First Department, February, 1921. [Vol. 195. (2) On March 5, 1920, defendant filed a libel in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to recover from the Susquehanna Steamship Company upon the same cause of action, and in that suit issued a writ of foreign attachment and seized the steamship Susquehanna belonging to said company and placed a United States marshal on board and plaintiff was compelled to give a stipulation for value for $147,867.37 to release the vessel and permit it to sail, giving a surety company bond at an expense to it of $1,400. (3) Defendant commenced an action in the Supreme Court, New York county, against the firm of Lamborn & Co. to recover the sum of $147,867.37, upon the alleged assignment of freight moneys, dated December 29, 1919. It is not necessary to enter into a consideration of the various steps already taken in these actions. On November 11, 1920, plaintiff commenced this action in the Supreme Court, New York county, setting forth at length all the transactions between the parties and the pendency of the three actions referred to and asked judgment as follows: (1) That the agreement of the defendant dated September 12, 1919, is a good and valid contract on its part to pay the charter hire as the same should become due to the Lydia Steamship Company, Inc., under its charter with F. E. Crotois (Exhibit A), attached to this complaint. (2) That the defendant defaulted and breached its agreement by a refusal to pay charter moneys which became due November 27, 1919, and by its insistence upon the making of said agreement of November 27, 1919, and it further breached its agreement by the failure to pay the moneys due for the month of February 27 to March 27, 1920, and again for the month of March twenty-seventh to April twenty-seventh, and again for the time April 27 to May 21, 1920, and it is now in default therefor. (3) That the charter of December 29, 1919, for the steamship Lydia by the defendant to the plaintiff was made by the defendant as the managing agent of the plaintiff and without any financial interest of the defendant therein except in the carrying out of its agency so long as such agency should continue. (4) That the agency of the defendant under said charter App. Div.] terminated by its breach of contract and by agreement of the parties prior to the commencement of this action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against this plaintiff to recover alleged charter hire and prior to its commencement of a similar action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, and prior to its commencement of its action for alleged assignment of freight moneys against Lamborn & Co. in the Supreme Court, New York county, and thereby this plaintiff became released and discharged from its obligation to pay said sum of $147,867.37 or any part thereof sued for in said actions 1 and 2 in the United States District Court. (5) That the assignment by the Lydia Steamship Company, Inc., of February 24, 1920, to this plaintiff was a good and valid assignment and transferred all the rights of the Lydia Steamship Company against said defendant and by reason thereof this plaintiff became the principal under said charter between A. O. Andersen & Co., Inc., as agent and the Susquehanna Steamship Company, Inc., dated December 29, 1919. (6) That the assignment, request or instruction of Lamborn & Co. to pay freight moneys to the defendant dated December 29, 1919, was taken by said defendant as a managing agent for the Lydia Steamship Company, Inc., and that it had no financial right, claim or interest in said moneys and was taken conditional upon the acceptance thereof by the said Lamborn & Co. and became lapsed and void through the agreement of the parties subsequent thereto and the substitution of the guaranty of Frank and Joseph Auditore dated January 30, 1920 (Exhibit F), attached to this complaint. (7) That both the obligation of Lamborn & Co. to pay said sum of $147,867.37 to the defendant or of Frank and Joseph Auditore to carry out their guaranty dated January 30, 1920, lapsed and became void by the termination of the agency of the defendant to act for said Lydia Steamship Company, Ine. (8) That there are no moneys due from this plaintiff to the defendant, but that upon the contrary the plaintiff have judgment against the defendant for the sum of $59,063.59 charter moneys due to it as the assignee of the Lydia Steam First Department, February, 1921. [Vol. 195. ship Company, Inc., under the agreement of the defendant dated September 12, 1919. (9) That the defendant be required to account for all the earnings and disbursements received and made by it as the agent of the steamship Lydia under the terms of the agreement of November 28, 1919, and be required to turn over to and account to this plaintiff as the assignee of said Lydia Steamship Company for any balance so collected by it. (10) That the defendant be forever enjoined and restrained from prosecuting said actions in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York and in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to recover the sum of $147,867.37 or any part thereof, and that it be permanently enjoined and restrained from suing this plaintiff for any charter moneys claimed under the charter between the defendant as agent and this plaintiff dated December 29, 1919 (Exhibit D), attached to this complaint. (11) That the defendant be permanently enjoined and restrained from bringing its action against Arthur H. Lamborn and others comprising the firm of Lamborn & Co. to recover the said sum of $147,867.37 under the said request, instruction or assignment dated December 29, 1919 (Exhibit E), attached to the complaint. (12) That the