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contemplation of Bankruptcy: Fidgeon v. Sharpe, 1 Marsh, 196; Taunt. 539; Wheelwright v. Jackson, Taunt. 109. Under this clause a bill of exchange is a chattel, and its fraudulent delivery, or transfer, will constitute an act of Bankruptcy, Cumming v. Bailey, 6 Bing. 363. A Bankrupt delivering goods to his agent in contemplation of Bankruptcy, for the purpose of selling them for the benefit of both Bankrupt and agent, is not a fraudulent delivery, as the goods in the hands of the agent, must be taken as still in the holding of the Bankrupt: Harwood v. Bartlett, 8 Scott, 171; 6 Bing. N. C. 61. So a mere sale of property, or exchange of it for other property, would not be an act of Bankruptcy: Whitwell v. Thompson, 1 Esp. 68; and see Rust v. Cooper, Cowp. 629; Martin v. Pewtress, 4 Burr. 2478; and see Burney v. Davison, 4 Moore, 127; Berney v. Viner, 4 Moore, 322.

Every such trader doing, suffering, procuring, executing, permitting, making, or causing to be made, any of the acts, deeds, or matters aforesaid, with intent to defeat or delay his Creditors, shall be deemed to have thereby committed an act of Bankruptcy.]—In the above twelve instances, we are given THE ACTS. Here we are given the Intention with which those acts must be accompanied. The act may be innocent, but committed with the intent here set forth, the whole of the trader's estate, and effects, become subject to the operation of the Laws of Bankruptcy; and if the mere intent to defeat or delay Creditors, actually existed in the mind of the trader, at the time the act was committed, it is no matter whether any Creditor was thereby defeated, or delayed, or not: Robertson v. Liddle, 8 East. 487; Wydown's case, 14 Ves. 86; Chenoweth v. Hay, 1 M. & S. 676; Aldridge v. Ireland, 1 Taunt. 273; Colkett v. Freeman, 2 T. R. 59; Ex p. White, 3 Ves. & B. 128; Ex p. Harris, 2 Rose, 27; Bayley v. Schofield, 1 M. & S. 338; Hammond v. Hincks, 5 Esp. 139; Williams v. Nunn, 1 Taunt, 270; and see Harvey v. Ramsbottom, 2 D. & R. 142; 1 B. & C. 55. The intent can be evidenced only by the trader's acts, or admissions. If a man admit that he commited the act with the intent of defeating, or delaying his Creditor's in the recovery of their debts, it is almost conclusive evidence of it, and can scarcely be explained away, see Ranson v. Hay, 2 Bing. 99; any thing said, or written, by the Bankrupt, before his Bankruptcy, tending to shew the intent of an act equivocal in itself, is admissible: Smith v. Cramer, 1 Scott, 541; Scott v. Thomas, 6 Car. & P. 611. If the act be accompanied by circumstances from which the intent may fairly be presumed, it will be sufficient. A trader wrote to his son at his manufactory, that he was unable to meet his engagements with his Creditor's, and requested to be denied to any that might call, and shortly after left the house, and was absent from his home and place of business, the whole of that and the next day, and such absence unaccounted for; this was held to be an act of Bankruptcy Johnson v. Woolf, 2 Scott, 372-and although no Creditor is actually delayed: Rouch v. Great Western Railway Company, 4 Per. & D. 686; 1 Ad. & E. N. S. 5. Yet it is not always because a Creditor is delayed by the act, that such is evidence of the trader's intention in committing it: Ex p. Osborne, 2 Ves. & B. 177; Fowler v.

