Forgery embraces a case where one unwittingly signs an instrument in the form of a negotiable promissory note, relying upon false representations made to him at the time, that the instrument he is signing is a contract of an entirely different nature. Gibbs v. Linabury, 22 Mich. 479; Anderson v.. Walter, 34 Mich. 113. Credit Lyonnais [1897], 1 Q. B. the manner the note was signed, 148, but as sec. 24 of the English and the want of authority on act is restricted in the manner the part of the actor to sign his above stated the case does not name, but who understandingly aid in the construction of the and unequivocally adopts the sigAmerican statute. nature and assumes the note as his own. It is difficult to perceive why such adoption should not bind the party whose name is placed on the note as promisor as effectually as if he had adopted the note when executed by one professing to be authorized, and to act as an agent as indicated by the form of the signature, but who in fact had no authority. It is, however, urged that public policy forbids sanctioning the ratification of a forged note as it may have a tendency to stifle prosecutions for criminal offenses. It would seem, however, that this must stand upon the general principles applicable to other contracts, and is only to be defeated where the agreement was upon the understanding that if the signature was adopted the guilty party was not to be prosecuted for the criminal offense." To the contrary: McHugh v. County of Schuylkill, 67 Pa. St. 391; Building and Loan Assn. v. Walton, 181 Pa. St. 201; Workman v. Wright, 33 Ohio St. 405, 31 Am. Rep. 547; Smith v. Tramel, 68 Iowa 488; Henry v. Heeb, 114 Ind. 280; Brooke v. Hook, 24 L. T. (n. s.) 34. One whose name has been forged may be estopped from setting up the forgery as a defense. 2-As to the ratification of a forgery there is a conflict of authority. Some courts hold that a person can adopt and affirm his signature made by another without authority, and thereby subject himself to liability on the instrument. Ashpitel v. Bryan, 3 B. & S. 492; Seaver v. Weston, 163 Mass. 202; Bowlin v. Creel, 63 Mo. App. 229; Casco Bank v. Keen, 53 Me. 103; Forsythe v. Bonta, 5 Bush 547; Greenfield Bank v. Crafts, 4 Allen 447. In the case last cited the court said: "It was clearly competent, if duly authorized (i. e., the signing), thus to sign the note. It is, as it seems to us, equally competent for the party, he knowing all the circumstances as to the signature and intending to adopt the note, to ratify the same and thus confirm what was originally an unauthorized and illegal act. We are supposing the case of a party acting with full knowledge of 28. Holder for value, what con- 31. Accommodation party, liabilstitutes. ity of. Sec. 26. Consideration; presumption of.-Every negotiable instrument is deemed prima facie to have been issued for valuable consideration; and every person whose signature appears thereon to have become a party thereto for value.1 Johnson v. Sutherland, 39 Mich. 1-Herein lies one controlling distinction between contracts of the law merchant and contracts of the common law. It is presumed that negotiable instruments were given for a valid consideration and the burden is upon the party alleging no consideration to prove his allegation. Rood v. Jones, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 188; Matteson v. Morris, 40 Mich. 52; Manistee Nat. Bank v. Seymour, 64 Mich. 59; Conrad Seipp Brewing Co. v. Under the law merchant a bill McKittrick, 86 Mich. 191; Beath of exchange non-negotiable by reaV. Chapoton, 124 Mich. 508; son of lacking the words "to orYoung v. Shepard's Est. Id. 552; der," or "bearer" nevertheless imFarnsworth V. Fraser (Mich.), ports a consideration. But a bill 100 N. W. 400; Taylor v. Taylor's non-negotiable by reason of beEst. (Mich.) 101 N. W. 832; Un- ing payable out of a particular ion Trust Co. v. Morgans (Mich.) fund does not import a consider103 N. W. 568. When the con- ation under either the law mersideration of a promissory note chant or the statute. Daniel's Neg. is named therein it is