The Court refused a rule made on the behalf of the Crown, calling on an attorney to pay over to the receiver of stamp duties a sum of money which the attorney had received from his client, an executor, for the purpose of paying legacy duty, but which he had not in fact paid. In re Fenton, 310.

The Court will not order an attorney to repay a sum of money paid to him voluntarily under an agreement to give him one-third of what was recovered in an action, the application not having been made until 13 years after the money was paid. Ex parte Yeatman, 510.

The Court refused to order an attorney to deliver up a deed which had been given him by one of the parties to it to get executed by his client, who was to be another party. Ex parte Smart, 526.

An attorney got into his hands the proceeds of stock belonging to his client, sold out for the purpose of being invested on mortgage: he kept the money in his hands, paying interest to his client. To applications to re-invest the stock, he at first made evasive answers, but ultimately promised to do so. At length a rule was by consent made absolute upon him to re-invest on or before a particular day, and pay the costs, or in default that an attachment should issue. On the day after the appointed day, a fiat in bankruptcy issued against him, under which he obtained his certificate: no service of the rule and allocatur took place before the bankruptcy:-Held, on the ground that the circumstances established a case of fraud, that the bankruptcy afforded no answer to a motion for an attachment: and the Court accordingly granted an attachment. In re Newberry, 575.

Independently of the question of fraud, the attachment should issue, as it is only giving effect to the former rule. Per Lord Denman, C. J. Id.

Where an attorney received money to pay over to a proctor for probate of a will, the Court refused to interfere summarily to make him account for it. Ex parte Cohen, 211.

Where, in an order to refer an attorney's bill for taxation, the usual undertaking to pay the amount when taxed is omitted; the Court will not grant an attachment for non-payment in pursuance of the Master's allocatur. Ex parte Ward,

212.

The executor of a defendant who had expressed his satisfaction with his attorney's bill, and had made a payment on account, may yet have it referred to be taxed, even after a lapse of four years. Woollaston v. Weston, 366.

A rule nisi against an attorney to answer matters in an affidavit, cannot be moved for on the last day of term. In re Turner, 217.

AUCTION.-See SALE.

AWARD.-See ARBITRATION.

BAIL.

Where a defendant has paid the debt and 107. for costs to the sheriff, in lieu of bail, under 43 G. 3, c. 46:- Held, that he has, under 7 & 8 G. 4, c. 71, till the day for perfecting special bail, to pay in the additional 10l. for costs. Stafford v. Love, 195.

And where, previous to that day, a bona fide correspondence to settle the action commenced, which did not terminate until after that day, and on the termination the defendant paid in the 107. additional:- Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to have the debt and costs paid out of Court to him. Id.

Time to justify bail, on account of the illness of one of the bail, refused, because it did not sufficiently appear on the affidavit he was really ill. Gablentz's Bail, 111.

Where there has been delay in applying to the Court to have a bail-bond set aside, which has arisen from compliance with the request of the plaintiff:-Held, that it could not be objected that the application was not made in a reasonable time. Gould v. Williams, 344.

A defendant who has been arrested on a capias since the Uniformity of Process Act, and given a bail-bond, cannot discharge the bail-bond by a surrender into actual custody within eight days after the arrest. Hodson v. Mee, 398.

In an action commenced by original, the declaration was amended under an order, by the addition of new counts, and the damages being increased-Held, that the liability of the bail upon their recognizance was not affected. Taylor v. Wilkinson, 451.

An affidavit of justification of bail describing one as of a parish which contained 7000 inhabitants, but not saying of any street, is sufficient. Hunt's Bail, 520.

Stating the bail was possessed of property to the requisite amount "over and above his just debts," but omitting the words "what will pay," is also sufficient. Id.

Stating he was not bail in any other action for any defendant, is also sufficient.

Id.

Where a bail-bond, in reciting the writ of capias, stated that "a copy of the writ was duly delivered to ," omitting the name of the defendant, and likewise omitted his name in the statement of the condition of the bond, the Court, in an action of escape brought against the sheriff, would not supply the deficiency. Holding v. Raphael, 571.

A defendant having given notice of bail according to the rule of T. T. 1 W. 4, is bound to

An action was referred to an arbitrator, and the defendant paid a sum awarded against him, but not the costs of the cause, as they had not been taxed. A fiat then issued against him, after which the plaintiff taxed his costs:- Held, first, that those costs were provable under the fiat; secondly, that the defendant having paid them to the sheriff on an attachment before he obtained his certificate, the Court would order them to be repaid to him afterwards, the sheriff having still the amount in his hands. Bishop v. Leigh, 664.

Where, to a plea of no consideration, in an action on a bill of exchange, there is a replication that consideration was given, setting it out under a scilicet, and concluding to the country, no new matter is alleged so as to make it necessary for the plaintiff to prove the particular consideration set out. Low v. Burrows, 12.

