The R. G. Winslow. lowed seven drafts of one hundred bushels of wheat to be lost. In respect to the loading and carriage of the goods, the master is chargeable with the most exact diligence. His responsibility with respect to them begins where that of the wharfinger ends, and when they are delivered to some accredited person on board the ship. If he receives them at the quay, or beach, or sends his boat for them, his responsibility attaches from the moment of the receipt. Not only is the master responsible with respect to the safety and security of the goods, but the vessel is also liable. It stands as the shipper's security, and is, by the maritime law, hypothecated to him for his indemnity. The duties of the master as carrier extend to all that relates to the loading, transportation, and delivery of the goods. And for the faithful performance of those duties the ship stands pledged, as well as the master and the owners personally. And the manner of taking goods on board, and the commencement of the master's duty in this respect, depends on the custom of the particular place. More or less is to be done by the wharfingers or lightermen, according to the usage.2 The master of the vessel knew that the wheat was to be delivered on board through the pipe; and he also knew the manner of weighing and discharging the grain from the hopper, when he made the contract; and with such knowledge he had the first mate placed in the cupola, to tally the drafts, and the second mate stationed on deck to watch the discharge of the wheat from the pipe into the hold of the vessel, and to keep the vessel trimmed; and the work had commenced before he turned in. It is not the business of the officer in charge of the receiving of wheat from a warehouse through a pipe, to permit any person not belonging to the vessel, nor under his command, on board, to shift the pipe, or to trim the vessel. This is as much the business of the vessel, as weighing the wheat is of the warehouseman. The parties proceeded to put the wheat on board, Flanders on Shipping, $189. 2 Abbott on Shipping, 345. The R. G. Winslow. according to the usual manner of loading vessels with grain from warehouses. The pipe is attached to the warehouse, and it is used jointly by the warehouse and the vessel. The vessel controls the discharge of the wheat from the warehouse through the pipe. The order to discharge or to stop, is given from the vessel; and the wheat is weighed by the warehouseman, and the drafts are tallied by the first mate before discharged from the hopper. Using the pipe in loading the vessel was necessary, in the performance of the contract made by the master with the shipper, for which the owners were to receive compensation in the freight earned by the vessel. Unless the wheat was transported, freight would not be earned; and it could not be transported unless a pipe was used in its delivery on board. The master might have supplied a pipe; and with the consent of the owner of the warehouse, he might have attached it to the warehouse and used it. But there can be no difference in law, whether he used the pipe of the warehouse or his own pipe. He had the sole control of the warehouse pipe, and made it the pipe of the vessel pro hac vice.' I am satisfied that the duty of the warehouseman ended with the tally of the drafts by the mate, and the discharge of the wheat from the warehouse into the outside pipe, and that the duty of the master then commenced. At that moment the delivery of the wheat was complete, and the liability of the vessel attached. The shipper had then fully parted with the possession; and having no longer any control, or right of control, over the wheat, he was in no degree responsible for its actual delivery on board. Upon the same principle it was ruled, in the case of the Bark Edwin, 23 Law Reporter, 198, that the vessel was liable for the non-delivery of bales of cotton according to contract, which were lost before reaching the vessel, in consequence of the explosion of the boiler of a lighter, in which the cotton was be 'De Mott vs Laraway, 14, Wendell, 225. The R. G. Winslow. ing carried from the cotton press to the vessel, in the possession of the master of the vessel. This case is different from a contract merely executory, where there has been no delivery of the goods to the master, nor change of possession, nor effort to deliver. When there is no delivery of the goods, the contract of the master for their transportation creates no lien. Buckingham vs. The Schooner Freeman, 18 Howard, 182. There the bill of lading of goods not shipped was designed as an instrument of fraud. And in Vandewater vs. Mills, 19 Howard, 82, where there was a contract for the future employment of the vessel. And in Hannah vs. The Schooner Carrington, 2 Law Monthly, 456; where the ship was withdrawn from the trade, and refused further to comply with a contract of affreightment. And in The Joseph Grant,1 