two parties entitled to notice reside in the same place and the holder resides in a different place.

48

§ 1021a. The notice must be properly addressed to the party at a distance entitled to receive it; and if it be directed to "Darcy' as indorser, instead of "Darey," the correct name, it is negligence which discharges him.49 A bank holding a note with the indorser's name ambiguously written should inform the notary who the indorser is. 50

51

§1022. To what post-office notice should be directed when sent by mail. The notice should be directed to the post-office at, or nearest to, the party's place of residence, unless he is accustomed to receive his letters at another post-office, in which case it should be directed thereto. If he live at one place and has his place of business another, notice may be sent to either;52 and the place where the party actually resorts to for his letters is always the appropriate one, when known, for notice to be addressed to, whether or not the party lives there or has there his place of business.53 If the place be that of his actual residence at the time, it need not be his domicile. If sent to former address of insolvent firm, whose affairs are being settled by a trustee, it has been held sufficient.55 And so if sent to former place of business, where the indorser's affairs were in the hands of an assignee, the holder knowing of the assignment but not knowing of the indorser's departure.56

54

1023. Memorandum of address.-The indorser has a right to direct to what postal address, or to what place, notice shall be sent, and it will always suffice to pursue his direction although he may

51. Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, 1 Pet. 582; Bank of Geneva v. Howlett, 4 Wend. 328; Mercer v. Lancaster, 5 Barr, 160; Jones v. Lewis, 8 Watts & S. 14; National Bank v. Cade, 73 Mich. 449; Northwestern Coal Co. v. Bowman, 69 Iowa, 103, citing text.

52. Bank of United States v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 549; Williams v. Bank of United States, 2 Pet. 96; Cuyler v. Nellis, 4 Wend. 398; Reid v. Payne, 16 Johns. 218; Montgomery County Bank v. Marsh, 7 N. Y. 481.

53. See ante, § 1021, note 46; 1 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 498, and cases

cited.

54. Young

v. Durgin, 15 Gray, 264.

55. Casco Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 79 Me. 376. See ante, § 1002.

56. Importers & Traders' Nat. Bank v. Shaw, 144 Mass. 424; Bank of America v. Shaw, 143 Mass. 291.

have a place of residence or business elsewhere.57 Sometimes the place to which he desires notice to be sent is designated by memorandum on the instrument, as, for example, by writing the words "214 E. 18th Street," "58 or by adding his address to his signature, as, for instance, "Memphis, Tenn.," 59 or "Walnut Bend, Arkan," 60 or "13 Chambers Street, New York," 61 or "W. Moors, Manchester," 62 or "T. M. Barron, London," 63 and he thereby impliedly directs notice to be sent to the place designated.64

sas,

"63

§ 1024. It is not sufficient to direct notice generally to a parish, county, or township within which there are a number of postoffices; 65 but it has been held that it was sufficient to direct notice to the party at the shire town of the county, although there was a post-office nearer to him which he was in the habit of using.66 Where there are two post-offices in the town where the party resides, notice may be directed to the town generally, unless the holder knows, or should know, that he receives his letters at one of them, in which case notice should be directed there.67 It has been held

57. Eastern Bank v. Brown, 17 Me. 356; Crowley v. Barry, 4 Gill, 194; Bell v. Hagerstown Bank, 7 Gill, 216; Bank of Columbia v. Magruder, 6 Harr. & J. 172; Carter v. Union Bank, 7 Humphr. 548; Tyson v. Oliver, 43 Ala. 455; Dicken v. Hall, 87 Pa. St. 379.

58. Bartlett v. Robinson 39 N. Y. 187. See also Davis v. Bank of Tennessee, 4 Sneed, 390.

59. Carter v. Union Bank, 7 Humphr. 548.

60. Peters v. Hobbs, 25 Ark. 67.

61. Morris v. Husson, 4 Sandf. 93.

62. Mann v. Moors, Ryan & M. 149.

63. Burmester v. Barron, 17 Q. B. 828.

64. See also Baker v. Morris, 25 Barb. 138; Davis v. Bank of Tennessee, 4 Sneed, 390; Farmers' Bank v. Battle, 4 Humphr. 86.

65. Beenel v. Tournillon, 6 Rob. (La.) 500.

66. Weakly v. Bell, 9 Watts, 273; Story on Bills, § 297; 1 Parsons on Notes and Bills, 497. In Bank of United States v. Lane, 3 Hawks, 453, the notice was sent to the shire town to the indorser, who was the high sheriff then in attendance at court; and it was held sufficient, although neither his residence nor post-office was at that place.

67. Morton v. Wescott, 8 Cush. 425; Cabot Bank v. Russell, 4 Gray, 167; Burlingame v. Foster, 128 Mass. 125; Bank of Manchester v. Slason, 13 Vt. 334; Downer v. Remer, 21 Wend. 10. In Saco Nat. Bank v. Sanborn, 63 Me. 340 (1873), the indorser lived at the time he became indorser at the town of Baldwin. There was no post-office of that name, but there were three postoffices in the town named North, East, and West Baldwin, respectively. Notice addressed to Baldwin was deemed sufficient, the indorser having responded to a previous notice so sent without intimation that it was not properly directed.