Where the buyer of goods paid for them by his own acceptance, and after the bill had been accepted the seller altered the date of it, and thereby vitiated it:-Held, that by so doing he did not preclude himself from suing for the original debt; and consequently that he might recover for the goods sold. Atkinson v. Hawdon, 77.

In an action by the indorsee against the indorser of a note made specially payable at a particular place, where the allegation of presentment in the declaration was general, but no objection was taken on account of the variance at the trial: -Held, that it was no ground for a new trial. Trinder v. Smedley, 164.`

If the drawer or indorser of a bill of exchange or promissory note receives due notice of its dishonour from any person who is a party to it, it enures for the benefit of all, and is sufficient to gives the notice be not the holder, or the agent of make him liable upon it, though the party who the holder, at the time. Chapman v. Keene, 165.

In au action on a bill of exchange by indorsee against drawer, the only evidence of notice of dishonour was a statement made by the defendant in conversation with a witness, in which he said, “[ have several good defences to the action; in the first place, the letter (containing notice of dishonour) was not sent to me in time." This statement was left to the jury as evidence of due notice J., and Coleridge, J. (Lord Denman, C. J., disof dishonour:-Held, by Littledule, J., Patteson, sentiente), that the jury were not warranted in presuming that due notice had been given. Braithwaite v. Coleman, 229.

Where a person takes an indorsement of a promissory note from the payee, with notice that the payee was indebted to the maker in a greater amount than that in the note, on separate transactions:-Held, that the indorsee could not recover on the note, except to the amount of some advances he had made on the security of the note Goodall v. Ray, 333. before he had the notice.

In an action to recover the amount of a check, where the defendant does not deny giving the check, but pleads that it was given for a gambling transaction, the plaintiff is not bound to make it part of his case, nor to produce it for the purpose of the defendant giving it in evidence, unless he has received notice to produce it. Reeves v. Gambell, 567.

An agent for the sale of goods was authorized to draw bills on the purchasers at the usual credit; and by the course of his employment he was to goods at a credit beyond the usual period, and transmit them indorsed to his principals. He sold drew for the amount; but instead of transmitting them to his principals, he used them for his own purposes. They got into the hands of the defendant, a bill-broker, who discounted them:— Held, that proof of these facts alone did not afford sufficient evidence of fraud connected with the defendant, to give the principals a primá facie right to recover the amount of the bills from him as money had and received, and make it incumbent on him to show that he gave full value for the bills. Davis v. Willis, 679.

Two joint and several notes were given to come due at different dates. After one of them had become due, the holder received from one of the makers a sum exceeding the amount of the note

which was due, and exceeding his share of the aggregate amount of the two notes. This sum was received in discharge of that maker from whom it was received; and the holder accordingly gave up to him the note that was due, and erased his name from the other note:-Held, that such maker was discharged from all claim on the remaining note; and that thereby the other maker was also discharged. Nicholson v. Revell 756.

Quare, whether the holder of a note, merely erasing the name of one of two joint and several makers, is a discharge of the other. Id.

A discharge by a debtee of one joint and several debtor, is a discharge of all. Id.

BRIBERY.

To constitute the offence of bribery at an election, under 2 Geo. 2, c. 24, s. 7, by" corrupting a voter to give his vote," by giving him a bribe, it is not necessary that the voter should vote in accordance with the wishes of the person who gives the bribe. The offence is complete, so far as the corruptor is concerned, by the act of giving the money, whether the voter have at the time of receiving it any intention of voting according to the bribe or not. Henslow v. Fawcett, 125.

BRIDGE.-See HIGHWAYS.

An infant whose guardian is in possession of an estate, in respect of the tenure of which there is a liability to repair a bridge, is not liable to an indictment for non-repair, either as owner or occupier. Rex v. Sutton, 428.

A guardian in soccage is liable. Id. Quære, whether an owner who is not in occupation is liable. Id.

BUILDING ACT.-See EXECUTORS.

CANAL.-See POOR RATE. STATUTE.

CERTIORARI.-See WAY.

The notice required by 13 Geo. 2, c. 18, s. 5, of intention to move for a certiorari to remove an order of justices, must be made six days, computed one day exclusive and one day inclusive, before the rule nisi is applied for; therefore, where notice was given on the 20th for a motion on the 25th, and the motion was made on that day, it was held insufficient, and the rule was discharged, but without costs. Rex v. The Justices of Cumberland, 16.

Certiorari to remove an indictment found at sessions, on the ground that the defendant was a magistrate, refused to a prosecutor. Rex v. Fellows, 648.

The defendant cannot have a certiorari to remove a conviction for being found in pursuit of game, under 1 & 2 W. 4, c. 32. Rex v. Hester, 650.

