used the ball three times daily for two weeks according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. £ 1,000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank Regent St. showing our sincerity in the matter." It was held that this advertisement was not a mere puff but that the plaintiff had a right to consider that it was intended to be a promise, and having performed the conditions was entitled to recover the reward.17

Performance of services. When one person renders valuable services for another with the latter's knowledge, that is ordinarily an offer intended to create a legal relation. But the circumstances under which the services were rendered and the relationship between the parties must be considered in order to determine whether the performance of the services was intended as the offer of an act for a promise, and was communicated as such. The secret intention on the part of the person doing the work to charge for it is not sufficient. In order to impose an obligation to pay upon the person receiving the benefit of the services, it must be shown that the latter assented to the proposal or ought to have known that compensation was expected.18

The relationship existing between the parties is often taken as indicating that there was no intention to pay for the services. So where a son made a claim against his mother's estate to recover compensation for his management of her affairs in her lifetime, the Court said: "If under all the circumstances of the case such services were of such a character as to lead to a reasonable belief that it was the under- · standing of the parties that pecuniary compensation should be paid for them, then the jury may find an implied contract. In order to justify the claim there must have been a design at the time of the rendition to charge, and an expectation on the part of the recipient to pay for the services. The services must have been of such a character, and rendered under such circumstances as fairly to imply an understanding of payment and a promise to pay. If services are rendered with expectation of compensation by will, a charge cannot after

17 Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. [1893]. 1 Q. B. 256.

18 Pew . Gloucester Bank. 130 Mass. 395.

wards be preferred against the person for them."19 When a woman lives with her brother for a number of years performing the household services but not expecting any pecuniary compensation, no liability to pay such can be inferred.20

When services have been rendered for a decedent by a member of his family, then in an action against his personal representatives to recover compensation for them, the presumption is that such services were gratuitous, and the plaintiff must show that they were performed with a design on his part to charge and an expectation by the deceased to pay for the same. But if the plaintiff was not a member of the defendant's family, then the rendering of the services is prima facie evidence of their acceptance, and of an obligation to pay what they were worth if there be no evidence of an express contract to pay a definite sum.21 In order to be a member of a family in this sense, it is not necessary that there be any blood relationship between the parties. Those who live together under the same roof, in the way in which families ordinarily live, each taking part in the domestic work, are to be regarded as members of the family.22

§ 11 (ii). The Offer May be Communicated by Conduct or by Words, but Must be Communicated. When a man offers his services or goods to another, a contract may be formed without the utterance of a word by either party when they are accepted under circumstances which show that the offeror intended to create a legal relation and that this intention was known or ought to have been known by the other party. The passing of a street railway car is the offer of a contract of transportation which is accepted by the passenger's board

19 Bantz . Bantz, 52 Md. 686. See also Bixler . Sellman, 77 Md. 494; Duckworth r. Duckworth, 98 Md. 92; Pearre r. Smith, 110 Md. 531.

20 Cone . Cross, 72 Md. 102.

21 Gill r. Staylor. 93 Md. 453. In this instance, as in several other citations of recent Maryland cases in this book. I have used the language of the Syllabus in the Report. Since I wrote all the head notes in the Maryland Reports from 80 Md. to 114 Md., I am minded to rely on them.

22 Pearrer. Smith, 110 Md. 533.

ing the car. When propeety is put up for sale at auction, that is the asking for bids, and each bid is an offer which is accepted when the hammer falls.1 The bidder at an auction sale often makes his bid by a mere nod of the head in response to an inquiry from the auctioneer. That nod of the head is as effective an offer as spoken words would be.2

When a man sends his goods to a person who has reason to suppose that the sender expects to be paid for them, that is the making of the offer. The principles relating to the formation of a contract under such circumstances will be considered more particularly in connection with the subject of the acceptance of an offer by conduct, or silence.

When the offer consists of an act, it must be done under such circumstances that the doing of it is known by the other party at the time to be an offer. If done without his knowledge, the offer is not communicated and the fact that he is benefited by the act, does not constitute an acceptance.3

A. built a party wall between his house and B.'s. B. neither directed the wall to be built nor promised to pay one-half of the cost. A. expected that B. would pay and B. knew it, and allowed him to proceed without objection. Under these circumstances a promise on B.'s part to pay may be inferred. Where the plaintiff as a volunteer aided in navigating the defendant's ship and then sued to recover compensation for his services, it was held that he could not recover, because the defendant did not have the power to refuse the services when they were offered. In this case Pollock C. B. said: "Suppose I clean your property without your knowledge, have I then a claim on you for payment?

