Zona v. Erie Railroad Co.
1057. This decision is controlling and requires a reversal of the judgment of our Supreme Court, which is ordered accordingly.
For reversal-THE CHANCELLOR, CHIEF JUSTICE, SWAYZE, TRENCHARD, BERGEN, BLACK, HEPPENHEIMER, WILLIAMS, TAYLOR, JJ. 9.
CHARLES ZONA, RESPONDENT, v. ERIE RAILROAD COMPANY, APPELLANT.
Submitted July 7, 1919-Decided November 17, 1919.
On appeal from the Supreme Court.
For the respondent, Peter J. McGinnis.
For the appellant, George S. Hobart and Edward A. Markley.
The judgment is affirmed, for the reasons stated in the opinion in Oppicci v. Erie Railroad Co., just decided.
For affirmance-THE CHANCELLOR, CHIEF JUSTICE, SWAYZE, TRENCHARD, PARKER, MINTURN, WHITE, HEPPENHEIMER, WILLIAMS, TAYLOR, GARDNER, ACKERSON, JJ. 12.
Defendant built and maintained an
awarded as to damages alone. Philbrick v. Mundy,
embankment and wall along a 3. Whether a jury is ordered by
the court to inspect or examine premises as an aid in ascertain- ing the truth of any matter in dispute between the parties to an action under the Evidence act (Comp. Stat., p. 2229, § 30), or to view any place to enable the jury better to understand the evidence given in the cause under the Jury act (Comp. Stat., p. 2976, §§ 31, 35), the judgment rendered by the jury should, nevertheless, be reversed if le- gally unsupportable in and by the record under review, as the questions presented to an appel- late court should be decided upon what appears in the record brought up from the court below, notwithstanding a view was had by the jury which tried the cause. Garland v. Furst Store, 127
4. That this court in reviewing judgments of courts of law has no power to pass upon the weight of evidence has long been definitely settled; and all judg- ments under review are to be sustained, so far as factual ques- tions are concerned, if there be any competent evidence to sup- port them. Koch v. Costello,
165. The Court of Errors and Ap-
peals has no power to review or determine the weight of evidence, or consider whether the amount of the verdict is excessive. Smith V. Brunswick Laundry Co., 436
2. Where on appeal from the Cir- cuit Court a judgment is wrong in respect to the inclusion of in- terest, and is right in all other respects, the judgment will be affirmed if the plaintiff will waive the interest; otherwise, it 6. The only proper ground of ap- will be reversed and a new trial]
peal in the Court of Errors and
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT. 1. Communications between attor- ney and client are protected from disclosure only at the in- stance of the client. State v. Snook, 29
1. A claim for damages for failure to deliver goods in pursuance of an executory contract of sale is a claim for unliquidated dam- ages, and such a claim is not one for which an attachment will is- sue. Parker v. Anthony-Ham- 2. A communication, made by a mond Chemical Works,
2. Attachment will not lie for un- liquidated damages claimed by reason of defendants supplying goods of a quality inferior to that agreed upon. Sher V. Church, 73
3. Proceedings in attachment being statutory and out of the course of the common law, must be strictly construed, and where the
client to an attorney, concerning the drafting of a will for the client, is a privileged communi- cation which continues after the death of the client, and the privi- lege is not waived by the fact that the attorney was one of the subscribing witnesses to the will. Anderson v. Searles, 227
affidavit alleged that defendant 1. A policy of accident insurance
was a non-resident and ab- sconded from his "debtors," and it appears that the defendant was, and for years past had been, a resident of the county and engaged in business therein so that service of ordinary pro-| cess might at any time have been served upon him, or a member. of his family, the writ will be quashed. Little v. Long, 99
4. On a judgment in attachment in the District Court, where there is no appearance by the defend- ant, the execution is strictly
was filed with the municipality. by a jitney driver, as a condition precedent to the granting of his license by the city. Thereafter. his bus collided with the plaint- iff's automobile, from which ac- cident plaintiff suffered personal injuries for which in a suit in- stituted against the bus owner she recovered damages. She then brought this suit against the insurer upon the policy of insurance. Held (1) that the act entitled "An act concerning auto busses, commonly called jit- neys, and their operation in
Banks and Trust Companies.
