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INSURANCE.

1. Assignment of policy, effect of violation of conditions by assignor; second insurance. — Where a policy of fire insurance is assigned as collateral to a mortgage, with the consent of the company, the assignee takes it subject to the conditions thereof, and no recovery can be had, merely in consequence of the equities of the assignee, if the assignor has lost the right to recover by violating the terms of the contract. The Illinois Mutual Fire Ins. Co., appellant v. Fix, 5 Am. Rep. 38 (53 Ill. 151).

PROMISSORY NOTE.

Non-negotiable instrument: estoppel: parol agreement.— The maker of a non-negotiable promissory note signed and delivered to the payee, to enable him to negotiate it, a separate writing, as follows: "This is to show that the note * * * is all right and will be paid when it comes due." The note was signed, and after it became due, the assignee, upon the promise of the maker that he would pay it at a specified time, forebore to sue. In an action on the note by the assignee against the maker, held (1), that, notwith

2. In an action by the assignor of a policy of fire insur-standing the writing, the defense of want of considerance, for the use of the assignee, evidence to show that plaintiff set the building on fire is admissible. Ib.

3. It seems that a clause in a policy of fire insurance prohibiting a second insurance, without the consent of the company, is valid. Ib.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Injuries received by employee of railroad company. -In an action by plaintiff against a railroad company to recover for the death of the intestate, while in the employ of the company, caused by the carelessness of an engine driver, held, that the following instruction contained the rule of law applicable to the case: "If the jury believed, from the evidence, that both the deceased and the engine driver, at the time deceased was injured, were in the employment of the railroad company, and that their ordinary occupations in such service bore such relations to each other, that the careless or negligent conduct of the engine driver endangered the safety of the deceased, then such danger was incident to the employment of the deceased, and the plaintiff cannot recover." Chicago & Alton Railroad Co., appellant, v. Murphy, 5 Am. Rep. 48 (53 Ill. 336).

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ation and fraud would be valid (Elliott, J., dissenting); but (2), that the promise constituted a new and enforcible contract. Gregory, Ch. J., dissenting. Jaqua, appellant, v. Montgomery, 5 Am. Rep. 168 (33 Ind. 36).

RAILROAD COMPANY.

1. Passengers: measure of damages: injuries to mind: "extraordinary care:" leaving train at station. In an action against a railroad company to recover for injuries sustained by a passenger, held (1), that evidence of the attending physician was admissible as to what effect the injuries would have upon the future condition of plaintiff, and as to how the injuries had affected his mind, although there was no declaration that the injuries had been willful; (2), that the phrase "extraordinary care," in the charge to the jury, was equivalent to "greatest care," "utmost care," the "highest degree of care," that being the degree of care legally required in his case; and (3), that railroad companies must afford a reasonable time to passengers, whether young or old, to leave the cars in safety, and if the time tables do not allow sufficient time for this purpose, and an injury is thereby occasioned, they will be liable therefor. T. W. & W. R. R. Co., appellant, v. Baddeley, 5 Am. Rep. 71 (54 Ill. 19).

2. Injury to passengers: contributory negligence.— Plaintiff purchased a ticket at L. on defendant's railroad for A., and got upon a freight train, while it was moving slowly. The conductor took the ticket; the train did not stop at A., and plaintiff in getting off was injured. Held, (1) that if plaintiff left the train voluntarily, although at the suggestion of the conductor, it was a question for the jury, whether he acted as a prudent man under the circumstances; (2) that, as the train was a freight train, and not advertised to stop at A., the taking up of the ticket did not imply an undertaking on the part of the company to put plaintiff off safely at that place. Chicago & Alton Railroad Company, appellant, v. Randolph, 5 Am. Rep. 60 (53 III. 510).

STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

Vendor and vendee: conditional sale: stoppage in transitu.- Where goods are sold on condition that title shall not pass until they are paid for, the vendor retains the right of stoppage in transitu as against the vendee, or an innocent third person who purchases of the vendee before the arrival of the bill of lading or the goods. Pattison, appellant, v. Culton et al., 5 Am. Rep. 199 (33 Ind. 240).

Senor Don Pedro Opaz has been appointed to the vacant seat on the bench of the supreme court of Mexico, caused by the elevation of Senor Lerdo de Qejada to the presidency.