it was decided that the master has no authority as such to sign a bill of lading in blank, and that the libellant as assignee of the bill of lading, filled up after the vessel sailed, acquired no lien on the vessel. The cargo on board at the time corresponded with the bill of lading as filled up, but it was delivered to a different consignee, according to the bill of lading correctly given by the master before the vessel sailed. The cases here referred to are wanting in the essential particular of delivery to the vessel, to make them precedents governing the case under consideration. The wheat lost by the negligence of the mate, was delivered to the vessel as a portion of the twenty thousand bushels contracted to be received on board and transported to Buffalo; and the libellant should have a decree for its value. The delivery of cotton on a lighter, employed by the owner of the vessel, is a delivery to the vessel, and the responsibility of the owners as common carriers attaches. Bulkley vs. Naumkeag Steam Cotton Co., 1 Clifford, 322. Delivery to a carrier should be according to the usage of his business, and actual or constructive; and the delivery is complete if the master, mate, 'Vol. 1 of this Series, 193. Goodrich vs. City of Chicago. or other agent of the owner, receive them either at the ship, or on the wharf, or in a warehouse, according to the usage. 2 Parsons on Contracts, 175, 6, 7. Ball vs. New Jersey Steamboat Co., 1 Daly, 491. Angell on Carriers, §§131-134.—[Reporter. ALBERT E. GOODRICH vs. CITY OF CHICAGO. CIRCUIT COURT.-NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.-JULY IN ADMIRALTY. 1. In the construction of the charter of a city the federal courts are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court of the State. 2. LIABILITY OF CITY FOR OBSTRUCTIONS IN RIVER.-If a city undertakes to remove obstructions from a river, which it is under no legal obligation to remove, and abandons the work without having changed the status of the obstruction, it does not become liable for subsequent damages caused by such obstruction. The city by assuming such a work does not assume any new liability. This was a libel filed by Albert E. Goodrich to recover damages sustained by reason of an obstruction in the Chicago river. The libellant alleges that he is the owner of a line of propellers regularly navigating the lakes, and that one of them, leaving the port of Chicago, ran against a sunken rock in the river and was seriously injured. The ground-work of the proceeding was that the city of Chicago, by its charter, had been vested with exclusive jurisdiction and control over the river, and that the duty was imposed on it to remove obstructions, and that this duty was binding on it. It is provided in the city charter of Chicago that the city may remove and prevent all obstructions in the waters which are public highways in said city, and widen, straighten, 1 Goodrich vs. City of Chicago. and deepen the same; may preserve the harbor, prevent any use of the same, or any act in relation thereto, inconsistent with or detrimental to the public health, or calculated to render the waters of the same, or any part thereof, impure or offensive, or tending in any degree to fill up or obstruct the same; prevent and punish the casting or depositing therein any earth, ashes, or other substance, filth, logs, or floating matter; prevent and remove all obstructions therein, and punish the authors thereof; and shall have power to regulate and prescribe the mode and speed of entering and leaving the harbor, and of coming to and departing from the wharves and streets of the city, by steamboats, canal-boats, and other craft and vessels, and the disposition of the sails, yards, anchors, and appurtenances thereof, while entering, leaving, or abiding in the harbor; and to regulate and prescribe, by such ordinances, or through their harbor-master or other authorized officer, such a location of every canal-boat, steamboat, or other craft or vessel, or float, and such changes of station in and use of the harbor as may be necessary to promote order therein, and the safety and equal convenience, as near as may be, of all such boats, vessels, crafts, and floats; and may impose penalties not exceeding one hundred dollars for any offense against any such ordinance; and by such ordinance charge such penalties, together with such expenses as may be incurred by the city in enforcing this section, upon the steamboat, canal-boat, or other vessel, craft, or float. The harbor of the city shall include the piers and so much of Lake Michigan as lies within the distance of one mile into the lake, and the Chicago river and its branches to their respective sources.-Laws and Ordinances of Chicago, 1873, pp. 403, 407. Further facts are stated in the opinion. Goodwin, Larned & Goodwin, for libellant. Robert Rae &B. F. Ayer, for the City. DAVIS, J.-The question depends upon the proper construc |