An Essay Concerning Human Understanding: To which are Now First Added, I. An Analysis of Mr. Locke's Doctrine of Ideas, on a Large Sheet. II. A Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion Concerning Personal Identity, with an Appendix. III. A Treatise on the Conduct of the Understanding. IV. Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman. V. Elements of Natural Philosophy. VI. A New Method of a Common Place-book Extracted from the Author's Works, Volume 2
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able abstract ideas actions agree animal annexed answer appear applied belong body cause clear collection colour common complex idea conceive concerning conformity confused consciousness consider consists constitution dead denominate depend determine discourse distinct distinct idea distinguish doubt evident examine exist extension false farther figure follow frame give gold hath ideas of substances identity immaterial individual joined kind knowledge known language least leave less lordship material matter meaning mind motion names nature necessary never nominal obscure observe occasion operations particles particular perceive perhaps person plain produce properties prove qualities raised real essence reason receive reference reflection relation resurrection rule sense sensible separate signification signs simple ideas solid sort soul sounds speak species spirit stances stand substance supposed taken things thought tion true truth understanding whereby wherein whereof words
Page 78 - Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die. And that which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be, but bare grain ; it may chance of wheat, or of some other grain. But God giveth it a body as it hath pleased him ; and to every seed his own body.
Page 333 - For that which befalleth the sons of men befalleth beasts ; even one thing befalleth them : as the one dieth, so dieth the other; yea, they have all one breath ; so that a man hath no pre-eminence above a beast : for all is vanity. All go unto one place ; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again.
Page 74 - For we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ ; that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad.
Page 55 - I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in different times and places...
Page 158 - Conceptions; and to make them stand as marks for the Ideas within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Men's Minds be conveyed from one to another.
Page 159 - It may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common sensible ideas; and how those which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and made to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of our senses...
Page 288 - But yet if we would speak of things as they are, we must allow that all the art of rhetorick, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, and so indeed are perfect cheats...
Page 162 - Words in their primary or immediate signification, stand for nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly soever, or carelessly, those ideas are collected from the things which u2 they are supposed to represent.
Page 387 - The mathematician considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or circle only as they are in idea in his own mind. For it is possible he never found either of them existing mathematically, ie precisely true, in his life.
Page 289 - ... harangues and popular addresses, they are certainly, in all discourses that pretend to inform or instruct, wholly to be avoided; and where truth and knowledge are concerned, cannot but be thought a great fault, either of the language or person that makes use of them.