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ron's sentimental expedition for the independence of Greece. As a friend and guest of Niebuhr, the great Roman historian, as a prisoner at Kopnick, as a private tutor and journalist in London, Lieber passed the six years of his life after returning from Greece. He then determined to shake the dust of tyrannized Europe from his feet, and to seek literary fortune in free America. In 1827 he took up his residence in Boston, where he occupied himself in editing the Encyclopædia Americana, afterward published in Philadelphia. In 1835 he was appointed Professor of History and Political Economy in the South Carolina College at Columbia, a position which he held till he accepted the same professorship in Columbia College, in New York City, in 1858. Prof. Lieber, while holding his chair in Columbia College, was a constant contributor to magazines and periodicals, and published many essays, especially in connection with the subject of prison management and punishment. Among his more striking publications are his translations of De Beaumont and De Tocqueville on the Penitentiary system of the United States, "Reminiscences of Niebuhr," "A Manual of Political Ethics," 66 Essays on Property and Labor," "Civil Liberty and Self Government," "Essays on Subjects of Penal Law and the Penitentiary Sytem," "Abuses of the Pardoning Power," and many others on kindred subjects. Prof. Lieber was familiar in all literary circles, and though far advanced in years, will leave a vacant place which will not be easily filled. - Times.

WITH THE NUMBER for September 28, our very excellent contemporary, the Chicago Legal News, entered upon its fifth year. Mrs. Bradwell, its editor, has displayed a marked degree of enterprise, ability and good judgment in the conduct of her paper, and has made it one of the most valuable publications in this country.

LEGAL NEWS.

Joaquin Miller, the "poet of the Sierras," was once a county judge in Oregon.

A French court has a case before it involving the question whether false teeth are personal property.

A commissioner in the Irish high court of chancery has taken depositions in support of a claim against the United States for a quantity of tobacco destroyed during the late war, valued at $60,000, and the property of Valentine D. O'Connor.

Mr. J. B. Barnet, a Hebrew scholar, contends that the prophet Jeremiah, with the remnant of the tribe of Judah, migrated to Ireland, and was no other than the celebrated Irish reformer and law-giver, Ollam Foda.

The statement that Hon.'E. Peshine Smith, formerly reporter of the supreme court of this State, who went to Japan, as one of the legal advisers of the emperor, has been dismissed from the service of that government, is pronounced untrue by Mr. Mori, the charge d'affaires of the Japan empire at Washington. Mr. Mori says that Mr. Smith went to Japan under contract for a fixed number of years, at a stipulated salary, and can therefore remain, if he so desires, until the expiration of the term.

State Auditor Graham, of Louisiana, who was recently committed to prison for contempt of court, has been pardoned by the Governor.

At a recent meeting of the New York bar association resolutions were adopted providing a new building for the wants of the association. After remarks by S. Tilden and others upon recent judicial investigations, a report was adopted thanking both branches of the legislature for their action. A resolution was also carried providing for the selection of suitable candidates for judgeships at the approaching election, and for the punishment of any of the profession implicated by the investigation of last winter.

Attorney-general Williams has decided that, under the statutes establishing the money order system, the remitter of a money order cannot stop the payment of it after it has passed into the hands of the payer, and cannot demand the repayment of the amount deposited without, at the same time, returning the order. This decision, which is of great practical importance, is based upon the special provisions of our statute, which differs in this respect from the provisions of the English statute on the same subject.

A dispatch from Washington, relative to the Mexican claims commission, says, that the filling of the position of umpire, rendered vacant by the death of Dr. Francis Lieber, will probably lead to trouble. Our government, it is said, would be unwilling to accept any one named by Mexico, as all questions referred would be by lot. The Indian cases, amounting to thirty-two millions, might fall to a Mexican umpire, and interest to his country, it is contended, would necessarily bias his judgment. It is also said that Mexico cannot consistently ask any of the European nations to name an umpire.

Toward the close of the late session of congress an act was passed allowing private entries to be made on public lands, of mines of gold, silver, cinnabar, lead and all other mineral deposits. The department of the interior recently, in view of the reported discovery of diamonds and other precious stones in Arizona and New Mexico, asked the opinion of the attorney-general as to whether entries could be made of these mines in the same manner as of other mines. He has replied that, under the head of mineral deposits, mineral lands of whatever kind, natural or descriptive, can be entered and therefore diamond mines, under certain restrictions made by law, are in like manner subject to private entry.

