the resignation of the last of the Shoguns. This was the year of Japan's re-birth, and well has the reign of the late Emperor Mutsuhito been called the Meiji, the Era of Enlightenment. The cloud of effete feudalism and dual government disappeared, and Japan's sun shone with radiant hope of better things in the future.

The Japanese, finding that the old barriers of seclusion had been broken down and that the

peoples from the West were clamouring for admission, realised for the second time in their history a danger that could only be met successfully on the ground of national, and not party, patriotism. The old samurai must go, but his spirit must remain, a vital force under modern circumstances. His spirit must be behind the gun of the latest pattern as it used to be behind the bow and arrow in the Wars of the Gempei. And Japan, let it be said to her honour, went to the school of Western civilisation and learned hard lessons, strange lessons, quickly and well. Japan has always been a borrowing nation. From China she learned the wisdom of Confucius, and from Korea, the pupil of the Celestial Empire, not only the teaching of Buddha but the beauties of art and many domestic refinements. With the Restoration she simply changed her school and teachers. England, America, France, and Germany have taught her much; for the wisdom of Japan lies in that rare virtue of never knowing enough, of never closing the inexhaustible Book of Knowledge. But with all Japan's borrowing, all her power of application and adaptation, she has never lost her national spirit, never ceased to be distinctly Japanese. Those apparently futile civil wars succeeded in distilling, as it were, a hardy, alert race. Electric trams rattle through Tokio to-day, and everywhere is to be found the latest scientific invention; but beneath the New Japan, with its elaborate system of education, its efficient army and navy, and its constiutional government, smiles the Old Japan with its

samurai spirit and profound belief in the power of ancestors. It is this samurai spirit, or Bushido, we must now briefly consider.

Bushido means "Precepts of Knighthood" the unwritten code of the military class. It implies far more than mere warfare, for it represents the qualities of the Arthurian knight, without including his strong vein of sentimentality. Bushido embraces courage, honour, benevolence, courtesy, or more briefly all that we infer by chivalry. No one can give the date of its origin or precisely describe all that moulded so complex

a faith inscribed upou the tablets of a warrior's heart. We associate Bushido with feudalism as it existed in the time of Yoritomo. It was a dominant force then, but it began to exist in a crude form long before the time of feudatory lords and their vassals. The Way of the Warrior owed much to Confucius, Mencius, and other Chinese philosophers, but it owed still more to Shintoism, and not a little to Buddhism. The driving force of Bushido, the spiritual power behind the sword, was an unshaken belief in the presence and continual help of ancestors. A battle was waged against a material foe, but the mighty dead were called upon to decide the victory, and prayers were answered on the battlefield as they have since been answered at Mons.

The samurai have been adversely criticised by certain writers. Sir Rutherford Alcock, our first Mirister to Japan, described them as "swashbucklers, swaggering blustering bullies, many cowardly enough to strike an enemy in the back or cut down an unarmed and inoffensive man, but ever ready to fling their own lives away in accomplishing a revenge or carrying out the behest of their chief." These faults cannot be attributed to Bushido, but rather to the fact that the samurai was too often engaged in petty disputes. The national spirit was there all the *ime, and in the main it was kept in the check by mercy, refined by poetry, art, and contemplation,

Lafcadio Hearn in his Japanese Letter wrote :—

I detest with unspeakable detestation the frank selfishness, the apathetic vanity, the shallow vulgar scepticism of the New Japan, the New Japan that prates its contempt about Tempo times, and ridicules the dear old men of the pre-Meiji era, and that never smiles, having a heart as hollow and bitter as a dried lemon.

He wrote again on another occasion:

There will be hearts after a time: Waterbury watches will be substituted instead. These will be cheap and cold but will keep up a tolerably regular ticking.

