COURT AND JURY.

1. Where there are no disputed facts in a case, the court may tell the jury, in an absolute form, how they should find. Bevans v. United States, 57.

2. When a patent of prior date is offered in evidence in an action at law, as covering an invention described in the plaintiff's patent, on a charge of infringement, the question of the identity of the two instruments or machines must be left to the jury, if there is so much resemblance as raises the question at all. Tucker v. Spalding, 453.

COURT OF CLAIMS.

A rule of the, requiring parties to present their claims to an executive department before suing in that court, is, under the statutes constituting and regulating that court, unauthorized and void. Clyde v. United States, 38.

BANKRUPTCY LAW.

ACTIONS IN TORT-WHAT DEBTS PROVABLE.

1. An action for an assault and battery and false imprisonment, being a tort for a personal injury to the plaintiff, may be prosecuted to final judgment after the petition in bankruptcy is filed, and a judgment recovered may be proved against the bankrupt's estate, for the reason that a claim of this nature is not a provable debt until final judgment, hence does not come within the language of the second clause of section 21 of the bankrupt act. In re Hennocksburgh & Block, U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. N. Y., 7 N. B. R. 37.

2. It was the intention of congress to adopt the time of the actual adjudication of bankruptcy as the time at which a debt must exist in order to be provable, in contradistinction to the time of the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy. Ib.

PARTNERSHIP.

Two firms shared in a certain venture, and kept an account at bank in the name of one firm, adding the word "Co.," and so signed the checks.

Held, that these checks did not establish a copartnership between the two firms, and that the holder of one of the checks thus signed could not file a petition in bankruptcy against the members of both firms. In re J. H. Warner et al., U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. N. Y., 17 N. B. R. 47.

STATE INSOLVENT LAWS.

After the passage of the bankruptcy act, an insurance company became insolvent and committed such acts of bankruptcy as brought it within the provisions of the act.

Held, that "After this time the operation of any State law regulating the assignment and distribution of the property of the insolvent debtor corporation, and affecting the same persons, property and rights that would be affected by proceedings under the bankrupt act, was suspended." "When the power is exercised by congress, and a bankrupt law is in force, it does suspend all State insolvent laws applicable to like cases, and this effect follows the enactment of such bankrupt law, and does not require the actual institution of proceedings in bankruptcy to produce such a result." Reed et al., Pet'rs, in matter of Independent Insurance Company, U. S. C. C., Mass.

MORTGAGES-PAYMENT.

1. Mortgages and bills of sale of personal property, which are void as to creditors under the statute of frauds of the State where the transactions occur, are

void and convey no title as against the assignee in bankruptcy. Edmonson v. Hyde, assignee, U. S. Cir. Ct., Cal., 7 N. B. R. 1.

2. If a bankrupt does not choose to assert any claim to property that is exempted from execution under the law of the State where he resides, a mortgagee of that property cannot claim it as against the assignee in bankruptcy. Ib.

3. A decree that payment should be made in gold coin is just and proper, as all business transactions in California are based on coin values, and, if the value had been found in currency, the amount would have been increased so as to equal the value as actually found in coin, hence the defendant is in no way injured by the judgment for coin. Ib.

PREFERENCE.

1. Preference in a bankrupt court must rest either on a lawfully acquired lien, created before the filing of a petition by or against the bankrupts, or else the consideration therefor must have been unequivocally in aid of the assignee after adjudication, or in aid of the proceeding in bankruptcy. In re J. F. Nounnan & Co., U. S. Dist. Ct., Utah, 7 N. B. R. 15.

2. Services performed or moneys expended prior to the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, cannot, by any section of the act nor by any rule of law or equity, be construed to be in the aid of the proceedings in bankruptcy. Ib.

LEASE.

It is well settled that, until an assignee in bankruptcy elects to accept a lease as assignee, he does not become liable for rent accruing after the adjudication, hence, when an assignee occupies the leased premises independently of the lease and pays for such occupation, this occupation is not evidence of such an election. In re Ten Eyck & Choate, U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D. N. Y., 7 N. B. R. 26.

INSURANCE LAW.