The United States government lately received communications from Minister Nelson, relative to the interruption of the proceedings of the United States and Mexican mixed claims commission, owing to the conduct of the Mexican commission, but there is as yet no definite action by the Mexican government. There is no doubt that a remonstrance will reach the Mexican government against the course of its commissioner. The commission will expire, by the terms of the convention, in February next, and it is the opinion of some of the attorneys who have had business before it, that the convention will be an entire failure, unless all the cases filed shall be acted on, and that even the awards on those which have been adjudicated will not be paid. The question is, however, considered by others to be involved in doubt.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, OCTOBER 19, 1872.

A FEW WORDS ON JUDICIAL INTEGRITY. So much has been said and written of late about the integrity of the judges, that we are tempted to say something upon the subject ourselves. It seems to be supposed in some quarters that the only forms of corruption are venality and partiality. But there are two others quite as bad, if not worse than partiality, and they are prejudice and fear. Venality is, of course, the worst of all, because it is sordid as well as corrupt, evincing a low and groveling disposition, along with a dishonest one. Whether this form of corruption has ever shown itself in our State, we do not know. No proof of it has been given, and though it has been suspected, the suspicion, so far as we have learned, may be set down to that meanness of spirit which suspects everbody, or that license which assails everbody in this carnival of envy, hatred and all-uncharitableness.

Partiality has been charged and pronounced proven in two instances.

Prejudice and fear have not been charged, at least in a public form; and yet no one has any doubt of their existence. They are as mischievous as partiality, and more to be feared. Prejudice insinuates itself into the mind, in the guise of virtuous indignation; listens to rumor and gossip; believes what it is told; judges without inquiry; and condemns without hearing. The moment it enters the mind of a judge it unfits him for the judicial office. He may think himself free of it, and even if he be conscious of an unfavorable opinion, he may believe himself superior. to its influence, and claim to be able to decide impartially between one whom he regards with disfavor, and an indifferent person as a friend. We know that he cannot. Judges are but men, and are swayed like other men by vehement prejudices. This is corruption in reality, give it whatever other name you please.

To act with partiality toward a litigant has been pronounced corruption; that is, a judge has been condemned as corrupt for making a wrong order under the influence of partiality. Surely it is not a better thing in morals or in law to make a wrong order under the influence of prejudice. To be warped by hatred is no less a meanness and a sin than to be warped by affection. Disliking is no more to be favored or forgiven than liking. For our part, if we care to choose between the two, we should prefer the latter, since there is something amiable and generous in partiality, while there is only weakness or ill temper in prejudice.

There are judges, and among them some who are commonly thought to be models of integrity, who

could no more judge impartially between certain persons and their adversaries than they could change their religion. There are men in this State who could not obtain exact justice, such is the prejudice accumulated against them. This is a reproach, we know, but it is true, nevertheless; and the truth may as well be told. The weakness of an elective judiciary, and the demoralization of the press, have made justice almost impossible in any case which excites the prejudice of large classes of men.

Fear is another form of corruption not less injurious, and not a whit more respectable than partiality or prejudice. Upon any just gauge and measure of the three, fear should be accounted the basest and meanest of all. To be afraid is the miserable condition of a coward. To do wrong, or omit to do right from fear, is to superadd delinquency to cowardice. Intimidation may come as surely from a clamorous crowd or a ribald newspaper, as from an armed ruffian. To be coerced or misled by it in any form is to be corrupted. It does not matter whether a judge be overawed by a sovereign on the throne, or a sovereign at the ballot -- by the king or the people. It is the same in essence, and he who quails before it is the betrayer of a trust as sacred as was ever committed to human hands.

We are not speaking of the merely speculative evil, but of an evil practical and present. No man can be so blind as not to see that judges are dictated to by politicians and the press; that language is addressed to them which those who use it would not dare to utter if they did not think the judges could be intimidated; they are told what the public expect; they are told that they themselves are on trial, and, if they decide this way or that, they will be marked and denounced. There is no occasion to specify instan

ces.

Ask the lawyers, for they are, of course, the best witnesses. Ask the first one of them you meet whether, in a particular case, which has raised a general clamor, he thinks an impartial trial can be had; impartial either as to judge or jury. He will answer you that he thinks it cannot; that he thinks the public mind has been so warped by continual clamor as to make the impaneling of an impartial jury impossible; and the judges are so sensitive to the attacks of the newspapers that either their convictions are influenced by their fears, or they are afraid to act upon their convictions.

