attends so rapid a progress. The movement of one or two principal men, if they manage the little popular strength, which is to be found in Dublin and Ulster, may do a great deal, especially when money is to be saved, and taxes to be kept off. I confess I should despair of your succeeding with any of them, if they can not be satisfied, that every job, which they can look for on account of carrying this measure, would be just as sure to them for their ordinary support of Government. They are essential to Government; which at this time must not be disturbed, and their neutrality will be purchased at as high a price as their alliance offensive and defensive. Now, as by supporting they may get as much as by betraying their country, it must be a great leaning to turpitude, that can make them take a part in this war. I am satisfied, that if the Duke of Leinster and Lord Shannon would act together, this business could not go on; or if either of them took part with Ponsonby, it would have no better success. Hutchinson's situation is much altered since I saw you. To please Tisdall, he had been in a manner laid aside at the Castle. It is now to be seen, whether he prefers the gratification of his resentment and his appetite for popularity, both of which are strong enough in him, to the advantages, which his independence gives him, of making a new bargain, and accumulating new offices on his heap. Pray do not be asleep in this scene of action; at this time, if I am right, the principal.

The

The Protestants of Ireland will be, I think, in general, backward; they form infinitely the greatest part of the landed, and the monied interests; and they will not like to pay. The Papists are reduced to beasts of burthen; they will give all they have, their shoulders, readily enough, if they are flattered. Surely the state of Ireland ought for ever to teach parties moderation in their victories. People crushed by law have no hopes but from power. If laws are their enemies, they will be enemies to laws; and those, who have much to hope and nothing to lose, will always be dangerous, more or less. But this is not our present business. If all this should prove a dream, however, let it not writing to me and telling me so. refute, in your conversation, the little topicks, which they will set afloat; such as, that Ireland is a boat, and must go with the ship; that if the Americans contended only for their liberties, it would be different: but since they have declared independence, and so forth

hinder you from You will easily

You are happy in enjoying Townshend's company. Remember me to him. How does he like his private situation in a country, where he was the son of the Sovereign?-Mrs. Burke and the two Richards salute you cordially.

Beaconsfield, October 8th, 1777.

E. B.

I

A LETTER,

TO THE

MARQUIS OF ROCKINGHAM*.

My dear Lord,

AM afraid, that I ought rather to beg your pardon for troubling you at all in this season of repose, than to apologize for having been so long silent on the approaching business. It comes upon us, not indeed in the most agreeable manner; but it does come upon us: and, I believe, your friends in general are in expectation of finding your Lordship resolved in what way you are to meet it. The deliberation is full of difficulties; but the determination is necessary.

A

The Affairs of America seem to be drawing towards a crisis. The Howes are at this time in possession of, or are able to awe, the whole middle coast of America, from Delaware to the western

* This Letter, with the two Addresses, which follow it, was written upon occasion of a proposed Secession from Parliament of the Members in both Houses, who had opposed the measures of Government, in the Contest between this Country and the Colonies in North America, from the time of the Repeal of the Stamp Act.-It from appears, an endorsement written by Mr. Burke on the Manuscript, that he warmly recommended the ineasure, but (for what reasons is not stated) it was not adopted.

VOL. IX.

M

boundary

boundary of Massachusets Bay: the naval barrier on the side of Canada is broken; a great tract of country is open for the supply of the troops; the river Hudson opens a way into the heart of the provinces; and nothing can, in all probability, prevent an early and offensive campaign. What the Americans have done is, in their circumstances, truly astonishing; it is, indeed, infinitely more than I expected from them. But having done so much, for some short time I began to entertain an opinion, that they might do more. It is now, however, evident, that they cannot look standing armies in the face. They are inferiour in every thing, even in numbers; I mean, in the number of those, whom they keep in constant duty and in regular pay. There seem, by the best accounts, not to be above 10 or 12,000 men, at most, in their grand Army. The rest are Militia, and not wonderfully well composed or disciplined. They decline a general engagement, prudently enough, if their object had been to make the war attend upon a treaty of good terms of subjection: but when they look further, this will not do. An army, that is obliged at all times, and in all situations, to decline an engagement, may delay their ruin, but can never defend their country. Foreign assistance they have little, or none, nor are likely soon to have more. France, in effect, has no King, nor any Minister, accredited enough either with the Court or nation to undertake a design of great magnitude.

ས་

In this state of things, I persuade myself, Franklin is come to Paris, to draw from that Court a definitive and satisfactory answer concerning the support of the Colonies. If he cannot get such an answer (and I am of opinion, that at present he cannot) then it is to be presumed, he is authorized to negotiate with Lord Stormont on the basis of dependence on the Crown. This I take to be his errand: for I never can believe, that he is come thither as a fugitive from his cause in the hour of its distress, or that he is going to conclude a long life, which has brightened every hour it has continued, with so foul and dishonourable a flight. On this supposition, I thought it not wholly impossible, that the Whig Party might be made a sort of Mediators of the Peace. It is unnatural to suppose, that, in making an accommodation, the Americans should not choose rather to give credit to those, who all along have opposed the measure of Ministers, than to throw themselves wholly on the mercy of their bitter, uniform, and systematick enemies. It is indeed the victorious enemy, that has the terms to offer; the vanquished Party and their friends are, both of them, reduced in their power; and it is certain, that those, who are utterly broken and subdued, have no option. But, as this is hardly yet the case of the Americans, in this middle state of their affairs (much impaired, but not perfectly ruined, one would think it must be their interest to