LIMITATION OF TIME TO SUE.

By a provision of the policy it was to be void unless suit was brought within twelve months after the loss occurred. The fire occurred October 17, 1869. On the 6th of November of the same year, the parties entered into an agreement by which the assured agreed to accept and the company agreed to pay the amount that had been determined by an adjustment on the 6th of February, 1870, unless the assured should be notified by the company before that time of its intention to contest its liability, under the policy, for the loss. The company gave no notice of such intention, and suit was brought November 7, 1870.

Held, that the period from November 6, 1869, to February 6, 1870, should be excluded in the computation, and that the action was brought within the limitation specified in the policy. Black v. Winnesheik Ins. Co., Sup. Ct., Wis., 1 Ins. L. J. 811.

TRANSFER-ASSIGNMENT OF POLICY.

1. The policy contained a condition that, in case of any sale, transfer or change of title to the property insured, the insurance should be void, and cease. A section of the charter of the company-a mutual company, of which the assured became a member-printed on the back of the policy, also provided that the policy should be void upon any alienation of the property by sale or otherwise. Home Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hauslein, Sup. Ct., Ill., 1 Ins. L. J. 818.

2. At the time the insurance was effected, the insured was the absolute owner of the property. He afterward made an assignment of the policy to Seibert, the mortgagee, with the assent of the company, and, subsequent to this, sold and conveyed the property to three other persons, one of whom reconveyed to him, and the other two executed mortgages to secure the purchasemoney. Ib.

3. Held, "The assignee of a policy takes it subject to the conditions expressed upon its face, and his equities confer no right, if the assignor has lost all right of recovery by a violation of the terms or conditions of the policy." The assignee knew of the condition in the policy providing for forfeiture in the event of alienation, and his rights must be controlled thereby. Ib.

4. There was a change of title in the property. The absolute ownership of the entire property is easily distinguished from the ownership of one-third, and a mortgagee of two-thirds. Ib.

5. The assignment was made with the consent of the company, but the condition of forfeiture upon alienation, without the consent of the company, was still applicable to the assignee as well as to the insured. The company did not waive the effect of the breach of the condition. By the act of the insured the policy became void. Ib.

6. It was contended that the memorandum, that the loss, if any, should be payable to the assignee, as his interest might appear, shows that his interest was intended to be protected; and that the change of title did not affect his interest. Ib.

7. The insured cannot sue, because he had so acted as to forfeit the policy. The assignee cannot sue, for he was not a party to the contract originally. In its nature the policy was only assignable so as to pass an equitable interest to the assignee. Even, as in this case, where the assignment was made with the consent of the company, the assignee cannot sue for a breach in his own name. Ib.

FOREIGN COMPANIES.

Action upon a premium note given the company for a health policy. The defense was that the company had not complied with the conditions imposed by the State law upon insurance companies from other States. The court held that it was competent for the State to prescribe conditions, upon which corporations from another State may transact business within its borders, and that such corporations are not citizens of the State in which they are created in such sense as to exempt them from the operation of such conditions, and that as this contract was unlawful under the statute, the note was void in the hands of the company. Cincinnati Mutual Health Assurance Co. v. Rosenthal, Sup. Ct., Ill.

DEFAULT OF AGENT -RIGHTS OF SURETY.

1. Wallis, a local agent of the company, as principal, executed a bond to the company, with appellant as surety, conditioned that he should pay over to the company all moneys he might receive. Raymond was general agent of the same company, and bound by his contract to pay over all moneys received. Wallis failed to pay over certain amounts collected for the company, and Raymond, in the general management of the affairs of the company, paid the money, taking from Wallis his promissory notes, to be paid in a few days. These notes were not surrendered before the judgment.

Held, the principle of subrogation has special applica

The rule is, that where stands in the situation

tion to the facts of this case. the person who pays the debt of a surety, or is compelled to pay, for the protection of his own interests, then, in either case, the substitution will be made. A mere stranger, who pays the debt of another, will not be subrogated to the creditor's rights. Hough v. Etna Life Insurance Co., Sup. Ct., Ill., 1 Ins. L. J. 836.