That this is deplorable every just man will admit; but deploring it will not cure it. We must take measures to correct the evil. We have no right to console ourselves with the fact, undeniable though it be, that in the main justice is impartially administered. So it is in France, and generally throughout the continent of Europe. Private cases, which create no public excitement, are debated and discussed calmly, impartially and justly; but in public cases, and those in which the government is concerned, the judges are, or are suspected to be, under public or court influence.

One step toward a remedy is the reformation of public sentiment. Let good men everywhere speak what they think about any form of corruption of the judges, not only that which results from venality or partiality, but that which results from prejudice or fear.

The very word "corruption" inspires dread. Men shrink from it as from infamy and degradation. Judges, who would resent the suspicion of it as the grossest of affronts, do yet suffer themselves to be deluded by prejudice or turned aside by the ignoble fear of newspapers, or the dread of what is called public opinion. They forget that in giving way to prejudice or fear they prove themselves as corrupt as those who give way to partiality. Let them not comfort themselves with the thought that, by drifting with the current, they escape contention. They were set in their places with the very design of resisting currents, and standing immovable in the rush and whirl of contending parties and clamorous multitudes.

These reflections, suitable at all times, are most opportune now, because of the unnatural excitement by which the whole community has been agitated for the past twelve months, and the bitter invective from all sides that fills our ears with its ceaseless din. The newspapers rave with real or affected passion. Violent language is ordinary speech. Suspicions fill the air. Distrust and alarm prevail; and all these things make the position of a judge a difficult post at best, but now a post of unwonted peril and temptation. The more honor to him who holds it bravely. He may possibly suffer present inconvenience, and lose for the moment in public estimation, but he will not lose his self-respect, and he will gain the respect and admiration of just and honorable men in that calmer future when the present agitation shall have passed

away.

THE WORK OF THE REVISION COMMISSION.

II.

Among the provisions relating to the service of a summons, the commissioners have incorporated one providing in substance that a resident of the State may designate some other resident as a person upon whom any summons or other process for the commencement of a civil action may be served, during the absence of the former from the United States, such designation to be filed and recorded in the county clerk's office. The value of this provision is obvious, and the wonder is that we have not before had something like it. Several other valuable alterations have been made relative to the service of the summons on corporations, and by publication, but it is not necessary for us to notice them at present. So, also, some few changes have been made in the provisions relating to "parties to civil actions."

But perhaps the most important part of that portion of the commissioners' work before us is the chap

ter relating to pleadings. The system, if it can be called a system, of pleading introduced by the Code has been strongly assailed by the opponents of codification, and its practical failure has been held up as a warning to all reformers who sought to break away from the technicalities of the past. This was not so much the fault of the Code, theoretically speaking, as it was of a great proportion of those who were to practice under it, and who have demonstrated time and again their inability to give "a plain and concise statement of the facts constituting a cause of action," when left to their own guidance. But Codes are, or ought to be, made for men, not men for Codes, and it is quite possible that we have gone a step too far in abolishing all forms and specific rules of pleading.

The revision commissioners, feeling the shortcomings of the present system, have set about reforming or rather improving it, so far as they were able "without departing from the rules which (they) have adopted to guide (them) in this revision." The commissioners think that the leading difficulty in the working of the present system lies in the fact "that although it has laid down good principles, it has provided no adequate remedy against their violation." These defects of remedy proceed, they say, from a difficulty in determining, in some cases, what is the appropriate remedy for a particular transgression of the statute or of the general principles of pleading, and in other cases, the cost of pursuing the appropriate remedy to remove these grievances. The commissioners have, in addition to the alterations of the phraseology of the present statute in order to correct errors, to make more definite, etc., given a more precise definition and some material extensions of the remedy by demurrer," and have also "provided and minutely regulated a new remedy by exception, for all violations of the formal rules of pleading not reached by demurrer." In short, they propose not to improve the system, but to improve the pleadings under it, by bringing upon the head of the faulty pleader the consequences of his own carelessness or ignorance.

