between him and Kase, the defendant would be entitled to an acquittal, even though you believe that the sum of money received from Hahn was greatly in excess of what his services were worth as a detective in the case." This was properly refused, because even if the defendant did not know the amount to be extorted, he did, subsequently, know the amount that had been extorted, and participated in the first distribution, and afterwards demanded his share of the whole. In other words, he adopted the conspiracy to cheat and defraud Kase, by participating in the overt act of dividing the proceeds of the conspiracy.

The next point is, that the court refused to charge that, before the jury could convict, all the allegations of the indictment sufficient to constitute a corrupt agreement to cheat must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the proof failed in any essential particular the verdict should be not guilty. The court had charged the jury that the defendant was entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt arising on the evidence, and that the burden was on the state to satisfy them, beyond such doubt, of the defendant's guilt, and then properly defined what was a reasonable doubt.

What was requested was that the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the necessary allegations sufficient to constitute a corrupt agreement to cheat. That is not correct; the state was bound to prove not only the corrupt agreement, but the overt act, and while the defendant might not have participated in the original corrupt agreement, still the jury could convict him if the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt his subsequent participation with knowledge of the corrupt agreement.

The next point is, refusal to charge if the defendant was guilty of a conspiracy there should be a verdict of not guilty, if the common object of the conspiracy was consummated more than two years before the indictment was found. This request was based upon the evidence which was that the defendant participated in a division of the fraud within two years. What the request amounts to is, that the court having

instructed the jury, as a matter of law, that the taking of the dividend in 1915 was a continuation of the crime, nevertheless, the jury could disregard that rule of law and find otherwise. It was no error to refuse this.

The same question is raised in another form by another request to charge, which was refused, that if the jury should find that the conspiracy was cheating Kase, and that object was consummated in December, 1913, there should be a verdict of not guilty. There was no error in this refusal.

The next point argued is, that the court should have charged as requested, that if the jury found from the evidence. that the money of Hahn, one of the conspirators, was paid by him as hush money to buy the silence of the defendant and Peaker, and was not done in execution of a conspiracy to cheat, then the verdict should be not guilty.

This the court properly refused because the evidence was that the money paid by Hahn was a part of the proceeds of the conspiracy, and so understood and demanded by the defendant, and if paid by Hahn either to the defendant or Peaker, it was done in completion of the conspiracy.

We have examined the two other matters referred to in the brief and find no legal error therein.

The judgment will be affirmed, with costs.

For affirmance-THE CHANCELLOR, PARKER, BERGEN, MINTURN, KALISCH, BLACK, WHITE, HEPPENHEIMER, WILLIAMS, TAYLOR, GARDNER, JJ. 11.

For reversal-None.

93 N. J. L.

Autrim v. Telegraphers' Benev. Asso., &c.

HELEN E. AUTRIM, RESPONDENT, v.

TELEGRAPHERS'

BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, &c., APPELLANT.

Submitted March 24, 1919-Decided June 20, 1919.

The by-laws of defendant association required notice of thirty days to a member of an assessment and provided that for failure to pay the same within the thirty days a forfeiture would result. Held, upon a claim for the amount due upon a death certificate, where a forfeiture by reason of the non-payment of the assessment, within the thirty days, that in the absence of a prescribed method of service in the constitution or by-laws, the notice must be actually or personally served upon the member, as a condition precedent to the forfeiture of his personal and property rights.

On appeal from the Supreme Court.

For the respondent, Ott & Carr.

For the appellant, W. Holt Apgar.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

MINTURN, J. The widow of Walter Autrim brought this suit to recover $300, the amount payable to her upon a death benefit certificate issued by the defendant to the plaintiff's husband while a member in good standing of the defendant association. Her right to recover is based upon the certificate of membership, which provides for such payment, "subject to all the requirements and conditions of the constitution and by-laws."

Section 608 of the constitution and by-laws requires upon the death of a member an assessment of one dollar shall be levied upon each surviving member, "and in case payment shall not be made within thirty days thereafter the delinquent shall forfeit all claims and membership to the association."

In this instance the assessment was levied on October 9th,

Autrim v. Telegraphers' Benev. Asso., &c. 93 N. J. L.

1916, requiring payment before November 9th, 1916. The notice was mailed to defendant "care of Pennsylvania Railroad, Camden, N. J." At the time it was mailed and until his death the deceased member was an invalid away from his home and unable to go to his place of business or to attend, to his business. His wife, upon her return to the home on December 7th, received the notice and at once mailed a dollar to the association, through an agent. It was received by the association the day Mr. Autrim died, December 9th.

The sole contention against payment of the amount claimed is that sixty, instead of thirty, days elapsed after notice of the assessment was mailed, and that the member and this claimant by this lapse of time forfeited all claim to the death benefit.

The insistence, it will be observed, is based upon the theory of a forfeiture. Forfeiture is not a favored policy of the law, and to insist upon its application in a given instance, one who makes the claim must show strict compliance with all the necessary conditions precedent, upon which the exaction is based. Johnson v. Grand Lodge, 79 N. J. L. 227; affirmed by this court, 81 Id. 511.

It will be observed that no method was provided for the service of the notice upon which the claim of forfeiture is based; that it never reached the member personally, and was received by his wife only two days prior to his death, when remittance of the assessment was at once made.

In such a status the forfeiture of the personal and property rights of the deceased, in the absence of a distinct or specified method of service, provided by the by-laws or constitution, must be predicated upon actual or personal service of the requisite notice as sine qua non to the legal exercise of the right. Supreme Assembly v. McDonald, 59 N. J. L. 248; Wachtel v. Noah Society, 81 N. Y. 28; Merriam v. Keystone Association (New York), 33 N. E. Rep. 738; Courtney v. Masonic Association (Iowa Supreme Court), 53 N. W. Rep. 238; Benedict v. Grand Lodge (Minnesota Supreme Court), 51 Id. 371.

93 N. J. L. Gillard v. Manufacturers Ins. Co. of Phila.

The disposition of the case upon this ground renders unnecessary any discussion of the other questions discussed in the briefs of counsel.

The judgment will be affirmed.

For affirmance-THE CHANCELLOR, CHIEF JUSTICE, SWAYZE, TRENCHARD, PARKER, BERGEN, MINTURN, KALISCH, BLACK, WHITE, HEPPENHEIMER, WILLIAMS, TAYLOR, GARDNER, JJ. 14.

For reversal-None.

GRACE GILLARD, RESPONDENT, v. MANUFACTURERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, APPELLANT.

Submitted March 24, 1919-Decided June 20, 1919.

A policy of accident insurance was filed with the municipality, by a jitney driver, as a condition precedent to the granting of his license by the city. Thereafter, his bus collided with the plaintiff's automobile, from which accident plaintiff suffered personal injuries for which in a suit instituted against the bus owner she recovered damages. She then brought this suit against the insurer upon the policy of insurance. Held-(1) that the act entitled "An act concerning auto busses, commonly called jitneys, and their operation in cities" (Pamph. L. 1916, p. 283), was not unconstitutional, in that its title by the use of the word "operation" fairly comprehended the subject-matter of jitney insurance, as indemnity and protection to the traveling public, for whose benefit the policy was issued and filed. (2) That since the insurance policy expressly provided for the payment of such indemnity to an injured third party, the omissions of the insured to comply with certain details thereof, in case of accident, such as notice of the accident, &c., could not affect the right of the injured party to recover upon the same for damages, adjudicated in a suit at law between the insured and the injured third party, as a basis for the suit upon the policy to recover the amount so adjudicated.