told them, "that there was usually such a confidence reposed in the judgment and faithfulness of those that are honoured with the command of an army, as that it is left to them when and where to prosecute and fall upon an enemy; that he took this to be due, though he was content to depart from it, because he would not confidently depend on his own judgment; that they might see lord Moore's and Sir H. Tichburne's judgment, by a letter signed by them and the rest of the chief officers, except the lord Lambert, and Sir R. Grenville, who were left in their quarters for the security thereof, and keeping the soldiers from disorder, but were as far consenting to the execution of that design, as himself who proposed it, or any of the rest who approved of, and signed the letter; that however he was applying himself to perform their last commands, and for that end had sent forth horse to destroy the dwellings of traitors for six miles about, and would quarter the night following at Balruddery, and thence continue his march to Dublin; want of bread causing him not to make use of the short enlargement of time granted in their letter of the 9th, which they could have been furnished with from Drogheda, if they had pursued their design towards Newry." He added, "that with regard to the gentlemen who came in, his method was to put them in safe keeping, and either to send them before, or to bring them along with him to Dublin, without any manner of promise or condition, but that they submit to his majesty's justice; nor did he dispute by what power they came in, leaving it to their lordships to determine that point when they had them in their hands, and he had given them an account of the manner of their coming."

The lords-justices were not to be influenced by such considerations as might appear to the earl of Ormonde of the most imperative moment, for they were governed by motives wholly different. To maintain their own authority; keep the rebellion away from the capital; and at the same time impede all proceedings which would have the effect of giving ascendancy to the friends or partisans of the royal cause, were the guiding principles of their whole conduct. They paid no regard to the strong representations or to the remonstrances of the earl and his officers, who saw in a strong light the real importance of an occasion, for pursuing and extinguishing the insurrection in its last retreats. According to the views of Sir W. Parsons, it was of little consequence what food for future vengeance lay collecting in the north, but it was in the last degree important, that their own hands should be strengthened in Dublin, and the surrounding country by the immediate presence of those troops which the zeal of the earl would have directed to more important purposes. Thus then, the communications here mentioned and others which followed, with a laudable pertinacity were set aside, and the earl was compelled to return. He was only allowed to leave a small reinforcement of 500 men, with lord Moore and Sir H. Tichburne. The whole of this tortuous proceeding is the more worthy of the reader's attention, as it is plainly indicative of the real policy of the puritans, not only in Ireland but in England. The attention of historians of our own time, has been singularly misdirected by the propensity of the human mind to look to results, and to form their judg ments of men either from the remote consequences of their actions,

or from principles subsequently developed. We, for our part, cordially concur in approving the fortunate and providential results of the great revolution which began in the reign of the unfortunate Charles: but we attribute all these advantages to the providence which overrules the wickedness of men to good events. It is not here permitted us to enter at length into the analysis by which it would be easy to separate the high professions, and the low conduct of a revolution begun, and consummated by the perpetration of every political crime; and to prove by the plainest tests that the motives of the responsible actors, were not merely different from the sounding eloquence of their pretensions, but far more reprehensible than the abuses which they overthrew. There were, no doubt, on either side, a few exalted characters who adopted with sincerity the purest principles of which their several positions admitted; but, upon the whole, the contest was a struggle for unconstitutional power on either side, in which fortunately for England neither party was successful, and both, as the strife advanced, endeavoured per fas et nefas, to attain the advantage. The conduct of both may be seen in some respects more clearly by looking to Ireland, the field in which their policy was pursued with least disguise. If the parliament of England was then enabled to dazzle the understandings of their own and after times by impressive commonplaces and specious complaints, and to veil their most unprincipled course in the fair disguise of public spirit and piety; it is plainly to be discerned that they were most recklessly indifferent as to the means. The virtue may be doubted of those zealots, who propose to raise the condition of their country by murders, massacres, and confiscations, which may effect the purpose pretended, but offer far nearer advantages to the perpetrators. The politician who is ready to purchase remote and abstract improvement at the expense of torrents of blood, and by the commission of present wrongs, must be either a fanatic, or is indifferent to the real benefits he pretends to seek. There is no real human virtue which would serve the unborn, at the expense of the living. But the understanding and passions of England were to be conciliated, by the leaders of that fanatic and intriguing corporation, the regicide house of commons: in the eye of England they endeavoured with the common discretion of all who play the game of revolutionary intrigue, to adorn and veil their purposes with the ordinary cant of civil justice and virtue, the lofty apothegms which cajole the multitude and spread a lying sanction over dishonesty, and impart a spurious elevation to baseness: but in their contempt of Ireland and Irish opinion, the whole truth of their policy was suffered to appear and to leave a record for the cool judgment of aftertimes; Ireland was a by-scene on which they crossed the stage without a mask. To prolong for their purposes a fearful conflict of crime and every evil passion, which the mind of Milton could combine for his description of the infernal habitations: "Regions of sorrow, doleful shades, where peace And rest can never dwell."