part of Inst. (5th ed.) sec. 161; Nat the contract itself and the con- Sav. Bank V. Cable, 73 Conn. tract cannot be so varied by parol 568, 48 Atl. 428; Louisville etc. as to show another consideration. R. R. Co. v. Caldwell, 98 Ind. 251; Cowan v. Hallack, 9 Col. 576. For cases under the statute see: Bringman v. Von Glahn, 71 N. Y. App. Div. 537, 75 N. Y. Supp. 845; Towles v. Tanner, 21 App. (D. C.) 530; Black v. Bank, 96 Md. 399; Hickok v. Bunting, 92 App. Div. 167, 86 N. Y. Supp. 1059; Moak v. Stevens, 91 N. Y. Supp. 903, 45 Misc. Rep. 147; Karsch V. Pottier etc. Co., 82 App. Div. 230, 81 N. Y. Supp. 782; Bank v. Dooley, 113 Wis. 590. Under the statute a nonnegotiable note does not import consideration. Deyo v. Thompson, 53 N. Y. App. Div. 9, 65 N. Y. Supp. 459. Sec. 27. Consideration, what constitutes.-Value is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.1 An antecedent or pre-existing debt constitutes value, and is deemed such whether the instrument is payable on demand or at a future time.2 1-A valuable consideration is necessary to support a negotiable instrument as well as any other contract. This is the settled rule. A note given by a father to his son as the son's share in the father's estate being but a promise to make a gift in the future is without consideration and unenforceable against the estate by the payee or by the indorsee with knowledge of the facts. Conrad v. Manning's Est., 125 Mich. 77; Phelps v. Phelps, 28 Barb. 121; Richardson v. Richardson, 148 IM. 563, 36 N. E. 608. But see Eaton v. Libbey, 165 Mass. 218, 42 N. E. 1127, where the privilege of naming a child was held a valid consideration for a promise. Sufficient consideration: Rood v. Jones, 1 Doug. 188; Miller v. Finley, 26 Mich. 249; Wright v. Irwin, 35 Mich. 347; Dansby, 42 Mich. 82; v. Frost, 55 Mich. 230; Kays, 64 Mich. 439; Taylor v. Parsons Hanold v. McCabe v. Caner, 68 Mich. 182; Steers v. Holmes, 79 Mich. 430; Aultman etc. v. Gorham, 87 Mich. 233; Walton v. Mason, 109 Mich. 486; Hilbert v. Barry, 111 Mich. 698; Union Banking Co. v. Martin's Est., 113 Mich. 521; Stevens v. McLachlan, 120 Mich. 285; Walbridge v. Tuller, 125 Mich. 218. Lack of Consideration: Kulenkamp V. Groff, 71 Mich. 675; Thornton v. Damm, 120 Mich. 510; Graham v. Alexander, 123 Mich. 168; Taylor v. Weeks, 121 Mich. 233; Brown v. Smedley, (Mich.) 98 N. W. 856; Nowack v. Lehmann, (Mich.) 102 N. W. 992. Illegal consideration: Where a note is given upon an illegal consideration or one contrary to public policy, it is as if it were given for no consideration at all and is unenforceable. Comstock v. Draper, 1 Mich. 481; Paton v. Coit, 5 Mich. 505; People v. Twp., 11 Mich. 222; O'Hara v. Carpenter, 23 Mich. 410; Buck v. First Nat. Bank, 27 Mich. 293; Hannah v. Fife, 27 Mich. 180; Hill v. Callaghan, 31 Mich. 424; Snyder v. Willey, 33 Mich. 483; Williams v. Guarde, 34 Mich. 82; Lyon v. Waldo, 36 Mich. 345; Wisner V. Bardwell, 38 Mich. 278; Mut. Assn. v. Hoyt, 46 Mich. 473; Shaw v. Clark, 49 Mich. 384; Tinker v. Hurst, 70 Mich. 159; Turnbull v. Twp., 74 Mich. 621; Fosdick v. Van Arsdale, 74 Mich. 302; Ward v. Doane, 77 Mich. 328; Goodrich v. McDonald, 77 Mich. 486; Chapman v. Remington, 80 Mich. 552; Wolf v. Troxell Est., 94 Mich. 573; French V. Talbot Pav. Co., 100 Mich. 443; Case v. Smith, 107 Mich. 416; Heffron v. Daly, 133 Mich. 613; Hubbard v. Freiberger, 133 Mich. 139. 2-This affirms the rule in Michigan and many other states. Bostwick v. Dodge, 1 Doug. 413; Outhwite v. Porter, 13 Mich. 533; Hanold v. Kays, 64 Mich. 439; Crump v. Berdan, 97 Mich. 293; Burroughs v. Ploof, 73 Mich. 607. In the case last cited it was held that the debt must have been extinguished to render the holder, a holder for value. See also Henriques v. Ypsilanti Sav. Bank, 84 Mich. 168; City Bank v. Dill, id. 549; Currie v. Misa, L. R. 10 Ex. 153. Whether this section extends the rule that an antecedent or preëxisting debt constitutes value the giving or transfer of an instrument as collateral security for a preëxisting debt does not constitute a valuable consideration. The rule is thus expressed: One who takes a note as additional security for a preëxisting debt, without releasing any security already held or agreeing to extend the time of payment is not a bona fide holder for value. Boxheimer v. Gunn, 24 Mich. 372; Hanold v. Kays, 64 Mich. 439; Burroughs v. Ploof, 73 Mich. 607; Maynard v. Davis, 127 Mich. 571. The former New York rule as established in Coddington v. Bay, 20 Johns. 