matter of another indictment, were inadmissible; Littledale, J., without hesitation, overruled the objection.(t) And in another case the same learned judge held that forged notes, the subject of other indictments, were admissible, although the names of the witnesses who were called to prove them forged, and to connect the prisoners with them, were not upon the back of the bill. (u) So on an indictment for uttering a forged Bank of England note, Alderson, B., admitted another forged Bank of England note in evidence, although the subject of another indictment.(e) And in a later case Lord Denman, C. J., said, that "he could not conceive how the rele vancy of the fact to the charge could be affected by its being the subject of another charge;" and offered to admit the evidence.(w)

But if the possession of other forged instruments is offered in evidence to prove a guilty knowledge, there must be regular evidence that such instruments are forged, and proof that the prisoner returned the money on any such instrument and received the instrument back again, is not sufficient without producing the instrument, or duly accounting for its non-production.(x)

*The prisoner was indicted for forging and uttering a receipt. The prose *842] cutor had been in the habit of writing his name on receipt stamps as acquittances, and attaching these receipt stamps so signed to acknowledgments of having received various sums from the prisoner. In accounting with the prosecutor, the prisoner produced an acknowledgment of having received £50, to which one of these receipt stamps was attached bearing the signature of the prosecutor. The prosecutor having no account of having received this sum, refused at first to admit its receipt, but ultimately, through an arbitrator, agreed to admit the payment to him of this sum by the prisoner on the receipt being given up. This was acceded to, and the receipt given up. It was then found that the receipt bore date before the particular receipt used had been issued by the stamp office, and it was then ascertained that the adhesive stamp had been removed from another receipt, and attached to the receipt in question, which constituted the alleged forgery. It was proposed to give in evidence other receipts alleged to be similar forged receipts by the prisoner, but not proved to be so, the prosecutor merely stating that he had never received the money for which the receipts purported to be acquittances, as evidence of guilty knowledge in support of the charge of uttering. It was objected that in the absence of proof that these were forgeries they were inadmissible. And it was held that the whole evidence must be confined to the document mentioned in the indictment, without at all trenching upon the rule as to uttering in other cases.(y)

Upon an indictment for uttering a £5 note, it appeared that on a former occasion the prisoner had paid away a £1 note, that the woman to whom he paid it, on finding it to be bad, sent word of it to the barracks, whereupon the prisoner, accompanied by one of the serjeants of the regiment. came to the woman's house to ask for the note, and to give good money in exchange for it. They found, however, that the woman had given the note to the constable, whom they immediately sent for; the constable, however, did not come to them, and the serjeant and the prisoner were obliged to return to the barracks without seeing him. But before they went away, they left two half sovereigns to make good the debt. Soon after they were gone, the constable came in, and finding that the woman was satisfied as to her money, he put the note into the fire. When the facts relating to the uttering the £5 note had been gone through, the counsel for the prosecution was about to prove these facts respecting the £1 note. But Bayley, J., interposed, and expressed a strong doubt whether they were admissible, no evidence having been given of the note being a forged note, and the note itself not being produced; he, however, consented to receive the evidence, stating that, if the prisoner should be convicted, he would reserve the point for the opinion of the judges.(z)

(t) Kirkwood's case, 1 Lew. 103, 1830.

(u) Martin's case, 1 Lew. 104, Littledale, J.

(v) Reg. v. Josiah Aston, Worcester Spr. Ass. 1838 MS. C. S. G.

(w) Reg. v. Lewis, Arch. Cr. P. 365, 8th edit.

(x) Rex v. Millard, R. & R. 245.

(y) Reg. v. Moore, 1 F. & F. 73. Byles, J., after consulting Martin, B.