We must bear in mind that Hearn had an overweening love for Old Japan. He was not a progressive, and would probably have endorsed the following old Chinese law. "Let him who says anything new, or him who shall invent anything new, be put to death." He saw Japan during the ugly period of transition. Had he lived to-day he might have changed his opinions, or at least have modified them. Young men cannot have hearts either like dried lemons or Waterbury watches, who have risen so splendidly as our Ally to crush Prussian militarism in the Far East. The New Japan would have tottered and fallen long ago if it had not been firmly based upon all that was best in the Old. The fighting spirit of Japan to-day is the fighting spirit of many yesterdays, and the fall of Kiaochau has become Bushido's greatest triumph.

Japan has taken, and may possibly continue to take, a prominent position in the present war: too prominent a position in the opinion of certain critics who regard the Japanese with no little suspicion and claim to see in the nation aggressive tendencies that may prove dangerous in future. Japan's interest in Kiaochau dates from the Chino-Japanese War of 1894-5. On April 17, 1895, the conflict was terminated by the Treaty signed at Shimonoseki, giving to the Bushido The Soul of Japan.

Mikado's Empire the peninsula of Liaotung. Owing to the aggressive action of Russia, France, and Germany, the countries that formed the Triple Alliance in the Far East, Japan was deprived of the fruits of victory. Great Britian, in spite of pressure being brought to bear, did not join in this spoliation, and her refusal to do so was not forgotten by Japan. According to the remarkable Memoirs of Count Hayashi, Germany was the chief offender. Her Minister threatened war, informing Hayashi that Japan was not strong enough to fight against Russia, France, and Germany. Japan yielded to the threat of a bullying power. Germany had mocked her victory, and Japan awaited the time when fortune would permit her to right the wrong.

Before Japan's opportunity for vengeance came she was destined to receive another insult from Germany. In 1897, two German missionaries, Nies and Henle, were put to death by Chinese in a district of Shantung. Under ordinary circumstances an apology and indemnity from China would have satisfactorily terminated the matter. Germany, however, made it her business to magnify the gravity of the case. The murdered missionaries became in death, not martyrs in a Christian cause, but the pivot upon which turned German's expansion of Empire in the Far East. The death of these two missionaries was deemed sufficient excuse to force China to lease to Germany, on the 6th March 1898, Kiaochau, of which Tsingtau is the capital, for ninety-nine years, while Russia established a fortified position on the Liaotuang Peninsula at Port Arthur.*

Germans, masters in the art of rapid and efficient organisation, lost no time in making good use of their new possession. Within a few months of occupation engineers had elaborate

By the Treaty of Portsmouth, October 15, 1905, Port Arthur was transferred to Japan. In March, 1915 China granted an extension of the lease to ninety-nine years.

Plans were made

harbour-works well in hand. and approved for a railway from the capital to Tsinanfu, a distance of 256 miles. The first sod was cut by Prince Henry of Prussia in 1899, and in 1904, the railway was opened for traffic. The success of this engineering feat was inevitable, for the permanent way stretched to the very heart of China's teeming population.

While engineers were busy with railway construction, others were no less energetic in completing the great harbour works, and in 1904 over four thousand vessels, including Chinese junks, were accommodated. The natives had regarded Kiaochau as a barren and unprofitable land. The Germans, on the contrary, looked forward to the time when they could make their colony of great strategic importance. They worked with that object well in view. They had to contend with many difficulties, but the goal towards which they marched was worth reaching. Money flowed from the Fatherland, and the Germans in China finally achieved what must be universally admitted to be a triumph in successful colonisation. Among the forty-seven open Chinese ports Tsingtau now "holds the sixth place as a Customs revenue producer." As a naval base, well-supplied with coal, it became a menace to other countries, and particularly to China and Japan. Tsingtau, according to a speech by the Kaiser, was almost as dear to Germany as Berlin itself. Tsingtau was intended to be the springboard which, at the right psychological moment, would precipitate the Germans into further possessions in the Far East. The board was there, but not the spring or the right pyschological moment, and years of incessant toil were destined to be utterly useless. The speech made by Baron von Bülow at the time of the occupation of Kiaochau now makes grim reading from a German point of view. He said :—

All that we have done is to provide that, come what may, we ourselves shall not go empty-handed. The

The

traveller cannot decide when the train is to start, but he can make sure not to miss it when it does start. devil takes the hindmost.

