been assumed that a man will not invent without pecuniary reward. Experience shows us that that must not be taken as an absolute truth. Some of the greatest inventions which have been of the most benefit to mankind, have been invented by persons who have given their inventions freely to the world. Again, it is supposed that a man who has obtained money for the future pro

That must not be assumed. Nothing is more common in intellectual pursuits than for men to sell beforehand the future intellectual product before it is made or even conceived." Having given examples, he continues: 'These examples are to my mind, entirely repugnant to the argument, that there is any public policy in prohibiting such contracts. On the contrary, public policy is the other way. It encourages the poor, needy, or struggling author or artist."

merits, the defendant was ultimately successful, the Lord Chancellor (Cairns), and Lord Justice (Mellish), being of opinion that the plaintiffs had failed to establish their case, and that the bill ought to have been dismissed. But upon the question of costs the former judge remarked-" The case is very peculiar. The plaintiffs ask us in fact to try the issue whether the two compounds are the same, but do not reveal what is the composition of the sub-ducts of his brain, will not be ready to produce these products. stance which they sell. The defendants also do not offer to discover what is the composition of the substances which they profess to make. They are both entitled to practice this concealment, but they can not ask the court to decide an issue which can not be satisfactorily dealt with, unless the composition of the substances is known. This, however, is not all. It is impossible not to see that these substances are introduced, recommended and sold for the purpose of enabling brewers to supply to the public a liquid which they may represent to the public as being made with pure hops, when it is not in fact so made. It is also clear that this was to be done secretly, because if the public knew what was done, they would not buy the beer so manufactured. I do not express any opinion whether the use of these compounds would come within the description of adulteration, but clearly the object was to induce the public to buy one thing when they thought they were buying another. It is not the province of this court to protect speculations of this kind, nor ought a defendant who is engaged in a business of the same kind, to obtain costs even when succesful." It is somewhat difficult to see upon what principle this decision as to costs was founded. Pacta illicita and contra bonos mores, have often formed the subject of judicial decision, but where the contract was deemed immoral, action was refused, and the court did not go into the merits at all. Here the merits appear to have been fully discussed, with the effect of securing the defend-mal registers. On the other hand, proof was led that amongst the ant from the restraint sought to be imposed upon him by the plaintiffs, and yet, contrary to the general and well established rule, he could not recover his expenses. It might be true that he was engaged in the same trade as the plaintiffs, and his position as regards the public might be the same, but his position as regards this particular matter of the injunction sought to be put upon him was different. He had succeeded in his defence, and why was he denied the full benefit of that success? Such a case would seem to occupy a middle place between actions founded upon ordinary and respectable contracts, and those which from the immoral character of the obligation will at once be expelled from a court of justice.

In the case of The Printing and Numerical Registering Company v Sampson, 10 Law Rep. E. C. 462, an attempt was made to get rid of an agreement by which certain parties had assigned all future patent rights of a like nature, to a particular patent sold, on the ground that such a patent was against public policy, as it tended to discourage inventors. It was contended that if a man knew that he had already received the price of his invention, he will not make public any invention. It seems a strange and desperate argument to have advanced, but was seriously considered by Sir G. Jessel, M. R., who said in giving judgment: "It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those rules which say that a given contract is void as being against public policy, because if there is one thing, which more than another public policy requires, it is that men of full age, and competent understanding, shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to consider, that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract." Having gone on to shortly state the principle under discussion, and the extent to which it has been applied, viz., to acts against public policy, or against the rules of morality, he observes: "I should be sorry to extend the case much further. I am satisfied there is no reason for so extending it in this case. In the first place, it has

