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"return without protest" "retour sans frais" or "retour sans protêt" would have the same effect. But it is doubtful whether any of these forms of endorsement could have the effect of dispensing with notice of dishonour to parties subsequent to C. The express authority of the section extends only to the waiver by a party "as regards himself" of some or all of the holder's duties.

CHAPTER XXXV.

ACCEPTANCE AND INTERPRETATION.

The sections of this Act which relate to acceptance do not apply to promissory notes: see sec. 186.

Acceptance is defined by secs. 35 and 36.

It may be general or qualified (sec. 38).

The time of acceptance is provided for by sec. 37.

As to acceptance supra protest, see sec. 147, and as to acceptance of bills in a set, see secs. 158 and 159.

Acceptance and Interpretation.

35. The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee Acceptance of his assent to the order of the drawer.

defined.

name wrong.

2. Where in a bill the drawee is wrongly designated or his Drawee's name is misspelt, he may accept the bill as therein described, adding, if he thinks fit, his proper signature, or he may accept by his proper signature. 53 V., c. 33, s. 17. Eng. s. 17.

Prior to 1906 this section and sec. 36 constituted one section. Unless the context otherwise requires, "acceptance" means an acceptance completed by delivery or notification, (sec. 2), for until delivery or notification the contract of acceptance is incomplete and revocable (sec. 39). After the drawee has accepted a bill he is termed the "acceptor.

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The liability of an acceptor is defined by secs. 128 and 129.

Acceptance must be by drawee.

There cannot be an acceptor of a bill other than the drawee or one who accepts as his agent (see notes to sec. 51) or for his honour (sec. 147, et seq.). Steele v. McKinley, 1880, 5 App. Cas. 754, at p. 782, 4 R.C. 218, at p. 235.

The same principle is not applicable to a note. Any number of persons may become bound as promisors along with the original maker (see ibid.).

Sec. 35.

In Steele v. McKinley, supra, W., addressed a bill to W. M. Acceptance and T. M. The drawees accepted. Their father, J. M., then must be by wrote his own signature across the back of the bill, and handed drawee. it to W. who remitted its amount, less discount, to the drawees. In an action by the representative of the drawer against the representative of J. M., it was held that what was done could not be effectual as a guarantee for want of a writing sufficient to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, or as an acceptance because the bill was not addressed to J. M.

It was urged that J. M.'s signature was operative as an endorsement to W., but the court held that W., being the drawer, was by virtue of that fact liable to an endorser, and could not at the same time be entitled to sue on the endorsement.

It is true that there may be an endorsement by a person who puts his name on the bill to facilitate its negotiation to a holder. Such an endorsement is known as the giving of an aval. But an aval for the honour of the acceptor is not effectual in English law. The endorsement by a stranger to a bill to one who is about to take it has the effect of making the endorser responsible to subsequent holders, but creates no obligation to those who were parties previously. See notes to sec. 131.

In Steele v. McKinley the liability of the defendant was discussed with reference to some Scotch authorities which seemed to indicate the contrary. The English authorities were already clear upon the point.

A bill is addressed to B. C. writes an acceptance upon it. C. is not liable as acceptor. (Davis v. Clarke, 1844, 6 Q.B. 16.) A bill is addressed to B. B. accepts it. C. also writes an acceptance upon it. C. is not liable as acceptor (Jackson v. Hudson, 1810, 2 Camp. 447), but might be liable as endorser.

A bill is addressed to the "Directors of the B. Co., Ltd." The acceptance is signed by two directors and the manager. The manager is not liable as acceptor. (Bult v. Morrell, 1840, 12 A. & E. 745.)

A bill is addressed to William B. His wife accepts it, signing the acceptance "Mary B." If he authorizes her so to accept, or afterwards promises to pay the bill, he is liable as acceptor. (Lindus v. Bradwell, 1849, 5 C.B. 583, on the ground that the drawee may accept in any name he chooses to adopt, and that in this case William B., chose to adopt pro hac vice the name of his wife to accept in: Chalmers, p. 43.)

Firm and partners.

When a bill is addressed to two or more persons, whether partners or not, any one of them may accept so as to bind himself (Owen v. Von Uster, 1850, 10 C.B. 318). If all do not accept, the acceptance is a qualified acceptance (sec. 38).