1 Payner. Cave, 3 Term R. 148; Blossom r. Railroad Co., 3 Wallace, 96; Anderson r. Wisconsin C. R. Co., 107 Minn. 296; 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1133. Sale of Goods Act, art. 58, sec. 2.

2 Warehime v. Graf. 83 Md. 98.

3 Coleman . U. S., 152 U. S. 96; Bartholomew r. Jackson, 20 Johnson, 28; Thornton r. Sturgis, 38 Mich. 641.

4 Day r. Caton, 119 Mass 513.

One cleans another's shoes, what can the other do but put them on? Is that evidence of a contract to pay for the cleaning?"5

The rule in question does not mean that all the terms of the offer must be actually known by the offeree. A man may give his assent to terms when the knowledge of them is merely imputed to him, upon the general principle that notice is often equivalent to knowledge. Thus one who purchases a railway ticket is held to assent to the conditions printed upon it although he may not have read them. The ticket is not only a token that the passenger has paid his fare, but is also the contract between the carrier and the passenger. The acceptance of a bill of lading embodying the terms of the contract is in general sufficient evidence of the assent of the shipper. When a policy of insurance states that it is made upon the terms and conditions mentioned in the charter and by-laws of the insurer, the assured is presumed to have knowledge of them all.

6

5 Taylor v. Laird, 25 L. J. Exch. 329, cited in Anson, Contr. 108. 6 Western Md. R. Co. v. Stocksdale, 83 Md. 255; Mosher . St. Louis, etc., Co., 127 U. S. 390; United Rys. Co. v. Hardesty, 94 Md. 661.

7 Wolff v. Adams Express Co., 106 Md. 472.

8 Mut. Ins. Co. v. Miller Lodge, 58 Md. 471. In Watkins v. Rymill [1883], L. R. 10 Q. B. D. 178, "R. kept a repository for the sale, on commission, of carriages, etc. W. took a waggonette to the repository and left it to be sold, and was given a receipt on a printed form, which ran: "Received from -, subject to the conditions as exhibited on the premises." The conditions referred to were printed and exhibited in many conspicuous parts of the repository. One condition specified the charges for standing room, etc.; another gave R. power to sell, without notice to the owner, any property which remained at the repository over a month, unless all expenses were previously paid. W. put the receipt into his pocket without reading it. A month later he called and was asked for the receipt. which he said he had lost, and was told that he must produce it. When he at last found the receipt and applied for the waggonette, R. had sold it for £9. 19 s., 6 d., and, after deducting the charges specified by the conditions, sent him the balance, 16 s. 10 d. W. sued R. for the value of the waggonette, contending that he was not bound by the conditions. Held, W. was bound by the conditions, and so had no right of action against R. For the acceptance of a carriage for sale on commission is a transaction in which special terms might reasonably be expected to exist. and R. had taken reasonable means to give notice of the conditions to W. Therefore the receipt

§ 12 (iii). The Offer Must be Certain and Definite-SubjectMatter of the Agreement. The object or subject-matter to which the agreement relates must be definite and ascertained, either by the offer or by reference to some extraneous thing, such as the usage of the trade or the custom of the parties. If it were not ascertained or ascertainable neither the Court nor the parties could know whether that which was done or tendered in performance of the agreement was a due performance. "If the agreement be so indefinite that it is not possible to collect from it the full intention of the parties, it is void, for neither the Court nor the jury can make an agreement for them."1 Theoretically, the object of a contract is to create one or more obligations and the object of the obligation thus created is a certain performance to be accomplished by the promisor. Therefore, the object of the contract is in reality, distinct from the object of the obligation. But it is natural and convenient to confound these two elements, since the ultimate object of the contract is that thing which is the object of the obligation.

Now since a contract is made by an unqualified acceptance of an offer, it follows necessarily that the offer must itself sufficiently describe the object of the obligation—the thing to be done or forborne by the promisor, or by both parties in a bilateral contract. If any uncertainty in what purports to be an offer is remedied by an apparent acceptance, then the latter is the real offer and itself requires an acceptance. In connection with this rule as to offer, we may therefore consider the general principles requiring certainty in agreements. The object of every agreement is something that one party agrees to deliver or something that

constituted an offer to receive the waggonette subject to the conditions exhibited, and W.'s act, in taking it without objection, amounted to an acceptance of that offer." Potts' Summary of the Principles of Contract, p. 95.

1 Thomson v. Gortner, 73 Md. 474. See also Pearce v. Watts, L. R. 20 Eq. 492, where the Court could not determine the extent of the obligations where the agreement was to sell an estate reserving "the necessary land for making a railway".

2 Huc, Com. vii, p. 91.