Presumed Marriage.—In the case of Lyle v. Ellwood, 19 L. R. E. C. 98, a judgment was given by Vice-Chancellor Sir Charles Hall, dealing with the subject of marriage, by habit and repute so familiar to Scotch lawyers. In that case the question of importance came to be whether or not a marriage had been entered into between a certain John Ellwood and Sarah Campbell. By the law of England it would appear that the evidence required to establish a marriage depends upon the object for which the proof of marriage is required. Thus habit and repute would not be sufficient in an indictment for bigamy, although it might hold good where the marriage is not the point so directly in question. In Lyle's case, evidence of marriage was necessary in order to establish a claim on next of kin, and it consisted of a divided repute. The parties had lived in various parts of Scotland as man and wife, and had entered their children as legitimate in baptis

relatives and connections they had not been treated as married persons, and in Ellwood's will no provision was made for his children by Sarah Campbell. The case was treated, it may be stated, as not depending upon Scotch law. It was maintained in the argument against the marriage, that a reputation such as that set up must not be divided, and Mr. Fraser was quoted, who lays down that "if the repute be divided, it is no repute at all." The Vice-Chancellor, however, founding upon a number of decided cases, including that of Breadalbane, has rejected this contention. He observed in giving judgment: "It can not, I think, be contended that wherever there is evidence of repute on one side and on the other a marriage can not be established. It appears to me that the court can, and should in the present case, receive and act upon the evidence to which I have referred, as answering and outweighing the evidence that there was a repute that there had not been a marriage."-[ The Journal of Jurisprudence (Edinburgh).

THE SANCTITY OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS.—If the truth justified Mr. O'Conor's letter, Mr. O'Conor was especially the man to write it. And if the senior leader of the bar believed that justice was tainted in its highest seat in the state, it was his imperative duty to sound the alarm plainly and fearlessly as he has done. He is not to be answered by the censure of Tweed's lawyers, nor by the impotent cry that the decisions of the courts are sacred from criticism. Mr. George F. Comstock, ex-Judge of Appeals, and one of Tweed's counsel, has written a letter reviewing that of Mr. O'Conor, and in the act of rebuking that gentleman for criticising the judgment of one court, he says of another, "I know of no precedent for such a trial since the times when Jeffreys and Scroggs administered the criminal law of England." And again he speaks of the transfer of the case 'from the murky atmosphere of Judge Davis's court, charged with electric passion and vaulting ambition, to the court of appeals, where all is calmness and deliberation." The critic is unwary. If Mr. O'Conor pointed out that one court has uniformly favored Tweed, is it for a lawyer who is paid with the money that Tweed has stolen, and who denounces the judge

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of another court as a Jeffreys and his decisions as lawless, to call Mr. O'Conor to account for want of respect for the judiciary?

proposes a judge for political office should be regarded as assailing social order.-|Harper's Weekly.

Correspondence.

ST. LOUIS, August 2, 1875. EDITORS CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL:-The agitation of the question of the admissibility of evidence as to the character of the deceased in cases of homicide, suggests the question of the admissibility of evidence as to the character of witnesses; not with reference to their "general reputation in the community for truth and veracity," but for the purpose of determining, from their habits and mental characteristics, to what extent they are accustomed to re

It is an astounding doctrine that the opinions of courts are not to be criticised. It was the universal and unrelenting criticism of the monstrous Dred Scott decision-a judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States-that helped to rouse the country to save its liberty and government. "What are you going to do about it?" was the sneer with which the critics of that decision were taunted, and the sneerers have had their answer. It was the peremptory challenge both of the legal-tender decision and its reversal which showed the healthful vigilance and independence of the public mind. And for ourselves we recall nothing with more satisfaction than that we joined with the Times and a few other journals in as-gard the sanctity and binding force of the obligation of the oath sailing Judges Barnard and Cardozo in the very height and prime of their power, and the power of Tweed, their master. In the light of known facts it is not a handsome spectacle, that those who were silent under the iniquities and appalling prostitution of the bench to Tweed seven or eight years ago, are now raising their voices, with Tweed's stolen money jingling in their pockets, in bitter denunciation of the magistrate who sentenced him as a Jeffreys and a Scroggs. In associating the name of Judge Davis with that of Jeffreys, Mr. Comstock, paid by Tweed, is guilty of a very gross offence. How gross, let any reader turn to English history and see.

