to August 24 made the necessary preparations for a trip to Italy. Just why the application for a steamship ticket was made from Beloit instead of the place of his residence does not appear, except defendants claim they had a cousin at Beloit whom they wished to visit and who also contemplated going to Italy. It does not appear from the record that defendants told anyone in Silvis that either of them was going to Italy. James testified he told a party named Guyer that he was going to Florida, and that he told “a couple of fellows" he was going South to buy a farm, and that he told the foreman where he was employed he was going to Beloit to see his cousin and then was going to buy a farm. He admitted telling Mrs. Kelter and Mrs. Stee he was going to live in Moline with friends. Dominick admitted he owned the revolver and testified it had not been fired since the fourth of July. He denied telling the widow of deceased he would kill her husband.

It clearly appears from the testimony that there was an unfriendly and rather bitter feeling on the part of defendants toward the deceased. Soon after the time the trouble between defendants and deceased arose deceased quit his work in the roundhouse in Silvis, where defendants were also employed, moved his family to Rock Island and entered the employment of the gas company at Moline. James Delorenzo said in his testimony that he had told deceased not to come to his house; that he blamed him for his trouble with his wife and for her being sent to the Watertown State Hospital for the Insane. Both defendants admitted they would not, since the trouble between them occurred, speak to deceased. Dominick testified he worked for a while for the same gas company deceased worked for, and for a few days in the same gang with him, but he never spoke to him, and quit that employment because deceased was there and because he could get better wages from another employer.

That Frenchevilla was assassinated cannot be, and is not, questioned. There was no direct proof as to who assassinated him, but guilt of a defendant charged with a criminal offense may be proven by evidence circumstantial in its character if the circumstances proven are sufficient to produce a moral certainty of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (Carlton v. People, 150 Ill. 181; Otmer v. People, 76 id. 149.) In trials before a jury, where the evidence is conflicting on questions of fact, it is the province of the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses testifying in the case and determine whether a fact alleged or crime charged has been proven. The jury see the witnesses while giving their evidence, which is recognized universally as being a great aid in determining the weight and credit that should be given their testimony. It is true, a reviewing court is not bound by the verdict and judgment of conviction in a criminal case and will reverse the judgment where the evidence is so inconclusive or unsatisfactory as to leave a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, but it is only when the reviewing court can say that from a consideration of the whole testimony there is a reasonable and well-founded doubt of defendant's guilt that the judgment will be reversed. People v. Schoop, 288 Ill. 44, and cases cited; People v. Rischo, 262 id. 596.

It is argued for defendants that the cap found near where the crime was committed, and introduced in evidence as the cap of James Delorenzo, was not proven to be his cap; that the testimony of the widow was hysterical, unreliable and unworthy of belief; that Mrs. Kelter, the only other witness for the State who testified to its being James' cap, only testified it looked like one she saw him wear. It is also argued that the revolver Dominick had when arrested had only five chambers while there were six wounds in the body of deceased, and that when found the revolver had been cleaned and oiled and bore no evidence of having been recently fired. The jury saw Mrs. Frenchevilla and

were better able than we are to judge her condition and reliability. She testified she had seen James Delorenzo wearing the cap, and Mrs. Kelter testified it looked like one she had seen him wear. It was the same size as the hat he wore when taken into custody. We think the better and more reliable testimony, before referred to, shows there were only five wounds in the body of deceased, and that the fact that the revolver had been recently cleaned, oiled and had all its chambers loaded when taken next day from Dominick, is not, in itself, sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt. Considering all the facts and circumstances proven, we are of opinion this court would not be warranted in reversing the judgment on the testimony.

Complaint is made by counsel here, who did not represent defendants at the trial, of rulings of the court in the admission of evidence and cross-examination permitted the People. Some of the complaints are not preserved for review by objections and exceptions, and in our opinion all of them are of a more technical than meritorious character.

