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596. In each of the cases menValue of subject-mat- tioned in cases (a) and (b) of sec. tion 595,

the amount or value of the subject-matter of the suit in the Court of First instance must be ten thousand rupees or upwards, and the amount or value of the matter in dispute on appeal to Her Majesty in Council, must be the same sum or upwards,

or the decree must involve, direct or indirectly, some claim or question to, or respecting, property of like amount or value,

and where the decree appealed from affirms the decision of the Court immediately below the Court passing such decree, the appeal must involve some substantial See p. 376. question of law. * (c)

† S. 2.

Bar of certain appeals.

597. Notwithstanding anything contained in section 595,

no appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council from the judgment of one Judge of a High Court established under the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth of Victoria, chapter 104, or of one Judge of a Division Court, or of two or more Judges of such High Court, or of a Division Court constituted by two or more Judges of such High Court, whenever such Judges are equally divided in opinion, and do not amount in number to a majority of the whole of the Judges of the High Court at the time being;

and no appeal shall lie to Her Majesty in Council from any decree which, under section 586, is final.

Application

to Court

598. Whoever desires to appeal whose decree is complain- under this chapter to Her Majesty in Council must apply by petition

ed of.

to the Court whose decree is complained of.

599. Repealed by Act XV. of 1877.(d)

or fitness.

600. Every petition under section 528 must state the grounds of appeal, and pray for Certificate as to value certificate, either that, as regards amount or value and nature, the case fulfis the requirements of section 596, or that it is otherwise a fit one for appeal to Her Majesty in Council. Upon receipt of such petition, the Court may direct notice to be served on the opposite party to show cause why the said certificate should not be granted. (e) 601. If such certificate be refused, the petition shall be dismissed: Provided that, if the decree complained of be a final decree passed by a Court other than a High Court, the order refusing the certificate shall be appealable to the High Court to which the former Court ist subordinate.

Effect of refusal of certificate.

*

CHAPTER XLV.

Nay, more, there are questions of Hindu and Mohametan law discussed before that tribunal; the result of which is of the utmost importance to the parties. The Court has then the assistance of persons, who having practised as Judges in India, are familiar with such questions.

Appeals to Her Majesty in Council lie from any *decree, final and (1) passed in appeal by any Court of final appellate jurisdiction (2) passed by High Court in exercise of original Civil jurisdiction (3) any decree if the case be certified a fit one for such appeal. In the first two cases the value of the subject matter of the suits in the first instance and of the matter in dispute on appeal to Her Magesty in Council must be Rs. 10,000 and upward or decree must directly or indirectly involve claim or question to or respecting property of like value and if decree appealed from affirms that of the Court immediately below the appeal must involve a substantial question of law. Appeals from judgment of (1) one Judge of a High Court under 24 and 25 vic. c 104, or (2) one Judge of a Division Court or (3) two or more Judges of such High Court or (4) of Division Courts constituted. by two or more Judges, of such High Court, equally divided, and not being majority of the whole of Judges of High Court at the time being, or (5) from, decrees from which no appeal lies are absolutely barred. The applicant must apply by petition to the Court from whose decree he appeals within six months from the date of such decree or first Court day subsequent if the time expire during a holiday. The petition must state grounds of appeal and pray for certificate that case is fit one in amount and other respects for appeal prayed for. Upon receipt of petition the Court may direct notice to be served on the opposite party to show cause against it. If the certificate be refused, the petition must be dismissed, unless the Court be not a High Court, in which case an appeal may be made within 30 days from the date of the order to the High Court to which such Court is subordinate. Within 6 months from the date of the decree or six, weeks from the grant of the certificate the applicant must give security for respondent's costs, deposit amount for complete preparation and transmission of record, and for printing the same, if applicant prefers to print in India.

