salvage, general average, or wages of crew or stevedores are classified as preferred. All other maritime liens, as liens for repairs and supplies, are non-preferred. Upon the libel of a vessel for a non-preferred lien, the mortgage is extinguished by sale and clear title is given, in accordance with existing admiralty practice; but the mortgagee may compel the purchaser to give a new mortgage for the balance of the old mortgage term and debt. Otherwise, the new mortgage is identical in terms with the old mortgage. The result is that the mortgage is given as a part of the purchase price-in effect subordinating the non-preferred maritime liens-just as though the vessel were sold subject to the mortgage; yet the international validity accorded admiralty titles obtained from a sale clear of all liens in an in rem proceeding, is preserved. Upon the libel of a vessel for a preferred lien, the existing practice is followed, the mortgage terminated upon the sale of the vessel, and the mortgage lien paid after the preferred maritime lien. Upon foreclosure, the suit is brought in rem in admiralty instead of in the state or federal courts in equity; all liens, including the mortgage lien, are terminated if the vessel is sold; and the mortgage is satisfied before the nonpreferred and after the preferred maritime liens. Inasmuch as the mortgagee can protect himself by insurance against practically all of the preferred maritime liens, except wages, the mortgage lien, in effect, becomes superior to nearly all maritime liens, preferred or non-preferred. The English law had already approximated this favorable situation for the mortgagee by denying a maritime lien and giving only a right of attachment, subject to all prior liens in point of time, to repairmen and supplymen whose claims constitute the largest subsequent liens which can arise against a mortgaged vessel and which cannot be insured against.

The act presents a constitutional question of great interest to the Admiralty Bar. It has long been held that while, under the 'general maritime law" a mortgagee may intervene in in rem proceedings in admiralty and participate in the distribution of the proceeds he may not foreclose his mortgage in admiralty in the absence of Congressional legislation (Bogart vs. The John Jay [1854] 17 How. 399; Schuschard vs. Babbige [1857] 19 How. 239). The act establishes jurisdiction in rem in admiralty to foreclose the preferred mortgage. It is seemingly based on the theory that the constitutional grant of admiralty jurisdiction did not intend to preserve the status quo of 1789, but made available for distribution to the federal courts not only cases arising under the "general maritime law," but also cases upon such other maritime subjects not within the general maritime law, but related to commerce by water, as to which Congress may

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from time to time enact subsequent legislation (Knickerbocker Ice Co. vs. Stewart [1920] 40 S. Ct. 38, 40). The Judiciary Act of 1789 may then be conceived of either as distributing to the federal courts jurisdiction to administer cases arising under the general maritime law" only, while jurisdiction of other cases must be distributed by special enactment, as in subsection K of the Ship Mortgage Act, 1920, or as distributing jurisdiction of all admiralty cases as fast as the necessary substantive legislation makes them available. The Limited Liability Act of 1884 in authorizing proceedings in admiralty to limit liability for torts not within the "general maritime law" forms a precedent (Richardson vs. Harmon [1911] 222 U. S. 106; The No. 6 [C. C. A. 1917] 241 Fed. 69).

Congress in the Merchant Marine Act makes another effort to extend the liability of the ship for torts to seamen. The abrogation of the fellow-servant rule by the Seamen's Act of 1912 did not increase that liability very far, as the Supreme Court pointed out that it did not effect the admiralty rules, especially that giving damages only in case of unseaworthiness of the ship (Chelentis vs. Luckenbach [1918] 247 U. S. 372). The new law attempts to assimilate the position of seamen with that of interstate commerce employees under the Federal Employers' Liability Law.

The generally accepted rule that state compensation statutes were applicable to workmen on and about ships, except seamen on ships in interstate or foreign commerce, was overturned by the Supreme Court so far, at least, as it affected workmen employed by the ship and injured while within the tort jurisdiction of the admiralty. Whether such workmen if injured on land, or any workman in or about a ship if employed by an independent contractor, could still claim compensation was left uncertain. Thereafter, Congress, by the Johnson Amendment (40 Stat. L. 395) sought to overcome this decision and to clear up the uncertainty it created by giving to all maritime workers, including seamen, the benefit of state compensation laws. The Supreme Court has recently held the amendment unconstitutional (Knickerbocker Ice Co. vs. Stewart [1920] 253 U. S. 149).

Among the other interesting labor laws are the provisions of the Transportation Act creating a board to settle railway labor disputes. The investigation and arbitration provisions of this act are voluntary and not compulsory. The Act, however, makes it the "duty" of employees and carriers to exert every reasonable means to avoid interruption of interstate commerce. It has been claimed that this provision would authorize a court of equity to enjoin a strike. The conclusion hardly seems to follow, however, unless all statutory duties whose violation is subject to

no penalty hereafter are to be made the basis of injunctive relief rather than to remain pious legislative declarations.

The so-called "court" of industrial relations created in Kansas contains compulsory provisions intended to prevent strikes in or closing down of establishments in certain industries, notably coal-mining, which are declared affected with a public interest. The Supreme Court of Kansas has recently said that the legislature for purposes of its own, designated as a court an administrative body which in reality is nothing more than a utilities commission with novel powers of regulation in the public in

terest.

In the interest of efficiency and economy New York has departed from the commission as an agency for the administration of its labor laws and has returned to an organization which vests the purely administrative duties in a commissioner and the rulemaking functions in a separate board.

