for the equity of redemption amount to 301. (j). And if the original purchase be under 301. no subsequent improvements will be sufficient to satisfy the statute for the purpose of gaining a settlement (k). But if a purchaser for less than 301. improves the estate, sells it, and repurchases it again for more than 307., he may gain a settlement under the latter purchase (1). A pauper purchased a messuage for 521. under an agreement that the vendor should allow 401. of the purchase money to remain on mortgage of the premises. The mortgage was made, and only 121. paid by the pauper to the vendor, who kept the title deeds; but the pauper took possession, and resided some years on the premises. He afterwards sold them to a third person for 60l., who paid 401. to the original vendor, and the remaining 207. to the pauper, obtained the title deeds from the original vendor, and the execution of the pauper to the conveyance; after which period the pauper did not reside any longer on the premises, but delivered them up to the new purchaser. The court said, “The 40l. paid by the new purchaser was for his own benefit, not for that of the pauper, who had in fact never paid more than 127.; never had any possession of the title deeds, and therefore had not made a purchase of any value, beyond the sum which was actually paid independent of the mortgage. That, in all the other cases of mortgagors which had been decided in their favour, if they had not actually paid the whole money from their own resources, they had at least credit to borrow it aliunde” (m). The two following cases peculiarly illustrate this principle:-J. C. having acquired a settlement by hiring and service in S., made a parol agreement for the purchase of a copyhold house and an acre of land, in E. for 150. He paid the sum of 341. on account of the purchasemoney, the remainder being to continue as a loan. The pauper took possession of the house and land, and continued to reside as owner for six months. There was no agreement in writing, nor any surrender on the court rolls. A disagreement arose between the pauper and the vendor, and it was determined between them to rescind their former agreement, the pauper restoring the possession of the premises, and receiving back 147., part of the 347. paid, and the vendor retaining the other 201. The question was, whether the residence on the property for six months, under the foregoing contract, gained a settlement. The (j) R. v. Mattingley, 2 T. R. 12. 553. (1) R. v. Stanfield, Burr. S. C. 205. (m) R. v. Olney, 1 M. & S. 387. court, however, admitting that an equitable estate or interest would be amply sufficient, supposing it to be perfect of its kind, said that here was no clear equitable interest vested, but only an inchoate title by part payment. They added, that " equity would consider the vendor as trustee for the purchaser, where the entire purchase-money was paid, or at least tendered. This may be in common parlance' a purchase,' but the statute requires that the entire purchase-money should be bona fide paid, or at least be ready to be satisfied" (n). A court of quarter session should give effect to equitable estates or interests when clearly vested in the claimants, as in a vendee who, after paying the vendor the whole purchase-money, has not received possession. Again, where there is a conveyance to uses not executed, or on trusts stated on the face of the deed, they will take notice of the equitable estate for the collateral purpose of settlement, but not of a bare equity or mere equitable right to have a conveyance of the legal estate; for where there is doubt what a court of equity would do, a superior court of law will not take cognizance of the estate (o). On a sale of land before the full purchase-money is paid, the vendor has a beneficial interest, and is something more than a mere trustee (p). Thus, where a written agreement was made for the purchase of an estate to be paid for by two instalments, the first payable within a few days after the signing the agreement, and the last in seven months, and the vendor was to make out a good title on payment of the last instalment, and to convey the premises, but the purchaser was to be let into possession on payment of the first. The purchaser paid the first, was let into possession, and continued possessed a year and a half; but the last instalment was never paid, nor any conveyance ever executed, and the purchaser afterwards gave up the contract on receiving back part of the first instalment. He was held not to acquire an equitable estate under this contract, so as to gain a settlement under 9 G. 1. c. 7, s. 5 (q). What Parties are Irremovable from an Estate, though they have not acquired a Settlement.]-Although the restrictions which we have noticed may prevent a settlement from being acquired, which will continue when the interest of the pauper in the premises has ceased, and (n) R. v. Long Bennington, 6 M. & S. 403. Confirmed, 2 B. & Cr. 132. (0) R. v. Long Bennington, 6 M. & S. 403, and per Holroyd, J., R. v. Geddington, 2 B. & Cr. 121. (p) See per Bayley, J., in R. v. Geddington, 2 B. & Cr. 134; 3 Dowl. & Ry. 403. (q) R. v. Geddington, 2 B. & Cr. 129. he has left them, yet while he continues on the estate as his own, he will be irremovable from it. Thus, a pauper cannot be removed from an estate which he has purchased for less than 301., though after he has sold it again, his previous estate will confer no settlement (r). Thus, where a pauper resided several years on a leasehold estate granted to him for three lives, in consideration of two guineas fine, and one shilling rent; and while so residing he became actually chargeable, the court, on a case submitted to them as to the right of the parish officers to remove him, said, "It is one thing to say that a person may not be removed, and another thing to say that he gains a settlement: here the pauper cannot be removed from his own; but being a purchaser under 301. and the estate not devolving on him by operation of law, he gained no settlement by forty days' residence on it" (s). Thus, although, as we have seen (t), a widow does not gain a settlement in her own right by residing on an estate out of which she is dowable