such was their manifest policy. But we are treading upon dangerous ground; so much has been latterly written, and ably written, to magnify this party and depress their opponents, that the writer who takes an

opposite view, must be prepared to enter upon a full and minute detail of the entire history of the period.

The lords-justices, at the period of our narrative, appear to have entertained but one solicitude which is not quite explicable; a vindictive eagerness to visit with the utmost severity in their power the parties remotely suspected of any connexion with the rebellion, which they evinced no anxiety to check. To waste, plunder and kill, was the entire substance of their orders to the earl, whose activity to encounter the rebels they impeded. Their vengeance was confined to the territories of the pale, where it was rather directed against the inhabitants than the rebels; and their conduct appeared equally unaccountable on the score of common prudence, for they were unable to maintain the troops which they endeavoured to retain about Dublin in a shameful state of destitution.

On the return of the earl of Ormonde, the rebels at once returned and took possession of Drogheda, Atherdee, and Dundalk. The gallant achievements of Moore and Tichburne, by which they were defeated with comparatively small forces, in several bloody sieges and encounters occurred in this interval, and have been already related in these pages. We have also taken several occasions to relate the impolitic and unjust treatment received at the same time by lord Dunsany, and other noblemen of the pale, when they came in on the faith of the king's proclamation, to offer their adherence to the government in Dublin. Their rejection forms a consistent part of the case against that government, of which we have here but faintly sketched the outline. This case is strongly aggravated by the iniquitous indictments which at the same time disgrace the courts, and the still more revolting proceedings of the castle, where the rack was freely employed, for the purpose of involving the whole of the Irish nobility and gentry in one sweeping charge of treason and rebellion. These demonstrations may be sufficient ex abundantiá, to fix the real policy of the castle, and to class these flagitious officials, among the lowest of those enemies of the people of Ireland, whose aim it has been to promote insurrection for the service of a small political intrigue. We reserve some special proofs, as we shall be compelled in a subsequent memoir to revert to this topic. These circumstances and this grievous state of affairs at length roused the anxious attention of the king, who very justly considered that his personal presence would be the most likely means to offer some decided check to this tissue of disorder and misconduct. Such a step might probably have been attended with the best results: his coming over would at once have brought to his side, every particle of right reason, prudence, or loyalty in the kingdom, and at this period there must still have been a preponderance in favour of his cause. For the Roman catholic clergy had not yet fully entered into the contest; the insurgents had already experienced its danger and folly, and the numerous and respectable body whose part in it had been involuntary, would all, on their own several grounds, have rallied round the standard which would have united them in one cause and feeling. The lords-justices and all their little junto of extortioners, pettifoggers and executioners, would have been set aside.

But a result so inimical to the views of the great and powerful

party by which the king was opposed in England, was not to be quietly effected without resistance. On the 8th April, 1642, the king, by a message to the two houses, communicated his intention, with the obvious reasons which require no detail. In this message he proposed to "raise by his commission in the county of Chester a guard for his own person (when he should come into Ireland,) of two thousand foot, and two hundred horse, which should be armed at Chester from his magazine at Hull."* To this the lords-justices remonstrated, on the grounds of the great power of the rebels, the weakness of the government force, the inadequacy of the means for the support of his majesty's army and court. The parliament urged their pretended solicitude for the personal safety of his majesty: with more sincerity they intimated the encouragement the rebels might derive from the assumption of his countenance: they contradicted the remonstrance of their own officers, the lords-justices, by observing that his presence was rendered unnecesary by the late successes against the rebels, and ended by throwing aside pretexts, and fairly declaring their desire to have the war left to their own management; and their intention "to govern the kingdom by the advice of parliament for his majesty and for his posterity." To this the distressing position of the king's affairs compelled him to submit.