Formal documents directed by Her Majesty in Council to be excluded, papers which the parties agree to exclude, accounts or portions thereof considered necessary by the appointed officer of the Court, and which the parties do not specifically ask to be included, and other documents which the High Court may direct to be excluded need not be copied or printed. On completion of security and deposit the Court may declare the appeal admitted, give notice to the respondent, and shall transmit to Her Majesty in Council correct copy of prepared record, and give to either party one or more authenticated copies on application and payment of reasonable expenses incurred. The security is liable to revocation and further directions any time before admission of appeal, and also any time after, but prior to transmission, the Court can order other and sufficient security to be furnished and deposit for preparation of record increased if necessary. If appellant fail to comply with such orders the appeal shall not proceed without an order from Her Majesty in Council and execution of the decree shall not be stayed. After transmission any balance of the deposit left over shall be returned to appellant. The decree appealed against shall be unconditionally executed unless the Court admitting appeal direct otherwise, but, if snch Court think fit, on any special cause, it may impound any movable property in dispute, take security from respondent for due performance of any order that may be passed by Her Majesty in Council, stay execution, taking similar security from appellants, or place any party seeking Court's assistance under such condition or pass such orders as it thinks fit. The above security, if found inadequate, may be be increased at any time during pendency of appeal.

Should such further security not be furnished by appellant, Court, on respondent's request, may issue execution, or if it be required from the respondent and he do not furnish it, the Court shall, as far as practicable, stay further execution and restore parties to the position they respectively occupied when the security which appears inadequate was furnished, or pass other fitting order.

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Any person seeking to enforce orders, &c., of Her Majesty in Council shall apply by petition, with certified copy of the said orders, &c., to the Conrt from which the appeal was taken, and such Court shall transmit it to the Court of First Instance, or other Court directed by Her Majesty in Council and give any necessary directions; all such are at once to be carried out as in any other decree by such Court. If the monies in the decree be expressed in British currency, they are to be paid at the rate of exchange fixed by Secretary of State for financial transactions between Imperial and

* Includes in this Chapter judgment and order.

* See p. 378.

+See p. 379.

602. If the certificate be granted, the applicant shall, within six months from the date Security and deposit requir- of the decree complained of, or ed on grant of certificate. within six weeks from the grant

of the certificate, whichever is the later date,

(a) give security for the costs of the respondent, and (b) deposit the amount required to defray the expense of translating, transcribing, indexing and transmitting to Her Majesty in Council, a correct copy of the whole of the suit, except

(1) formal documents directed to be excluded by any order of Her Majesty in Council in force for the time being; (2) papers which the parties agree to exclude;

(3) accounts, or portions of accounts, which the officerempowered by the Court for that purpose considers unneo cessary, and which the parties have not specifically asked t be included, and

(4) such other documents as the High Court may direct to be excluded:

and when the applicant prefers to print in India the copy of the record, except as aforesaid, he shall also, within the time mentioned in the first clause of this section, deposit the amount required to defray the expense of printing such copy.* (f)

603. When such security has been completed and deposit Admission of appeal and made to the satisfaction of the Court, procedure thereon, the Court may, (a) declare the appeal admitted, and

(b) give notice thereof to the respondent, and shall then (c) transmit to Her Majesty in Council, under the seal of the Court, a correct copy of the said record, except as aforesaid, and

(d) give to either party one or more authenticated copies of any of the papers in the suit on his applying therefor and paying the reasonable expenses incurred in preparingthem.t(g) 604. At any time before the admission of the appeal, the Court may, upon cause shown, revoke the acceptance of any such security, and make further direc

Revocation of acceptance
of security.
tions thereon.t(h)
605. If at any time

Power to order further
security or payment.

after the admission of the appeal, but before the transmission of the copy of the record except as afore said, to Her Majesty in Council

such security appears inadequate,

or further payment is required for the purpose of translating, transcribing, printing, indexing or transmitting the copy of the record, except as aforesaid,

(Continued on page 380).

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The High Court is Indian Government. Appeals from orders made by executing Court are subject to appeal like the orders of such Court in execution of its own decree empowered to make rules for all matters connected with the enforcement of this chapter, and on being published in the local Gazette, they are to have the force of law in the High Court and Courts subordinate thereto. Nothing, however, in this chapter is to be read as barring the full and unqualified exercise of Her Majesty's pleasure in receiving or rejecting appeals, or as interfering with rules for conduct of business before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Councial, or with Criminal, Admiralty or Prize Court jurisdictions.