before the assignment of dower, yet where she resides there with her children, who are of tender years, she, being by law their natural guardian, is not removable from the estate (u). The following case also may further illustrate this part of the subject. The pauper's husband was settled at White Rooding, from which place he went away and deserted his wife and children. The wife left White Rooding, and went, with her children, and "lived forty days without her husband, in a copyhold tenement of her husband's own, at Aythorpe Rooding." She was removed from thence to the parish of White Rooding. The court were unanimously of opinion, that, "although the wife could not gain a settlement for her husband by residing forty days upon his own estate, yet that she was irremovable from the property of her husband; for she had a natural, or at least a matrimonial, right to go to her husband's estate; and as there did not appear to be any dissent of her husband, it was rather to be presumed that he consented" (v). What Residence is necessary to a Settlement by Estate?]-To enable a party to gain a settlement by estate, there must be a residence of at least forty days in the parish where the estate lies (w); it is now enacted (x) that no person shall be deemed, adjudged, or taken to retain any settlement gained by virtue of any possession of any estate or interest in any parish for any longer or further time than such person shall inhabit within ten miles thereof; and in case such person shall cease to inhabit within such distance, and therefore become chargeable, such person shall be liable to be removed to the parish wherein, previously to such inhabitancy, he may have been legally settled; or in case he may have, subsequently to such inhabitancy, gained a legal settlement in some other parish, then to such other parish. The residence need not be actually on the estate; it may be on another person's estate, or at an inn (y); and the forty days' residence need not be forty successive days, for an occasional residence coupled with a continuing estate will suffice, if there be forty days' residence in the whole (z). But the estate must be vested in the party at the time of the residence; and, therefore, where a person entitled to administration of the effects of a deceased person resided on his leasehold premises for three years, but took out administration only eighteen days before removal, it was held that this grant, though for some purposes having relation to the death, had not this effect in reference to the settlement before it was taken out, and therefore that no settlement could be gained under the grant. But the administrator being entitled to the entire estate as sole next of kin, the settlement was sustained without reference to the grant (a). On the other hand, if an estate descend to a pauper, and he resides in the same parish forty days after, though immediately after the acquisition he contracted to sell the estate, yet, if the conveyance be not executed till after the expiration of the forty days during which he has resided, he will gain a settlement (b). It was formerly thought that a certificated party, residing in a parish under a certificate, might obtain a settlement there by estate (c). But in 1697 it was enacted (d), "that no person who shall come into any parish by certificate shall be adjudged by any act whatsoever to have procured a legal settlement in such parish unless he shall bona fide take a lease of a tenement of the value of 107., or shall execute some annual office in the parish, being legally placed there." Upon this act it has been decided, that the purchase of an estate for 301. and upwards, by (y) R. v. St. Nyott's, Burr. Sett. C. 132; R. v. Sowton, Andrews's R. 345. (z) Ibid. (a) R. v. Dorstone, 1 East, R. 296; R. v. Great Glenn (Inh.), 5 B. & Adol. 188; 2 Man. & Ry. 91. (b) R. v. Deddington, Stra. 1193 Burr. S. C. 220, S. C. (c) Stra. 1193, R. v. Deddington. (d) 9 & 10 W. III. c. 11. a certificated party, was such an act of his own, as under the statute debarred him from obtaining a settlement (e). But where such a party became possessed of an estate in the parish where he was resident, by descent, or act, or operation of law, or for a mixed consideration, consisting partly of money and partly of love and affection, the certificate was held to be discharged, and the settlement by estate to be gained (ƒ). Whether a voluntary conveyance to such a party will discharge a certificate, is not expressly decided (g). But a father of a girl, to whom, at the age of sixteen, an estate came by devise, was held not settled in respect of residence on it with her for five years as her supposed guardian in socage (h). A., a certificated man, was hired by a farmer residing in parish B. as his shepherd, to go into his service at Midsummer. It was agreed between them that A. should have a cottage in B. rent free, and the going, riz. the pasture feeding of 105 sheep with his master's flock [on pasture in B.]. The feeding on pasture in B. was worth 107. per annum. At the same Midsummer, A. hired C. to serve him for a year as shepherd's page, and C. served accordingly. Held that C. gained a settlement by hiring and service with A., because A. never resided in parish B. by virtue of the certificate; for having come there to settle on a tenement of 101. per annum, he was irremovable as soon as he came into the parish, though he could not gain any settlement there till he had resided forty days (i). SECTION XI. OF SETTLEMENT BY SERVING AN OFFICE. THIS settlement originated in 1691, when it was enacted (j), “that if any person who shall come to inhabit in any parish, shall for himself or on his own account execute any public annual office or charge in the said parish during one whole year, he shall be adjudged and deemed to have a legal settlement in the same;" and by a later act (k), the service of such office by a party legally placed therein will ac (e) R. v. Great Driffield, 8 B. & Cr. 684. (f) Ibid. R. v. Ufton, 3 T. R. 251; (g) R. v. Cassington, 2 B. & Adol. 874. (h) R. v. Sherrington (Inh.), 3 B. & Adol. 714. (i) R. v. Nacton (Inh.), 3 B. & Adol. 543. See 4 B. & Adol. 254; 1 Adol. & E. 126. (i) 3 & 4 W. & M. c. 11, s. 6. |