The signature of the name of a firm is equivalent to the signature by the person so signing of the names of all persons liable as partners in that firm (sec. 132). If a bill is addressed to B. & Co., and D., a partner in the firm, accepts it in his own name, he is liable as acceptor (Owen v. Von Uster, supra), but the firm is not liable. (Mason v. Ramsay, 1808, 1 Camp. 384, to the contrary, is not good law since the Act requiring the acceptance to be signed by the drawee: Chalmers, p. 44, see sec. 36.)

A bill is addressed to B. & Co. B., a partner in the firm, accepts it in the firm name, adding also his own name. This is the acceptance of the firm, and not of B. personally. Barnard, Edwards v. Barnard, 1886, 32 Ch. D. 447.)

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A bill is addressed to D., who is a partner in the firm of B. & Co. D., accepts in the firm name. He is liable personally as acceptor. (Nicholls v. Diamond, 1853, 9 Ex. 154.)

A firm of "Cormack Bros," dissolved partnership, and Carter, an agent, was appointed to wind it up. M. Cormack had been a partner in the firm. Carter accepted, for his own purposes, a bill drawn on Cormack Bros., signing the acceptance "M. Cormack and R. Carter." M. Cormack is not liable on this acceptance. (Odell v. Cormack, 1887, 19 Q.B.D. 223.)

Incorporated company.

The acceptance of a company is sufficiently signed if it is duly sealed with the corporate seal (sec. 5). A company may however be bound by an acceptance duly signed on its behalf by an agent: see notes to sec. 5.

A bill is addressed to the B. Co., Ltd. Two of the directors accept it, signing thus: "J. S. and H. T., directors of the B. Co., Ltd." This is an acceptance by the company. (Okell v. Charles, 1876, 34 L.T.N.S. 822.)

A bill is addressed to the S. S. P. Co., the proper name of the company being the S. S. P. Co., Limited. It is accepted by "J. M., secretary to the company." This is not the acceptance of the company. (Penrose v. Martyr, 1858, E.B. & E. 499;

Sec. 35.

Sec. 35. Acceptance by a company.

Acceptance.

On the bill.

For money.

Mere signature.

Atkins v. Wardle, 1889, 58 L.J.Q.B. 377; Brown v. Howland, 1885, 9 O.R. 48, affirmed, 15 A.R. 750.)

If a bill is addressed to an officer of a company either by name or by the title of his office, the company cannot be liable as acceptor because it is not the drawee; the officer will be liable personally if he accepts either as officer of the company or "for the company, "but not if he accepts in the company's name, per himself. (Madden v. Cox, 1880, 5 A.R. 473, where the previous cases in Upper Canada are discussed.)

Drawee wrongly designated or his name misspelt.

There is no provision in the English Act corresponding to sub-sec. 2. Sec. 64 contains a similar provision in regard to the payee or endorsee of a bill payable to order, except that the words "if he thinks fit" are omitted.

A bill is addressed to D. & Co.
the firm is C. D. & Co., and the
that name. This is a valid acceptance.
2 B. & Ad. 23.)

The proper style of bill is accepted in (Lloyd v. Ashby, 1831,

A bill is addressed to M. & McQ., for goods supplied M. McQ. & Co. Acceptance in the name of M. McQ. & Co. Held not a valid acceptance. (Quebec Bank v. Miller, 1885, 3 Man. R. 17; under the Act the acceptance would be valid.)

36. An acceptance is invalid unless it complies with the following conditions, namely:

(a) It must be written on the bill and be signed by the drawee;

(b) It must not express that the drawee will perform his promise by any other means than the payment of money. 2. The mere signature of the drawee written on the bill without additional words is a sufficient acceptance. 53 V., c. 33, s. 17. Eng. s. 17.

Cf. notes to sec. 35.

At common law not only might an acceptance be by a separate letter, but it might be oral. The requirement that the acceptance be in writing on the bill itself and signed, was introduced into the law of England bv the Mercantile Amendment Act of 1856. In Hindhaugh v. Blakey, 1878, 3 C.P.D. 136, it was

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