(z) Phillips' case, 1 Lew. 105. The result of the case is not stated, but it is said that

the learned judge subsequently expressed the following opinion: "That the prosecutor

*It has been held on the trial of an indictment for forging a bill of [*843 exchange, that evidence of what the prisoner said respecting other bills of exchange which are not in evidence, is not admissible. (a) And although a letter written by the prisoner to a third person, stating that that person's name is on another bill, and desiring him not to say that that bill is a forgery, is receivable in evidence, yet the jury ought not to consider it as evidence that the other bill is forged, unless such bill is produced, and the forgery of it proved in the regular way. Upon an indictment for forging and uttering an acceptance of W. Prosser to a bill of exchange, a letter written by the prisoner to one Lawrence, in which he stated that a £20 bill was the last one of Prosser's with Lawrence's name upon it, and requested Lawrence on no account to say it was a forged bill, and to be careful of speaking to Prosser, was tendered in evidence, and objected to, as it related to another bill, and, at all events, that the bill to which it referred ought to be put in; Coleridge, J., held the letter receivable, and in summing up said, "With respect to the letter that has been read, I think that you ought not to take it as proof that the bill mentioned in it is forged. Bills which are not the subject of indictment, are often given in evidence to show guilty knowledge, but there is in such cases strict proof that those bills are forged. No such evidence is given here, nor is the bill even produced. It therefore may be, that the bill alluded to in the letter is in some respects irregular, but still it may not be a forgery."(b)

Sullivan was indicted for uttering a forged order upon Messrs. Coutts, and Pearce as an accessory before the fact for having incited Sullivan so to do. Several other orders of the same character had previously been presented to, and paid by, Messrs. Coutts. They and the one mentioned in the indictment were in Pearce's handwriting, but there was no evidence to show by whom they were uttered. It was objected that these other orders were not admissible against Sullivan; for she was in no way connected with them; and they were not evidence against Pearce, who was not charged with uttering; and the evidence was rejected.(c)

The punishment of forgery at common law is, as for a misdemeanor, by fine, imprisonment, and such other corporal punishment as the court, in their discretion, shall award. (d) The punishments ordained for the offence by the statute law will be mentioned, with the other enactments of the different statutes, in the succeeding chapters. *A consequence of the judgment for forgery was an incapacity to be a witness until restored to competency by the king's pardon. (e)

[*844 And the 12 Geo. 1, c. 29, provides that, in case persons convicted of forgery shall afterwards practice as attorneys, solicitors, or law agents, the court where the suit or action is brought shall, on complaint, examine the matter in a summary way, in open court, and cause the offender to be transported for seven years.

The principal statutes relating to the crime of forgery having been consolidated by could not give in evidence anything that was said by the prisoner at a time collateral to a former uttering, in order to show that what he said at the time of such former uttering was false, because the prisoner could not be prepared to answer or explain evidence of that description. That the prisoner is called upon to answer all the circumstances of a case under consideration, but not the circumstances of a case which is not under consideration; that the prosecutor is at liberty to show other cases of the prisoner having uttered forged notes, and likewise his conduct at the time of uttering them. But that what he said or did at another time collateral to such other utterings, could not be given in evidence, as it was impossible that the prisoner could be prepared to combat it."

(a) Reg. v. Cooke, 8 C. & P. 586 (34 E. C. L. R.). Patteson, J. But where on an indictment for forging and uttering a bank note evidence of statements made by the prisoner as to other bank notes, supposed to have been the subject of a guilty uttering by him, was tendered, and this case was cited, Crompton, J., said, "I confess that I entertain doubts upon the subject; but I think you had better not offer the evidence in question. I do not see the force of the reasoning upon which Cooke's case was decided; but I am not at present prepared to overrule it :" Reg. v. Brown, 2 F. & F. 559.

(b) Rex v. Forbes, 7 C. & P. 224 (32 E. C. L. R.). See this case, ante, p. 744.

(e) Reg. v. Sullivan, 2 Cox C. C. 80. Pollock, C. B., after consulting Erle, J.

(d) 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 70, s. 1; 4 Blac. Com. 247; Bac. Ab. Forgery; 2 East P. C. c. 19,

s. 69, p. 1003. The corporal punishment of the pillory cannot now be inflicted for this offence: 56 Geo. 3, c. 138; 1 Vict. c. 23.