The activities and influence of the federal government continue to expand into fields of power heretofore reserved to the states. The decision of the United States Supreme Court in the child labor case has prevented the expansion of the federal power through indirect regulation of interstate commerce with the effect of local regulation. The taxing power, however, remains available for the accomplishment, to some extent at least, of the same purpose. Moreover, there is a noticeable increase in the tendency to expand the Federal power indirectly by appropriations distributed to the states on condition that they comply with standards set by Federal authority. The proponents of these Federal grants to the states may point to the successful use of this method in Great Britain for the purpose of building up local administration. It unquestionably tends toward efficiency and uniformity, but it likewise has a tendency to restrict individual state initiative and experiment.

The controversy over the administration of military justice finally resulted in the 1920 Revision of the Articles of War (66th, No. 242). When in 1919 this Association undertook an investigation of our system of military justice, defenders of the system contended that there could be no justification for the demand for revision because Congress had revised the Articles of War as late as 1916. Careful examination, however, of the 1916 Revision disclosed the fact that it was principally a consolidation and rearrangement of the then existing law. Some of the changes made in 1916 were, however, important and are essential to an appreciation of the importance of the 1920 Revision.

The most important changes in 1916 were:

(1) Article 17.-The then existing law required the Judge Advocate "to so far consider himself counsel to the accused to prevent leading questions to witnesses and to protect the

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accused against incriminating himself. The amended article dropped the admonition to the Judge Advocate to consider himself "counsel to the accused," and provided that the Judge Advocate should, in the case of an accused not represented by counsel, advise him of his legal rights. The effect of this change was to emphasize the position of the Judge Advocate as a prosecutor and it in fact reduced the protection given to the accused under the pre-existing law because under that law it was always the duty of the Judge Advocate to regard himself as "counsel to the accused" for the purpose of protecting him against leading questions and self-incrimination.

While it is true that the Revision of 1916 required the Judge Advocate to advise the accused of his legal rights, this provision was applicable only when the accused was not represented by counsel; and when it is remembered that the accused is most often represented by a junior officer without knowledge of the law, the effect of the change was a real reduction in the protection given to the accused at his trial.

(2) The pre-existing law prohibited the members of the court or the Judge Advocate from disclosing a sentence of a courtmartial except to the proper authority. The 1916 Revision extended this prohibition to the findings as well as to the sentence. The effect was to give secrecy to a verdict of acquittal until it had been passed on to the "proper authority." The effect was to give color to the theory that the appointing authority is a part of the court-martial, and the court's action is not complete until the appointing authority has passed upon the record. This is the theory on which defenders of the system asserted that verdicts of acquittal could not be set aside. What they meant was that a verdict of not guilty by the court was not a verdict of acquittal until it had been approved by the appointing authority.

(3) The pre-existing law required the Judge Advocate to forward the record of every general court to the Judge AdvocateGeneral of the Army. Article 36 of the 1916 Revision changed this by requiring the Judge Advocate to send the record to the appointing authority. Explaining this change, the revisers said that the Judge Advocate was required to send the record to the appointing authority and he thereby lost control of it. But there was nothing in the pre-existing law indicating the necessity of sending the record to the appointing authority, except the requirement that he approve a sentence before its execution. He was not authorized or required to review and approve or disapprove the record of the trial. The pre-existing law provided that the record" after having been acted upon" should be filed with the Judge Advocate of the proper department. The revised article provided" after being acted upon by the appointing authority" the record should be sent to the Judge Advocate of the proper

department. Here, again, we find changes, the principal effect of which is to give color to the theory that the appointing authority is a constituent part of the court.

(4) Article 43 of the 1916 Revision gave to the majority of the court power to convict, except of a crime for which the death penalty is mandatory. This was the first statutory recognition of the right of the majority to convict and punish for crimes which only a unanimous verdict can convict and punish in the civil courts.

(5) Article 47 of the 1916 Revision by a slight change in phraseology established for the first time the power of the appointing authority to set aside an acquittal or not guilty verdict by a court-martial. Previous to this revision the appointing authority could set aside a sentence imposed on a verdict of guilty; but he had no power to change a verdict of not guilty. This important change was accomplished by adding to the preexisting law, which authorized the setting aside of a sentence, the word "finding." The result, whether or not intended, was that the power to set aside the finding carried with it the power to annul an acquittal, and this power was exercised during the war and gave rise to some of the most vigorous criticisms of the operations of our courts-martial.

The principal changes accomplished by the 1920 Revisions are: (1) Composition of Courts-Martial.-The maximum of 13 and 5, respectively, for general and special courts, is removed, but the minimum of 5 and 3 is retained. This will probably result in fewer officers being detailed to court-martial duties. There is added a provision that officers detailed to court-martial duty shall be those "best qualified for the duty by reason of age, training, experience and judicial temperament." Not more than a minority of the court shall consist of officers with less than two years' service. Provision is made for the detailing by the appointing authority of a "law member" to each general court, who shall be an officer of the Judge Advocate's Department, unless such an officer is not available, when there shall be detailed an officer "specially qualified to perform the duties of law member." This law member is to perform such duties as the President may prescribe. This makes it possible for him to become the judicial officer who shall rule on questions of law. The Trial Judge Advocate for each general or special court is continued and provision is added for a "defense counsel." There is also added in Article 17 a provision that the Trial Judge Advocate shall take an oath to "faithfully and impartially" perform his duties. Provision is made that no person who has acted as a member of the court, as Trial Judge Advocate, or as Defense Counsel, shall subsequently, as Staff Judge Advocate, advise the reviewing or confirming authority on the same case.