In

value being only about fifty per cent of the former. addition to this appellant introduced oral testimony which tended to show that in Massac county it has been and is the rule and custom of assessors in fixing the full value of property for purposes of assessment, not to fix the same at the real, actual, fair cash market value of the property but at from forty to sixty per cent thereof, the average being about fifty per cent. Appellant put three witnesses on the stand, each of whom testified that he had spent many years either in the collection of taxes or in assessing property, and who testified that by long experience they were qualified to speak intelligently and accurately upon the question.

It is insisted by counsel for appellant that under the authorities, if the evidence is what they claim the record shows, appellant was entitled to have judgment in its favor as to the excess over and above fifty per cent of what its railroad ties were assessed. It has been held by this court that taxing authorities have no justification in withdrawing any property from the protection of the constitutional principle of uniformity of taxation, as uniformity of taxation is required under the constitution, and that a person cannot be compelled to pay a greater proportion of taxes, according to the value of his property, than another property owner. (Board of Supervisors v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad Co. 44 Ill. 229; Chicago and Northwestern Railway Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 44 id. 240.) Where the assessing authorities have disregarded this provision of the constitution and the law and have assessed property far below its real cash value, generally speaking, they must also follow the principle of uniformity, and "their assessment of all persons and corporations * must be at the same proportionate value." (People's Gas Light Co. v. Stuckart, 286 Ill. 164.) While it is true that error in the exercise of an honest judgment in fixing the value of property will not invalidate the tax, it is also true that an arbitrary violation of the rule of uniformity is an invasion

* *

of constitutional right and will not be tolerated; that "it is sufficient for an objector to show such willful and intentional violation of the constitutional provision, and where an assessment shows a very great disparity and discrimination, which could not reasonably have arisen from an error of judgment, the courts will give relief." (People v. Keokuk and Hamilton Bridge Co. 287 Ill. 246.) The circumstances under which a valuation was made may be considered in connection with the amount, and they may be sufficient to show that the valuation was not the result of the honest judgment of the assessing officer. People v. Bourne, 242 Ill. 61. See, also, on this point, People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. 273 Ill. 220, and authorities there cited.

Counsel for appellee find no serious fault with the rules of law laid down in the decisions but claim that on the facts in this case they do not apply here. They do, however, most earnestly argue that some of the evidence admitted on behalf of appellant and relied on by its counsel in their argument here was not properly admissible. They argue that the evidence of A. N. Banes was not admissible as best evidence; that counsel should have introduced, as we understand the argument, the public records of the sales to which Banes testified. In this we think counsel are in error. The authorities hold that "where the originals that are to be introduced in evidence consist of numerous documents, books, papers or records which cannot conveniently be examined in court, and the fact to be proved is the general result of an examination of the whole collection, evidence may be given as to such result by any competent person who has examined the documents, provided the result is capable of being ascertained by calculation." (People v. Gerold, 265 Ill. 448, and cases there cited; Jones on Evidence, 2d ed.-sec. 206.) Under these authorities we think Banes' testimony as to the result of his examination of the original records of Massac county was properly admissible.

Counsel for appellee also argue that the reports and tabulations of the Illinois tax commission introduced on behalf of appellant were not properly admitted in evidence on the question here under consideration. These printed. reports of the tax commission were printed under the authority of the State of Illinois. The law is, that when it is the duty of officials, under their oath of office, to certify certain official facts, such returns are generally received as evidence. (Jones on Evidence,—2d ed.—sec. 631, and authorities there cited.) Beyond doubt, these official records. and reports of the tax commission, whose official duty it was to make them, are public documents and admissible in evidence. As we understand the record, reports of the tax commission on the same points were submitted to and considered by this court in People's Gas Light Co. v. Stuckart, supra.

Counsel for appellee also argue that as no propositions of law were submitted by appellant it has no right to raise the questions of law here under consideration. Under section 61 of the present Practice act as construed by this court, counsel are required to submit propositions of law to be passed on by the court only where the right to a trial by jury exists and has been waived and the propositions are for the purpose of making the record show the principles of law which were applied in the decision of the case. (Trego v. Estate of Cunningham, 267 Ill. 367, and authorities there cited; Hurd's Stat. 1917, p. 2243.) The court, in tax cases of this nature, is authorized to examine the delinquent list, and if any defense, specifying in writing the particular cause of objection, is offered by any person interested to the entry of judgment, the statute requires that the court shall hear and determine the matter in a summary manner, without pleadings. It is very clear under that statute and the Practice act, that in a hearing on a delinquent list for failure to pay taxes, counsel are not required to submit, and the court is not compelled to pass upon, prop

ositions of law. Therefore no reason is presented in the argument why counsel for the appellant cannot raise these questions of law even though no propositions of law were filed on the hearing.

We do not consider that the reasoning of this court in People v. St. Louis Bridge Co. 291 Ill. 95, should control on this record as to the fixing of the taxable value of the appellant's property. The facts in the two cases, in our judgment, are entirely different. Without regard to the argument of counsel for appellee that the action of appellant's representative was not fair towards the public officials of the county, and without regard to the statements with reference to the taxation of property and the objections before the board of review, some of which appear to be based on facts outside the record, (which, of course, we cannot consider,) the evidence, in our judgment, shows clearly that according to the method, system and practice prevailing, the assessable value of the property in Massac county was not fixed at its true cash value but at not more than fifty per cent of the same, and under the authorities already cited it must be held that the valuation of appellant's property was fixed arbitrarily at its cash value rather than in accordance with the custom, method and practice that obtained in valuing other property in that county, and that therefore the board of review fixed such valuation, as shown on this record and under the authorities cited, arbitrarily, and the objections of the appellant as to the tax should have been sustained.

The judgment of the county court will be reversed and the cause remanded, with directions to sustain the objections as to the taxes in question.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Mr. JUSTICE THOMPSON, dissenting.

(No. 14286.-Judgment affirmed.)

THE PEOPLE ex rel. E. G. Williamson, County Collector, Appellee, vs. THE CITY OF TOULON et al. Appellants.

Opinion filed December 22, 1921.

I. TAXES-County court may determine question of tax exemption. Although property owners have the right to make application to the board of review for the purpose of having the board determine whether or not their property is exempt from taxation, this remedy is not exclusive, and the county court, upon the application of the collector for judgment for delinquent taxes, has jurisdiction to determine the question of exemption.

2. SAME-constitution limits right of legislature to legislate on question of exemption. The provision of section 3 of article 9 of the constitution for the exemption of certain property from taxation is a limitation upon the right of the legislature to legislate upon the question of exemption.

3. SAME―a municipality must have legal or complete equitable title for property to be exempt. Within the contemplation of the constitution municipal corporations must be the owners of the property before the same can be exempted from taxation, and the corporation must have such legal or complete equitable title to the property that it can be said to be the property of the municipality.

4. SAME when proposed park is not exempt. The facts that citizens have organized a civic league, whose officers have taken title to certain property in their own names for the purpose of creating a public park, and that said owners are willing to deed the property to the city when they have collected unpaid subscriptions. and finished improving the property, do not sustain the claim that the city is the owner of the equitable title to the property so as to exempt it from taxation, even though the present city authorities are willing to accept a deed and the city has spent some money in improving the property and joined in the suit to have it declared exempt, there being no written evidence of the alleged trust.

5. TRUSTS-resulting trust arises only in favor of parties contributing to purchase of the property. A resulting trust can arise only in favor of parties who have contributed to the purchase of or paid for the property in question.

APPEAL from the County Court of Stark county; the Hon. FRANK THOMAS, Judge, presiding.