THE VOTE ON THE IMPEACHMENT. The following is the vote on the impeachment trial as reported:

ARTICLE I, which has reference to the order in the case brought by John Nyce against the Erie Railway Company, enjoining that company to close its books against the transfer of the Heath and Raphael stock, the vote stood:

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Guilty President Beach, Chief Justice Church, Judges Allen, Grover, Peckham, Folger, Andrews; Senators Adams, Allen, Baker, Benedict, Bowen, Chatfield, Cock, Dickinson, Foster, Graham, Harrower, Johnson, Lewis, Lord, Lowery, McGowan, Madden, O'Brien, Perry, Weismann, Tiemann, Wagner, Robertson, Winslow, D, P. Wood, J. Wood.

Not Guilty-Judge Rapallo, Senators Murphy and Palmer.

ART. II, which had reference to the order in the case of Fisk and White against the Erie Railway Company concerning the same stock, the vote stood all guilty.

ART. III, which had reference to the same matter, the vote stood all guilty.

ART. IV, which had reference to the order issued in the case of Fisk and Earle against John Benjamin Heath and others, wherein Charles Robinson was appointed receiver of the Heath and Raphael stock, the vote stood all guilty.

ART. V, referring to the order restraining the Union Pacific Railroad Company from holding an election, the vote stood all guilty. Judge Allen excused, as stated above.

ART. VI, referring to the order appointing William M. Tweed, Jr., receiver of the bonds of the Union Pacific Railroad, the vote stood the same as last.

ART. VII, referring to the order directing said receiver, Tweed, to force open the safe of the Union Pacific Railroad, the vote stood:

Guilty-President Beach, Judges Grover, Folger, Andrews, Rapallo; Senators Adams, Allen, Baker, Benedict, Bowen, Chatfield, Cock, Dickinson, Foster, Graham, Harrower, Lewis, Lord, Lowery, McGowan, Madden, Murphy, Palmer, Perry, Robertson, Wagner, Weismann, Winslow, D. P. Wood, J. Wood.

Not Guilty-Chief Justice Church, Judge Peckham, Senators Johnson, O'Brien, Tiemann.

ART. VIII, referring to the fact that after the Union Pacific Railroad case had been removed to the United States circuit court the above orders were issued, the vote stood all not guilty.

ART. IX, referring to the order restraining Joseph H. Ramsay and others from acting as president and directors of the Susquehanna Railroad, the vote stood:

Guilty Senators Benedict, Bowen, Chatfield, Dickinson, Graham, Lewis, Lowery, McGowan, Madden, Perry, Winslow, D. P. Wood, J. Wood.

Not Guilty-President Beach, Chief Justice Church, Judges Grover, Folger, Andrews, Rapallo; Senators Adams, Allen, Baker, Cock, Foster, Harrower, Johnson, Lord, Murphy, O'Brien, Palmer, Robertson, Tiemann, Wagner, Weismann.

ART. X, referring to the order directing W. L. M. Phelps, secretary of the Albany and Susquehanna Railroad Company, to refrain from transferring stock belonging to towns of Oneonta and Worcester, the vote stood:

Guilty Senators Benedict, Bowen, Chatfield, Dick

inson, Graham, Lewis, Lowery, Madden, Perry, Winslow, D. P. Wood, J. Wood.

Not Guilty-President Beach, Chief Justice Church, Judges Grover, Folger, Andrews, Rapallo; Senators Adams, Baker, Cock, Foster, Harrower, Johnson, Lord, McGowan, Murphy, O'Brien, Palmer, Robertson, Tiemann, Wagner, Weismann.

ART. IX, referring to the order appointing Fisk and Courter receivers in same case, the vote stood:

Guilty-Judges Folger, Andrews; Senators Adams, Allen, Baker, Benedict, Bowen, Chatfield, Cock, Dickinson, Foster, Graham, Lewis, Lowery, McGowan, Madden, Murphy, Perry, Robertson, Tiemann, Wagner, Weismann, Winslow, D. P. Wood, J. Wood.

Not Guilty-President Beach, Chief Justice Church, Judges Grover and Rapallo; Senators Harrower, Johnson, Lord, O'Brien, Palmer.

ART. XII, referring to the order directing the sheriff and others to refrain from interfering with Fisk and Courter as receivers, the vote stood all guilty.

ART. XIII, referring to the writs of assistance issued in this case, the vote stood the same as last vote.

ART. XIV, charging that defendant granted an order directing no interference with the execution of the writ of assistance "irregularly, without jurisdiction and contrary to law," the vote stood all guilty, except Chief Justice Church and Judge Grover.

