[March, Opinion of the Court-Deady, J. the United States is defined, and that said act being passed since the cession of Alaska is in force there from the time of its passage, which was prior to the commission of the crime charged in the indictment No. 444. 4. That although this Court would not have jurisdiction of these offenses for the sole reason that they were committed in Alaska, unless the act defining the crime of extortion was pro tanto an act relating to customs, and therefore extended over Alaska by the said act of 1868; yet under section 14 of said act of 1825 (Sec. 730 of the R. S.), if the law punishing extortion was otherwise in force in Alaska, this court would have jurisdiction to try the defendant upon the charges, if it appears that this is the district in which he was found or first brought, because Alaska, the place where the alleged crimes were committed, is without the limits of any State or district of the United States. The demurrers must be overruled. The act defining the crime of extortion, and providing for its punishment, includes officers of the customs, and so far it is an act "relating to customs," and is, therefore, in force in Alaska by virtue of section 1 of the act of July 27, 1868, extending "the laws of the United States relating to customs, commerce, and navigation" over that country, if not proprio vigore. Besides section 12 of the act of 1825, defining extortion, having been re-enacted on June 22, 1874, as section 5481 of the R. S. after the cession of Alaska to the United States--was, therefore, in force in that country proprio vigore at the time the crime charged in No. 444 is alleged to have been committed. This being so, the facts stated constitute a crime, of which this court has jurisdiction, it also appearing that it was committed without the jurisdiction of any particular State or district" (Sec. of Act of 1825; Sec. 730 R. S.); and that the defendant was first brought into this district, independent of the jurisdiction specially conferred upon it by section 7 of the Alaska act of 1868 (Sec. 1957 R. S.) The demurrers are overruled, but the defendant may be heard upon the same questions in arrest of judgment if a verdict should be given against him on the trial.* *The defendant afterwards pleaded guilty and was fined. IN RE JOHN SIME & Co., BANKrupts. DISTRICT COURT, DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA. 1. CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT-BANKRUPTCY OF MAKER.-After the bankruptcy of the maker his certificates of deposit are dishonored paper, and after they have been proved as claims against his estate no longer possess the qualities of negotiable paper. 2. IDEM. Such claims are not entitled to the protection allowed by law to negotiable instruments, but stand on the same footing as a claim proved for an open account. 3. PURCHASER FOR VALUE.-A person who takes an assignment of a claim proved in bankruptcy, as security for an antecedent liability from him in whose name the claim is proved, and who is apparently, though not really, the owner thereof, is not a purchaser for value and cannot hold the claim against the true owner. Before HILLYER, District Judge. Petition of Sol. A. Sharp for an order restraining the trustee, P. J. White, from paying certain moneys in his hands to one Wm. T. Garratt, and directing the payment of said moneys to the petitioner. The material facts are as follows: Sime & Co. were bankers, and on the first day of November, 1871, filed a petition and were adjudged bankrupts. At the time of the failure, Wm. R. Briggs was the holder of two certificates of deposit issued to him by Sime & Co. of the usual form payable to himself or his order on return of the certificate properly indorsed, one for $4000 and the other for $3500. At the same time the petitioner, Sharp, had a balance on an open deposit account to his credit of $1413.92. Prior to the said first of November, two suits had been commenced and were still pending, one against John N. Risdon, and the other against Risdon & Coffee, the plaintiff in each being one Smith, who sued as assignee of John Sime & Co. and for their use and benefit. In these suits the property of John N. Risdon had been attached and released upon an undertaking executed by William Ware and the respondent Garratt. Garratt had also paid out for Risdon $3200 on a note. Before executing the undertaking Garratt obtained from Risdon a conveyance of certain real property on Bush street as security for the money paid, and against his liability on the undertaking. In this state of affairs, an agreement was made between Briggs, Sharp and Risdon on the same day (November 1), whereby it was agreed between them that Sharp and Briggs should assign their claims against Sime & Co. to Risdon; that Risdon should execute notes for sixty per cent. of their amount, the notes to be indorsed by Ware; that the certificates of Briggs, and the account of Sharp, when indorsed and assigned, should be placed in the hands of R. H. Lloyd, and the notes in the hands of John R. Jarboe; and that in the event Risdon was able to use these claims as a setoff in the before-mentioned suits, then Lloyd was to deliver the certificates and account to Risdon, and Jarboe the notes to Briggs and Sharp. If the claims were not used as a setoff, then the notes were to be given up by Jarboe to Risdon, and the claims to Briggs and Sharp, by Lloyd. At the time of making