(e) Co. Litt. 6 b; 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 46, s. 101; Com. Dig. Testmoign, A. 3. But see now the 9 Geo. 4, c. 32, s. 3, in the Chapter on Evidence. C. S. G.

the 24 & 25 Vict., c. 98, which contains general provisions applicable to all the offences affected by that Act, it is thought expedient to introduce those provisions in this place, in order that they may be more readily referred to in the subsequent chapters.

By the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 98, s. 40, "where the forging or altering any writing or matter whatsoever, or the offering, uttering, disposing of, or putting off any writing or matter whatsoever, knowing the same to be forged or altered, is in this Act expressed to be an offence, if any person shall, in England or Ireland, forge or alter, or offer, utter, dispose of, or put off, knowing the same to be forged or altered, any such writing or matter in whatsoever place or country out of England and Ireland. whether under the dominion of Her Majesty or not, such writing or matter may purport to be made or may have been made, and in whatever language the same or any part thereof may be expressed, every such person, and every person aiding, abetting, or counselling such person, shall be deemed to be an offender within the meaning of this Act, and shall be punishable thereby in the same manner as if the writing or matter had purported to be made or had been made in England or Ireland; and if any person shall in England or Ireland forge or alter, or offer, utter, dispose of, or put off, knowing the same to be forged or altered, any bill of exchange, or any promissory note for the payment of money, or any indorsement on or assignment of any bill of exchange or promissory note for the payment of money, or any acceptance of any bill of exchange, or any undertaking, warrant, order, authority or request for the payment of money, or for the delivery or transfer of any goods or security, or any deed, bond, or writing obligatory for the payment of money (whether such deed, bond, or writing obligatory shall be made only for the payment of money, or for the payment of money together with some other purpose), or any indorsement on or assignment of any such undertaking, warrant, order, authority, request, deed, bond, or writing obligatory, in whatsoever place or country out of England and Ireland, whether under the dominion of Her Majesty or not, the money payable or secured by such bill, note, undertaking, warrant, order, authority, request, deed, bond, or writing obligatory may be or may purport to be payable, and in whatever language the same respectively or any part thereof may be expressed, and whether such bill, note, undertaking, warrant, order, authority or request be or be not under seal, every such person, and every person aiding, abetting, or counselling such person, shall be deemed to be an offender within the meaning of this Act, and shall be punishable

thereby in the same manner as if the money had been payable, or had

*845] purported to be payable, in England or Ireland."(ƒ)

Sec. 41. "If any person shall commit any offence against this Act, or shall commit any offence of forging or altering any matter whatsoever, or of offering, uttering, disposing of, or putting off any matter whatsoever, knowing the same to be forged or altered, whether the offence in any such case shall be indictable at common law, or by virtue of any Act passed or to be passed, every such offender may be dealt with, indicted, tried, and punished, in any county or place in which he shall be apprehended or be in custody in the same manner in all respects as if his offence had been actually committed in that county or place; and every accessory before or after the fact to any such offence, if the same be a felony, and every person aiding, abetting, or counselling the commission of any such offence, if the same be a misdemeanor, may be dealt with, indicted, tried, and punished, in any county or place in which he shall be apprehended or be in custody, in the same manner in all respects as if his offence, and the offence of his principal, had been actually committed in such county or place."(g)

(f) This clause is taken from the 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 30, and extended to Ireland. The words in italics are introduced to make this clause correspond with the other parts of the Act. It was held in Ireland that forging an indorsement in Ireland on a bill drawn in America on a person in Ireland, and payable in Ireland, was within the Irish Act, 39 Geo. 3, c. 63: Reg. v. Roberts, 7 Cox C. C. 422.

(g) This clause is taken from the 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 24, and extended to Ireland.

The former clause provided that the offence might "be laid and charged to have been committed" in any county or place where the offender was apprehended or in custody, This provision was rendered useless by the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 23; which renders it unnecessary to state any venue in the body of any indictment which does not relate to a local offence.

