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to operate at once, and the reservation by the grantor of a life estate strengthens that presumption. Riegel v. Riegel, 243 Ill. 626; Hill v. Kreiger, 250 id. 408; Baker v. Hall, 214 id. 364; Valter v. Blavka, 195 id. 610.

The record shows the existence of all the elements necessary to make a prima facie case of intention of the grantor that exhibit A should immediately vest in the grantee the estate conveyed. It was a voluntary settlement. The grantee was a minor. The grantor reserved a life estate to himself and caused the deed to be placed on record. Unless the presumption arising from these facts and circumstances is overcome by proof showing the deed was not intended to become immediately effective but that the grantor intended it to become operative only after his death, the conveyance must be held to have become immediately effective.

It is contended by appellants that the testimony of Grant and Minnie on the trial of this case, and the transcripts of the testimony of Hiram Humphreys in the case he prosecuted to set aside the deed to his daughter Jennie and in a case to correct the descriptions in the deeds to Grant and Minnie, show that the grantor did not intend the deed (exhibit A) to become operative or vest any estate in the grantee until the grantor's death. The substance and effect of the testimony of Grant and Minnie on this question as affecting exhibit A was that they heard the grantor say he intended to keep possession of the deeds and receive the income from the land as long as he lived. This utterly fails to show the intention of the grantor that the deed should not become operative until after his death. Some of the cases above cited specifically hold that retaining the possession of the deeds in a transaction of this character does not show an intention that the conveyances shall not become immediately effective. The grantor having reserved a life estate in the land was as much entitled to the custody of the deed as the grantee would have been.

It is further contended the decrees, files and transcripts of the testimony of Hiram Humphreys in the two suits referred to above show that no title was intended to or did pass when exhibit A was executed and recorded. In the suit to correct the description in the deeds to Grant and Minnie the bill alleged the deed to Grant described the land intended to be conveyed to Minnie and Minnie's deed described the land intended to be conveyed to Grant; that the mistake had just recently been discovered and Humphreys requested the parties to correct the mistake by exchanging quit-claim deeds, but Minnie refused. The bill prayed that the descriptions be corrected in accordance with the grantor's intention, and alleged they had never been delivered to the grantees by the grantor but had been retained in his possession and under his control and that he had retained possession of the land. There was a decree by default, and upon the hearing of testimony before the master, Humphreys testified that he had retained in his possession and under his control the deeds and also possession of the land. The bill to set aside the deed to Jennie alleged she had died leaving a husband but no child or descendants of a child; that the deed had never been delivered but had been retained by and under the control of the grantor. The transcript of his testimony on the hearing of that case, which does not appear to have been contested, shows he was asked by his counsel if it was his intention that the deed to his daughter Jennie should pass title in his lifetime, and he said it was not. If it be conceded that testimony and the decrees and files of those two cases were competent,—which we do not determine,—it does not overcome the prima facie case made by the proof of the intention of the grantor to immediately vest title in the grantee by exhibit A. It seems quite apparent that the two suits referred to were prosecuted and decided on the theory that as there was no manual delivery of the deeds no title passed. Those decrees are valid and binding decrees in those cases,

but they cannot control this case in view of the evidence and the law applicable to such cases. In addition to the other circumstances referred to as supporting the claim that title was intended to vest in the grantees in the deeds made in 1894, the evidence shows that some years prior to the grantor's death Grant took possession of the land conveyed to him and made improvements thereon. He testified he paid some rent, but how much is not stated. For some years prior to his father's death Charles lived in the house on the lots in Annawan described in exhibit A. In May, 1914, Humphreys procured insurance on the Annawan house and had the policies made payable to Charles, insuring the property against loss by fire, lightning and tornado. The agent who wrote the insurance testified that Humphreys told him to make the policies payable to his son Charles, as it was his property. In October, 1915, Humphreys procured fire, lightning and tornado insurance on a barn situated on the 100 acres described in exhibit B and had the policies made payable to himself and his son Charles. Humphreys paid the premium for the insurance in both cases.