In the mean time, the English parliament concluded a treaty, highly favourable to the system of policy they were pursuing, with their own party in Scotland, by which, without suffering the hazard of their policy, they contrived to arrange with their allies the Scottish commissioners in London for the occupation of the north of Ireland by a body of ten thousand Scottish soldiers. Such was the origin of the armament under Monroe, who landed at Carrickfergus about the middle of April, while the communications just adverted to between the king and parliament were pending. The conduct of Monroe we have already commented upon: it was in precise accordance with the policy here attributed to the parliamentary party, and there can be no ground for hesitation in identifying them. Monroe occupied an influential and central position in Ulster, but only acted so far as appeared necessary for the security of a commanding neutrality; seizing on the king's partisans when they fell into his power; or attacking the rebels when they appeared to endanger his own security. Along with his own force, and under his command, were joined such forces as were subject to the authority of the parliament in that province, making altogether an army sufficiently formidable if commanded to any purpose.

The earl was during these events mainly confined to Dublin a reluctant witness of counsels to which he could little consent, yet had no Under these circumstances his conduct was discreet power to resist. and cautious. It is one of the prominent traits indeed of the character of this great man, that while his conduct was always firm and strenuous, his manner and his professions of opinion were marked by prudent moderation. Where it was vain to resist by actions, and where nothing was to be expected from remonstrance, he quietly

• Husband's Collection, quoted by Carte.

yielded to circumstances, and contented himself with watching for occasions, which, when they presented themselves, were never suffered to pass, though often to the sacrifice of the nearest personal considerations. Of this an instance finds its place here. In the end of March, the lords-justices resolved on sending out a large detachment for their favourite purpose of wasting and burning the lands and tenements of rebels who had left their homes in Kildare. On this expedition the earl of Ormonde received orders to march. The earl, who was always averse from such a task, saw nevertheless an occasion for exploits of a more worthy and honourable kind. He marched out and commenced a series of able and effective operations, which the lords-justices presently attempted to interrupt. The earl's countess and his family, with an hundred protestants who had found refuge at his house in Carrickon-Suir, had just arrived safe in Dublin, and the lords-justices sent to acquaint him of the event, with permission to join them: the earl de-clined the insidious offer and pursued his march. He advanced to Kilcullen, Athy, Stradbally and Maryborough, as he went detaching parties to the relief of the principal castles and forts in the rebels' possession, and securing the country on every side. It was upon this march that the distinguished conduct of Sir C. Coote, who was detached to the relief of Birr, occurred* in the woods of Mountrath.

As the earl was on his return to Dublin, after the full execution of these important services, he was checked near Athy by a strong rebel force under lord Mountgarret, who had under his command the chief rebel leaders with 8000 infantry and several troops of horse. The incident was indeed alarming; for, at this period of the march, the forces of the earl were exhausted, their horses out of serviceable condition, their ammunition spent in supplying the garrisons which they had relieved, and the whole force trifling in numerical comparison with the enemy, which seemed to menace inevitable destruction.

The earl, attended by Sir T. Lucas, took a party of 200 horse, and marched out to reconnoitre, after which he called a council, in which the above circumstances were taken into account, together with the advantageous position of the enemy. It was agreed on to march towards Dublin, and not to attack them, unless they should themselves be tempted to begin, a highly probable event, which would have the effect of altering their position, and placing them in circumstances more favourable for an effective assault. In pursuance of this plan, the earl, with 2500 men, pursued the march to Dublin. In front he detached Cornet Pollard with a party of thirty horse to spread out among the numerous bushes which then covered the road sides, and facilitated those ambushes which were the prevalent danger of Irish war. Next followed Sir T.

Lucas with six troops of horse. The baggage of the army filled the intervals: after which came the earl himself leading a troop of volunteers, among whom were lord Dillon, lord Brabazon, and other distinguished persons. Four "divisions" of foot, came next, not much like the divisions of modern war, amounting each to three hundred men, and followed by the artillery: after these four other divisions of foot, and