Sec. 44. "It shall be sufficient, in any indictment for forging, altering, uttering, offering, disposing of, or putting off any instrument whatsoever, where it shall be necessary to allege an intent to defraud, to allege that the party accused did not act with intent to defraud, without alleging an intent to defraud any particular person; and on the trial of any such offence it shall not be necessary to prove an intent to defraud any particular person, but it shall be sufficient to prove that the party accused did the act charged with an intent to defraud."(h)

Sec. 45. "Where the having any matter in the custody or possession of any person is in this Act expressed to be an offence, if any person shall have any such matter in his personal custody or possession, or shall knowingly and wilfully have any such matter in the actual custody or possession of any other person, or shall knowingly and wilfully have any such matter in any dwelling-house or other building, lodging, apartment, field, or other place, open or inclosed, whether belonging to or occupied by himself or not, and *whether such matter shall be so had for [*846 his own use or for the use or benefit of another, every such person shall be deemed and taken to have such matter in his custody or possession within the meaning of this Act."(i)

Sec. 46. "If it shall be made to appear, by information on oath or affirmation before a justice of the peace, that there is reasonable cause to believe that any person has in his custody or possession, without lawful authority or excuse, any note or bill of the governor and company of the Bank of England or Ireland, or of any body corporate, company, or person carrying on the business of bankers, or any frame, mould, or implement for making paper in imitation of the paper used for such notes or bills, or any such paper, or any plate, wood, stone, or other material having thereon any words, forms, devices, or characters capable of producing or intended to produce the impression of any such note or bill, or any part thereof, or any tool, implement, or material used or employed or intended to be used or employed in or about any of the operations aforesaid, or any forged security, document, or instrument whatsoever, or any machinery, frame, mould, plate, die, seal, paper, or other matter or thing used or employed or intended to be used or employed in the forgery of any security, document, or instrument whatsoever, such justice may, if he think fit, grant a warrant to search for the same; and if the same shall be found upon such search, it shall be lawful to seize and carry the same before some justice of the county or place, to be by him disposed of according to law; and all such matters and things so seized as aforesaid shall by order of the court where any such offender shall be tried, or in case there shall be no such trial then by order of some justice of the peace, be defaced and destroyed or otherwise disposed of as such court or justice shall direct."(j)

The former clause made the accessories, aiders, and abettors triable in any place where the principal was triable; but cases of forgery might occur where the principal had not been apprehended, and where no proof could be given of any place where he would be triable, and therefore the latter part of the clause was assimilated to the former part by substituting the words "in which he shall be apprehended or be in custody." As to the proceedings against accessories in general, see vol. 1, p. 67, et seq.

(h) This clause is taken from the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 8.

The passage in italics was inserted to prevent its being supposed that this clause made it necessary to allege an intent to defraud in cases where the clause creating the offence did not make such an intent an ingredient in the offence.

(i) This clause is taken from the 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 28, and extended to Ireland.

As to the clause in italics, see ante, vol. 1, p. 96.

(j) This clause is new in England; but by the 38 Geo. 3, c. 53, s. 6 (I.), and 39 Geo. 3, c. 63, s. 6 (I.), power was given in Ireland to search for forged bills and notes of the banks of England and Ireland, and for frames, moulds, &c., for making such bills or notes. This clause is partly framed on these enactments, and partly on the similar clauses in the Coin Act, 2 Will. 4, c. 34, s. 14, with great additions.

Wherever information on oath is made before a justice that there is reasonable cause to believe that any person has in his custody or possession without lawful authority or excuse any of the things mentioned in the clause, the justice may issue a search warrant under which it may be seized and secured to be used as evidence or otherwise dealt with according to law.

