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would, beyond doubt, add greatly to the prestige and efficiency of the Force. But be that as it may, the question of whether or not the whole of the Militia should be incorporated in the Territorial Army is one, primarily, of expense and of the extent of the military demand for men. The ideal is, undoubtedly, to utilise the whole Force as far as it can be made effective.

One word more remains to be said with regard to the amalgamation of the Line and the Militia in the Territorial Army. It has been said by some who have arrogated to themselves the right to speak for the Militia, that the plan is wholly objectionable because it involves the degradation of the Line and the destruction of the Militia. Such a criticism is a mere appeal to prejudice.

If the idea really exists on the part of the Regular Army that the Militia are unfit to work side by side with them, the sooner such an idea is got rid of the better. The Militia battalions are, and have for many years past been, the 3rd and 4th battalions of Line regiments; Linesmen and Militiamen have time after time fought side by side, and in the future the association must inevitably be even closer than it has been in the past. But, as a matter of fact, the statement that any such feeling exists is a fantasy. Nor is there any more truth in the contention that the utilisation of the Militia as part of a true Territorial Army is calculated to prove detrimental to the Militia itself. It is probably true to say that, by no other means can the Militia be saved from the extinction to which it is doomed if the present system be allowed to continue.

To suppose that the proposal fails to commend itself to Militia officers is also an entire mistake. Abundant testimony is available to show that such is not the case, but that, on the contrary,

a very large number of Militia officers, comprising probably all those who have taken pains to understand the actual nature of the proposal made, hail with satisfaction a change which would restore their regiments to their old dignity and importance, would free them from the cut-throat competition with the Regular Army to which they are now exposed, and would make them a recognised and important part of the fighting force of the nation.

In the following chapter it is proposed to explain the constitution and working of the Short-Service battalions, the methods by which these battalions can be derived from the Regular Army on the one hand, and from the Militia on the other, and the duties which these battalions will perform both in peace and in war.

SUMMARY OF CHAPTER IX.

1. The Short-Service Army is the complement of the Long Service Army.

2. The numbers of the Short-Service Army must be dependent upon policy.

3. The whole of the battalions of the Army are not required for long service, and must therefore be either

(a) Abolished.

(b) Reduced in establishment.

4. The battalions so reduced are required for the purpose of forming a Reserve. They cannot form a Reserve unless the men are enlisted for short service; they should therefore be Short-Service battalions.

5. It is as cheap to reduce two units as to destroy one,— and much more to the advantage of the Service and the country.

6. It is better to retain redundant Line battalions as ShortService battalions than to destroy them.

7. The number of Line battalions which may be considered as redundant depends upon the number of battalions required for service abroad in time of peace, and this in turn depends on policy.

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8. The redundant Line battalions will under no circumstances be sufficient to furnish the whole of the Short-Service Army; they must be supplemented from some other source.

9. The natural source from which the Line battalions can be supplemented is the Militia.

10. The amalgamation of Line battalions with Militia battalions for this purpose is consonant with the traditions of the Service and will be of advantage both to the Line and to the Militia.

CHAPTER X

THE SHORT-SERVICE ARMY: PART II

PERSONNEL OF THE SHORT-SERVICE BATTALION.

IN the preceding chapter some account was given of the source from which the Short-Service Army may be derived,' and the number of infantry units such an army should contain. In the present chapter the constitution and functions of such an army will be described in greater detail.

The strength of a Short-Service battalion as proposed is as follows:

The twenty officers referred to are officers of the Regular Army, making the Army their profession both in peace and war, and liable to serve abroad or at home in accordance with the exigencies of the Service.

The battalion will serve at home, exclusively, in time of peace, but the men will be enlisted for general service and will be sent abroad in time of emergency or war. The establishment of the battalion in peace time, as proposed in 1904, was 525—a number considerably in excess of the

The transition period presents no difficulty. A Short-Service battalion may be formed from an existing Line battalion by drafting out of the latter such long-service men as are in excess of absolute requirements, and by enlisting recruits for two years' colour service up to the requisite total of 400. The process is a gradual one, and an exceedingly easy one.

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SHORT-SERVICE BATTALIONS establishment of battalions on a peace footing in most foreign armies. Of the rank and file, 400 are men enlisted at the age of eighteen and upwards for two years' service with the colours and for a period of from six to ten years in the First-Class Army Reserve. The remainder are long-service soldiers, either men who have enlisted for nine years with the colours and three years with the Reserve, or men who have extended for a period of twentyone years' colour service. The presence of a considerable number of old soldiers in the ranks gives to such a battalion as that proposed an advantage which a foreign battalion does not possess. On the other hand, the effect of the conscription, which brings men to the colours in large batches and at stated times, gives to foreign battalions an advantage in the matter of training which we cannot hope to obtain to the same extent under our system of voluntary enlistment. For this reason it is greatly to be desired that service in the Short-Service battalions should be preceded, as in the case of service in the Long-Service battalions, by a period of instruction at a central depot. By this means the entry of the men in batches can to a large extent be ensured, and the battalion training can proceed from the day on which the soldier joins the colours. Such a proposal was, in fact, contained in the original scheme for the formation of a Short-Service Army, but it was not possible to proceed with the formation of depots until a sufficient number of Short-Service battalions had been created to furnish occupation for the staff of such depots, and this part of the scheme was, therefore, necessarily allowed to stand over.

1 The term of Reserve service must depend upon the strength of the Reserve required. A ten-years' period of Reserve service would make the total service equal to that of a man enlisting for nine years with the colours and three in the Reserve, viz. twelve years in all. There are obvious disadvantages attached to a reserve service of ten years, but, as will be seen, in the present case these disadvantages are greatly diminished by the proposal to call out the reservists for training at regular intervals.