Was it the duty of all good Englishmen not to criticise the bloody assizes? On the contrary, was there any higher duty than to decry and expose the infamy as loudly and as broadly as possible? What remedy remains to the people if criticism and cen sure of judicial outrages are to be suppressed as "insults to the bench?" What is so sure to secure respect for the judiciary, by promoting its respectability, as its consciousness that its conduct is carefully watched and weighed? In a state where judges are elected, and where elections are so often carried and managed by Tweeds and corrupt rings, what surer cloak of corruption upon the bench than the understanding that criticism of the action of courts is an insult to the bench? Readers out of the state of New York, may not be aware that there are singular facts and reports in regard to that court "where all is calmness and deliberation." Its chief justice is a conspicuous politician, who was last year the intended candidate of the democratic opponents of Governor Tilden, and who has recently publicly assailed the motives of one of the counsel for the people in the Tweed suits, while the figures of the votes for one or two of the Judges of Appeals are publicly cited as evidence that they were "counted in" by the Tweed interest. These things, however painful, are necessarily remembered when the uniformity of the decisions of the court in favor of Tweed is remarked, and they are the reserved force of Mr. O'Conor's letter.

they are required to take, and what degree of credibility is to be accordingly attached to their testimony. Children and persons suspected of being unsound in mind, before being allowed to testify, are usually examined preliminarily, to ascertain whether they are competent to testify; and if found to be ignorant of the nature of an oath, and the consequences of telling an uutruth, they are held incapable of giving testimony altogether. Witnesses who are suspected of lying habits, are subject to a severer test, and evidence of such habits, and that their "general reputation for truth and veracity" is bad, is admitted to impeach and destroy their testimony.

The testimony of witnesses who are interested in the subjectmatter or event of the suit, is either entirely disregarded, or so modified as to render it of much less than the full weight it would otherwise have upon the minds of the jury. In all such cases the judge is required to guide and instruct the jury in their consideration of such testimony, and to explain to them the degree of weight they are to attach to it.

Now, if suspicion attaches to the evidence given by a person interested in the event or subject-matter of the suit, without reference to his reputation for truth and veracity; if the infant or imbecile who is incapable of comprehending the nature of an oath, is entirely prohibited from testifying; and if the evidence of the liar is suffered to be impeached, and the jury instructed to disregard it, why should not similar rules apply to the testimony of persons of notoriously profligate character, and those who have so little comprehension of, or regard for the solemn nature and sanctity of the oath which they are required to take in open court, "upon the Holy Evangelists of Almighty God," that they make it their daily habit to take in vain the name of that God to whom they now so solemnly appeal, and spend their lives in utter disregard and open defiance of the very principles by which they are supposed to be governed in taking the oath ?

In other words, can such an oath, by such a person, be supposed to have as much, or more or less binding effect upon the conscience and acts of the witness, than if taken by the infant, the imbecile, or the person interested in the suit?

This is not a question of religion. It is not a religious test. It is a plain, simple, practical question, such as every judge is required to solve and elucidate to every jury, in every case where the testimony of infants, imbeciles, or persons interested, is offered. It is not a question of the honesty or the mental ca

As we said when the decision was published, the release of Tweed was humiliating, but if the laws, honestly interpreted and administered, are not adequate to the punishment of such offenses as Tweed's, we must all submit and wonder. The release may have been law, but it was certainly not justice, and the fact remains that lawyers quite as astute and able as Mr. Comstock or any of Tweed's counsel, are of opinion that the laws are quite sufficient for justice, if they could only be applied. Nevertheless, the opin- | pacity, or the reputation for veracity, of the witness, any more than ion of the highest court will always be respected, however law yers may differ as to its merits, so long as the court itself is above suspicion. Nor will any sensible man easily suffer it to fall under suspicion. But when one of the greatest lawyers in the country, and of spotless personal character, takes the responsibility of calling it to account, no sensible man will affect to think the matter disposed of by calling his charge an insult to the bench. And as the present court is elective, the result of its decision upon the Tweed case, will necessarily be to strengthen the conviction that there should be an absolute separation of the bench from politics, so that every magistrate as he seats himself, should understand that the political career is closed to him while every man who

it is a question of excluding his evidence because he happens to differ in his "religious views" from his fellows. But it is a question whether the testimony of a person who has no religious views, no reverence for the oath he takes, or the God in whose name and presence he takes it, is to occupy precisely the same ground, and be entitled to the same degree of faith and credibility, as the testimony of one, his exact opposite in every such respect.

Of what use is it to administer an oath upon the Bible, to a witness who does not believe a word in it? And where is the advantage to be gained in requiring a witness to swear with uplifted hand, to tell 'the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God!" when that God is the constant subject

of derision and blasphemy to him? Would it not be better to abandon the use of the oath altogether in courts of justice, than make it such a mockery as this? Or else adopt such rules of evidence as would graduate and modify, and fix bounds upon the admissibility and effect of such testimony?

Real Estate-Adverse Possession.-McManus, Admx. v. O'Sullivan, p. 7. Opinion by Wallace, C. J. An adverse possession of land, which will bar an action to recover possession of it, under the Statute of Limitations, is a possession merely hostile to the particular claim of the other party in the action, to which it is oppossed in proof.

Public Lands-Contest as to the Right to Acquire. -Young v. Shinn, p. 26. Opinion by Rhodes, J. When two parties have each an equal right to acquire public lands, the one by location and purchase from the state, and the other by locating as a homestead under the laws of the United States, the party who first commences his proceedings to acquire the title has the better right.

This is a curious and interesting subject, Messrs. Editors, and it is to be hoped that we may hear, not only from you, but from some of your readers, in regard to it. C. COMMENTS.-Whilst cheerfully publishing the above suggestions, we hope it will not be for a moment supposed that we concur in them. The above writer is manifestly mistaken in several respects as to the present state of the law. 1. Evidence of the "habits" of witnesses as to truth and veracity is never admitted, as he intimates, for the purpose of impeaching their testimony. It is alone their reputation for truth and veracity which can be called in question. 2. Judges are never permitted, as he intimates, to explain to juries the degree of weight" they are to attach to particular testimony. Judges constantly intimate to juries the legal effect of certain testimony, if believed. "If you believe from the evidence so and so, your verdict will be so and so," is the stereotyped form of instructions to juries. The judge may also, doubtless, with propriety tell the jury that in estimating the value of a particular witness' testimony, they should consider the fact that he is interested in the event of the suit. But if he undertakes to tell them how far they are to credit a witness on this or any other account, or, in other words, the "degree of weight" they are to attach to his testimony, he clearly invades their exclusive province. 3. It is not necessary, as the above writer intimates, that witnesses should be sworn "on the Holy Evangelists of Al-good legal reason for the refusal, the principal will not be precluded, on apmighty God." Various other forms of oaths are administered to non-Christian witnesses; and the statutes, we presume, of every state in the Union permit an affirmation to be administered in the place of an oath, where the witness has scruples about taking an oath in the prescribed form; and witnesses are constantly permitted simply to affirm that they will tell the truth, under the pains and penalties of perjury.

The premises on which "C." bases his suggestions consisting thus of erroneous views as to the present state of the law, it would seem unnecessary to consider his suggestions further. One or two counter suggestions may not, however, be inappropriate. It is believed that the rule which excludes evidence of the moral character and habits of witnesses is grounded in two considerations that of convenience, and that of public policy. I. If the general character and habits of every witness were to be investigated, it is obvious that litigation would be interminable. 2. If the moral character and habits of every witness were liable to be made a subject of public investigation in courts of justice, men of delicate sensibilities would be deterred from appearing as witnesses, and justice would thus in many cases be defeated.

"

Mandamus-Admission of Child into Public Schools-Fourteenth Amendment.-Ward v. Flood, p. 36. Opinion by Wallace, C. J. A motion by the applicant for the writ of mandamus, that the writ issue notwithstanding the matters alleged in the defendant's answer, amounts to a general demurrer to the answer. The rule that one who bases his refusal to perform an official act on some defect in his adversary's proceedings, will not afterwards be permitted to allege a new defect, does not apply to officers whose duties are governed by law. The writ was applied for to compel the principal of a public school to admit a colored child thereto. The law provides for the education of such children in separate schools. The board of education had made provision accordingly. Held, that if such principal refuses to receive a child for a reason which is not good in law, but there is a

plication for mandamus, to compel him to admit such child, from relying on such true reason. He may refuse to receive a child, in a graded school if the child is not sufficiently educated to enter the lowest grade. The law providing for the education of black children in separate schools is not in conflict with the constitution, or with the fourteenth amendment thereto; and colored childred may be excluded from the schools where white children are educated, provided separate schools are established for them, with the same facilities as those enjoyed by the schools for white children.