In the 1 & 2 W. 4, c. 32, s. 45, (the Game Act,) is a general enactment that no summary conviction, in pursuance of the act, shall be removed by certiorari :— Held, that a writ of certiorari might nevertheless be issued at the instance of a private prosecutor. Rex v. Boultbee, 713.

CHURCHWARDEN.

A rule for a mandamus to an archdeacon to swear in a churchwarden, is absolute in the first instance. Rex v. Archdeacon of Lichfield and Coventry, 463.

COMMITMENT.-See BANKRUPT.

COMPENSATION.

been made to a claimant under the 3 W. 4, c. 46, Where an assessment of compensation had (Greenwich Railway Act,) in one entire sum, and he was possessed of a leasehold interest as well as other subjects of compensation, the Court refused an application on behalf of the Company for another assessment to be made, on the ground, that as the value of the leasehold property was not assessed separately according to the act, it could not be known what would be the proper ad valorem stamp-duty to be affixed to the deed of assignment: the Court saying, that the difficulty would be obviated by putting on the deed a stamp applicable to the whole sum assessed, and reciting all the circumstances of the case. In re The London and Greenwich Railway Company,

81.

COMPOSITION WITH CREDITORS. See BANKRUPt.

CONSIDERATION.-See SMUGGLING.

CONSTABLE.-See ASSAULT.

In such a case there must be a demand of a copy of the warrant before any action brought against the constable. Barrons v. Luscombe, 457.

Quare, whether magistrates have in any case a right to withdraw a warrant after they have once issued it. Id.

CONSTRUCTION OF Deeds. See INSURANce.

CONTEMPT.-See BANKRUPT.

CONTRACT.

See AGREEMENT. EVIDENCE. PLEADING.

CONTUMACE CAPIENDO.

Semble, that it ought to appear upon the warrant granted upon a writ of contumace capiendo that the suit was for a subject-matter which was exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Spiritual Court: therefore when a warrant merely stated that the suit was for slander, without showing that it was a slander, of which alone the Spiritual Court had cognizance, the Court granted a rule to show cause why the party should not be discharged out of custody. In re Gale, 59.

Where a party in custody under writs of contumace capiendo applied for a rule to show cause why they should not be set aside for irregularity, with costs, and after the rule obtained also applied

to the Chancellor, who decided that one of them was bad, and ordered the others to stand over for argument, the Court, on showing cause, enlarged the rule, with a stay of proceedings. Rex v. Ricketts, 64.

COPYHOLD.-See DEVISE.

A custom in a manor required that the consent of the husband to a surrender by his wife should be expressed in the surrender and admission; a surrender was made by a wife at a general court, and the husband was present at that court, but in the surrender his consent was not expressed :Held, that the surrender was inoperative. also, that the Court could not infer from circumstances that the husband's consent had been given. Doe d. Shelton v. Shelton, 287.

Held

Semble, that such a surrender would not be good, even if the husband were divested of all property at the time. Id.

CORONER.-See PRACTICE.

CORPORATION.

King Edward 1. by charter granted to the

borough of Carnarvon, that the constable for the time being of the castle of Carnarvon should be mayor of the borough, to be sworn in a manner prescribed in the charter. The Marquis of Anglesea was appointed constable of the castle of Carnarvon by George 3: he continued in that office until January, 1831, under that appointment, and was then re-appointed by William 4: -Held, that his title was not complete, as mayor of the borough, until he had taken the oath required by the charter; and, consequently, that an appointment by him of the defendant as deputy mayor was invalid. Rex v. Roberts, 444.

The grant by William 4 was a new appointment to the office, and not merely a confirmation of the old appointment of the Marquis of Anglesea. Id.

Quare, whether an officer in the situation of the constable of the castle of Carnarvon, can ap

point a deputy to be mayor of the borough; and if so, whether the appointment must be by deed. Id.

In an action by an attorney for his work and labour as such against a corporation of which he was a burgess, the Court refused to grant him inspection of the books of the corporation. Stevens v. Mayor of Berwick, 517.

Under the 5 & 6 W. 4, c. 76, s. 8, places which are made parts of boroughs, are made so for all purposes; therefore, since the passing of that act, county justices have no jurisdiction over places which are included within the metes and bounds of a borough. Rex v. The Justices of Gloucestershire, 682.

In an action by a corporation, a witness stated on the voire dire that he had been a member of the corporation, but that he was disfranchised:Held, that the answer was not conclusive, so as to preclude further inquiry as to the mode of disfranchisement. The Bailiffs of Godmanchester

v. Phillips, 686.

He stated, in answer to such inquiry, that he was disfranchised by having resigned at a corporate meeting; he did not know the number present on that occasion, but referred to the corporation books which were in Court:- Held, that it was competent to refer to those books, to show that there was not a sufficient majority present on that occasion, so as to invalidate the resignation, and show the witness to be still a member of the corporation. Id.

