According to some authorities, the letter writer cannot be sued as acceptor (but only for breach of promise to accept), unless the letter designates the specific bill-puts its finger on the particular bill, so to speak;17 but the better opinion, as it seems to us, is adopted by others, that whenever the bill corresponds with the authority under which it is drawn sufficiently to be identified, the letter writer may be sued as acceptor.18

§ 1800. Conclusion. And here we conclude these Commentaries on the Law of Negotiable Instruments. Nice and refined in many of the distinctions necessary to be noticed, and strictly technical in many of its ramifications, the subject is, nevertheless,

17. Boyce v. Edwards, 4 Pet. 11; Coolidge v. Payson, 2 Wheat. 66; Schimmelpennick v. Bayard, 1 Pet. 264; State Ins. Bank v. Young, 14 Fed. 890.

18. See chapter XIX, §§ 560, 561 et seq., vol. I; Bissell v. Lewis, 4 Mich, 450; Nelson v. First Nat. Bank, 48 Ill. 39; Ulster County Bank v. McFarland, 5 Hill, 434, 3 Den. 553. In Scribner v. Rutherford, 65 Iowa, 553, it was held that the letter must indicate in what way the writer proposes to be bound; whether as surety, acceptor, indorser, or guarantor. There the language was: "K. wants a little money. If you want any one on the note, I will fix it when I come in." And in Wilson v. Beardsley, 20 Nebr. 449, where a party having written authority to draw for $75, raised the amount to $175 by adding the figure 1, it was held that a person indorsing such party's draft on the giver of credit for the raised amount could recover to the extent of $75, the credit actually given. Atlanta Nat. Bank v. N. W. Fertilizing Co. (Ga.), 9 S. E. 671. Where the character of the letter of credit amounts to an acceptance, the letter writer is estopped from setting up a defense based upon the alleged invalidity of the letter of credit for any cause. McCann v. City of Albany, 158 N. Y. 634, 53 N. E. 673; Benecke v. Haebler, 38 App. Div. 344, 58 N. Y. Supp. 16. In this case, vendees of certain goods sent to firm of bankers letter: "Please issue letter of credit for account of ourselves, in favor of Anton Strauss of Budapesth (the vendor), for any sums not exceeding about 825 pounds Stlg. Drafts to be drawn at three months' date from date of bill of lading against shipment by the steamer or steamers to New York, direct or otherwise, for invoice cost of 1,000 bags beans. Bills to be accompanied by full set, in due course, of blank indorsed bills of lading to order and original invoice certified by the U. S. Consulate." The letter of credit was issued and vendor availed himself of it by drawing with blank indorsed bill of lading and certified invoice attached, which draft was accepted by the bankers. Bank informed vendees by letter, of the transaction and transmitted to them invoice and bill of lading for the merchandise. Vendees acknowledged same by letter "as per their letter of credit for 825 pounds.” Held, that the letter last referred to constituted an approval by the vendees of the bankers' acceptance of the draft drawn by the vendor and a plain admission that both draft and acceptance were regular and in accordance with letter of request; further held that the bankers were not merely guarantors of bills drawn by the vendor on the vendees. The principle stated in the text is equally applicable to ordinary bills of exchange. Seaboard Nat. Bank v. Burleigh, 74 Hun, 400, 26 N. Y. Supp. 587.

pervaded by a broad, and liberal, and catholic spirit, as engaging to the mind of the philosophical student of jurisprudence, as it is instructive and needful to the active practitioner of the profession. Fortunes, vaster in amount than the dowries of monarchs, are daily committed, in our commercial cities, to the keeping of those frail but precious fabrics known as negotiable papers. With good faith crowned as their patron goddess, and fortune as their ward, they attract to their consideration and protection, not only the hunters of wealth, but as well the good who cherish sentiments of integrity, and the learned and great who expound the principles by which it shall be jealously guarded and maintained.

Ever expanding to embrace new species of instruments within its scope of operation; ever increasing in consequence as commerce explores new fields of adventure, industry unlocks new mines of wealth, and capital seeks new subjects of investment, the law of negotiability is destined to rise into an importance of which its early history gave little promise, and which its present development falls far short of realizing.

