There was no evidence to show in what state the check was at the time when it was signed by any of the officers except Caley. It was objected that if the check was altered after Caley had signed, and before any of the others signed, it was not a forgery, as it was an incomplete instrument till it was signed by a majority of the officers. Platt, B.: "Until the signatures of a majority of the parish officers were attached to this check it was an incomplete instrument, and was neither an order on the treasurer for the payment of the money, nor a warrant to him to pay money; and the altering it when incomplete is, therefore, no forgery."(1) It is also laid down as clear, that it is no objection to the charge *of forgery that the instrument is not available, by reason of some collateral [*761 objection not appearing upon the face of it.(m) So that, where a prisoner was indicted for forging an order for the payment of prize-money, and it appeared that the party whose name was forged was a discharged seaman, and was, at the time the order bore date, within seven miles of the port where his wages were payable; under which circumstances his genuine order would not have been valid by the provisions of the 32 Geo. 3, c. 34, s. 2, unless made in the manner therein prescribed; the offence was holden to be forgery, the order itself purporting, on the face of it, to be made at another place beyond the limited distance.(n) So it is no defence to an indictment for forging and uttering an order of a board of guardians of a poor law union, to show that the person who signed the order as presiding chairman was not in fact chairman on the day he signed the order. The indictment against the prisoner was for forging and uttering the following order:— "No. "Aylsham Union, the 14th day of Nov., 1837. "To John Ringer, Esq., Treasurer. 66 "JOHN WARNES, Presiding Chairman. The signatures of Warnes and Rump were proved to have been written by them at a meeting of the guardians of the union, but it was not proved that Warnes was the presiding chairman when he signed the order. The signature of John Cross was proved to be forged. Upon a case reserved, it was contended that though the instrument purported to be signed by the presiding chairman, and so was on the face of it valid, yet it might be shown on the part of the prisoner that in fact the person signing and describing himself as presiding chairman did not fill that character, and that the instrument would then be equally invalid, as if the deficiency had been on the face of the instrument; but the judges were unanimously of opinion that there was nothing in the objection.(0) (1) Reg. v. Turpin, 2 C. & K. 820 (61 E. C. L. R.). This decision seems very questionable. Rex v. Bingley, R. & R. 446; Rex v. Kirkwood, R. & M. C. C. R. 304, and Rex v. Dade. Ibid. 307, 1 vol. p. 61, show that if several make distinct parts of a forged instrument, each is a principal, though it is finished by one alone in the absence of the others. It is plain, therefore that a party may be guilty of forging an instrument, though at the time he executes part of it, such instrument is in an incomplete state. If, therefore, a person alters an incomplete instrument, with intent that it shall afterwards be completed, and it is afterwards completed, it should seem that he is then guilty of forging such instrument, especially where the only false part is that executed by himself. In this case also the prisoner appears to have signed the check last, and until he signed there was not a majority of the officers, who had signed; the forged instrument, therefore, was completed by the prisoner himself. Again, the prisoner must have uttered the check to some one, and to whom is immaterial, if it was then in its altered state, and of that no question seems to have been made, and therefore he ought to have been convicted of uttering. See Reg. v. Cooke, 8 C. & P. 582 (34 E. C. L. R.); ante, p. 717. (m) 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 45, p. 956. (n) M'Intosh's case, 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 39, p. 942; 2 Leach 883. (0) Reg. v. Pike, 2 Moo. C. C. R. 70. Per Lord Abinger, C. B., "It does not lie in the But the offence will not be forgery where the false instrument does not carry on the face of it the semblance of that for which it is counterfeited, or where it is illegal in its very frame.(p) In a case where the instrument charged to be forged was an order in the name of a creditor to a gaoler, for the discharge of a debtor who was in prison under an attachment for a contempt, it was objected that such instrument was a mere nullity in itself, even if genuine; but it became unnecessary to decide upon the objection.