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Passing over the provisions relative to the complaint, which do not differ materially from those in our Code, we come to "Demurrer" by "a more precise definition and some material extensions" of which they hope, in part, to obviate the difficulties before alluded to. The grounds for demurrer are the same as in section 144 of the Code, except that subdivision 6 has been changed to read as follows: "That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to the judgment demanded," instead of "to constitute a cause of action " as it now reads, and except also that a seventh subdivision has been added which reads: "That the plaintiff demands judgment for two or more kinds of relief inconsistent with each other." A qualification is made to these subdivisions, to the effect that, under the sixth subdivision, a demurrer is not allowable when the complaint shows that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment for a greater or less sum

of money then stated, or for other greater or less relief of the same general character as that demanded, nor under the seventh subdivision is a demurrer permissible when judgment is lawfully demanded in the alternative. Specific directions are given as to the method of stating the objections to the complaint, and a new provision is added, that, if demurrer is made under two or more of the subdivisions and sustained only in part, judgment must be for the defendant, but without costs.

provided, to comply with any requirement of this act, or of the rules established by the convention of judges provided for in this act," the opposite party may except thereto within ten days, specifying the grounds of his objection. The party whose pleading is excepted to has thereafter ten days wherein to elect either to amend his pleading or to test it before the court, on a five days' notice. Should he fail to make his election within the ten days, the excepting attorney may notice the exception for hearing. Upon the hearing, the court may direct the pleading, or any portion thereof excepted to, to be stricken out, upon such terms and with such privileges of amendment as are just, costs to be allowed to either party in the discretion of the court, except where scandalous matter is stricken out, in which case the attorney plead

a stay of proceedings, so that it cannot be made use of to secure delay.

The change which has been made in the sixth ground of demurrer will do away with much of the looseness in pleading now so prevalent, in that the plaintiff will be required to base his demand for judgment on the facts set forth in the complaint. In their note to the section the commissioners say: "The proposed amendment to subdivision six is intended to remove a grieving it is to pay. The exception is not to operate as ance which has become a serious one, whereby the ignorance or carelessness of the plaintiff's attorney is allowed to embarrass and sometimes to prejudice the defendant. It is surely not too much to require an attorney to determine and state correctly the kind of relief to which he deems his client entitled, especially as it determines the mode of trial, and he has the privilege of amending, after a demurrer, in that particular as well as any other. As the section now stands, it seems to preclude a demurrer, where the plaintiff states a cause of action entitling him to relief in damages, and asks a judgment in replevin, or a decree for a specific performance; and we venture to say that it is impossible for any lawyer to state with certainty, what the remedy is in such a case."

The new seventh subdivision is in accordance with their amendment of a previous section of the revision, requiring the causes of action united in a complaint to be consistent with each other, and the judgment demanded thereon such that issues of fact arising upon the allegation of the complaint will not require different modes of trial.

There is a further provision allowing the plaintiff to demur to a counterclaim, upon which the defendant demands an affirmative judgment, and if the court decides that the matter of the counterclaim is sufficient to defeat the cause of action, but not to entitle the defendant to an affirmative judgment, the demurrer must be sustained. This is avowedly to put an end to the vexatious habit of needlessly demanding affirmative relief in an answer, especially relief of an equitable character.

The new remedy, by exception, for all violations of the formal rules of pleading, not reached by demurrer, is contained in sections 534, 535 and 536. These sections provide a system which is briefly as follows: "If any pleading contains irrelevant, impertinent or scandalous matter, or denials or allegations which are so indefinite or uncertain that the precise meaning or application thereof is not apparent; or if the form or contents of such pleading fails in any respect, for which another remedy is not expressly

We have now given the leading features of those provisions, by means of which the commissioners hope to bring about a more careful and systematic method of pleading, and we cannot doubt that their efforts in this behalf will meet the hearty approval of every thoughtful practitioner. It is quite possible that even their plan might be improved upon, but we confess that it seems to us far-reaching and effective, and more likely than any thing else, except it be an entire revolution of our system of pleading, to accomplish the object sought.

CURRENT TOPICS.

Prof. Ordronaux, who ought to be an authority, pronounces, in the Zion Herald, the plea of “moral insanity," as a defense to crime, "a gross delusion born in the bosom of casuistry and nursed in the cradle of ignorance." And while he does not especially blame the lawyers for making use of this strangely begotten and cradled plea, he denounces the courts for having acquiesced in it, to the extent of charging juries that it was an acceptable defense. "It is noteworthy," he remarks, "that those cases of moral insanity, figuring in the annals of our jurisprudence as precedents, have almost invariably occurred in courts whose judges were notoriously inferior to the counsel practicing before them, and who, consequently, were overpowered by them, and afraid to cross swords in the field of dialectics or legal criticism." The learned Doctor would probably not deny, in the present state of medical psychology, that there is such a thing as "moral insanity," and that it may, in very rare cases, be the moving cause in the commission of crimes, but it is equally true, that what is most often called "moral insanity" or "moral mania," is nothing more than innate depravity or "cussedness." In years past, no form of insanity but the most violent and pronounced was admitted to be a defense. This was one extreme, and when we remember that

the plea of somnambulism cleared a Tyrrill, and of momentary insanity, acquitted a Cole, we can but believe that we have swung to the other extreme, and that it will not be long before we shall reach that mean where the really irresponsible shall not be punished, and scoundrels shall not go unwhipped of justice.