We have read and considered the testimony and the argument of counsel as to the facts and circumstances attending the making, recording and custody of exhibit B, which was the deed for the 100 acres made in August, 1915, as to whether it was the intelligent, voluntary act of the grantor and became immediately operative. We are fully satisfied that the evidence supports the decree that exhibit B became immediately operative to vest in Charles a life estate, with remainder in fee to the eight grandchildren mentioned, subject to a life estate reserved by the grantor.

The decree is affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

(No. 14037.-Reversed and remanded.)

E. N. ARMSTRONG, Receiver, et al. Appellees, vs. Louis L. EMMERSON, Secretary of State, Appellant.

Opinion filed October 22, 1921-Rehearing denied Dec. 9, 1921.

I. CORPORATIONS-what is meant by capital stock of corporation. The capital stock of a corporation, unless the context of the charter indicates a different meaning, is an invariable sum fixed by the charter as the amount to be paid in by the stockholders for the prosecution of the business of the corporation and for the benefit of the corporate creditors, and the term does not include the capital of the corporation or its actual property, the value of which may fluctuate from time to time.

2. SAME―a public utility corporation may be taxed on the full amount of authorized capital stock under section 105 of Corporation act. In assessing the franchise tax of a public utility corporation under section 105 of the general Corporation act, as amended in 1919, the tax may be assessed on the full amount of the capital stock authorized by its charter even though such stock can be issued only with the consent of the Public Utilities Commission, as the unissued part of the stock of the corporation is a part of its authorized capital stock.

3. SAME-appointment of receiver of railroad company does not enlarge or restrict corporate powers. The appointment of a receiver for a railroad company creates no change in the corporate body but its existence continues with its legal functions unimpaired, its acts being performed by agents appointed by the court and not by the corporation, and the court and its agents are bound to manage the corporation in accordance with the charter and within the limits and duties imposed thereby.

4. SAME-corporation whose property is in hands of receiver is subject to franchise tax under section 105 of Corporation act. A corporation whose property is in the hands of a receiver is subject to the franchise tax under section 105 of the general Corporation act, as amended in 1919, as section 102 of the act indicates such an intention in requiring the report upon which the assessment is to be based to be signed by the assignee, receiver or trustee of such a corporation.

5. RAILROADS-act of Congress for control of railroads did not deprive States of power to assess franchise tax. The act of Congress providing for the operation and control of railroads by the Federal government, known as the Federal Railway Control act, did not deprive the States of the power of taxation of railroads

which they possessed and exercised prior to the passage of the act, and section I of said act, by providing that taxes assessed "either on the property used under such Federal control or on the right to operate as a carrier" shall be paid out of revenues derived from operation under Federal control, expressly provides for the payment of franchise taxes.

6. SAME-franchise tax of interstate railroad is not a burden on interstate commerce. The assessment of a franchise tax, under section 105 of the Corporation act, against a railroad company engaged in interstate commerce does not impose a burden upon interstate commerce. (American Can Co. v. Emmerson, 288 Ill. 289, and Hump Hairpin Manf. Co. v. Emmerson, 293 id. 387, followed.)

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. E. S. SMITH, Judge, presiding.

EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Attorney General, (Clarence N. BOORD, and Jas. W. GULLETT, of counsel,) for appellant.

GEO. B. & GEO. M. GILLESPIE, (J. M. ELLIOTT, of counsel,) for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court: The Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway Company is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Illinois, and on July 2, 1917, E. N. Armstrong was appointed receiver for it under a decree of the United States district court for the southern district of Illinois and has since his appointment been in possession of all its property and has operated its railroad exclusively under the control of that court, except during such time as the railroad was in the possession of the government of the United States and was operated under the act known as the Federal Railway Control act. The Secretary of State assessed the annual license fee or franchise tax provided by section 105 of the general Corporation act, as amended in 1919, upon the capital stock of the railway company in the year 1919 and notified the railway company and its receiver of such assessment, amounting to $2250, which they were required

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