(q) *Where the false instrument was in the following form, without any sig *762] nature: "No. F. 946. "I promise to pay John Wilson, Esq., or bearer, Ten Pounds. £ Ten. "Entered, JOHN JONES," "London, March 4, 1776. and it was laid in one set of counts as a paper writing, purporting to be a bank note; and in another as purporting to be a promissory note, for the payment of money; it was holden that the prisoner was entitled to an acquittal, though it was specially found by the jury that the prisoner averred that the instrument was a good bank note, and uttered and published it as a good bank note. The court said that the representation of the prisoner could not alter the purport of the instrument. which was what appeared upon the face of the instrument itself; and that, although such false representations might make the party guilty of a fraud or cheat, they could not make him guilty of a felony.(r) In a case where a bill of exchange was directed to "John Ring," and the acceptance was by "John King;" and the indictment stated that the bill purported to be directed to John King by the name of John Ring, and that the prisoner forged the acceptance in the name of John King; judgment was arrested, because Ring could not purport to be King.(s) Forging or uttering a note which, for want of a signature, is incomplete, was holden not to be an offence within the statute, by which forgery of notes was subjected to capital punishment. The prisoner was convicted of the offence of uttering a forged promissory note for the payment of £40, with intent, &c. The note in question had been originally issued by the Bedford bank as a one pound note, and was then as follows: "No. 16209. Bedford Bank, £1. "I promise to pay the bearer One Pound on demand here or at Sir Charles Price, Bart., & Co., Bankers, London. "Value received. "Bedford, the 17th day of October, 1817. "For Barnard, Barnard, and Green. "THOMAS BARNARD." The note was afterwards altered by cutting out or obliterating the word one and pasting in or inserting in the place of it the word forty, and by cutting off the last Îine which contained the signature, and by some other smaller alterations. The note then was as follows: prisoner's mouth to set up that Warnes was not in fact chairman. By uttering the bill he represents the whole as true." . (p) Ante, p. 748. (7) Fawcett's case, 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 7, p. 862, and s. 45, p. 952, where the learned writer says that it does not appear whether the judges decided the case on that ground: as, at any rate, the indictment was holden good as a cheat. And see Gibbs's case, 1 East R. 173; 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 7, b. 864. (r) Jones's case, Doug. 300; 1 Leach 204; 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 11, p. 883, and s. 45, p. 952. Upon this case, Mansfield, C. J., in the case of Rex v. Collicott, 4 Taunt. 303, odserved, "Jones's crime was that of telling a falsehood." (s) Reading's case, 2 Leach 590; 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 45, p. 952, and s. 56, p. 981. *"No. 16209. Bedford Bank. "I promise to pay the bearer Forty Pounds on demand here or at Sir Charles Price, Bart., and Co., Bankers, London. 'Bedford, the 17th day of October, 1817. "Value received. [*763 "For BARNARD, BARNARD, and GREEN." And in this form it was uttered by the prisoner, as a note for forty pounds, and the prosecutor gave him forty pounds in change for it. Objection was taken on behalf of the prisoner, that this note as uttered by him was incomplete, and was not, nor did it purport to be, a promissory note, for want of the signature; and that, therefore, it was not the subject of forgery within the statute; and, on a case reserved, the judges were unanimously of opinion that the objection was fatal, and the conviction wrong.(t) Where the prisoner had been convicted of a misdemeanor, as for an offence at common law, for disposing of, &c., an instrument in the form of a promissory note, the count upon which the prisoner was found guilty charged in substance as follows; namely, that the prisoner unlawfully and fraudulently did dispose of and put away to one J. H. a certain forged promissory note, which was as follows:— I promise to take this as thirty shillings on demand, in part for a two pound note value received. Entd. J. C. 30 Shillings. . Blackburn, Sept. 18, 1821. No. 6414. For Cunliffe, Brooks, & Co. R. Cunliffe. with intent, &c. It was objected that this instrument could not in any legal sense be denominated a promissory note, as charged in the indictment; and the learned judge reserved the point, it appearing also to him that there was great doubt whether the genuine instrument or writing, supposed to be forged and uttered, had any legal validity; and whether it was not a mere nullity, for the forgery of which no indictment could be sustained; and the judges decided that judgment should be arrested.