He also said in the same speech :

We have secured in Kiaochau a strategical and political position which assures us a decisive influence on the future of the Far Fast. From this strong position we can look with complacency on the development of affairs,

To-day we hear no more of Teutonic complacency, either in the East or West: it has given place to German "frightfulness" and German hymns of hate.

When Great Britain declared war against Germany, Japan, in compliance with the AngloJapanese Alliance of 1892 (renewed in 1905 and 1911), addressed an ultimatum to Germany on August 15, 1914, in which it was stated that all German warships should withdraw from Japanese and Chinese waters, and deliver up Kiaochau, which would be eventually restored to China. no reply was given, Japan declared war on August 23. In the Imperial Rescript we read:

We, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, on the throne occupied by the same Dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make the following proclamation to all Our loyal and brave subjects:

"We hereby declare war against Germany and We command Our Army and Navy to carry o hostilities against that Empire with all their strength, and We also command all our competent authorities to make every effort in pursuance of their respective duties to attain the national aim within the limit of the law of nations.

"Since the outbreak of the present war in Europe, the calamitous effect of which We view with grave concern, We, on Our part, have entertained hopes of preserving the peace of the Far East by the maintenance of strict neutrality, but the action of Germany has at length compelled Great Britain, Our Ally, to open hostilities against that country, and Germany is at Kiaochau, its leased territory in China, busy with warlike preparations, while armed vessels, cruising the seas of Eastern Asia, are threatening Our commerce and that of Our Ally. The peace of the Far East is thus in jeopardy."

The Rescript is concluded in three more paragraphs, but enough has been quoted to indicate the reason for Japan's interference. It will also be observed that another reason for this action is associated with Japan's grievance against Germany to which we have already referred. Her intervention, however, did not take place without full consultation with Great Britain. It is sated in

the Anglo-Japanese Alliance that :

Whenever, in the opinion of either Great Britain or Japan, any of the rights and interests referred to in the preamble of the agreement are in jeopardy, the two Governments will communicate with one another fully and frankly, and will consider in common the measures which should be taken to safeguard those menaced rights or interests.

The Governments cf Great Britain and Japan were of the opinion that it was necessary to protect their respective interests in the Far East, and both regarded the German territory of Kiaochau as a menace to the peace of the Orient.

The blockade of Tsingtau commenced on August 27, 1914. Adjacent islands served as a local base, and mine-sweeping was soon in active progress The Japanese troops landed at Laoshan Bay on September 18, and were joined about a week later by a small British and Indian force under the command of Brigadier-General N. Barnardiston. The Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Army, General Kamio, was prepared for vigorous resistance. The outer defence, however, including Prince Heinrich Hill, fell into Japanese hands within a day. An important position had been gained, for from this eminence all Tsingtau's forts could be successfully bombarded. On October 14, the naval squadron destroyed part of the Iltis and Kaiser Forts, but a day or two later the Japanese cruiser Takachiho struck a mine and sank. On the anniversary of the birthday of the Emperor of Japan, the army and navy commenced a general bombardment. November 2 marked the destruction of Iltis Fort, and a portion of the attacking infantry was able to occupy a prominent position. The following day, in spite of heavy firing, the besiegers continued their advance. On November 7, the Japanese and British forces occupied central positions on the main line of defence and captured the battery of Shaotan Hill and Tahtungchin, while Chugchiawa Fort was also taken. While the troops were waiting orders to storm the remaining forts, white flags were run up by the enemy. The first was

seen floating from the Observatory at about six o'clock in the morning.