ART. XV, charging that the order issued on the same case to set aside an order issued by Judge Peckham, was issued contrary to law, the vote stood all guilty.

ART. XVI, referring to the order making William J. A. Fuller receiver of the Groesbeck stock of the same road, the vote stood all guilty.

ART. XVII, referring to the writ of assistance commanding the sheriff of New York to put Fuller in possession of this stock, the vote stood all guilty.

ART. XVIII, referring to the order arresting Ramsay, Smith, Pruyn and Phelps, the vote stood:

Guilty Senators Allen, Benedict, Bowen, Chatfield, Graham, Lewis, Lowery, McGowan and Perry.

Not Guilty-President Beach, Chief Justice Church, Judges Grover, Folger, Andrews, Rapallo; Senators Adams, Baker, Cock, Dickinson, Foster, Harrower, Johnson, Lord, Madden, Murphy, O'Brien, Palmer, Robertson, Tiemann, Wagner, Weismann, Winslow, D. P. Wood and J. Wood.

ART. XIX, charging conspiracy between Barnard and Fisk and others.

In these cases the vote stood all not guilty.

ART. XX, charging that the Erie Railway Company, James Fisk, Jr., and Jay Gould or others made presents to Barnard of $1,000 to his child on one occasion, and of chairs valued at $500 on another, the vote stood: Guilty President Beach, Judge Grover, Senators Allen, Benedict, Foster, Lowery, McGowan, Madden, Perry, Wagner, D. P. Wood.

Not Guilty-Chief Justice Church, Judges Allen, Peckham, Folger, Andrews, Rapallo; Senators Adams, Baker, Bowen, Chatfield, Cock, Dickinson, Graham, Harrower, Johnson, Lewis, Lord, Murphy, O'Brien, Palmer, Robertson, Tiemann, Weismann, Winslow, J. Wood.

ART. XXI, referring to the injunction on the Milwaukee and St. Paul Railroad Company, applied for by Aaron J. Bright, the vote stood all guilty.

ART. XXII, charging that this order was not duly verified on only $250 security, the vote stood all guilty. ART. XXIII, referring to the order making James

M. Sweeny receiver of this company, the vote stood all guilty.

ART. XXIV, referring to the fact that Sweeny was made manager as well as receiver of that road, the vote stood all guilty.

ART. XXV, referring to the order leasing the Olympic theater to James E. Hayes, the vote stood:

Guilty-Judge Folger, Senators Adams, Allen, Baker, Chatfield, Dickinson, Foster, Graham, Perry, Wagner, D. P. Wood.

Not Guilty-President Beach, Chief Judge Church, Judges Grover, Peckham, Andrews and Rapallo; Senators Benedict, Bowen, Cock, Harrower, Johnson, Lewis, Lord, Lowery, McGowan, Madden, Murphy, Palmer, Robertson, Tiemann, Weismann, Winslow and J. Wood.

ART. XXVI, referring to the order to the Pacific Mail Steamship Company to pay a certain debt or suffer imprisonment, the vote stood the same as the last vote, with Senators O'Brien and Tiemann absent.

ART. XXVII, referring to the order restraining the closing of Tammany Hall, the vote stood, all not guilty. ART. XXVIII, referring to excessive allowances to the receiver case of Terence Farley and D. P. Ingraham, the vote stood:

Guilty-Judges Grover, Peckham, Folger, Andrews, Rapallo; Senators Adams, Allen, Baker, Benedict, Bowen, Chatfield, Cock, Dickinson, Foster, Graham, Lewis, Lowery, McGowan, Madden, Palmer, Perry, Robertson, Wagner, Weismann, Winslow, D. P. Wood. Not guilty - President Beach, Chief Judge Church, Judge Allen, Senators Harrower, Johnson, Lord, Murphy, Tiemann, J. Wood.

ART. XXX, referring to the discharge of registrars of voters arrested on a charge of false registration, the vote stood all not guilty, except Senators Benedict, Chatfield, Wagner, Weismann and D. P. Wood, who voted guilty.

ART. XXXI, referring to the charge of excessive allowance in case of Shepard against Thompson, Tighe and Duffe, the vote stood, all not guilty.

ART. XXXII, referring to the order in the case of Frederick A. Lane against John Doe and Richard Roe, which was improper, the vote stood, all guilty.

ART. XXXIII, referring to the order directing the Pier and Warehouse company to make a report of their election, the vote stood, all guilty.