(u) So where the prisoner was indicted for forging and uttering a bill of exchange in the following form: "Nov. 10, 1840. "Please to pay to your order the sum of forty-seven pounds for value received. "J. BISHOP. "To Mr. G. PECKFORD, "Yeovil." [*764 *"Accepted G. Peckford," and indorsed "J. Bishop;" it was objected that this was not a bill of exchange; it was nothing more than a request to a man to pay himself, and the acceptance of such a document laid the acceptor under no obligation to a third party; Erskine, J., said he would reserve the point, and the prisoner was convicted, but the learned judge afterwards thought the objection so clearly good that he recommended a pardon for the offence.(v) Where the indictment was for uttering, as true, a forged acceptance of a bill of (t) Reg. v. Pateman, R. & R 455. (u) Rex v. Burke, R. & R. 496. It may be observed of the instrument stated in the indictment that it was not payable to the bearer on demand; that it was not payable in money; that the maker only promised to take it in payment; and that the requisitions of the 17 Geo. 3, c. 30, were not complied with. (v) Reg. v. Bartlett, 2 M. & Rob. 362. exchange, and it appeared that the bill in question was absolutely void by the provisions of a statute at that time in force, it was holden that a conviction could not be supported. The bill of exchange was of the following tenor : "SIR, 66 Navy Office, 21st December, 1786. "Seven days after date, please to pay to Mr. John Moffatt, or his order, the sum of three pounds three shillings, and place the same to the account of "To GEORGE PETERS, Esq., "Bank of England." "Accepted, G. PETERS.". "WALTER STERLING." And the question was, whether, supposing this bill of exchange to be void by the provisions of the 17 Geo. 3, c. 30, s. 1, not being drawn according to the form therein prescribed (as it neither specified the place of abode of the payee, nor was attested by any subscribing witness, though for less than £5), the forging of it could be considered as a capital offence within the 2 Geo. 2, c. 25, and 7 Geo. 2, c. 22, on which the indictment proceeded. All the judges were of opinion that the conviction was wrong; on the ground that, if the bill in question had been a genuine instrument, it would have been absolutely void, and nothing could have made it good: and that, by the 17 Geo. 3, c. 30, such an instrument was no bill, and had not the appearance or semblance of one.(w) The prisoner was convicted upon an indictment for forging and uttering a will of land of one John Skidmore, deceased, attested by only two witnesses; and, as it did not appear in evidence what estate the supposed testator had in the land so devised, or of what nature it was, so that it might be presumed to be freehold, and therefore, the will void and of none effect, by the express enactment of the statute of frauds,(x) for want of the attestation of three witnesses, the judges held the conviction wrong; on the ground that, as it was not shown to be a chattel interest, it was to be presumed to be freehold. (y) So it has been held, upon a case reserved, that an order for relief of discharged prisoners from a County gaol under the 5 Geo. 4, c. 85, being in many instances ungrammatical and at variance with the Act, will not support an indictment for forgery.(z) Upon an indictment for uttering an order for the payment of money with intent to defraud Blake in one count, and Woodman *in another, it appeared that *765] the prisoner applied to Blake, the relieving officer of the Berkhampstead Union, for payment of money under the instrument described in the indictment, and represented herself as the wife of William Henry therein mentioned, and stated as a reason for his not presenting it personally, that he was sick. Blake stated that, except as relieving officer, he was not an overseer of Berkhamstead, but that he was authorized by Woodman, the overseer, to pay money to persons producing prisoners' passes under the 5 Geo. 4, c. 85. The instrument in question, after reciting the provision in the 5 Geo. 4, c. 85, as to discharged prisoners being entitled to a certain allowance from the overseers of the poor of any place through which they might pass to the places of their settlement, proceeded, " And whereas William Henry, his wife, and eight children, corresponding in appearance and account he gives of himself to the description after mentioned, has come before us, two of the visiting justices of the House of Correction at Sandwich, and is deemed by us to be a fit object to receive the regulated allowances under the said Act; this is to certify the same, and to require