The

surrender of

Kiaochau had fallen. Tsingtau, after a short siege, came as a surprise to many, for the German garrison was expected to hold out until the end of the month, but Fate had decreed otherwise. Kiaochau had not been fortified to anything like the extent projected, and General von Bernhardi had advocated a further expenditure of £5,000,000 for the purpose of completing the defence. At the commencement of the siege the Governor of Tsingtau, Captain Meyer-Waldeck, received an Iron Cross and a congratulatory message from the Kaiser. Neither saved Germany's colony in the Far East, The fall of Kiaochau is undoubtedly one of the most significant events in the great world-conflict. Mr. Blane writes:

:

The fall of Tsingtau, it is safe to say, will be noted as a landmark in the progress of the present War when its history comes to be written. It marks the end of German pretensions in the Far East, and probably the end of her colonial empire. Whatever happens, Tsingtau is lost to her, never to be regained.*

America regarded Japan's action with considerable suspicion.+ The United States were by no means convinced that Germany had made warlike preparations in the East or were destroying commerce, and they saw in Japan's interference an aggressive act of utilitarian significance, an act not rendered free from danger even by the support of Great Britain. In the New York Times we read:

66

Japan's assurances must be accepted in good faith, of course. They are reinforced by the British statement. But there is a general belief that it is the general policy of Japan to assert and to maintain for herself the supremacy of control in the Asiatic waters of the Pacific, with a view probably to the ultimate exclusion of Western nations." Mr. E. Bruce Mitford sees in Japan's action * Nineteenth Century, December 1914,

† Recent events have tended to increase that suspicion. In Japan's rather premature demands on China, the Chinese complain that Japan is anxious to establish a Japanese Protectorate over China. These fears, partly due to German influence, have resulted in a fresh outbreak of Japanophobia in America.

British Review, October 1914.

"not aggrandisement but magnanimity," for he does not seem to doubt the return of Kiaochau to China. He sees Japan stepping forward, not to gain a possession, but to crush Germany in the Far East. "It is the dawn ", he writes, "in the distant East, of that new Era--which, we hope, the downfall of Prussianism will herald in the Westwhen there shall be no more war!" This utopian conception is giving Japan a crown not made by human hands and making virtue its own reward, which is, unfortunately, contrary to the way of nations. We cannot at the present time foresee whether Japan will retain or return Kiaochau, but it is worth noting that Japan has already frightened China into ceding demands quite as valu

able as the colony upon which America looks with anxious eyes, and at a more recent date Japan strongly objected to the restoration of the Monarchy in China, an objection which did not meet with the entire approval of the Celestial Empire. But if Japan is not quite as disinterested as Mr. Bruce Mitford would have us suppose, there is on the other hand no ground for base suspicion. Japan knows that the victory of peace is the greatest victory in the world, and with prudent statesmanship we have no reason to doubt that, so far from stirring up strife, she will be strong enough and wise enough to maintain peace in the Far East.

T is strange that in an agricultural country like India so little should have been done by its people for the improvement of agriculture and the application of scientific methods to this ancient and honorable occupation. While the sons of the soil have taken full advantage of the system of education provided by the British Government in the acquisition of a knowledge of law, medicine, engineering and the like, scientific agriculture has been entirely neglected and the land is being tilled and cultivated to-day as it was centuries ago: and agriculture is, I am afraid, considered as fit only for the Kunbi and the rustic. A good deal has from time to time been written on the subject. There is nothing new that I can write. All that I can hope to do by this article is to reattract attention to the subject with the object of keeping it alive in the mind of the educated and well-to-do classes, who alone can help in the agricultural and economic regeneration of the country.

There are four sources of wealth in the world, namely, (1) the sea, (2) the forest, (3) the mine, and (4) the soil. The sea, as a source of wealth, may be dismissed as of no great importance because it supplies no more than about 2 or 3 per cent. of the wealth of the world. Next in point of importance comes the forest: but as a source of wealth, the forest is of limited utility with the disadvantage, that after you have taken from it what it can yield, it takes years to replenish. In fact, the denudation of the forests of the world has proceeded at such an alarming pace that all the civilised Governments have considered it necessary to introduce stringent measures of forest conservancy. Next in point of importance is the mine but there also we are confronted with the disadvantage, that after it has yielded what it contained it gets must be closed and abandoned.. most important source of wealth is the soil, which cannot get exhausted if judiciously used, and so

exhausted and The fourth and