tunity to get them resolved, either by persons or books, when we meet with them.

XVIII. BE not satisfied with a mere knowledge of the best authors that treat of any subject, instead of acquainting yourselves thoroughly with the subject itself. There is many a young student that is fond of enlarging his knowledge of books, and he contents himself with the notice he has of their title-page, which is the attainment of a bookseller rather than a scholar. Such persons are under a great temptation to practise these two follies. (1.) To heap up a great number of books at greater expence than most of them can bear, and to furnish their libraries infinitely better than their understandings. And (2.) when they have got such rich treasures of knowledge upon their shelves, they imagine themselves men of learning, and take a pride in talking of the names of famous authors, and the subjects of which they treat, without any real improvement of their own minds in true science or wisdom. At best their learning reaches no farther than the indexes and tables. of contents, while they know not how to judge or reason concerning the matters contained in those authors.

And indeed how many volumes of learning soever a man possesses, he is still deplorably poor in his understanding, till he has made these several parts of learning his own property, by reading and reasoning, by judging for himself, and remembering what he has read.

CHAP. V.

Judgement of Books.

I.

Ir we would form a judgement of a book which we have not seen before, the first thing that offers is the title-page, and we may sometimes guess a little at the import and design of a book thereby; though it must be confessed that titles are often deceitful, and promise more than the book performs.

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performs. The author's name, if it be known in the world, may help us to conjecture at the performance a little more, and lead us to guess in what manner it is done. A perusal of the preface or introduction (which I before recommended) may further assist our judgement; and if there be an index of the contents, it will give us still some advancing light.

If we have not leisure or inclination to read over the book itself regularly, then by the titles of chapters we may be directed to peruse several particular chapters or sections, and observe whether there be any thing valuable or important in them. We shall find hereby whether the author explains his ideas clearly, whether he reasons strongly, whether he methodizes well, whether his thoughts and sense be manly, and his manner polite; or, on the other hand, whether he be obscure, weak, trifling, and confused: or, finally, whether the matter may not be solid and substantial, though the manner or style be rude and disagreeable.

II. By having run through several chapters and sections in this manner, we may generally judge whether the treatise be worth a complete perusal or not. But if by such an occasional survey of some chapters, our expectation be utterly discouraged, we may well lay aside that book; for there is great probability he can be but an indifferent writer on that subject, if he affords but one prize to divers blanks, and it may be some downright blots too. The piece can hardly be valuable, if in seven or eight chapters which we peruse, there be but little truth, evidence, force of reasoning, beauty, and ingenuity of thought, &c. mingled with much error, ignorance, impertinence, dulness, mean and common thoughts, inaccuracy, sophistry, railing, &c. Life is too short, and time is too precious, to read every new book quite over, in order to find that it is not worth the reading.

III. There are some general mistakes which persons are frequently guilty of in passing a judgement on the books which they read.

One

One is this; when a treatise is written but tolerably well, we are ready to pass a favourable judgement of it, and sometimes to exalt its character far beyond its merit, if it agree with our own principles, and support the opinions of our party. On the other hand, if the author be of different sentiments, and espouse contrary principles, we can find neither wit nor reason, good sense nor good language in it. Whereas, alas! if our opinions of things were certain and infallible truth, yet a silly author may draw his pen in the defence of them, and he may attack even gross errors with feeble and ridiculous arguments. Truth in this world is not always attended and supported by the wisest and safest methods; and error, though it can never be maintained by just reasoning, yet may be artfully covered and defended: an ingenious writer may put excellent colours upon his own mistakes. Some Socinians, who deny the atonement of Christ, have written well, and with much appearance of argument for their own unscriptural sentiments; and some writers for the Trinity and satisfaction of Christ, have exposed themselves, and the sacred doctrine, by their feeble and foolish manner of handling it. Books are never to be judged of merely by their subject, or the opinion they represent, but by the justness of their sentiments, the beauty of their manner, the force of their expression, or the strength of reason, and the weight of just and proper argument which appears in them.

But this folly and weakness of trifling, instead of arguing, does not happen to fall only to the share of Christian writers: there are some who have taken the pen in hand to support the Deistical or Antichristian scheme of our days, who make big pretences to reason upon all occasions, but seem to have left it quite behind them when they are jesting with the Bible, and grinning at the books which we call sacred. Some of these performances would scarce have been thought tolerable, if they had not assaulted the Christian faith, though they are now grown up to a place amongst the admired pens. I much question whether several of the rhapsodies,

rhapsodies, called the Characteristics, would ever have survived the first edition, if they had not discovered so strong a tincture of infidelity, and now and then cast out a profane sneer at our holy religion. I have sometimes indeed been ready to wonder how a book, in the main so loosely written, should ever obtain so many readers amongst men of sense. Surely they must be conscious in the perusal, that sometimes a patrician may write as idly as a man of plebeian rank, and trifle as much as an old school-man, though it is in another form. I am forced to say, there are few books that ever I read, which made any pretences to a great genius, from which I derived so little valuable knowledge as from these treatises. There is indeed amongst them a lively pertness, a parade of literature, and much of what some folks now-a-days call politeness; but it is hard that we should be bound to admire all the reveries of this author, under the penalty of being unfashionable.

IV. ANOTHER mistake which some persons fall into is this. When they read a treatise on a subject with which they have but little acquaintance, they find almost every thing new and strange to them, their understandings are greatly entertained and improved by the occurrence of many things which were unknown to them before, they admire the treatise, and commend the author at once; whereas, if they had but attained a good degree of skill in that science, perhaps they would find that the author had written very poorly, that neither his sense nor his method was just and proper, and that he had nothing in him but what was very common or trivial in his discourses on that subject.

Hence it comes to pass, that Cario and Faber, who were both bred up to labour, and unacquainted with the sciences, shall admire one of the weekly papers, or a little pamphlet that talks pertly upon some critical or learned theme, because the matter is all strange and new to them, and they join to extol the writer to the skies; and for the same reason a young academic shall dwell upon a Journal or an Obser

t

vator that treats of trade and politics in a dictatorial style, and shall be lavish in praise of the author. While, at the same time, persons well skilled in those different subjects, hear the impertinent tattle with a just contempt; for they know how weak and awkward many of those little diminutive discourses are; and that those very papers of science, politics, or trade, which were so much admired by the ignorant, are perhaps but very mean performances; though it must be also confessed, there are some excellent essays in those papers, and that upon science as well as trade. V. BUT there is a danger of mistake in our judgement of books on the other hand also: for when we have made our selves masters of any particular theme of knowledge, and surveyed it along on all sides, there is perhaps scarce any writer on that subject who much entertains and pleases us afterwards, because we find little or nothing new in him; and yet in a true judgement, perhaps his sentiments are most proper and just, his explications clear, and his reasonings strong, and all the parts of the discourse are well connected, and set in a happy light; but we knew most of those things before, and therefore they strike us not, and we are in danger of discommending them.

Thus the learned and the unlearned have their several distinct dangers and prejudices ready to attend them in their judgement of the writings of men. These which I have mentioned are a specimen of them, and indeed but a mere specimen; for the prejudices that warp our judgement aside from truth are almost infinite and endless.

VI. YET I cannot forbear to point out two or three more of these follies, that I may attempt something toward the correction of them, or at least to guard others against them.

There are some persons of a forward and lively temper, and who are fond to intermeddle with all appearances of knowledge, will give their judgement on a book as soon as the title of it is mentioned, for they would not willingly seem ignorant of any thing that others know. And especially if they happen to have any superior character or pos

sessions