Much of the work of legislatures is worse than useless. It is, therefore, a question whether it is not better to do away with legislatures entirely, or only allow them to sit once in a great while. But we cannot do without these adjuncts of government, these law-makers, and law-modifiers, and law-repealers, especially since it is quite certain that codification is the desideratum, and law-reform the necessity of the age, neither of which can be secured without legislative action. The State of Vermont has been trying legislative infrequency, and has now a legislature which holds biennial sessions. Our neighboring State has not, however, tried legislative paucity, for it now has, or may have, over two hundred and forty members in one house the lower house. This new legislature is now in session, and, judging from some of the measures it has already attempted, it is a fearless, radical and reformative body. Among the first bills introduced is one proposing to abolish capital punishment, substituting therefor imprisonment for life, and taking away from the governor the pardoning power in such cases, unless on recommendation of the legislature. If this bill should pass in its present form, a prisoner convicted of what is called a capital offense, and deserving pardon, might have to wait two years or so before the legislature could get a chance to sit and recommend his pardon. But there is no certainty that the new biennial legislature will pass this proposed measure.

Sir John Coleridge, attorney-general of England, recently delivered an address before the Social Science Congress, which has received nearly as much attention at the hands of the English newspapers as the Geneva Awards. His subject was law reform, and his method of treating it such as to call out any amount of adverse criticism from those satisfied with the present order of things; but Sir John must be used to that sort of thing, since he himself says, in his opening remarks, that "candid and philosophical criticism" has drawn his portrait thus: "A lethargic amateur, knowing nothing about law, and, if possible, caring less, altogether wanting in breadth of view and manliness of mind, perfectly satisfied with every thing as it exists, the indolent but inveterate foe of all improvement." Not a flattering picture, surely, and one which the critics may, after reading his speech, take occasion to modify. Sir John touched first and briefly on the evils of the present jury system, declaring that the "present law works very badly and occasions a large amount of unjust, oppressive

and entirely needless inconvenience." He did not state, in terms, what remedy he proposed, but promised to endeavor to have passed the jury bill introduced at the last session, and which, he said, "will contain the whole law of juries, and will introduce certainly very large, and, I hope, very useful alterations into one of the most important of our institutions." He advocated the fusion of law and equity, and said that "to have two sets of courts existing side by side, one main function of one set being to prevent the injustice which would result from the judgments of the other set, is in idea barbaric, and in practice highly inconvenient."

The most important subject, however, to which the attorney-general gave his attention was the codification of the English laws, in favor of which he expressed himself warmly and strongly. "That we might have had it (a code) at this moment," he said, "I am fully convinced, if we had spent upon the code the money, the time, and the labor that have been comparatively thrown away in feeble and inefficient attempts to make a digest of English law." He recognized fully the fact that "a code, if it is to be made at all, must be made by the first lawyers in the country, men of power and authority sufficient, not merely to digest the law, but, if need be, to make it." He gives his plan, as follows: "Take three men, and, if you choose, four, of the very highest position; give them, if they have not it already, the rank of privy counselors, and the salary of judges; make their services in the preparation of a code count as judicial, and give them, if not otherwise entitled to it, at the expiration of their labors, the pension of a judge." While the difficulties in the way of preparing a code are undoubtedly greater in England than in this country, they are by no means insurmountable, and will be easily overcome if the plan of Sir John be adopted, and a small commission of the very best men be appointed to the task and compensated sufficiently to allow them to devote their entire energies to the work.

The western States, though progressive and liberal in many things, have never displayed any great amount of those desirable qualities in regard to the compensation of their judges and law reporters, and especially are the reporters, where their compensation is paid by the State, an ill-starred and illy-requited class. We have received a tract containing a correspondence between Mr. Hovey K. Clarke, the late very excellent State reporter of Michigan, and the governor. It has been found possible, heretofore, in that State, to include the decisions of a year in one volume, but, for a year or two past, the business of the court has increased to such an extent as to require two, or sometimes even three, volumes a year. In 1871 an act was passed providing for the appointment of a reporter, fixing his salary at $1,500 a year,

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