70 of the soldiers to be thrown into the sea, under the pretence that they were Irish.* The parliamentary ships which were not to be had while they pretended to support the king, were now in full force, employed in blockading the harbour of Dublin, and in intercepting all communication between the king and his party in that country.
During the cessation it was the main object of the marquess to preserve its continuance; his chief difficulty arose from the fears of the rebel confederacy, that their party might become weakened by the division consequent upon the advantageous offers or overtures of the government. This year was spent in negotiations, in which to those who look back with a full knowledge of after events it is likely to appear that every party committed grievous and fatal mistakes. The popular party insisted upon such terms from the king, as were not consistent with the interests of the protestant inhabitants of Ireland; they were rejected with a decision not compatible with the position of the king's affairs at the time. The marquess was desirous to be released from his embarrassing post, from the consideration that the compliances which might become essential under the circumstances were such as it would not be consistent with his honour to advise: as
ception had been intended in some part of the transaction; as he denied having given a power to Glamorgan to conclude the treaty, while he admitted that having sent over the earl for the purpose of raising forces, he thought it necessary to fortify him with such authority as might obtain him credit among the Irish. He wrote an apology to the marquess of Ormonde assuring him, that "he never intended Glamorgan should treat of any thing, without his approbation, much less his knowledge," a letter which, it should be observed, exonerates the marquess from all privity to such a transaction. The earl of Glamorgan was accused of high treason, arrested and imprisoned for exceeding his orders, and a scene of shuffling followed which is not worth detailing here, but which shows the nature of the whole proceeding, to be precisely that which we have described it, a scene of unworthy collusion from beginning to end. The earl of Glamorgan made such declarations as were adapted to save the credit of the king, who consoled his imprisonment with private letters of friendly approbation, and stood between him and all consequences; the marquess though offended by the whole conduct of both parties, yet when the mischief was done endeavoured to lessen the pernicious consequences, by favouring the efforts of the king to secure his weak minister from further exposure.
The parliamentary party from this began to gain ground in both countries. The confederates became divided, and the army hitherto in the main obedient to the king's officers, began to be tampered with by parliamentary agents and to be divided into factions. The solemn league and covenant was taken by Monroe and his troops, as well as by several bodies of the English forces in Ulster. And Monroe began to make more determined and earnest efforts to possess himself of the principal garrisons of Ulster. A long and intermitting negotiation of which the details are monotonous and of no historical importance, continued to be carried on between the king and the Irish confederates. As the difficulties of the royal cause increased, the confederates raised their demands, and the king showed signs of a disposition to give way, but was mainly impeded by the firmness of the marquess, who although he had freely sacrificed his fortune and faced all dangers and labours in the royal cause, never once made the slightest compromise of principle. Under these painful conditions he struggled on during a distressing and laborious period of three years, without means, or any steady or efficient aid from others, pressed by a hundred daily necessities and cruel embarrassments, zealous to save the king, rescue his own property, and restore peace, but resolute in rejecting the compromise which these interests appeared to demand:* and displaying with a striking reality not often met in the page of history, the example of a great and good man struggling with adversity.
In this desperate condition of the protestant party, the nuncio Rinuncini who had confined those members of the confederate assembly who had consented to the peace, called an assembly in Kilkenny of persons more favourable to his own views. And while Owen O'Neile held the
* On the justice and wisdom of the concessions demanded, there may be room for difference of opinion. We only insist upon motives.
greater part of Leinster with an army of 8000 men, introduced the question of the proposed peace, together with the conditions on which it might be concluded. The greater part of the members were nominated by the clergy, and were completely at their disposal. Soon after they met, a paper was presented from a synod of the clergy at the same time convened by Rinuncini, containing the outline of their project for the settlement of the country. They proposed the establishment of the papal church through every part of the country, with the entire and absolute possession of all churches, benefices, and ecclesiastical offices and dignities; the repeal of every statute by which any ecclesiastical right was vested in the crown, &c, &c, amounting to the full and entire jurisdiction of all ecclesiastical concerns in Ireland. The nuncio proposed in addition, that the monasteries should be restored their lands, a proposal which the assembly rejected, as most of the members were themselves largely possessed of such lands. With a few slight modifications these proposals were passed into a vote by the clergy. The commissioners who had assented to the late peace, were severely handled, and an attempt was made to pass a vote of censure upon them; this question prolonged the debate, but the peace was itself condemned and rejected by an overwhelming majority.*
These incidents are here selected from the events of two years, in which amongst the confusion of numerous parties and the absence of all preponderating control, no progress of historical interest can be traced, further than the desolating effect consequent upon a state of disorganization so long protracted. Their present importance to the subject of this narration, is however not inconsiderable. The treaty of the marquess of Ormonde by which he delivered up the country to the parliament, has been noticed by a writer of opposite politics, as affording proof of the insincerity of his loyalty and the selfishness of the entire of his policy. The charge is indeed too absurd to be formally combatted. If ever an instance could be found of the entire abandonment of all self-interest it would be the marquess; but in this special case, the accusation has altogether proceeded from the singular oversight of not considering the whole principles of the conduct of the marquess, but in their place imputing to him the views of the writer himself, who seems to have imagined that the proposed establishment of a papal ascendancy in Ireland, must have been as indifferent to the leader of the protestant party in Ireland, as it appeared to the historian, who was either a Roman catholic himself, or as is more probable, indifferent to all creeds. Much historical injustice would be avoided by the adoption of an obvious but constantly neglected rule; that of weighing the motives of eminent public men according to the principles of their own party and profession. So long as the act is consistent with the uniform and professed principle, it is unfair, and a fallacy to ascribe other motives different from those professed; these may, it is granted, be in themselves unjustifiable, but this is not the question here. The marquess had indeed no choice, and acted from an absolute necessity; but waving this consideration it would be sufficient to reply to the dis
* These particulars are stated in great detail by Carte upon the authority of the nuncio's memoirs.