(a) An order of the Supreme Court of Madras dismissing a person from his office of Master of that Court, and for alleged official misconduct is not an appealable order made in the course of a judicial proceeding.

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, however, upon the petition of the dismissed Master, reported to Her Majesty, as their opinion, that leave ought to be granted him to enter and prosecute the appeal from the order, the same not being an appealable order under the ordinary provisions for appeal.

It was further recommended that the appeal should come on for hearing upon the petition of appeal and the printed case already lodged on behalf of the petitioner, and that the appeal should be allowed to stand in the same plight and condition as if the same had not been irregular. In re Minchin, M. I. A. IV., 220.

Upon an ex parte applicatlon for special
leave to appeal from an order of the High
Court of Calcutta, made under Bengal
Regulation No. V., of 1831, section 26,
dismissing the petitioner from his office of
Munsiff, for corruption in the exercise of
his judicial functions as Munsiff. Held,
that the office of Munsiff was not a patent
office within the meaning of 22, Geo. III.
chap. 75.

Ex parte Robertson (XI. Moores's Privy
Council Cases, p. 288) is an express authori-
ty that the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council has no jurisdiction to entertain
such an application. In re Sri Mohan
Ghutuck, ib., XIII., 343.

In consideration of the Court deciding an
appeal before them upon one point only,
the council for the appellant, in the pre-
sence and with the consent of the son and
agent of the appellant, stated to the Court
that he would not appeal from such deci-
sion. An appeal, however, having, in viola-
tion of good faith, been brought, the Court
of the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council refused to entertain it.
Neither party having brought the fact of the
High Court having sent over a certificate
mentioning the undertaking, to the notice of
the Court until the hearing, full costs were
not allowed, but a sum of money nomine

expensarum. Múnshi Amir Ali v. Maha-
ráni Indarjeet Singh, M. I. A., XIV.,

203.

As to cross appeals: :—

Application on part of respondents for spe-
cial leave to enter a cross appeal against
portions of a decree of the Sudder Court
of the North-Western Provinces appealed
from to England, so far as the decree af-
fected the applicant's interest, was granted,
although applicants thinking, according to
the practice of the Sudder Court, that
they could state their objections at the
hearing of the principal appeal, without
any formal or separate appeal being in-
stituted by them, had in error. not ap-
plied for leave to appeal within the six
months prescribed. The cross appeal to be
prosecuted and come on for hearing on
one printed case, and on the same print-
ed transcript record as the principal ap-
peal; and if the latter should be dis-
m issed for non prosecution, applicants
to be at liberty to prosecute their appeal
as a separate case. Nana Narain Rao v.
Hurree Punt Bhao, ib., 6, p. 464.
Where appellants through their counsel
stated that they were willing to have the
case argued without the necessity of the
respondent's lodging a petition for leave
to appeal, appeal was heard on the whole
decree. Myna Boyee Utaram, ib. 8, p.400.
So also were a petitioner urged, that ap-
pellants having appealed against the whole
decree, he, acting upon the practice of the
Courts of India, was under the impression,
until the time for appeal had expired,
that it would be open to him at the hearing
of the appeal in England to offer objec-
tions to that portion of the decree to
which he objected, without incurring the
expence of a cross appeal in respect thereof,
leave to file a cross appeal was granted
Owanath Chawdhry v.
but on terms.
Sheikh Nujab Chawdhry, ib. 8, p. 498, I.
A. C., p. 67.

The proceeding of the Governor of Bom-
bay in Council is not an act of a Court,
Judge, or Judicial Officer, within the
meaning of the 3rd sec.of the Statutes 3
and 4, Will 4. Chapter41, but the act of a
person or body not in any sense judicially
delegated and authorised to perform a
particular function. As to responsibility

for the exercise of such power or as to any appeal from that exercise, they were exempted by the legislature which created them. In re the Nawab of Surat, M. I. A., V. 499.