ART. XXXIV, referring to the order making Nathaniel A. Prentiss receiver of this company, the vote stood, all guilty.

ART. XXXV, referring to the order to arrest Thompson D. Sherwood, of this company, for contempt, the vote stood, all guilty.

ART. XXXVI, charging conspiracy between defendant, Frederick A. Lane, James Fisk, Jr., and others in the above cases, the vote stood, all not guilty, except Senators Benedict, Chatfield and Foster.

ART. XXXVII, charging various indecorous and indecent remarks and conduct, the vote stood:

Guilty-President Beach, Judges Allen, Grover, Peckham, Rapallo; Senators Adams, Allen, Benedict, Cock, Dickinson, Foster, Graham, Lewis, Lowery, McGowan, Madden, Murphy, Perry, Robertson, Tiemann, Wagner, Weismann, Winslow, D. P. Wood.

Not guilty-Judges Folger and Andrews; Senators Baker, Bowen, Chatfield, Harrower, Johnson, Lord, O'Brien, Palmer, J. Wood.

THE SPECIFICATIONS.-On specification one, relative to appointing referees, the vote was guilty.

On specification two, relative to language used in a divorce case, the vote stood:

Guilty-Judges Allen and Peckham; Senators Allen, Benedict, Chatfield, Foster, McGowan, Madden, Perry, D. P. Wood.

Not guilty-President Beach, Chief Judge Church, Judges Grover, Folger, Andrews and Rapallo; Senators Adams, Baker, Bowen, Cock, Dickinson, Graham, Harrower, Johnson, Lewis, Lord, Lowery, Murphy, O'Brien, Palmer, Robertson, Tiemann, Wagner, Weismann, Winslow, J. Wood.

On specification three, refusing to appoint Judge Clerke referee, the vote was guilty.

On specification four, in which Judge Barnard is charged with using indecorous language, the vote was not guilty.

On specification five, about driving scoundrels out of the city, the vote was guilty, Judges Andrews, Rapallo, and Senators Bowen,Harrower, Lewis, Lord, and J. Wood voting not guilty.

On specification six, using indecorous language, the vote was not guilty.

Specifications seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven and twelve were excluded. On specification thirteen, showing favoritism to friends, the vote was guilty. Specification fourteen and fifteen were excluded. ART. XXXVIII, charging that defendant by his decisions aud conduct excited fear and distrust among the people there was no evidence taken, and the evidence was not guilty.

REMOVAL AND DISQUALIFICATION.

The vote was then taken on removal, and it was decided in affirmative unanimously. The question was then put, "Shall George G. Barnard be disqualified to hold any office of honor, trust or profit in the State," and it was decided as follows:

Yeas- President Beach; Judges Allen, Grover, Peckham, Folger, Andrews, Rapallo; Senators Adams, Allen, Baker, Benedict, Bowen, Chatfield, Cock, Dickinson, Foster, Graham, Harrower, Lewis, Lowery, McGowan, Madden, Murphy, O'Brien, Palmer, Perry, Robertson, Tiemann, Wagner, Weismann, Winslow, D. P. Wood, J. Wood.

Nays-Senators Johnson, Lord.

The court then adjourned subject to the call of the President.

INSANITY AS A DEFENSE.

New Hampshire is blessed with a court which considers most thoroughly the cases before it, and with a reporter-John M. Shirley-who takes a most commendable interest in making known the decisions of the court. The more important decisions he circulates in advance of the reports, a practice which we should be glad to see followed by other reporters.

We have just received from Mr. Shirley a very elaborate opinion on the question of what form or degree of insanity is a legal defense to an indictment for murder. In this case, State v. Jones, the defendant was indicted for killing his wife, the defense was insanity. The court examined most carefully the judicial decisions and medical opinions and held that "neither delusion, nor knowledge of right and wrong, nor design or cunning in planning and executing the killing and escaping, or avoiding detection, nor ability to recognize acquaintances, or to labor, or to transact business, or manage affairs is, as a matter of law, a test

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1st Tuesday, special term, Ogdensburg-James. 1st Tuesday, special term.

1st Tuesday, special term, Herkimer-Hardin. 2d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Chautauqua - Barker.

2d Tuesday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Plattsburgh.

2d Tuesday, special term, Saratoga Springs - Bockes. 3d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Westchester-Gilbert.

3d Monday, special term (issues), Kings-Pratt. 3d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Chemung - Boardman.