cities" (Pamph. L. 1916, p. 283), was not unconstitutional, in that its title by the use of the word "operation" fairly compre- hended the subject-matter of jit- ney insurance, as indemnity and protection to the traveling pub- lic, for whose benefit the policy| was issued and filed. (2) That since the insurance policy ex- pressly provided for the pay- ment of such indemnity to an in- jured third party, the omissions of the insured to comply with certain details thereof, in case of accident, such as notice of the accident, &c., could not affect the right of the injured party to recover upon the same for dam- ages, adjudicated in a suit at law between the insured and the injured third party, as a basis for the suit upon the policy to recover the amount so adjudi- cated. Gillard v. Manufacturers Ins. Co.,
1. Where the signatures of named payees of checks issued by a loan association upon supposi- titious applications for loans) gotten up by its treasurer, pay-
vidual endorsement below those that were forged and either drew in cash from, or had the amount of the checks passed to his own credit in his individual account in the bank, which transactions extended over a period of four years and upwards and included thirty-two checks in all, and the fraud could have been discovered by the loan association in the earliest stages of its perpetration by an examination of its bank pass-books and the vouchers re- turned therewith, which included the forged checks, by any one or more of its officers, other than the treasurer, the loan associa- tion was negligent in not dis- covering the fraud, and is there- fore estopped from recovering from the bank the sum it paid out on the checks so fraudulently endorsed. Pannonia Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. West Side Trust Co., 377
2. The acceptance of the balanced pass-books with the forged vouchers returned by the bank to the loan association without protest or objection as to the forgeries, constituted, in the cir- cumstances present, an account stated between the parties. Ib.
3. The holding by the Supreme Court in Pratt v. Union Na- tional Bank, 79 N. J. L. 117, that a bank having paid a check (with forged endorsement) can- not charge the amount against its depositor unless it shows a right to do so on the doctrine of estoppel or because of some neg- ligence chargeable to the deposi- tor, approved. Ib.
4. Does Pamph. L. 1908, p. 428. relating to forged checks apply to forged endorsements on checks: Quære. Ib.
able at bank, were forged by the When a bond given in pursuance treasurer, who wrote his indi- of a statute is not in accordance
therewith, but is not the pro-| duct of coercion or duress, is not prohibited by statute nor con- trary to public policy, is founded
From the Supreme Court. (Af- firmed as to Amelia Spierling). 167
v. Mildred J. Brown, Respond- ent. From the Supreme Court, 91 N. J. L. 481, 171
upon good and sufficient con- 4. Susannah B. Trapp, Appellant, sideration and intended to sub- serve a good and lawful pur- pose, it is good as a voluntary bond; and recovery had thereon, if supported by competent evi-5. Levenson Wrecking Co., Re-
6. The State of New Jersey. De- fendant in Error, v. Gennaro Palmieri, alias Napolitano, Plaintiff in Error. From the the Middlesex County Court of Oyer and Terminer,
1. The duty which an agent under- takes, the obligation he assumes as a condition of his right to de- mand commissions is to bring the buyer and seller to an agree- ment. The agent, to earn com- missions on the sale of property, 7. The State of New Jersey, De-
must be the efficient or procur- ing cause of the sale. Queen v. Jennings,
2. In this case, the evidence ex- amined and held, whether the plaintiff was discharged in good faith, or whether he was the effi- cient or procuring cause of the sale, were questions of fact prop- erly submitted by the trial court
fendant in Error, v. Frank La- vieri and Michael DePalma, Plaintiffs in Error. From the Middlesex County Court of Oyer and Terminer,
S. The State of New Jersey, De- fendant in Error, v. Francis Gregory. Plaintiff in Error. From the Supreme Court, 205
to be determined by the jury. 9. Helen E. Autrim. Respondent,
1. Mary E. Maitland, Respondent., v. Board of Police Commission-
ers of the City of Garfield, Ap- 11. Marietta Rathbun, Administra- pellant. From the Supreme Court. 150
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