Padgett, 7 T. R. 509. But if it be a necessary consequence of the act, that Creditors be defeated or delayed, this is presumptive evidence of his intentions to defeat or delay them: Ramsbottom v. Lewis, 1 Camp. 279; Holroyd v. Whitehead, 3 Camp. 530; Ex. p. Kilner, 2 Dea, 325; 3 Mon. & A. 722. Even although it appears that he had other ostensible reasons for it, see Woodie's case, Bull, N. P. 39; Raikes v. Poreau, Cooke, 85; and dict. per Lawrence, J., in Fowler v. Padgett, 7 T. R, 156. So if done to avoid an arrest-Williams v. Nunn, 1 Taunt. 270; Holyrood v. Gwynne, 2 Taunt. 176; Warner v. Barber, 1 Holt, 175; Chenoweth v. Hay, 1 M. & S. 676; Harvey v. Ramsbottom, 2 D. & R. 142; 1 B. & C. 55; Ex p. Bamford, 15 Ves. 459-even although merely for the purpose of gaining the Term: Maylin v. Eyloe, 2 Str. 809. Or if done to avoid the importunity of Creditors: Ramsbottom v. Lewis, 1 Camp. 279; Dudley v. Vaughan, Id. 271; but see Vincent v. Prater, 4 Taunt. 603. Or if done under a pretence which is false, see Capper v. Dessanges, 3 Moore, 4. Or if a trader receive a Creditor, and leave his house, under a pretence of going for money to pay him, but instead of doing so, go to a billiard-table, and do not return for many hours afterwards-Bigg v. Spooner, 2 Esp. 651-or make an appointment to meet and pay his Creditor, and fail to keep it: Widger v. Browning, 9 Dow. & R. 306. These, and the like, are circumstances from which it may be fairly presumed that a trader's intention was to delay his Creditors, for the necessary consequence of them, was that the Creditors must have been delayed by them. But strong presumption may be rebutted by shewing that the trader did not, at the time, entertain the intention imputed to him. For instance, if he prove, upon departing the realm, he left a partner behind him in the country-Ramsbottom v. Lewis, 1 Camp. 272—or that his presence abroad was absolutely necessary, in order to look after his concerns there-Ex p. Mutric, 5 Ves. 574; Warner v. Barber, 1 Holt. 175; and see Fowler v. Padgett, 7 T. R. 509-or that previous to his departure, he made arrangementst hat the interests of his Creditors should be attended to during his absence-Ramsbottom v. Lewis, 1 Camp, 277; and see Waridham v. Patterson, 1 Stark, 144-or that he advertised in the public papers the time when his ship would sail, that he was ready to take shipments-Ex p. Osborne, 2 Ves. & B. 177; or in the case of a denial to a Creditor on a Sunday-Ex p. Preston, 2 Ves. & B. 311; 2 Rose, 21-or that the trader was at dinner, or engaged in some particular business, or that the time was unseasonable-Smith v. Currie, 3 Camp. 349; Shaw v. Thompson, 1 Holt. 159; Ex p. Hall, 1 Atk. 201-or the trader was sick: Bull, N. P. 39-or that the Creditor calling at the private house, was there desired to go to the counting house, he never receiving persons on business at his private house: Round v. Byde, Cooke, 110, 111. All these, and the like, circumstances may be given in evidence to rebut the presumption of the trader's intention arising from circumstances accompanying the act, such as those above mentioned. And the act must be done with intent to defeat or delay Creditors, for if done to avoid performing a mere duty, as to avoid an arrest upon an excommunicato capiendo, or the service of process to enforce a decree in chancery, (unless a decree for

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payment of money)-Com. Dig. Bankrupt, C.; 1 Cooke, 9-or to avoid an attachment upon an award for not delivering goods pursuant thereto-Per Willes, C. J. in Linwood v. Eade, 1 Atk. 196-—it will not of itself constitute an act of Bankruptcy, unless accompanied by circumstances from which also an intent to defeat or delay Creditors may fairly be presumed.

CLASS II.

ACTS WHICH SIMPLY RAISE A PRESUMPTION OF INSOLVENCY.

Blackstone, who speaks of Bankrupts in the improved tone adopted by writers about his time and ever since, yet defines a Bankrupt thus:- "A Bankrupt is a trader who secretes himself, or does certain other acts tending to defraud his Creditors;" 2 Com. 285; and by repeating his definition, ibid. 471, and again, ib. 477, affords evidence of having adopted it, not without due reflection. And it will strike the reader, upon consulting the early statutes, that such description perfectly accords with the spirit of their provisions. In the statutes of Henry and Eliz., and of James, they are "offenders;" and up to the commencement of the reign of James I., acts of Bankruptcy were all acts of fraud, and fraudulent intent should be proved. Towards the close of his reign, however, great innovations appear, as will be seen by reference to 21 Jas. I., c. 19, s. 2. By this section, acts of Insolvency evidenced by not paying or compounding for a debt within six months after it became due, &c., or, lying two months in prison for debt, were made acts of Bankruptcy; and since that period the law has gradually relaxed its rigour towards persons who fail in paying their debts, whilst it has extended its watchfulness over the conduct of traders, in order to secure the property for Creditors.

This altered spirit in dealing with Bankruptcy matters, will account for the increase in the number of involuntary acts of Bankruptcy which appear in the recent Act, the law being desirous to test a trader's solvency in as early a stage as possible.

ACTS OF BANKRUPTCY

Which simply raise a presumption of Insolvency.

These have been divided (p. 23) into 1st.-Voluntary. 2d.-Involuntary.

1st.-Voluntary, where the trader, of his own accord, ex proprio motu, commits an act declared by the statute to be an act of Bankruptcy.

These are seven in number, viz.:—

1ST.-VOLUNTARY ACTS.

1.-Escaping from prison or custody.—6 W. IV., c. 14, s. 21.
2.-Compounding with Petitioning Creditor.-6 W. IV., c. 14, s. 24.
3.-Executing conveyance or assignment by deed to trustees, for benefit of
Creditors.-6 W. IV., c. 14, s. 20.

4.-Filing declaration of Insolvency-6 W. IV., c. 14, s. 22-in Secre-
tary of Bankrupt's office, to be inserted in Gazette, under this
section.

5.-Filing petition in Insolvent Debtors' Court.-3 & 4 Vic., c. 107, s. 27.
6.-Filing declaration in form in Schedule D to this Act-12 & 13
Vic. c. 107, s. 22-in Secretary of Bankrupt's office.
7.--Filing petition for arrangement with Creditors, under section 90 of
same Act.-12 & 13 Vic., c. 107, s. 23.