3d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Cortland - Balcom.

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3d Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Otsego -Murray.

3d Tuesday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Caldwell-James.

3d Tuesday, special term, Ogdensburg-James. 3d Tuesday, special term.

4th Monday, special term, Westchester-Barnard. 4th Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Syracuse-Morgan.

4th Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, OvidE. D. Smith.

4th Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, ErieLamont.

4th Tuesday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Ballston Spa.

4th Tuesday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Schenectady-Bockes.

4th Tuesday, special term, Saratoga Springs - Bockes. Last Monday, circuit and oyer and terminer, Watertown Hardin.

Last Monday, special term (motions), Rochester - J. C. Smith.

Last Tuesday, special term (motions), Albany - Hogeboom.

The court of appeals of this State met in Saratoga on the 19th inst., and adjourned until November 11th.

AN UNPROFITABLE CLIENT. The notorious McGehan, who murdered Myers in Ohio, has been an unprofitable client for his lawyers. Mr. Vallandigham fatally shot himself while trying to illustrate a theory tending to show that McGehan might have been innocent; Mr. Craighead of Dayton, who defended the murderer with such ability as to get a verdict of acquittal from a Montgomery county jury, has been debarred from a nomination for congress on account of his connection with this case; Gov. McBurney, another of McGehan's counsel, has met with a similar check to his political aspirations from the same cause; and Judge Hume, still another of McGehan's victims, has been defeated in the Ohio State Democratic convention, where his name was offered as a candidate for the nomination of judge of one of the State courts, principally because he had defended the Dayton murderer. And the lawyers had to sue McGehan to get their pay.

CORRESPONDENCE.

OGDENSBURG, August 17, 1872. Mr. EDITOR-Speaking of the law of marriage, in the last number of the Law Journal you say: "We apprehend that, under the law of the State of New York, the marriage of citizens of the State on the high seas, out of sight of land, if performed in the presence of one or more witnesses, or by any clergyman or justice, or any body would be valid." Now, is the presence of witnesses at all essential to the validity of the contract? LEX.

[Certainly not; though it might be to the establishment of the contract. ED. A. L. J.]

Mr. EDITOR-The eloquent commentator on Rufus Choate's style of oratory, whom you have just cited in your valuable journal, must have been unfamiliar with "Weather Probabilities," for he has got the wind in the wrong quarter, when he attempts to quote from Butler's Hudibras those famous lines:

“He could distinguish, and divide

A hair 'twixt south and south-west side." Did he not have in his mind the pregnant reply of Hamlet to Guildenstein:

"I am but mad north-north-west; when the wind is southerly, I know a hawk from a hand-saw."

Yours,

A LIFE-LONG ADMIRER OF "THE GREATEST OF AMERICAN ADVOCATES."

The following appointments have been made by the president, I. M. Hedrick, supervisor of internal revenue; Augustus Morrill, consul at Manzienillo, and George L. McManus, consul at Chihuahua. Also the following postmasters: Cornelius A. Field, at Hanover, N. H.; Charles W. Miller, Frederick, Md.; John Crawford, Oneida, N. Y.; Carlos Morgan, Glens Falls, N. Y.; William H. Polk, Paris, Ky.; Andrew Hunter, Chicopee, Mass.; Socrates N. Hermann, Ogdensburg, N. Y.; Thomas G. Scott, Fork Smith, Arkansas; George W. Pratt, Corning, N. Y.; H. B. Kinney, Austin, Texas; and the following as Indian agents: James H. Wilbur of Oregon, at Yahama agency, Washington Territory; Joseph Burchard of California, Round Valley Reservation, California; Henry W. Reed of Iowa, Fort Hall Reservation, Idaho; John A. Lockwood of California, register land office in the Susanville district, California.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, AUGUST 31, 1872.

LIABILITY OF TELEGRAPH COMPANIES. An institution so important and extensive as the telegraph system may well furnish the materials for an immense amount of litigation. Telegraph companies have become so opulent and powerful, that a case in which they are beaten in the lower courts seldom fails to reach the highest tribunal within the jurisdiction in which it is brought. But, notwithstanding the immensity of the business conducted by means of the telegraph, the comparative novelty of the systein has precluded very many cases reaching the courts of last resort. Many cases are now, doubtless, undergoing litigation in the primary and intermediate tribunals which will reach the courts of last appeal, and there be decided according to the principles laid down in the cases already adjudicated.