Mining Stocks-Innocent Purchaser.-Thompson v. Toland, p. 99. Opinion by Crockett, J. In this state mining stocks properly endorsed pass by delivery; and if the true owner places them in the hands of another, on some secret trust between them, without notice to subsequent purchaser, or any thing on the face of the certificates to show such trust, the true owners and not the innocent purchaser must bear any loss which may occur.

Liability of City for Negligence of a Contractor.-O'Hale v. Sacramento, p. 212. In this case, and in Krause v. Sacramento, p. 221, the court held, affirming James v. San Francisco, 6 Cal. 528, that the city is not liable for damages caused by the negligence of the contractor on public works, when the law requires the city authorities to let out the work on contract.

Pre-emption- Contests between Claimants- Review by the Court of Acts of Law Officers.-Burrell v. How, p. 222. Opinion by McKinstry, J. The courts will not pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence, upon which the land officers based their action in awarding a patent for preempted lands; but fraud upon the land officers must be shown before their action will be enquired into. [Or error by the said officers in matter of law. Hess v. Bolinger, p. 349.]

As to the suggestion that a man's habits as to blasphemy furnish a test of his truthfulness, we have never supposed this to be the case. The army that I swore terribly in Flanders" was no doubt composed of bluff, honest soldiers. A habit of blasphemy is an evidence of an irreligious and vulgar cast of mind; but it is believed that in the ordinary affairs of life little attention is paid to it in estimating men's truthfulness; and we believe that any change in the rules of evidence based upon the supposition that it would afford a safe test would be found misleading and chimerical. If the law has passed through ages of superstition and barbarism--ages when the courts were presided over by ecclesiastical judges-without such tests being engrafted upon it, it is surely too late to talk of such things now. The common sense of the nineteenth century would receive such propositions with derision. Notwithstand- | Co., p. 229. Opinion by McKinstry, J. Where payments of premium are ing the disclaimer of "C.," what he proposes is in the main a religious test, whereas history and experience show that there is no necessary connection between morals and religion, and notwithstanding the fact that the manifest tendency of modern legislation is to repeal such tests as applicable to the credibility of witnesses.-[Ed. C. L. J.

Recent Reports.

REPORTS OF CASES DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME Court of THE STATE

OF CALIFORNIA, at the January, April, July and October Terms, 1874.
CHARLES A. TUTTLE, Reporter. Volume 48. San Francisco : Sumner,
Whitney & Co. ; A. L. Bancroft & Co. 1875. Printed by A. L. Bancroft
& Co.

Life Insurance-Payment of Premium.-Howard v. Continental Ins.

to be made thrice yearly, and one-third of the premium is endorsed as a loan on the policy, the payment of the premiums must be made as they fall due, and the loan of such portion does not have the effect of giving a credit for the second and third payments of the premium.

A clause in the policy, that at the death of the insured the company may deduct any balance of the years's premium due and unpaid, does not have the effect of extending credit for any portion of the premium.

"Local Option Laws"-Statute to take effect upon the Happening of a Future Event.-Ex parte Wall, p. 279. Opinion by McKinstry, J. The report of this case occupies 45 pages of the book. It is a decision of very great ability and importance, involving the extent of the law-making power. By an act of the legislature, approved March, 1874, it was provided that, whenever one-fourth of the legal voters of any township, incorporated city, or town, should petition the Board of Supervisors of the county in which the town, etc., was situated, to call a special election to vote

This volume is in the best style of its well-known publishers, and has scarcely a defect. The division of the syllabi into paragraphs with small-cap side-heads, is particularly pleasing, and the work, both of the reporter and publishers, is generally well and carefully done. One hundred and thirty-two | upon the question of " liquor license." or " no liquor license," the Board of cases are reported. The pages are almost full width, with forty lines on each, showing a desire on the part of the publishers to get a fair amount of matter into the volume. The use of small-caps, instead of large for the titles of the