Where the Supreme Court of Bombay in a suit before it in its equitable jurisdiction remitted for trial certain issues which were afterwards tried by the Court on the plea side thereof, and a verdict found for the defendants; the plaintiffs, if they objected to such finding, should have appealed to the equity side of the Court for a new trial as a verdict against the evidence; and the refusal of a new trial, and consequent adoption of the finding, as one of the grounds for a decree, would then have been the subject of appeal, and, the propriety of the decision of facts, could have been considered and decided in the Courts of Appeal. But, the plaintiffs not having done so, they must be taken to have made no objection to the finding, and the verdict on the issues of which the postea, was the only evidences, was to be treated as one proof of the truth of the facts in the cause involved in it, and might be acted upon accordingly.

There having been no application for a new trial, the facts proved on the issues and the propriety of the finding upon it, cannot be brought under the review of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council; and the appeal must be confined to the propriety of the decree on further directions, founded on the postea and the evidence in the Court. Nathubhoy Ramdass v. Mulji Madhodoss, ib. II., 169. (c) The substantial question of law, is not limited to a question of law, arising out of the facts as found by the Courts, from whose decisions it is desired to appeal. A question of law arising on the evidence taken in the case is, without reference to the findings of the lower Courts, sufficient to found an appeal. Moran v. Mittu Bibi, I. L. R., Č. 11., 228.

A suit in which the stamp originally paid, was upon an amount very much less than rupees 10,000, and the whole course of the litigation and the stamps paid throughout had reference to that valuation, though the property was really of the value of rupees 10,000, the Court, upon the strength of a former decision in the Privy Council Department, refused the application for leave, to appeal to Her Majesty in Council. Lekhraj Roy v. Kenhya Singh, S. W. R., XVIII., 494.

Where there are two distinct causes of action, and two separate judgments in the lower Courts, and the suits were never consolidated, but all along treated as

separate and distinct actions, the same cannot be consolidated for the purposes of appeal. Moofti Mohammad Vidullak v. Babu Mootee Chund, M. I. A., I., 363. There being no grounds for a claim for damaages amounting to the appealable sum of rupees 10,000, and the amount actually recovered, falling far short of that sum, the Court directed the costs below to be apportioned according to the ordinary course of the Courts below, and gave neither party the costs of the appeal Mudhun Mohun Dass v. Gokul Dass, ib., X., 563.

A Hiudu widow, as guardian of an infant, represented as the adopted son of her deceased husband, instituted a suit for the recovery of certain landed property from the respondent, and carried the suit in appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. They decided that they had not really such an interest in the appeal, or such a locus standi, as entitled her to insist that the appeal should go on, when the party, in whose name it was brought, had come of age, and wished to withdraw from it. As having incurred costs on behalf of the infant in the suit, she might have a claim to be re-couped from his estate, if he had any; but, that did not entitle her to prosecute the appeal in his name, against his will. Ranee Bistoopren Putnadarje v. Nund Dhul, ib., XIII., 602.

(d) Where through the culpable, but alleged unintentional neglect of the appellant's Mukhtear, certain appeals were struck off the file, for want of prosecution, the grounds of appeal not having been filed within the period of six weeks prescribed; and the evidence showed that it was a case of unavoidable accident they were re-admitted. Anundoyee Dassee v. Poorno Chunder Roy, ib., IX., 38.

A party who in observance of the rule of valuation prescribed by the stamp law of the country in which he sues, has paid stamp duty upon a sum lower than the appealable amount,fis not thereby preclud ed from obtaining leave from the Courts of that country to appeal to Her Majesty in Council, if he can shew that the value of the property in dispute does reach the appealable amount. Babu Lekraj Roy and others v. Kauhya Singh and other, L. R. I. A. I., 317.

(e) Special leave to appeal granted in a suit which had been consolidated by consent of both parties.

A party to a suit having adopted a certain valuation cannot, in the same suit, object to that valuation. Kristo Indro Saha v. Huromonee Dassce, L. R. Í A. I. p., & It appearing that the petition on which special leave to appeal, was granted, con

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