the agreement it was supposed that Sime & Co. would go into bankruptcy, and it was uncertain whether the claims would be assigned before the filing of their petition so that they could be used as setoffs. In pursuance of this agreement Sharp made a written assignment of his account to Risdon, and Briggs indorsed his certificates; the notes were executed and placed in the hands of Jarboe and the claims in the hands of Lloyd. Briggs' indorsement was as follows: "Without recourse, W. R. Briggs." The assignments from Briggs and Sharp to Risdon were made after the petition was filed. On the ninth of December, 1871, Lloyd made out formal proofs of these claims in his hands, which were sworn to by Risdon. They were then left in the hands of register Bates, Mr. Lloyd stating to the register, that he was acting for other parties in the matter, and claimed a right to control the claims. Subsequently the claims got into the hands of the trustee White, and on the twelfth of September, 1872, into those of register Clarke. Prior to this no file mark appears on the claims. Attached to the proof is a copy of Sharp's account with the written assignment and 1875.] Opinion of the Court-Hillyer, J. the original certificates of Briggs indorsed in blank as aforesaid. So that on their face the claims appeared to be Risdon's. On each proof over the date of October 21, 1872, is a statement signed by the trustees to the effect that the claim is allowed, but that they think the assignment was made after the petition was filed, and that the claims. cannot be used by Risdon as a setoff. On November 21, 1872, Risdon, by an assignment filed with register Clarke, assigned both claims to the respondent, Wm. T. Garratt, as security, in addition to the real property before conveyed, for the liability on the undertaking and the money paid as aforesaid. No new or present consideration was paid by Garratt for the assignment. When the agreement was made it was supposed the Sime & Co.'s estate would pay about twenty-five cents on the dollar. Afterwards by an advance in stocks the estate became able to pay dollar for dollar. The suits against Risdon went to judgment without the claims being used as setoffs; ever since the trustee and his attorney have refused their assent to the allowance of them as a setoff in the bankruptcy matter. Before the filing of the present petition Briggs assigned his interest in the claims to the petitioner, Sharp. Sharp & Lloyd and Walter H. Tompkins, for petitioner. M. M. Estee, for respondent. HILLYER, J. Upon the facts it is plain that Risdon never has become, and he never can become, the true owner of these claims, under the agreement between him and Sharp and Briggs. Because he never did, and he never can, use them as a setoff to the demand of Sime & Co. against him. The construction sought to be put upon the agreement by counsel for Garratt, that it was the intention of the parties to transfer the absolute title to Risdon subject only to a right on his part to return the claims and receive the notes, if he could not use them as a setoff, is not the true one. This is evident from the fact that Sharp and Briggs, by the terms of the agreement never could become entitled to a delivery of Opinion of the Court--Hillyer, J. [March, the notes to them until the claims were used as setoffs. The agreement must all be construed together; and so taken, the use of the claims as a setoff was the thing upon which the right of Risdon to the claims, and of Sharp and Briggs to the notes, hinged. So far, then, as the parties to the agreement are concerned the property in these claims never was in Risdon. His assignment of them, under the circumstances, was a fraudulent act, and the only question in this case upon which I have felt any hesitation is, whether Garratt got them under such circumstances as to debar the true owners from asserting their title against him. But little need be said in answer to that portion of respondent's argument which went upon the assumption that the two certificates of deposit were negotiable instruments, and came into Garratt's hands as indorsee without notice of any of the facts impeaching Risdon's title. For, after the bankruptcy of the maker, they were dishonored paper, and, after they were proved and filed as claims in the bankruptcy court, they no longer had the qualities of negotiable paper. The claims, as such, were neither transferable by delivery nor indorsement; they could still be assigned but not delivered or taken from the files. It is surely a complete misnomer to call such claims negotiable paper. The claim, then, which embraces the certificates, stands on the same footing as the one proved for the open account. These claims must be treated as personal property, and as not entitled to the immunities and protection allowed by law to negotiable instruments. The general rule of the common law is, that no one can give a better title to personal property than he has himself. (Murray v. Lardner, 2 Wall. 110.) It is said in Root v. French, 13 Wend. 510, that one exception to this rule which will give a third person a better title and a superior equity to the true owner, is made in favor of a third person who has given value for the property or incurred some responsibility upon the credit of it, and without notice of the fraud. Garratt claims that he is a purchaser for value without notice of the fraud. Is he? It has been held that "a per |