2. The objection that notice was not given to the surety cannot be maintained. So far as the rights and remedies of the insurance company are concerned, appellant and Wallis are both principals. The appellant was primarily liable for any defalcations; and the company was not compelled to sue Wallis before resorting to its remedy against the surety. Where two persons execute a bond, one as principal and the other as surety, one is equally bound to the obligee as the other. The default did not lie within the peculiar knowledge of the opposite party. In such cases no notice is necessary before suit. Ib.

ADMIRALTY LAW.

Marine insurance: re-insurance -"to commence from loading at as above:" outward cargo to be homeward interest after a certain time. - Declaration upon a policy of insurance under-written by defendants for £1,000, declared to be upon cargo, being a re-insurance subject to all clauses and conditions of the original policy, in the ship D, at and from any port or ports in any order on the west coast of Africa to the vessel's port or ports of call and discharge in the United Kingdom, the insurance to commence "from the loading" of the goods at, as above; that it was a clause and condition of the original policy that the insurance made by it should be for £1,000 upon the cargo valued at £3,500 of the said vessel D, at and from Liverpool to any ports in any order backward and forward and forward and backward on the coast of Africa, and thence back to a port of discharge in the United Kingdom, with leave to increase the valuation of the cargo on the homeward voyage; "outward cargo to be considered homeward interest twenty-four hours after her arrival at her first port of discharge;" that goods were shipped at Liverpool, and the vessel, with goods on board, departed from a port on the west coast of Africa, and in the course of the voyage in the original policy described, and more than twenty-four hours after she had arrived at her first port of discharge, the goods were lost by perils insured against in the original policy.

Demurrer on the ground that it appeared from the declaration that the goods were not loaded at any port on the west coast of Africa.

Held, that the goods, though shipped at Liverpool, were within the policy of re-insurance after the lapse of twenty-four hours from the vessel's arrival at her first port of discharge on the west coast of Africa. As the policy was declared to be a re-insurance, subject to all clauses and conditions of the original policy, and by the original policy outward cargo was to be considered homeward interest twenty-four hours after the vessel's arrival at her first port of discharge, the words from the loading" were not to be construed strictly. Joyce v. The Realm Marine Insurance Co., Q. B., 27 L. T. R. 144.

Judge Fancher, successor on the bench of the supreme court of this State to Judge Barnard, assumed his seat on the 22d inst.

CORRESPONDENCE.

A PRACTICAL COURSE IN LAW SCHOOLS. SPRINGFIELD, MASS., October 27. Editor Albany Law Journal:

It has always seemed to me a matter for wonder that the several law schools of the country have never made any attempt to teach practice in connection with law practically, something after the plan that has proved so successful in commercial colleges. It is well known that in the latter schools pupils are not only instructed in the theory but also in the practice of mercantile operations. Banking departments are run, deposits made, drafts and checks drawn, and in fact every thing conducted as far as possible in the manner of the business world outside; other departments of business are run in the same manner, but the one illustration is sufficient. Something of this sort could be profitably introduced into the schools of law. So poorly is the practice taught in such schools now, that there is not one graduate in a hundred, unless he has previously passed some time in an office, that could conduct, creditably, a case in a justice's court, or draw a deed without a blank or form, or draft a pleading on a promissory note, or do any other of those numerous things that are usually done by the clerks or junior partners in law firms. There is no sense or defense to this. I know that the prime essential is a knowledge of substantive law, and that it is the duty of the schools to teach this, but substantive law will not prove very useful to a lawyer, either in the way of fame or bread and butter, unless he know the machinery by means of which it is to be applied to the affairs of life. A young man will learn the law relating to wills quite as thoroughly, indeed more thoroughly, if he can draft a will without the aid of a form book.

