by the law of England the parishioners are bound to repair their churches. And so far is that Court from acknowledging, that when the parishioners refuse to repair a church, there is no power to compel them; that one chief ground of their judgment in the case appears to me to be, the admission that the Ecclesiastical Court has, by ancient law, the power to compel the parishioners, either by interdict or excommunication, to do their duty. It was, indeed, intimated by the Court of Queen's Bench, that possibly these powers might have lost their effect; that the people might probably be no longer awed into obedience by being deprived, through an interdict, of all the public and private ministrations of religion; and that the sentence of excommunication might pass unheeded upon them. It must be confessed, that if in the present age the power possessed by the Ecclesiastical Court were only a spiritual power, there might be some reason to fear that it would be ineffectual. Accordingly, I cannot but feel some regret that the Court of Queen's Bench should on this occasion have couched its judgment in terms apparently calculated to perpetuate the erroneous idea, that the Ecclesiastical Courts are powerful only towards those who dread the spiritual censures of interdict and excommunication. It did not come, perhaps, within the duty of the Court of Queen's Bench, in pronouncing the judgment in the Braintree case, to explain the manner in which contempts of the authority of Ecclesiastical Courts, formerly punishable by excommunication, can now be punished by imprisonment; still it would, in my humble judgment, have strengthened the grounds of the decision of the Court, had the Court intimated, that the Ecclesiastical Court has the power, through the instrumentality of the Court of Chancery, to punish by imprisonment those who disobey its decrees; and that, therefore, the liability of the parishioners to repair their churches, was a liability which the law has still the power to enforce. I believe that I state the case correctly, in saying, that supposing the Ecclesiastical Court were now to admonish parishioners to repair their church; that whereas, under the former state of the law, before the passing of Lord Stowell's Act', they would have been excommunicated for a disobedience of the decree of the Court to repair their church, they would, under the existing law, be liable to imprisonment under the writ issued from the Court of Chancery, "De Contumace Capiendo." Thus, though purely spiritual censures may now be powerless, it is not so with the decrees of the spiritual courts; it being an acknowledged rule of the law, (as lately proved in Thorogood's case,) that the temporal court is ready, when called upon, to lend its aid to enforce the judgment of the spiritual court, 1 An Act for the better Regulation of Ecclesiastical Courts in England, 53 Geo. III. c. 127. and thus the very same punishment awaits the contumacious parishioner, who neglects to do what the spiritual court decrees, as would happen to him if he ventured to disobey a mandamus of the Court of Queen's Bench. The process may be expensive, and technical difficulties may be raised, to cause delay, but still it is true, that disobedience to the spiritual court is punishable, as certainly as a contempt in Chancery, or a refusal to obey the orders of the courts of law. The judgment of the Court of Queen's Bench in the Braintree case, may possibly undergo revision, by appeal to a higher court. But whether this be the case or not; it is manifestly the duty of the heads of our Church, to take every measure which is necessary, in order to ascertain the state of the law upon the matters of Church-rate, and the methods by which it may be enforced. It is only by such a course, that the defects or hardships, if any, of the existing law, can be duly discovered, as well as the means of remedying them by fresh enactments pointed out. I would add, that it is the duty of the State also, to aid and assist the Church in vindicating the power of the law, and checking the unconstitutional combination which is made to overthrow and to change it. Conscience is put forward as the plea for non-payment of Church-rates by Dissenters. The State would do well to look to it; it being manifest, that when once the principle is acknowledged, that private conscience justifies disobedience of public law, the whole frame of civilized society is dissolved. It was private conscience, binding itself by the solemn league and covenant, which overthrew the monarchy in the person of Charles I. The progress of the power of private conscience upon the power of the State, ought always to be watched with jealousy; for it may at last be found too strong for those, who for the sake of temporary popularity have taught it to know its strength: it may again have power to dry up all the resources of the State, and to overwhelm the country in disorder and destruction. I have to thank the Clergy and Churchwardens for their attendance, and for the patience with which they have listened to these statements. I will only add, that though we live in troublous times, as regards the relation between the Church and State, we ought not to be dismayed or alarmed for the result. The minds of men are being opened, to consider whether the Church of England, connected as she is with the State, be not the greatest blessing to the country and people at large. The Church is willing to abide the event, conscious of her Divine origin; and that her existence is independent of the will of The State may dissolve the alliance; but the separation would destroy not the Church but the State: the Church tied still closer to her Lord, and man. |