as a result of such examination it has been made apparent that the cost of quartering these battalions in their territorial districts would be less than that involved in the completion of the barrack schemes which are considered necessary for the accommodation of our existing force on its present basis. That the question of cost cannot present a serious obstacle is indeed self-evident. The amount of barrack accommodation in the United Kingdom is perfectly well known. In 1904 there were 84 Infantry barracks and 61 establishments serving as depots.1

But on the basis proposed, the total number of barracks and depots required for both the Long- and Short-Service Armies is less than the number of barracks and depots actually available. Some of these buildings, therefore, are clearly superfluous, and can be disposed of. That there are many barracks and depots in our large towns which ought to be got rid of, every soldier knows perfectly well. Some of these buildings occupy sites of great value, and the fact that they are of value frequently indicates that they are unsuitable for military purposes. It seems reasonable, therefore, that in the interests of economy and efficiency alike, some of our barracks and depots should be sold, and the proceeds applied to erecting new buildings in more suitable places, or to enlarging existing depots which are not quite big enough to accommodate the Short-Service battalions.

There can be little doubt that if the Short-Service battalions were to be quartered in their districts, the Army would greatly benefit. At present many of our barracks are in a scandalous condition. Built in some cases as much as 150 years ago, or designed in accordance with the ideas of the eighteenth

The total number of depots was 69; but there being a certain number of double depots, the number of buildings actually available was as stated above.

TERRITORIAL QUARTERING

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century, the barracks tend to become worse from year to year. The reason is not far to seek. The officers and men quartered in an Infantry barrack under the existing system know that when they leave it, they leave it for ever, and that in all human probability not one of them will ever set foot inside it again. They know, moreover, that they will be charged barrack-damages when they go out, and it is not in human nature that under these circumstances, either officers or men should take the slightest pains to improve or beautify their temporary home; nor is there any great inducement to the residents in the locality to contribute towards the comfort of the regiment which is temporarily quartered within its limits.

We have now seen what is the nature and constitution of the proposed Long- and Short-Service Armies respectively. It has been demonstrated that without putting any strain upon our resources, both armies can be raised and maintained; that having been raised, each will fulfil a definite function in peace time, and will help to perform a common duty in time of war. With respect to the Short-Service battalions, it has been shown that they will add greatly to our numerical strength; that they will furnish us with a large addition to the number of our trained officers; that they will continue and not destroy the traditions of our regiments, and that they will form an effective link between the long-service soldier of the Regular Army and the territorial and localised army of which the nation, by common consent, stands in need.

In the immediately succeeding chapters the question of the Reserve for the Army will be considered, and the relative merits of the LinkedBattalion system, as it now exists, and of the Depot system which it is proposed to substitute for it, will be discussed.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER X.

1. The constitution of a Short-Service battalion as proposed

But this peace establishment is recommended for the sake of convenience, and not as an essential figure.

2. 400 of the rank and file are enlisted for two years with the colours, and from six to ten years with the Reserve.

3. The remainder of the rank and file are enlisted for long service.

4. Men enlisted for short service may extend under certain conditions.

5. Short-Service battalions will be called out for training each year, and on such occasions the Reserve officers and a portion of the Reserve will also be called out.

6. The battalion will have 20 regular officers and 10 to 15 officers serving one year with the colours, and afterwards with the Reserve.

7. Officers of the Reserve should obtain certain privileges on retirement, and may be retained as officers of a Second Territorial Reserve.

8. The surplus reservists available after mobilisation will furnish a second battalion officered by the Second Reserve of officers.

9. The retention of battalions at home in peace time will not injure the prestige of the battalion or inflict injury upon officers or men.

10. Barrack accommodation can be found for the ShortService battalions without undue cost.

CHAPTER XI

THE REASONS FOR ADOPTING TWO YEARS' COLOUR SERVICE

THE SHORT-SERVICE TERM AT HOME AND ABROAD.

THE criticism which was directed against the proposals made in 1904 was largely based upon an imperfect comprehension of the proposals themselves, and a failure to regard them as a whole. Many of the criticisms were mutually destructive, and others were directed to the establishment of points of disagreement and difference where no real divergence of view existed. But after making full allowance for misconception and misrepresentation, there remains one important ground of difference between those who approve and those who disapprove the scheme.

That there must be a Long-Service Army is beyond question; that there must also be a ShortService Army, and that this army must be liable to serve abroad in time of war, is also axiomatic. The Short-Service Army may be called by many names, but that under some name or another it must be created, admits of no doubt.

When, however, we come to the question of the period of colour service which ought to be laid down for the Short-Service Army, there is an undoubted difference of opinion between those whose agreement on other matters is practically absolute as to

substance. The difference is real, but it is very slight. How slight, the reader will be able to judge after perusing the statements contained in this chapter.

In the proposals laid before Parliament in 1904 two years' colour service was prescribed for the Short-Service Army. In the Report of the Norfolk Commission six months' preliminary training and six weeks' annual training were recommended for the Militia. The present actual length of the Militia training is forty-nine days preliminary, and twenty-eight days yearly.

The maximum training for Volunteers in camp is fifteen days, to which, of course, must be added any drills or exercises performed at other times.

For convenience' sake it may be added that the Japanese period of service is three years with the colours, while in France and Germany the term has recently been reduced from three years to two.

There are some officers of distinction in our own Army who entertain a strong opinion to the effect that a minimum training of three years is necessary to make the British recruit into a serviceable soldier.

We have, then, a series of alternatives which may conveniently be embodied in a table thus: