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every man's hand is put the execution of such natural law on those who molest their neighbors, as far as reason allows that power may be used to prevent recurrence of offence, or secure reparation for the injury. In this state of nature, Locke argued, all men are, until by their own consent they make themselves members of some political society. Paternal power is the right and duty of guiding children till they reach ma turity, because they are not, as soon as born, under the law of reason, and this has no analogy with the social compact. A civil society is formed when any number of men agree to form a government that shall maintain and execute laws for avoidance of those evils which lie in the state of nature, where every man is judge in his own case. Absolute monarchy, said Locke, is no form of civil government at all; for the end of civil society is to avoid the inconveniences of a state of nature, and that is not done by setting up a man who shall be always judge in his own case, and therefore himself in the state of nature in respect of those under his dominion. In this work, Locke gave philosophical expression to the principles established practically by the English Revolution.

Locke's "Essay concerning Human Understanding," in Four Books, was first published complete in 1690. Its object was to lead men out of the way of vain contention by showing, through an inquiry into the nature of the human understanding, what are the bounds beyond which argument is vain. In his First Book he followed into a new field Bacon's principles, and maintained that man has no innate ideas, but is created with a receptive mind and reason, whereby he draws knowledge from the universe without. In his Second Book, Locke traced the origin of our ideas from the world about us by sensation or reflection, and argued that our most complex thoughts are formed by various combinations of simple ideas derived from the world about us, suggested to the mind only by sensation and reflection, and the sole materials of all our knowledge. The Third Book was a distinct essay upon words as signs of ideas, and enforced the importance of assuring that, as far as possible, they shall be made to represent clearly the same impressions in the minds of those who use them, and of those to whom they are addressed. Thus two men might argue without end upon the question whether a bat be a bird, if they had no clear and equal notion of the collection of simple ideas forming the complex idea of a bat, whereby they could ascertain whether it contained all the simple ideas

to which, combined together, they both give the name of bird. The Fourth Book of the Essay applied the whole argument to a consideration of the bounds of knowledge and opinion. Knowledge can extend no farther than we have ideas, and is the perception of the connection and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of any of our ideas. What is deducible from human experience God enabled us by reason to discover. What lies beyond our experience may be the subject of a revelation, which is above reason, but not against it. Locke ended with a threefold division of the objects of human knowledge -1, Study of nature, in the largest sense a man's contemplation of things themselves for the discovery of truth; 2, Practical applications, a man's contemplation of the things in his own power for the attainment of his ends; and, 3, Man's contemplation of the signs (chiefly words) that the mind makes use of, both in the one and the other, and the right ordering of them for its clearer information. "All which three," said Locke, "viz., things, as they are in themselves knowable; actions, as they depend on us in order to happiness; and the right use of signs in order to knowledge, being 'toto cœlo' different, they seemed to me to be the three great provinces of the intellectual world, wholly separate and distinct one from another." In this Essay, and in his two letters to Stillingfleet, Bishop of Worces ter, in the course of the controversy raised over it, the simple piety of Locke is very manifest. The reason of Locke caused him to maintain "that we more certainly know that there is a God than that there is any thing else without us."

Locke had finished, in March, 1690, "Some Thoughts concerning Education," published in 1693, -a treatise wisely designed to bring experience and reason to aid in right training of the bodies and minds of children. It is very practical, beginning with the education that may form a healthy body, passing then to a consideration of the right methods of influencing and guiding the mind, the relation of parents to the children, who "must not be hindered from being children, or from playing, or doing as children, but from doing ill;" relation of teachers to the young, development of character, subjects and methods of formal study, and the ordering of travel. The

influence of Locke's treatise on education was direct and wholesome; and to this day, among sensible customs and traditional opinions that help to the well-being of an English or an American home, there are generally some that may be traced back to the time when Locke's treatise on education was a new book with a living power over many of its readers.

In 1695 Locke published a book on "The Reasonableness of Christianity, as Delivered in the Scriptures," the result of his endeavor to turn aside from contending systems of theology and betake himself to the sole reading of the Scripture for the understanding of the Christian religion. Out of the same spirit came his study of St. Paul in "A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul to the Galatians, Corinthians, Romans, Ephesians. To which is prefixed, An Essay for the Understanding of St. Paul's Epistles, by consulting St. Paul himself." This was published in 1705, the year after his death. In 1706 appeared some posthumous works of his, the chief being an essay "Of the Conduct of the Understanding," the self-education of the man in learning to make right use of his mind, which has its natural place between the "Essay concerning Human Understanding" and the "Thoughts concerning Education."