Supervisors must within one month afterwards call such election, etc., and if a majority of the ballots at such election were " against license," then no license to retail liquor should be granted, etc., and it should be unlawful for

any person to sell, etc. The statute imposed punishment by fine and impris- COURT OF CLAIMS REPORT, Vol. 9. Cases decided in the Court of Claims onment, for its violation,

The petitioner, Wall, was convicted and fined under the act, failing to pay which, he was imprisoned, whereupon he sued out the writ of habeas corpus herein. We give the syllabus of the case almost entire. The power to make laws conferred upon the legislature by the constitution, can not be delegated by the legislature to a portion of the people, Although a statute may be conditional, so that its taking effect may depend upon a subsequent which may be named in it, yet this court must be one which shall produce such a change of circumstances that the law-makers, in their own judgment can declare it wise and expedient that the law shall take effect when the event shall occur; and the legislature must pass upon the question of expediency, and can not say that it shall be deemed expedient, provided the people, by a vote, shall afterwards declare it to be expedient. Such a statute must be a law in præsenti or take effect in futuro.

at the December term, 1873, and the decisions of the Supreme Court in the appealed cases from October, 1873, to May 1874. CHARLES C. NOTT (one of the judges), and ARCHIBALD HOPKINS (chief clerk of the court), reporters. Washington, D. C.: W. H. and O. H. Morrison. 1875. pp. 575. This volume contains 122 cases covering many questions based upon con tracts with the government, the sale of captured or abandoned property, the capture of prizes, and the settlement of commercial or property rights compli cated by a state of war. It is clearly printed and the cases are furnished with convenient head lines by which the reporter's statement, the arguments for either party, and the opinion may be readily distinguished and referred to without groping for the place where one leaves off and another begins. The index omits all cross-references but classifies the points of law decided, and if any one point refers to more than one subject, it appears in full under each heading. The head-notes are sometimes unnecessarily full. Although this is a

The court accordingly ordered the discharge of the prisoner. [For the fault on the safe side, it is always desirable to divest statements of legal prinopinion of the court in this case, see 1 CENT. L. J. 592.]

"Twice in Jeopardy "-Discharge of Jury without Verdict.People v. Cage, p. 323. Opinion by Niles, J. When a person is placed upon trial on a valid indictment, before a competent court and jury, he is "in jeopardy " within the meaning of the constitutional provision that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence." In such case, the discharge of the jury without verdict, unless by consent of the defendant, or from some unavoidable accident, or necessity, is equivalent to an acquittal. The inability of the jury to agree after a reasonable time for deliberation, is such an unavoidable necessity. But the order discharging them must be based on good grounds, and if the jury is so discharged without any evidence but the statement of the officer in charge of them that they can not agree, it is equivalent to an acquittal. See next case.

Discharge of Jury-Acquittal.-People v. Hunckeler, p. 331. Opinion by McKinstry, J. When the court, in a trial for manslaughter, without the consent of the defendant, discharges the jury because the court is o opinion that the evidence shows the defendant to be guilty of murder, the de

ciples, as completely as possible, of the circumstantial details from which they are drawn. To encumber a head-note with narrative, implies that its application is limited to the state of facts therein set forth, and often obscures the principle embodied in it. The disposition of appealed cases in the supreme court, occupies about a quarter of the volume. There is also a report of the proceedings taken by the court of claims upon the announcement of the death in April, 1874, of Judge Samuel Milligan, one of its members, a short sketch of whose life is furnished. He was succeeded upon the bench by Hon. Wm. A. Richardson, ex-secretary of the treasury.

The following points of law decided by the two courts are interesting. Supreme Court-Admiralty-Wages of Vessels in Custody.-A vessel's charterers, having no control of her while she is in legal custody under the libel of a court of admiralty, are not liable for her wages at the agreed rate meanwhile. Goodwin's Case.

Captured or Abandoned Property-The Non-intercourse Act.— A New York merchant who had no license to trade in Savannah, could no

fendant can not again be tried for the same killing, or be again put in acquire title to personal property by purchase there, even after the United

jeopardy, and is entitled to his acquittal. See Bell & Murray v. the State, I CENT. LAW J. 630.

