that Scofield was injured until he was arrested some days later. Plaintiff in error was employed as a cutter for a tailoring establishment in Chicago, and the knife he used was an ordinary pocket knife which he carried. We have not attempted to set out in detail all that occurred before and during this fight, but we think we have stated all that is necessary for the purposes of this opinion.

The only proof in the record that a weapon was used during the fight is the testimony of plaintiff in error. He testified that after Scofield came out of the house the second time he struck plaintiff in error in the back and in the neck, and that witness did not draw his knife until he felt the pain from these wounds and saw the blood running down over his coat. He could not see what Scofield had in his hand. The women testified that they did not see anything in the hands of either of the men.

In connection with the motion for a new trial plaintiff in error filed the affidavit of James Blue, who swore that he was engaged as a taxicab driver and that he overheard some people discussing the conviction of plaintiff in error for manslaughter on account of a fight which occurred some time in March, 1920, in the 3200 block on Warren avenue; that it immediately occurred to him that he had seen the trouble, and that he told the people who were discussing the matter what he had seen; that plaintiff in error came to see him and that he told him what he had seen; that some time during the last part of March, 1920, he delivered some passengers to an address on the south side of Warren avenue about a half block east of Homan avenue at about half-past three in the morning; that they left the cab and just as he was about to start his car he heard loud talking and swearing, and that he looked across the street and saw two women and two men and that the men were holding onto one another; that one man got loose and ran into a building and then ran out again immediately and chased the other man, who started to run into the roadway;

that the man who ran from the house had his hand raised as he chased the other man and that he saw something bright in his hand, which he believed to be a knife; that when the man, whom he now believes to be Burns, reached the middle of the roadway he saw Burns turn and grab his assailant, and that then one of the women came up and took the assailant by the arm and pulled him away and that they went into the house; that he did not investigate further because he did not think anyone was hurt much, because he saw the man whom he believes to be Burns walk up the street holding his handkerchief to his face, and that he drove away and thought no more about the matter until he heard the discussion of the conviction. In view of the unsatisfactory character of the testimony on which this conviction must rest, a new trial should have been granted and the jury given the opportunity to consider the testimony of this witness.

There are several inaccurate statements appearing in the instructions, but the most serious objection to the instructions is that at least twice as many were given as were necessary to give the jury a full understanding of the law of this case. This situation grows out of the effort of counsel for both parties to have the court make a closing argument to the jury through the instructions. The State offered forty instructions, twenty-two of which were given, and plaintiff in error offered twenty-nine, nineteen of which were given. Counsel have little room to complain of error in instructions where they burden the trial court with the labor of weeding out a lot of miscellaneous stock instructions in the short time available for this task of the court. Repetition should be carefully avoided in instructions in a criminal case. Enough instructions should be given to cover the law of the case and no more. When propositions of law are repeated in different language in a number of instructions there is great danger of error, and the repetition only tends to confuse the jury.

We do not consider it necessary to discuss more than two of the instructions which ought not to have been given. People's instruction No. 14 is a stock instruction, which attempts to tell the jury how intent may be proven. It concludes with this phrase: "And if you further find from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt, that such assault was committed deliberately, and was likely to be attended with dangerous consequences, the malice or intent requisite to make out the case as charged will be presumed.” This instruction wholly omits the defense of self-defense. One assailed may, in defending himself, deliberately assault another in a manner that is likely to be attended with dangerous consequences. Self-defense is usually a deliberate act, and it is quite often attended with dangerous consequences, and yet the law does not presume from these circumstances the malice or intent necessary to make out a case of murder. The giving of this instruction was clearly error.

People's instruction No. 34 tells the jury "that the law affords ample protection to every citizen, and under no circumstances can he take the law into his own hands except in the necessary self-defense of his property or person," et cetera. While the quoted part of this instruction would not, of itself, justify a reversal, such expressions in instructions should be avoided. When a citizen exercises the right of self-defense he is not taking the law into his own hands. He is simply exercising a natural right which the law recognizes and protects. We think it is commonly understood among laymen that when a man is said to "take the law into his own hands" he is committing an unlawful act. An instruction of this character can give no light to the jury and tends to confuse them, and therefore it ought not to be given.

The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the criminal court of Cook county for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

(No. 14092.-Writ dismissed.)

THE PEOPLE OF the State of ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. NICHOLAS KORAK, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed December 22, 1921.

CRIMINAL LAW-writ of error will be dismissed for failure to file assignment of errors. Where a plaintiff in error in a criminal case has failed to assign errors at the time of filing his record in the Supreme Court according to rule 11 and has made no request for leave to file an assignment of errors, the judgment against him will not be affirmed but his writ of error will be dismissed.

WRIT OF ERROR to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOSEPH H. FITCH, Judge, presiding.

JOHN T. BYRNES, for plaintiff in error.

EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Attorney General, ROBERT E. CROWE, State's Attorney, and EDWARD C. FITCH, (HENRY T. CHACE, JR., EDWARD E. WILSON, and CLYDE C. FISHER, of counsel,) for the People.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the

court:

Plaintiff in error was indicted in the criminal court of Cook county on the charge of taking indecent liberties with Josephine Pozgaj, a female child under the age of fifteen years, to-wit, of the age of seven years. The jury returned a verdict on January 11, 1921, finding him guilty and finding his age to be forty-five years, and he has sued out a writ of error to review the judgment entered on the verdict.

On May 21, 1921, plaintiff in error filed a transcript of the record and the original bill of exceptions, the use of the latter being stipulated. On September 14, 1921, he filed a brief and argument and an abstract of the record in the cause. No errors are assigned on the record filed While the abstract contains what purports to

in the case.

be an assignment of errors, none appear on the record. By rule II of the rules of practice of this court a plaintiff in error is required in all cases to assign errors at the time of filing his record in this court, and on failing to do so the case may be dismissed or the judgment or decree affirmed. No errors were assigned at the time of the filing of the record in this case and no request for leave to do so has been filed since. The judgment in this case should not for this reason be affirmed, however, but the writ will be dismissed. Writ dismissed.

(No. 14188.-Judgment reversed.)

THE PEOPLE ex rel. John T. Cox, County Collector, Appellee, vs. THE Cleveland, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO AND ST. LOUIS RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed December 22, 1921.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—the act of 1909 requires a vote on proposition to issue improvement bonds for amount of public benefits. The act of 1909, (Laws of 1909, p. 130,) requiring a vote of the people on an ordinance to issue certain bonds, does not apply to improvement bonds issued against a special assessment on private property benefited but does apply to improvement bonds issued to pay the amount assessed as public benefits.

2. TAXES-judgment against city for unauthorized bonded indebtedness does not justify levy of tax in excess of statutory limit. A judgment against a city recovered on improvement bonds which it has issued without a vote of the people to pay the public benefits assessed does not justify the levy of a tax in excess of the statutory limit although such judgment was not appealed from, as the statutory limitation on municipal taxation cannot be evaded by issuing invalid bonds and then consenting to judgment thereon.

APPEAL from the County Court of Crawford county; the Hon. JOHN C. MAXWELL, Judge, presiding.

P. J. KOLB, and JONES & LOWE, (L. J. HACKNEY, and H. N. QUIGLEY, of counsel,) for appellant.