A charter granted to a corporation, consisting of two bailiffs, and twelve assistants and commonalty, or the greater part of them, of whom the bailiffs for the time being shall be two, to do corporate acts:-Held, that the necessary majority must consist of the two bailiffs, and a majority of twelve assistants; and therefore that a meeting, at which the two bailiffs and six assistants were present, was not a good corporate meeting. Id.

The exemption of a plaintiff executor from costs, under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 31, after a verdict for the defendant, is a matter entirely of discretion; and the decision of a judge upon the point is final: the power of the judge being under that statute co-ordinate with that of the whole Court. Maddox v. Phillips, 251.

In assumpsit on promises to an executor, the defendant on a nonsuit is entitled to his costs, under the 23 Hen. 8, c. 15; and semble, that the Court has no jurisdiction to deprive him of them by the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 31. Spence v. Albert, 7,

The burden of making out an exemption from costs, under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 31, on the part of an executor plaintiff who has failed in his action, lies on him; because the exemption is an exception from the general rule under which executors who are plaintiffs and have failed are liable for costs. Farley v. Briant, 775.

It is not sufficient for such a plaintiff to show that the action was brought bona fide under legal advice to try a doubtful point of law, which it was necessary to have decided in order to obtain an equitable administration of assets in a creditor's suit. Id.

The conduct of the defendant after action brought, relative to the mode of conducting the defence, will not be considered by the Court in exercising their discretion. Id.

Where a jury, not being able to agree upon a verdict, were dismissed by the judge, but without the consent of the parties, the Court refused to grant the plaintiff, who obtained a verdict at a second trial, the costs of the first. Seally v. Powis, 118.

The 74th rule H. T. 2 Will. 4, extends to give the defendant the costs of an issue found for him on a demise in ejectment, which the lessor of the plaintiff abandoned at the trial, though the evidence was equally applicable to the demise, upon which he succeeded. It is not necessary under the terms of the rule, that the costs should be confined exclusively to the issue found for the defendant; but the question of amount is entirely a question for the master, with which the Court will not interfere. Smith and Payne v. Webber,

10.

Where, in case for libel, on the general issue, the jury found for the plaintiff, and also found as a fact, that a great part of the declaration did not apply specifically to the plaintiff; though there were inuendos by which it was endeavoured to connect him with the matter complained of: -Held, that the defendant was entitled to the costs of that part. Prudhomme v. Fraser, 5.

In trespass, four defendants pleaded separate pleas by the same attorney; one the general issue and a justification, upon both of which he was found guilty; another, similar pleas, but was only found guilty on the general issue; and the two others the general issue only, upon which they were acquitted:- Held, that the costs payable to the three last might be set off against the costs which the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the first. Lees v. Kendall, 316.

In trespass for assault, battery, and false imprisonment, and tearing the plaintiff's clothes, there was issue upon a new assignment to a plea of son assault demesne. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff with one shilling damages: Held, that the judge had no power to certify under the 43 Eliz. c. 6, to deprive plaintiff of costs. Bone v. Dawe, 311.

Where in such a case the judge had certified, the Court granted a rule on the Master to tax the plaintiff his costs, notwithstanding the certificate. Id.

In an action for the diversion of a watercourse, where a plea of not guilty was found for the plaintiff, but a plea denying the right to the water, for the defendant:- Held, that the defendant was entitled to the general costs of the cause. Frankum v. Earl of Falmouth, 337.

Quare. Whether under the statute 7 Geo. 4, a prosecutor under recognizances to prosecute at the sessions, who prosecuted at the assizes, is entitled to costs. Rex v. Jeyes, 325.

Semble, that the statute meant to give costs to those parties only who have previously gone before a magistrate. It does not apply to cases where an indictment is preferred after a magistrate has dismissed the complaint. Per Littledale, J. Id.

The Court will not interfere where a judge has granted a certificate under the stat. 43 Eliz. c. 6, to deprive the plaintiff of costs, except upon the question whether he had power to grant the certificate. Cann v. Facey, 482.

An application for security for costs may be granted after plea pleaded. Fletcher v. Lew, 430.

Costs of increase form no integral part of the suit, as they are awarded by the Court in consequence of the damages recovered by the plaintiff, and form the subject of a distinct and separate adjudication. Taylor v. Wilkinson, 451.

In ejectment, where there was but one count, and the lessor of the plaintiff recovered judgment for part only of the lands claimed, the defendant succeeding as to the chief question in dispute:Held, that the defendant was entitled to have his costs as to the part found for him set off against the costs of the lessor of the plaintiff, under the rule H. T. 2 Will. 4, I. 74. Doe d. Errington v. Errington, 502.