Property of a Corporation-Fraudulent Conveyance by a Corporation-Formation of New Corporation by Members of Old One.-San. F. & Northern Pac. R. R. v. Bee, p. 398. Opinion by Wallace, C. J. The property of a railroad corporation is vested in its trustees, to be preserved by them as a fund to secure creditors of the corporation. If the persons interested in one railroad corporation, form a new one, which chooses for its officers the officers of the old corporation, and the persons owning the stock of the old corporation receive in exchange therefor stock of the new, and the trustees then cause the property of the old corporation to be conveyed to the new, the conveyance is a fraud upon the creditors of the old corporation.

Negligence-Railroad Track Crossing Street.-Robinson v. Western Pac. R. R., p. 409. Opinion by McKinstry, J. When the track of a railroad crosses a city street, and a train is stopped so that the last car stands

just in the crossed street, and a person going along said street, crossing the track just behind the last car, is injured by the train being backed onto him, without notification or warning, the employees of the railroad company are guilty of gross negligence, and the company liable. The injured person, in such case, is not guilty of contributory negligence, as he had the right to presume that he would be notified of the moving of the train.

Mechanic's Lien of Sub-contractor.-Quale v. Moon, p. 478 Opinion by McKinstry, J. The lien of a sub-contractor, for work done or materials furnished, does not depend on, and is not suspended until the completion of the building.

States troops had occupied the city, so long as the laws suspending commercial intercourse were in force, and could not therefore sue for the proceeds of such property under the Captured or Abandoned Property Act. Cutner's Case.

One residing in the insurrectionary districts, and within the military lines of the United States, held disabled from trading with the disloyal without, or the loyal within. Ensley's Case.

Where New Orleans Merchants had sent an agent into the interior to collect debts and buy cotton, the agency was ended by the capture of the city; subsequent purchases, though made with confederate notes, were void and gave no title to the cotton, so that the merchants can not recover for it under the Captured or Abandoned Property Act. Lapene's Case.

Contracts-Alterations imply Extension of Time.-A request from sufficient extension of time for meeting the improvement. Amoskeag Coma contracting purchaser for an alteration in the article contracted for, implies

"

Military Law." Posts" defined to be military establishments where bodies of troops are permanently fixed, and 'depots" places where military stores or supplies are kept or troops assembled. Caldwell's Case.

Court of Claims-Appeals.-Where a claimant has no right of appeal and the government has, he can secure no review in the supreme court unless he requests a judgement pro forma in his favor; otherwise the judgment would be final even though decisions of the supreme court in analogous cases were

favorable to his claim. Osborne's Case.

Corporations-Formation of-Legislative Grants to Individua who are to form à Corporation.-San Francisco v. the Spring Valley Water Works, p. 403. Opinion by Crockett, J., and McKinstry, J., concurring; Rhodes, J., dissenting. Corporations in this state, except for muBailment.--The bailee of personal property under a common contract of nicipal purposes, must be formed under general laws, and can exercise no hire, must pay the stipulated hire for the term agreed on, and return the proppowers except such as are conferred by such general laws. The Legislature erty in as good order and condition, aside from reasonable wear, as when recan not confer on such corporation any powers, or grant them any priv-ceived. He thus takes the risk of loss, for which he must indemnify the ileges by special act. An act which grants to individuals and their assigns certain powers and privileges, and then provides that the act shall not take effect unless the persons to whom the grant is made shall, within a certain time, organize themselves into a corporation under existing laws, is a grant, not to the individuals as persons, but to the corporation when formed, and is an attempt of the legislature to confer powers and privileges on a corporation by special act, and is void. Such corporation, when formed, possesses no powers or privileges, except such as are conferred by generaf laws. C. A. C.

owner, paying him the hire to the time thereof. The hirer must notify the owner of the loss. Smith's Case.

Captured or Abandoned Property Act.-A claimant, in estimating his recovery, must be limited to his own allegation of the amount of his cotton captured, though subjected to subsequent losses that reduced his recovery to less than the quantity alleged, while the evidence indicates that a larger quantity was captured. Boyd's Case.

An alien living abroad could acquire title to personal property in the insur