What the schools should do and will ultimately do in connection with their instructions in law is, first, to require constant practice in drafting wills, deeds, mortgages, pleadings, etc., etc. This can be easily done in this wise: The instructor should assume the role of a client desiring to make a will, and give the particulars of the devises and bequests he wishes to make. These should be simple at first; but, after the simple forms are mastered, the instructions should be more complicated. The students from these data should each be required to prepare a will as carefully as he would for a client. This should be done in the lecture-room and without the aid of statute or form book. The instructor should then examine each and note on it its errors and short comings. And so with all the papers and instruments a lawyer is ordinarily called upon to draft. No one imagines that this course will make a lawyer who can draft any and every form of instrument at sight without the aid of statute or study, but it will make one who will be better prepared than most of our law school graduates now are to begin creditably the business of life.

The second thing to be done is, to teach the details of practice by requiring the students to go through with them. This will require a little more trouble, but it will abundantly repay. To do this the several courtsjustices', probate, nisi prius and appellate, having clerks, sheriffs, etc., should be established as nearly like actual courts as circumstances will permit. These should be presided over by a professor as moot courts now are. Take for instance a case in the nisi prius court. Clients, both plaintiff and defendant, should be selected and their attorneys appointed from among the students.

The facts of a supposed case should be given to the plaintiff and his attorneys with full instructions. The attorneys should be required to issue process, draft the pleadings and proceed precisely as in actual practice. The defendants should be instructed as to the facts of the defense and left to draft the answer. At the trial a jury should be regularly impaneled from the students, witnesses instructed on both sides and the case tried under the direct supervision of the teacher. All notices should be given, papers filed with the clerk, and the minutia carefully insisted upon. Then let an appeal be taken and conducted through to the court of last resort.

I have only space to give the idea in the rough, but I trust I have made sufficiently obvious the general scope of the plan.

This may seem like boy's play, and perhaps it is, but it is that kind of play which will save the boys much chagrin, disappointment and trouble when they come to have real clients and real business. It has been said that almost every thing depends upon a lawyer's beginning his professional career right — with eclat, and this course of school instruction will help him to do it. Experience is no doubt the best teacher, but if the lesson is learned at the expense of the client it will prove to the young lawyer a very dear experience indeed.

Will not this new Boston school of law, which has just so prosperously opened, introduce some features like those proposed. If any one can improve upon the plan, let him make it known through the Law JOURNAL. T. G.

ORDERS OF ARREST.

TROY, N. Y., Oct. 28, 1872.

Editor Albany Law Journal:

Dear Sir: I was somewhat amused by a paragraph in the last number of your excellent journal, to the effect that a judge ought not to issue an order for arrest in an action for "breach of promise," where the defendant, who was a lawyer, was about to be married to (another) "very worthy lady." What would you have? Should the judge make it an order to show cause, or appoint a referee to take proofs as to, whether the defendant was about to put it out of his power to repent his breach of contract? I remember reading in a law book, that, where a man had married a wife, it was still not an excuse for not answering a certain summons. How can it be an excuse for not attending to the demands of his creditors, that he is about to marry a wife? However inconsiderate and impolite the slighted fair one may have been, and however inordinately the counsel may have wrought himself up in her behalf, I think it is rather hard on the judge to hold him responsible for it. Really, our circuit judges seem to be too busy to go around inquiring whether the officers of their court are going to be married or not.

THE NEW LORD CHANCELLOR.

Sir Roundell Palmer, the new Lord Chancellor of England, was the second son of the late William Jocelyn Palmer, rector of Mixbury, Oxfordshire, and was born on the 27th of November, 1812. He was educated at Rugby and Trinity College, Oxford. At Oxford his under graduate career was one of more than ordinary brilliancy, as he obtained, in 1831, the chancellor's prize for Latin verse on Numantia, and, in 1832, the Newdigate prize for English verse, the subject being Staffa. He also gained the Ireland university scholarship in 1832, and took his Bachelor's degree in Easter term, 1834, as a first-class man in the school of Litera Humaniores. He was subsequently elected to the Eldon law scholarship, and also to an Oxfordshire fellowship at Magdalen College, which he held for some years. He was called to the bar at Lincoln's-inn in Trinity term, 1837. His career since that time as a chancery barrister has been brilliant, and of late years there has scarcely been an important appeal case before the house of lords in which he has not been engaged professionally. He was appointed Q. C. in April, 1849; was elected M. P. for Plymouth in the "Liberal Conservative" interest. In June, 1853, his old constituency again returned him, and he continued to represent them down to the middle of 1857. After having remained without a seat in parliament for four years, he again entered the house of commons, in July, 1861, as one of the members for Richmond, Yorkshire, which he has represented, in the moderate liberal interest, down to the present time. Sir Roundell Palmer, who is one of the honorary fellows of Magdalen College, was created D. C. L. of Oxford in 1862; he married, in 1848, the Lady Laura Waldegrave, eldest surviving daughter of William, eighth Earl Waldegrave. Sir Roundell Palmer has now been promoted to the highest judicial office without having ever held a seat on the ordinary judicial bench. Erskine was promoted in like manner, per saltum, in 1806; so was Henry Brougham, in 1830; so was Sir Frederick Thesiger, in 1858, and Sir Richard Bethell, in 1861; in 1852, also, Lord St. Leonards was appointed lord chancellor of Great Britain without ever having held a seat on the English judicial bench, though he had sat as lord chancellor in Ireland for a few months in 1835, as did Lord Campbell in 1841.