plaintiff have such other and further relief as to the court may seem just, together with the costs and disbursements of this action. On November 12, 1920, plaintiff obtained an order to show cause why an injunction pendente lite should not issue restraining defendant from bringing to trial its three suits, and meantime their prosecution was enjoined. On December 18, 1920, the order was made whereby upon plaintiff's giving an undertaking in the sum of $165,000, defendant was enjoined and restrained during the pendency of this action from proceeding further with the prosecution of the suit brought by it in admiralty in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against the plaintiff and Frank Auditore and Joseph Auditore to recover the sum of $147,867.37 and interest; also from proceeding further with the prosecution of the suit brought by it against the plaintiff in admiralty in the United States District Court for the Eastern App. Div.] District of Virginia, to recover the sum of $147,867.37 with interest; also from proceeding further in the prosecution of the suit brought by it in the New York Supreme Court, New York county, against Arthur H. Lamborn and others, copartners trading under the firm name and style of Lamborn & Co., to recover $147,867.37 with interest. Plaintiff concedes that the general rule as to the right of State courts to enjoin proceedings in the United States court is as laid down by Judge WILLARD BARTLETT in Beardslee v. Ingraham (183 N. Y. 411) as follows (at p. 417): " The general rule that there is no authority in the State courts to enjoin proceedings in the courts of the United States is laid down as distinctly as a judicial proposition can be declared and the correctness of the conclusion finds ample support in the authorities cited. (See Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. [U. S.] 612, 624; Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166; 2 Story's Equity Jur. § 900; Moran v. Sturges, 154 U. S. 256.) In the case last cited (which was a reversal of Matter of Schuyler's Steam Tow Boat Co., 136 N. Y. 169), the question was whether it was within the power of a State court to restrain the libellants in a District Court of the United States from prosecuting their libels, and the chief justice declared the general rule to be that State courts cannot enjoin proceedings in the courts of the United States,' and reviewed a large number of authorities sustaining that doctrine. Furthermore, it is 'a rule of general application that where property is in the actual possession of one court of competent jurisdiction, such possession cannot be disturbed by process out of another court.' (Moran v. Sturges, supra, on p. 274.)" But plaintiff claims that there is an exception to this rule, namely, that the right to enjoin exists where the United States courts have not jurisdiction to properly try the issue and to do justice between the parties, and an irreparable injury will, therefore, result. And it calls attention to the decision handed down by the Supreme Court of the United States on December 6, 1920, in Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor (254 U. S. 175; 41 Sup. Ct. Rep.). Therein the court in sustaining a permanent injunction against the enforcement of a judgment obtained in a court of the State of Mississippi, obtained on the ground that an injustice was created against the company by the judgment, First Department, February, 1921. [Vol. 195. considered the effect of section 265 of the Judicial Code (36) U. S. Stat. at Large, 1162), formerly section 720 of the United States Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. Stat. 1916, § 1242), providing that "The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." The court said: "The provision has been in force more than a century and often has been considered by this court. As the decisions show, it is intended to give effect to a familiar rule of comity, and, like that rule, is limited in its field of operation. Within that field it tends to prevent unseemly interference with the orderly disposal of litigation in the State courts and is salutary; but to carry it beyond that field would materially hamper the Federal courts in the discharge of duties otherwise plainly cast upon them by the Constitution and the laws of Congress, which, of course, is not contemplated. As with many other statutory provisions, this one is designed to be in accord with, and not antagonistic to, our dual system of courts. In recognition of this it has come to be settled by repeated decisions and in actual practice. that, where the elements of Federal and equity jurisdiction are present, the provision does not prevent the Federal courts from enjoining the institution in the State courts of proceedings to enforce local statutes which are repugnant to the Constitution of the United States [citing cases], or prevent them from maintaining and protecting their own jurisdiction, properly acquired and still subsisting, by enjoining attempts to frustrate, defeat or impair it through proceedings in the State courts [citing cases], or prevent them from depriving a party, by means of an injunction, of the benefit of a judgment obtained in a State court in circumstances where its enforcement will be contrary to recognized principles of equity and the standards of good conscience" (citing cases). We deem it sufficient for the disposition of this appeal to hold that plaintiff has not established any ground for the injunction sought. Defendant acted with diligence, and selected its forum for the determination of its claim against plaintiff. The court in which it commenced its actions had jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject-matter of the |