Much of defendants' brief is devoted to a criticism of the instructions given for the People. We shall not discuss the objections in detail. It is sufficient to say we do not see any reasonable basis for saying defendants were prejudiced by the instructions. Most of them were substantially stock instructions given in criminal cases and have been approved in substantially or exactly the same form in previous decisions of this court.

We are satisfied there was no error committed during the progress of the trial which affords any reasonable or sufficient ground for a reversal of the judgment, and it is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

(No. 14080.-Decree affirmed.)

CHARLES E. Doose, Appellant, vs. ADELA E. Doose et al.

Appellees.

Opinion filed October 22, 1921-Rehearing denied Dec. 14, 1921.

I. DIVORCE-Section 8 of Divorce act does not apply where cause is heard on bill and cross-bill-collateral attack. Section 8 of the Divorce act, concerning the proof required when a bill is confessed or heard on default, does not apply where the issues are made up by answers to the original bill and a cross-bill, even though the complainant makes no defense to the cross-bill, and a decree which recites that the parties were present and evidence was heard, and which finds the facts and grants a divorce against the complainant, is binding until reversed and is not subject to collateral attack as being based on the evidence of only one witness.

2. CONTRACTS-when a contract may be avoided for duress by threats. Duress by threats constitutes good cause for avoiding a contract, and it is sufficient to constitute duress that the party seeking to avoid the contract has been prevented from exercising his free will by threats of bodily harm made by the other party of such a character as in view of the surrounding circumstances were sufficient to overcome his mind and that the contract was obtained by reason of such threats.

3. SAME whether contract was obtained by threats is a question of fact-allegations. Whether or not a contract has been obtained by threats of bodily harm is a question of fact, and in a suit to avoid such a contract the allegations must be sufficiently positive and direct and the circumstances averred such as to make it appear that the contract in question was the result of fear occasioned by the threats complained of.

4. FRAUD-allegation of conspiracy, collusion and fraud must show facts. An allegation of conspiracy, collusion and fraud must show the facts on which it is based, as the words themselves, unsupported by facts, are mere vituperation.

5. DEEDS when complainant is not entitled to have a deed set aside for duress. A complainant is not entitled to have a deed to his wife set aside on the ground that the grantee, who had just obtained a decree for divorce against him, had threatened him with bodily harm, where the allegations of the bill show that the deed was executed on the advice of the complainant's solicitor and fail to set out any facts in support of the charge of conspiracy, collusion and fraud on the part of the solicitors for both parties.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. GEORGE FRED RUSH, Judge, presiding.

JAMES BOOTH MCCLANE, for appellant.

CHURCH, SHEPARD & LYNDE, (HOWARD W. LEWIS, and CORNELIUS LYNDE, of counsel,) for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal by the complainant from a decree of the circuit court of Cook county sustaining a demurrer to his amended bill and dismissing it for want of equity.

The amended bill alleged that on January 29, 1914, the complainant, Charles E. Doose, filed his bill in the superior court of Cook county against the defendant Adela E. Doose, praying for a divorce; that on the 20th of March she answered the bill and on April 8 filed a cross-bill charging the complainant with cruelty, and on April 15 a decree was entered granting a divorce to her on her crossbill; that on January 29, 1914, and prior thereto, the complainant was the owner of certain real estate in the village of Wilmette, which on April 4, 1914, he, together with Adela E. Doose, conveyed by quit-claim deed to the defendant the State Bank of Chicago, and on April 16 the grantee by special warranty deed conveyed the same premises to Adela E. Doose, and the respective deeds were filed for record; that on April 4, and for a long time prior thereto, the complainant was suffering from ill-health, was under the care of physicians and was so greatly depressed in mind in consequence of his ill-health and physical suffering that he was not in control of his faculties; that Adela E. Doose, knowing him to be in ill-health and mentally depressed and not understanding the legal effect of his acts, frequently made threats to inflict bodily injury upon him and to kill him in case he failed to convey to her the property mentioned; that said deed was finally executed