636, was that when a note is given as payment or as collateral security for the payment of a preexisting debt it is not based on sufficient consideration. This rule has been followed by a minority of the other states. Thompson v. Maddux, 117 Ala. 468, 23 So. 157; Goodman v. Simonds, 19 Mo. 106; Penn. Bank v. Frankish, 91 Pa. St. 339; First Nat. Bank v. Strauss, 66 Miss. 479, 6 So. 233; Jenkins v. Schaub, 14 Wis. 1; Roach v. Woodall, 91 Tenn. 206; Bank v. Wright, 63 Ark. 604; Bone v. Tharp, 63 Iowa 223. The United States courts and a majority of the state courts have taken a different view. Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. (U. S.) 1. In Railroad Co. v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 25 the court said, “Our conclusion, therefore, is that the transfer before maturity of negotiable paper, as security for an antecedent debt, merely, without other circumstances, if the paper be so indorsed that the holder becomes a party to the instrument although the transfer is without express agreement by the creditor for indulgence, is not an improper use of such paper, and is as much in the usual course of commercial business as its transfer in payment of such debt. In either case the bona fide holder is unaffected by equities or defenses between prior parties of which he had no notice. This conclusion is abundantly sustained by authority. A different determination by this court would, we apprehend, greatly surprise both the legal profession and the commercial world." Maitland V. Citizens' Nat. Bank, 40 Md. 540; Alexander v. Bank, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 620, 47 S. W. 840; Rockville Nat. Bank v. Citizen's Gas Light Co., 72 Conn. 581, 45 Atl. 361; Nat. Revere Bank v. Morse, 163 Mass. 383; Dunham v. Peterson, 5 N. Dak. 414, 67 N. W. 293, 57 Am. St. Rep. 556; Spencer v. Sloan, 108 Ind. 183; Bonaud v. Genesi, 42 Ga. 639; McPherson v. Boundreau, 48 La. Ann. 431; Barker v. Lichtenberger, 41 Neb. 751, 60 N. W. 79. Thus the authorities were in irreconcilable conflict. It was the evident purpose of the statute to settle the question, but it would appear that the purpose has failed of accomplishment. This provision of the statute has been passed upon by the courts of Virginia, North Carolina and New York. was held that a preëxisting debt constitutes value for the transfer of negotiable paper and a person to whom a negotiable instrument has been pledged as collateral is a holder to the extent of the amount due him. In Brooks v. Sullivan, 129 N. C. 190 it was held that when a negotiable instrument is transferred before maturity as collateral security for a preëxisting debt, the assignee is such a holder for value to the extent of the debt secured, that he takes the paper free from all equities of which he had no notice; changing the prior law of North Carolina. In Mohlman Co. v. McKane, 60 N. Y. App. Div. 546, 69 N. Y. Supp. 1046, it was held that under the statute, receiving a note as security for a debt or forbearance to sue upon a present claim or debt, constitutes a consideration for the note or an indorsement of the note made for the purpose of procuring its acceptance. See also Petrie v. Miller, 57 App. Div. 17, 173 N. Y. 596. Brewster v. Shrader, 26 Misc. Rep. 480, 57 N. Y. Supp. 606, was the first New York case in which this provision of the statute was specially construed. The court said: "Prior to the enactment of the said law it was the settled rule in this state that one who receives a promissory note as collateral security merely, for an antecedent debt, cannot enforce such note against a maker or indorser thereof when the same has In Payne v. Zell, 98 Va. 294, it been obtained by fraud, or has |