In no other branch of jurisprudence have the laws of different nations and different States so closely assimilated to each other. It is the pioneer in producing a homogeneous code, which shall prevail throughout the realm of commerce, without regard to the limits of country, race, or language. It is continuously struggling to eradicate local partialities, and prejudices, and temporary expediencies, and to attain that which shall remain stable, because founded on principles of universal justice. It was in maintaining the validity, and enforcing the obligation of a negotiable instrument that the United States Supreme Court said: "We will never immolate truth, justice, and the law, because a State tribunal has erected the altar and decreed the sacrifice." 19 And for the facilitation of trade, and the fair understanding of mercantile negotiations among all mercantile men, it is to be hoped that the day is not far distant, when it may be truly said (in the language of Cicero, approvingly quoted by Mansfield and Story), respecting the law of our subject, wherever industry turns a wheel or commerce sets a sail: "Non erit alia lex Roma, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et omni tempore, una eademque lex obtinebit."

19. Ante, vol. I, § 10, note cititng Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1.

END OF VOLUME SECOND.

APPENDIX.

THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.

"The following is a copy of the Negotiable Instruments Law as enacted by the State of New York. The following states have also enacted the same law, to wit:

Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, Florida, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Colorado, North Dakota, Utah, Oregon, Washington, and Arizona, and also the District of Columbia.

THE NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW.

Article I. General provisions. (§§ 1-7.)

II. Form and interpretation of negotiable instruments. (§§ 2042.)

III. Consideration. (§§ 50-55.)

IV. Negotiation. (§§ 60-80.)

V. Rights of holder. (§§ 90-98.)

VI. Liabilities of parties. (§§ 110-119.)

VII. Presentment for payment. (§§ 130-148.)

VIII. Notice of dishonor. (§§160-189.)

IX. Discharge of negotiable instruments. (§§ 200-206.)

X. Bills of exchange; form and interpretation. (§§ 210-215.)

XI. Acceptance. (S$ 220-230.)

XII. Presentment for acceptance. (§§ 240-248.)

XIII. Protest. (§§ 260-268.)

XIV. Acceptance for honor.

(S$ 280-290.)

XV. Payment for honor. (§§ 300-306.)

XVI. Bills in a set. (§§ 310-315.)

XVII. Promissory notes and checks. (§§ 320-325.)

XVIII. Notes given for a patent rights and for a speculative con

sideration. (§§ 330-332.)

XIX. Laws repealed, when to take effect. (§§ 340-341.)

Section 1. Short title.

ARTICLE I.*

General Provisions.

2. Definitions and meaning of terms.

3. Person primarily liable on instrument.

4. Reasonable time, what constitutes.

5. Time how computed; when last day falls on holiday.

6. Application of chapter.

7. Rule of law merchant; when governs.

§ 1. Short title.- This act shall be known as the negotiable instruments law.

§ 2. Definitions and meaning of terms.—In this act unless the context otherwise requires:

"Acceptance" means an acceptance completed by delivery or notifi

cation.

"Action" includes counter-claim and set-off.

"Bank" includes any person or association of persons carrying on the business of banking, whether incorporated or not.

"Bearer means the person in possession of a bill or note which is payable to bearer.

"Bill" means bill of exchange, and "note means negotiable promis

sory note.

Delivery" means transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another.

66 Holder" means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof.

"Indorsement " means an indorsement completed by delivery. "Instrument means negotiable instrument.

"Issue 99

means the first delivery of the instrument, complete in form, to a person who takes it as a holder.

Person includes a body of persons, whether incorporated or not. "Value" means valuable consideration.

"Written" includes printed, and "writing" includes print.

§ 3. Person primarily liable on instrument. The person "primarily" liable on an instrument is the person who by the terms of the instrument is absolutely required to pay the same. All other parties secondarily" liable.

are

§ 4. Reasonable time, what constitutes.— In determining what is a 66 reasonable time" or an 66 unreasonable time," regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the usage of trade or business (if any) with respect to such instruments, and the facts of the particular case.

* The numbers of the sections of this article in other States than New York are as follows: Colorado, Iowa, Massachusetts. New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Utah, Virginia, and Washington, 190-196: Mary land, 13-19; Ohio, 3178-3178e; Oregon, 190-192; Rhode Island, 1-7; Wisconsin, 1675. In Arizona, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, and Tennessee, these sections are not numbered.