The cases embraced by this clause are:-1. Where any person has in his possession, without lawful authority or excuse, any note or bill of the Bank of England or Ireland, or

*847] victed of any

*Sec. 47. "Whosoever shall, after the commencement of this Act, be conoffence which shall have been subjected by any Act or Acts to the same pains and penalties as are imposed by the Act passed in the fifth year of the reign of Queen Elizabeth, intituled An Act against Forgers of False Deeds and Writings,' for any of the offences first enumerated in the said Act, shall be guilty of felony, and shall, in lieu of such pains and penalties, be liable, at the discretion of the court, to be kept in penal servitude for any term not exceeding fourteen years and not less than five() years,- -or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years, with or without hard labor, and with or without solitary confinement."(k)

Sec. 48. "Where by any Act now in force any person falsely making, forging, counterfeiting, erasing, or altering any matter whatsoever, or uttering, publishing, offering, disposing of, putting away, or making use of any matter whatsoever, knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, counterfeited, erased, or altered, or any person demanding or endeavoring to receive or have anything or to do or cause to be done any act, upon or by virtue of any matter whatsoever, knowing such matter to have been falsely made, forged, counterfeited, erased, or altered, would, according to the provisions contained in any such Act, be guilty of felony, and would, before the passing of the Act of the first year of King William the Fourth, chapter sixty-six, have been liable to suffer death as a felon; or where by any Act

of any other bank. This provision is intended to reach any case where any bills or notes of any of these banks may have been unlawfully taken away before they were regularly issued. It is true that in such a case the bills or notes are not forged, but they have been unlawfully taken out of the bank, and ought not to be circulated, and the case is at least as strong as that of coining tools conveyed out of any of Her Majesty's mints without lawful authority or excuse, which may be seized under a search warrant. See the Coin Act, ss. 25, 27, ante, vol. 1, pp. 105, 113.

2. Where any person has in his possession, without lawful authority or excuse, any frame, &c., for making paper in imitation of any of the paper used for such notes or bills, -or any such paper, or any plate, wood, &c., having thereon any words, devices, &c., capable of producing the impression of any such note or bill,—or any tool, &c., used about any of those operations.

3. Where any person has in his possession, without lawful authority or excuse, any forged security, document, or instrument whatsoever. This is a new provision and a very important amendment of the law; for it will tend to facilitate prosecutions for forgery in many cases. Hitherto it has frequently happened that forgers have escaped with impunity for want of such a power as is here conferred. This clause includes every forged instrument whatsoever, and it authorizes the search for such an instrument in every case at the instance of the Crown or a private prosecutor. It is clear that a search may be made under it wherever there is reasonable cause to believe that the instrument is in the possession of the forger, for he can have no lawful authority or excuse for its possession; just as clearly is that the case where it is in the possession of any agent of the forger, for he can have no more authority or excuse for its possession than the forger. But perhaps it may be said that where a forged instrument is delivered to an attorney under such circumstances that, if it were a genuine instrument, he would be privileged from producing it, the attorney has a lawful authority or excuse for keeping possession of it: but this clearly is not so; the words "without lawful authority or excuse" are introduced in this clause for the like purpose as in the other sections of this Act (ss. 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 18, 19), and in the similar sections of the Coin Act (ss. 6, 7, 8), viz., to protect persons who are lawfully in possession, &c., of the things specified, and their agents, and are inapplicable to persons who are unlawfully in possession of the things, or their agents, whether attorneys or not. Consequently all such questions as arose in Rex v. Smith, 1 Phil. Ev. 171; Reg. v. Avery, 8 C. & P. 596 (34 E. C. L. R); Reg. v. Hayward, 2 C. & K. 234 (61 E. C. L. R.); s. c., as Reg. v. Jones, 1 Den. C. C. 166; Reg. v. Farley, 2 C. & K. 313; 1 Den. C. C. 197; and Reg. v. Tuffs, 1 Den. C. C. 319, may be avoided in future by seizing the forged instrument under a search warrant issued in pursuance of this clause. Nor is there any reason why this should not be done; for it is perfectly clear that a stolen deed, bill, or note, delivered by a client to his attorney, may be seized under a search warrant issued under sec. 103 of the Larceny Act; so that this construction places the search for forged and stolen instruments on precisely the same footing.

Lastly, where any person has in his possession, without lawful authority or excuse, any machinery used in the forgery of any security, document, or instrument whatsoever. (j) 27 & 28 Vict. c. 47.

(k) This clause is taken from the 1 Will. 4, c. 66, s. 23, and extended to Ireland to meet any cases, if such there be, to which its provisions may apply.