CHAPTER X.

SECOND HALF OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY: HISTORIANS, BIOGRAPHERS, DIARISTS, AND ESSAYISTS.

1. Lord Clarendon.-2. Samuel Pepys.-3. John Aubrey.-4. Anthony à Wood. 5. Gilbert Burnet.-6. Roger North.-7. John Strype.-8. Humphrey Prideaux.-9. John Evelyn.-10. Sir William Temple.-11. Marchamont Need. ham; Roger L'Estrange.-12. Jeremy Collier.-13. Gerard Langbaine.

1. Edward Hyde was made at the coronation of Charles II. Earl of Clarendon, having been Lord Chancellor since 1658. After his fall, in 1667, he went to France, and died at Rouen, in December, 1674. His "Brief View of the Pernicious Errors in Hobbes's Leviathan" appeared two years after his death; but his "History of the Rebellion and Civil Wars in England, begun in the Year 1641," was first published at Oxford, in three folios, in 1702-4. Still later, in 1727, appeared in folio "A Collection of several Tracts of the Right Honourable Edward, Earl of Clarendon," containing his "Vindication" from the charge of high treason that closed his political career; "Reflections upon several Christian Duties, Divine and Moral, by way of Essays," all written after his fall; a "Dialogue on Education," and a complete set of "Contemplations and Reflections on the Psalms of David." The manuscripts of Clarendon's own "Account of his Life, from his Birth to the Restoration in 1660," and a Continuation from 1660 to 1667, written for the information of his children, were given by Clarendon's descendants to the university of which he had been chancellor, and were first published at Oxford in 1759. The "Continuation serves at the same time as a continuation of the History of the Rebellion, Clarendon's life being as inseparable from the events in which he played a leading part as his history is inseparable from the bias of mind which determined his career.

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2. Many details of life in the reign of Charles II. are brought near to us by the diary of Samuel Pepys (b. 1632, d. 1703), the son of a tailor. He went to St. Paul's School and Cambridge, married at twenty-three a girl of fifteen, and was helped up in life by the patronage of Sir Edward Montagu, afterwards Earl of Sandwich, to whom he was related. He became, as Clerk of the Acts, a busy and useful member of the Navy Board, not unmindful of profits to be made in his position, but watchful over the best interests of the navy. This was his position during the years in which he kept his amusing" Diary." It extends from January, 1660, to May, 1669. The unguarded small-talk of the diary, a mixture of simplicity and shrewdness, which entertains us while it gives life to our knowledge of the past, should not make us forget that Pepys was a sensible and active public servant. The liveliest impression of the fire of London is that given us in his "Diary," from Sunday, the 2d of September, 1666, when a maid called Mr. and Mrs. Pepys up at three in the morning "to tell us of a great fire they saw in the city; so I rose and slipped on my night-gown, and went to her window, and thought it to be on the back side of Mark-Lane at farthest," through all the work, misery, and confusion of the week, to the next Sunday, the 9th, when at church they had "a bad, poor sermon, though proper for the time; nor eloquent, in saying at this time that the city is reduced from a large folio to a decimo-tertio." Pepys's "Diary," in six manuscript volumes, was among the books and papers bequeathed by him to Magdalene College. It was first published by Lord Braybrooke, in 1825.

3. John Aubrey (b. 1626, d. 1697), who, in 1646, by his father's death, inherited estates in Wiltshire, Surrey, Herefordshire, Brecknockshire, and Monmouthshire, had a taste for antiquarian gossip, but was so credulous and superstitious that his records are worth little. His "Miscellanies upon Various Subjects," first published in 1696, are an amusing gathering of superstitious notes upon Day-Fatality, Apparitions, etc. Aubrey left behind him a work on "The Natural History and Antiquities of the County of Surrey." He lost his property, by litigation and otherwise. Anthony à Wood, after twenty-five years' acquaintance, said of him, spitefully: "He was a shiftless person, roving and magotie-headed, and sometimes little better than crased; and,

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