the overseers of the poor of the places mentioned in the route, to issue to the discharged prisoner the allowance specified in the said route, as required by the said Act: provided that the discharged prisoner produces the said route himself, and that the description corresponds with his appearance and agrees with the account he gives of himself and the number of children he has with him. Given under our hands and seals this 20th day of November, 1843." The (w) Moffatt's case, 1 Leach 431; 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 45, p. 954. (x) 29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 5. (y) Wall's case, 2 East P. C. c. 19, s. 45, p. 953, 954. (z) Rex v. Donnelly, R. & M. C. C. R. 438. instrument contained the "Route for William Henry, his wife and eight children, from Sandwich, in the County of Kent, to Kenilworth, in the County of Warwick,' which specified "the names of the places through which the discharged prisoner is to travel" (amongst which Berkhamstead was not included), the rate per mile, the sum paid by the overseer, &c. The instrument also contained "directions for filling up the passes," and "description of the discharged prisoner." The seals to it were small pieces of paper affixed to it by wafers. Upon a case reserved after conviction, it was objected, 1. That this instrument was not a warrant. The statute, sec. 23, required it to be sealed with the county seal, or with a seal to be specially provided for that purpose-in this case the seals were common paper seals without any impression. The forgery, therefore, was incomplete. The overseer could not be deceived by it, nor would he, if he had paid the money under it, have been entitled to recover that money again. 2. The justices, who purport to have signed this pass, are only described as visiting justices of the House of Correction at Sandwich, not saying in what part of the United Kingdom Sandwich is, and the statute only relates to prisons in England and Wales. 3. There is a proviso in the pass, "that the discharged prisoner produces the said route himself." The presentment here was by the woman, and therefore void. 4. The statute says that the overseer shall pay the discharged prisoner, and take a receipt from such prisoner. This, therefore, was clearly a conditional order. 5. This is not an order for the payment of money. The statute speaks of it all through as a pass. When a statute designates an instrument by *a particular name, it must be described by that name : and it is not true, because a document contains one little ingredient of a [*766 particular nature, that therefore the instrument itself should be so designated. Lastly, if Blake had been a servant of Woodman's, an uttering to him might have been deemed an uttering to his master, but he holds a distinct office under the Board of Guardians. But the judges were unanimously of opinion that the conviction was right.(a) The prisoner was charged in some counts with forging, in others with uttering the following document, with intent to defraud the Great Western Railroad Company: "Great Western Railway. bearer to Oxford and back on business 66 'GEO. WM. CARRINGTON." It appeared that the prisoner went to the Abingdon Station by the Great Western Railway, and being asked for his ticket, presented the document in question; and on being asked who John Palmer was, he replied, "Your deputy superintendent at Paddington;" he also stated that he was sent with a letter to Mr. Morrell, of Oxford, on business of the Rugby Railroad, which was false. Passes of this kind were granted by the deputy superintendent at Paddington to allow persons to pass on the railway free of charge, but this was a forgery. The jury having acquitted of the forgery, but convicted of the uttering, it was submitted, in arrest of judgment, that, as the forgery of such a document was only a forgery at common law, the uttering of such a forged instrument was not an offence. Cresswell, J.: "I have not found any case, in which an indictment for uttering a forged instrument at common law has been maintained, unless some fraud was actually perpetrated by it, which is not the charge in this indictment: and Patteson, J., is not aware of any case on the subject. That the forgery of this instrument was a forgery at common law there is no doubt, but my opinion is that the charge of uttering cannot be sustained, and the judgment must be arrested."(b) But this case has been since overruled. The prisoner was indicted for a forgery at common law of a consent of R. Soden to act as next friend to certain infants in a chancery suit, and a second count charged him with uttering the forged consent, which was as follows: (a) Reg v. M'Connell, 2 M. C. C. R. 298; 1 C. & K. 371 (47 E C. L. R.). |