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Washington Telegraph Co., 18 Md. 341; Breeze v. United States Telegraph Co., 45 Barb. 275; Ellis v. American Telegraph Co., 13 Allen, 226; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Carew, 15 Mich. 525. In Leonard v. New York, Albany and Buffalo Telegraph Co., 1 Am. Rep. 446 (41 N. Y. 544) Judge Hunt sets forth the following excellent statement of the legal liability of telegraph companies: "I can discover no principle upon which to charge such a company with the absolute liability of a common carrier. That liability was founded upon the necessities of the case, real or fancied, and has never been applied to any person or to any occupation, except those of carriers of goods and innkeepers. *** Whether his liability is based upon the contract he makes or upon his public duty, the telegrapher does not come within any of these principles. He has no property intrusted to his care. He has nothing which he can steal or which can be taken from him. There is no subject of concealment or conspiracy. He has in his possession nothing which, in its nature and of itself, is valuable. It is an idea, a thought, a sentiment, impalpable, invisible, not the subject of theft or sale and, as property, quite destitute of value. *** He is bound to conduct the business appertaining to this pursuit with skill, with care, and with attention. *** There may be circumstances in the nature of the instrumentality employed, and the effects to be produced which, in a particular case, will prevent the proper accomplishment of the undertaking. A thunderstorm, which prevents or renders dangerous the operation of electrical currents or machines; a tempest, which prostrates poles and breaks the wires; or unusual pressure of prior business; the sudden sickness of an operator, or many other causes might prove a sufficient excuse for the want of a prompt delivery of a message." Telegraph companies may limit or modify their common-law liability by stipulations or printed conditions. See Ellis v. Telegraph Co., supra; MacAndrews v. Telegraph Co., supra; Telegraph Co. v. Carew, supra ; Birney v. Telegraph Co., supra; Breese v. Telegraph Co., supra; Wann v. Telegraph Co., 37 Mo. 472; Camp v. Telegraph Co., 1 Met. (Ky.) 164; 2 Am. Law. Rev. 615-632; 4 Am. Law. Reg. N. S. 192199. As to the precise effect of the usual printed conditions on the liability of the company, the decisions are not harmonious. In MacAndrews v. Telegraph Co., supra, the extreme doctrine was announced that companies may protect themselves from liability for mistakes in unrepeated messages, except those caused by gross negligence; and this doctrine, although it has simply the authority of a dictum, was affirmed

The first question which was considered by the courts was, whether or not telegraph companies were bound by the strict liability of common carriers. And in MacAndrews v. Electric Telegraph Co., 17 C. B. 3, decided in England in 1855, it was held, that telegraph companies stand in the same relation to their patrons as common carriers of goods; and, in the absence of express stipulations to the contrary, are liable as insurers. This was the first reported case on the liability of telegraph companies, and an examination of it raises a doubt whether the question fairly arose in the case, although it is certainly a dictum of one of the judges. In Parks v. Atlantic and California Telegraph Co., 13 Cal. 422, the supreme court of California held, that there was no difference in the general nature of the legal obligation of the contract between carrying a message along a wire and carrying goods or a package, and that telegraph companies were liable as common carriers. But this is not the law as laid down in this country by a majority of the decisions reported. There is a class of cases which hold telegraph companies to be analogous to common carriers, though not absolute insurers, and liable for a failure to exercise the utmost diligence and skill in the performance of their duty. See New York and Washington Telegraph Co. v. Dryburg, 35 Penn. St. 298; Bowen v. Lake Erie Telegraph Co., 1 Am. Law Reg. 685; Stevenson v. Montreal Telegraph Co., 16 U. C. 530; De Rutte v. New York, Albany and Buffalo Telegraph Co., 1 Daly (N. Y. Com. Pleas) 547; Rittenhouse v. Telegraph Co., 4 Am.arguendo in Wann v. Tel. Co., 37 Mo. 472. In this Rep. 673 (44 N. Y. 263); Elwood v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 45 N. Y. 549.

Another class of cases hold telegraph companies bound to the exercise of reasonable diligence and skill. See Washington and New Orleans Telegraph Co. v. Hobson, 15 Gratt. 122; Birney v. New York and

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last case it appeared that, the plaintiff ordered, by telegraph, salt from New York, by "sail," but the dispatch, as delivered, read "ship by rail;" the company's messages had the ordinary condition as to repeating, but plaintiff did not repeat, damage ensued, and on the trial the only evidence adduced to sustain the

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