FOREIGN NOTES.

Earl Russell is said to be writing a pamphlet, indorsing the views of Mr. Chief Justice Cockburn on the Alabama claims question. The repairs to the library of Lincoln's Inn are nearly completed.— Sir John Duke Coleridge, attorney-general of Great Britain, in the course of a recent address before the liberal association of the city of Exeter, said, speaking of the result of the Geneva arbitration, that England had got well out of a bad business.It is reported that

the Hon. George Denman has been appointed the successor, on the bench of the English court of common pleas, of the late Mr. Justice Willes. He is the fourth son of the late Lord Denman, formerly Lord Chief Justice of England, and was called to the bar in 1846, and was made queen's counsel in 1861. Mr. Denman was elected to parliament from Tiverton in 1859, and has represented that borough ever since, with the exception of an interval of a few months. -In Great Britain, during the year ending March 31, 1872, the sum of £649,200, 10s, 8d, was expended in the courts of justice, exclusive of the courts of equity, and the cost for the current year is estimated at £655,000. — The Spanish Cortes has rejected, by a vote of 99 against 58, the resolution providing for the abolition of capital punishment for political offenses. The names of the imperial advisers on whose reports the judgment on the San Juan boundary question is based, are: Grinim, vice-president of the supreme court; Kiepert, the eminent geographer, and Goldschmidt, member of the superior tribunal of Leipzig. The referees handed in their reports four weeks ago. The reports will not be published. They charge England with vagueness in the wording of the treaty of 1846, and state that the word "southerly" means shortest channel to the strait of San Juan de Fuca. A special messenger has left Berlin for Washington.-Prince Napoleon has appealed to the procurator general of France for redress, against the officials who took part in his expulsion from France. The appeal is made in accordance with the provisions of the penal code, and, should it be rejected, he will commence personal proceedings in the courts against the parties concerned, and avail himself of all legal means to procure a restoration of his rights as a citizen of France, and the punishment of those who have illegally driven him from it.— M. Hauji, one of the chief justices of the Empire of Japan, narrowly escaped assassination recently.

LEGAL NEWS.

Chancellor Zabriskee, of New Jersey, has returned from Europe.

The last Pennsylvania legislature passed 1,145 laws, of which number only 48 were public.

A. P. Loring, Esq., who pulled the Harvard "stroke" in the contest with the Oxford four, has been admitted to the bar in Boston.

Ex-Judge Curtis, the senior counsel for Mrs. Fair, is said to have received the sum of $8,000 for his services in her behalf.

Governor Parker, of New Jersey, has appointed Hou. John C. Rafferty judge of the common pleas court of Hunterdon Co. in that State, to fill the vacancy occasioned by the death of Judge Voorhies.

It is said that as soon as congress meets a commission will be appointed to take evidence with regard to distributing among the claimants, the sum awarded at Geneva.

The statue of Hon. Edwin Bates (attorney-general of the United States during a portion of Mr. Lincoln's administration), which was ordered by the city of St. Louis some time ago, has just been completed by the Ames works at Chicopee, Mass.