1. Escaping from prison or custody.]-This was very early made an act of Bankruptcy. Under 21 Jac. I., c. 19, s. 2, it was an act of Bankruptcy to escape from prison, but the arrest must have taken place for a sum of £100, or more, of just debts. Even if he put in bail in order to procure his enlargement when so arrested, he committed an act of Bankruptcy. The statutes 6 Geo. IV., c. 16, s. 5, Eng., and 6 Wm. IV., c. 14, s. 21, Ir., are silent as to the sum for which the person is arrested, therefore any escape from an arrest for debt is an act of Bankruptcy. The following are the words of the section here referred to :"Or if any such trader having been arrested, committed, or detained for debt, shall escape out of prison or custody, every such trader shall be deemed to have thereby committed an act of Bankruptcy, from the time of such arrest, commitment, or detention;" these are also in 6 Geo. IV., above cited. The escape must be in fact, and not merely that which might be deemed an escape in contemplation of law. And, therefore, where a prisoner, arrested in Kent, and brought up by habeas was allowed to call at his attorney's in the City, by the officer who accompanied him, before he brought him to the judge's chambers, this, though an escape in law, was holden not to be such an escape as would constitute an act of Bankruptcy, the prisoner having been substantially in custody the whole of the time: Rose v. Green, 1 Burr. 437; the words "being so arrcsted, committed, or detained," have reference to those immediately preceding them in the section, and comprised under the involuntary acts of Bankruptcy, No. 1. Lying in prison for debt twenty-one days, which see at p. 48.

2. Compounding with petitioning "Creditor.]-By 6 Wm. IV., c. 14, s. 24, Ir., and 6 Geo. IV., c. 16, s. 8, Eng., "If any trader, liable by virtue of this Act to become Bankrupt, shall, after a docket struck against him, pay to the person, or persons, who struck the same, or any of them, money, or give, or deliver to any such person, any such satisfaction or security for his debt, or any part thereof, whereby such person may receive more in the pound, in respect of his debts, than the other Creditors, such payment, gift, delivery, satisfaction, or security, shall be an act of bankruptcy," &c., see Ex p. Brown, 16 Ves. 472;

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Ex p. Mear, 1 Mont. B. L. 20; Ex p. Vernon, 2 Cox, 61; Vernon v. Hankey, Cooke, 116. The word "Creditors in this section means the Creditors who are entitled to receive dividends under the Bankruptcy, in the ordinary way; and the "property," the payment, gift, or delivery of which this section was intended to guard against, is property which would form the subject of administration and distribution under and by virtue of the "fiat" (in Ireland the "commission"). So where a partnership which had subsisted between A, B, and C, was dissolved, and the business continued by A and B, and a separate fiat issued against A, on the petition of a joint creditor of A and B, another separate fiat issued against B, also a joint fiat against A and B, and ultimately a joint fiat against A, B, and C, when all the other fiats were annulled, and between the issuing the separate fiat against A and the adjudication under the joint fiat, against the three, payments were made out of the estate of A and B to the petitioning Creditor under A's separate fiat, it was held that this did not occasion a forfeiture of the debt, under the 8th section: Ex p. Smith, 3 M. D. & D. 144; 7 Jur. 183. Where the petitioning Creditor's debt consisted of the balance of an account settled, and also on an account current, and after commission issued, the Creditor took security for the balance of an account settled, leaving the other account, he was held to have forfeited both debts: Ex p. Vernon, 2 Cox, 61. And where the Bankrupt, after the commission issued, and before certified, gave to the petitioning Creditor, who was also assignee, a bill of exchange for part of his debt, the residue having been proved under the commission, the bill was held to be void, as contrary to the general policy of the Bankrupt law, and contrary to the spirit, although not strictly within the letter of this section: Rose v. Main, 1 Scott, 137; 1 Bing. N. C. 357. And if the agreement of the petitioning Creditor with the Bankrupt is wholly, or in part, the consideration for a bill of exchange, the bill is void, and no action can be maintained upon it-Davis v. Holding, 1 M. 2 W. 159; but the giving a bill of exchange to the petitioning creditor does not make his debt void, so as to preclude his suing on the original consideration where no fiat has been prosecuted, and it does not appear that the Creditor has in fact, or by the agreement could have, received more than his debt: Davis v. Holding, 3 Per. and D. 413. And this obtaining of payment or security seems to be an act of Bankruptcy, although it be uncertain at the time whether the person obtaining it will thereby receive more than the other Creditors: see Ex p. Paxton, 15 Ves. 463. But where a friend of the Debtor agreed to give a Creditor 5s. in the pound on the amount of his debt, on condition that the Creditor should sue out a commission against the Debtor, this was holden to be a legal contract, and a bill given for the amount of it a valid bill: Fry v. Malcolm, 5 Taunt. 117. A payment of part of the petitioning Creditor's debt to an agent of the petitioning Creditor after the fiat issued, but without notice thereof, and with no intention on the part of the petitioning Creditor, or agent, to gain an advantage over the other Creditors, does not bring the case within this section: Ex p. Gardiner, 2 Dea. 142; 3 Mon. & A. 46. So also a Creditor receiving the amount of his debt and costs for the purpose of supersedeas, with the consent of the

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