68

that in London delivery of a letter to a bellman in the street is not equivalent to a deposit in the post-office, but this was doubted. And it has been held not essential to the validity of the notice that it be addressed to the post-office at which the indorser gets his mail, if in the usual course of the mail it will be sent to and delivered from such office.70

$1025. If the party live in one place and have his place of business at another, the holder of a bill or note protested at a third place should send notice to the place at which he usually receives his letters; but if the holder does not know that he usually receives at the place where he is engaged in business, it will be sufficient to send it to the place where he lives.72 But when a bill or note is protested at the place where the party entitled to notice. has a place of residence, notice should not be sent away from there to another place where he transacts business.73 In New York, the indorser of a note, who had a known residence in the village where the note was protested, and who was usually at home three days. in the week, was held to be discharged, the notice having been sent by mail to another city, where his place of business was, where he spent four days of the week, and received his letters and papers, there being no evidence that the notice actually reached him in due time, so as to render it equivalent to personal service.

75

When the party has his residence part of the year at one place and part at another, notice may be sent to either, at least when the holder does not know, or is not to be charged with knowledge. that he is accustomed to receive his letters at one of them." But in the case of a temporary sojourn, as for the summer at a water

68. Hawkins v. Rutt, Peake's N. P. C. 186.

76

69. In Skilbeck v. Carbett, 14 L. J. Q. B. 339, 7 Q. B. 846 (53 Eng. C. L.), Lord Denman says: “A bellman is an ambulatory post-office." See Byles

on Bills [270], 419.

70. Bank of Commerce v. Chambers, 14 Mo. App. 159.

71. Montgomery County Bank v. Marsh, 7 N. Y. 481; Reed v. Payne, 16 Johns. 218; Bank of Geneva v. Howlett, Wend. 328; Van Vechten v. Pruyn,

13 N. Y. 549.

72. Seneca County Bank v. Neass, 2 N. Y. 442, 5 Den. 329.

73. Story on Bills (Bennett's ed.), § 297.

74. Van Vechten v. Pruyn, 13 N. Y. 549, Comstock, J.

75. Exchange, etc. v. Boyce, 3 Rob. (La.) 307.

76. The notice should be sent where it is most likely to reach the party, as said in Chouteau v. Webster, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 1.

ing place, country place, or village, the notice should be sent to the place of the party's permanent residence."

§ 1026. When a party about to be absent directs notice to be sent to him at a place distant from his residence, so that its transmission thither, and thence to the prior parties, will occupy more time than if the notice had passed through the ordinary place of residence, a notice to him at the substituted and more distant place will not only be a good notice against him, but as well against all prior parties.

78

But when the party goes to a place distant from his residence for the purpose of a business negotiation which will occupy a few weeks, it would be insufficient to send notice there without instructions to do so.79

§ 1027. In the case of parties residing temporarily in a certain place-members of Congress or of a State legislature residing at their respective capitals, while the bodies to which they belong are in session, for instance - it is sufficient and proper that notice should be sent to them at such place, or left there at their place of residence;80 but after the adjournment of the session the rule would no longer apply, and notice should be sent to the party's permanent place of residence.81 And while Congress is in session it will not

77. Runyon v. Mountfort, Busbee, 371; Stewart v. Eden, 2 Cai. 121. 78. Shelton v. Braithwaite, 8 M. & W. 252; Byles on Bills (Sharswood's ed.) [*272], 422.

79. Walker v. Stetson, 14 Ohio St. 89.

80. Chouteau v. Webster, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 1; Graham v. Sangston, 1 Md. 59; Marr v. Johnson, 9 Yerg. 1. Contra, Walker v. Tunstall, 3 How. (Miss.) 259, 2 Smedes & M. 638; Bank of Commerce v. Chambers, 14 Mo. App. 156. 81. Bayley's Admr. v. Chubb, 16 Gratt. 284. In this case it was held that where notice was left at the dwelling-house of a member of Congress in Washington, after the adjournment of Congress, and after he had left the city, and it appeared that he kept up his domicile in the district he represented, and it was his habit to leave Washington directly after Congress adjourned, it was insufficient. Daniel, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, distinguished this case from that of P. Chouteau v. Daniel Webster, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 1, in which a notice sent to Mr. Webster while he was a Senator, and the Senate was in session, was held sufficient; so he said: "In the case of Graham v. Sangston, 1 Md. 59, the indorser at the time of the maturity of the bill was a member of the General Assembly of Maryland, then in session, and boarded at a hotel in Annapolis, and the notary gave notice by leaving the notice at the room of the indorser at the hotel; but whether the indorser was in Annapolis on the day that the notice was given did not appear; nor was there any proof in respect to the general domicile of

be sufficient to deposit notice for the member in the post-office of the Senate or House of Representatives, as it should be served personally by a party in the same place at his residence, or where he might personally be.82

It has been held that even when the indorser who was a member of Congress was known to be in Washington, notice sent to his residence in his district was sufficient.83 It has also been held that a temporary residence in a place is sufficient for the purposes of notice, although the person entitled to notice has a permanent residence elsewhere.84

85

§ 1028. Several post-offices where party receives letters. Where there are two or three 86 post-offices at which the indorser is in the habit of receiving his letters, notice may be sent to either; and where he lives at equi-distance from two post-offices, notice addressed to one will suffice, although he was accustomed to receive his letters at the other.87 Where the party lives in the United States, it is especially important in sending notices by mail to put the full address, town and State, as there are many cities in which the same name is applicable to towns and cities in different States. An omission to name the State, where there is more than one place the indorser. The notice was held sufficient." The judge referred also to Walker v. Tunstall, reported in 3 How. (Miss.) 259, and in 2 Smedes & M. 638, as opposed to Chouteau v. Webster, and the result of which decision is, that "notice sent to a member of Congress who has no known place of residence, is good if directed to Washington, whilst Congress is in session, and he is there engaged in the discharge of his official duties; but that such notice is not sufficient if he has a known place of residence, except upon a failure of the notary to ascertain the residence after having used due diligence to ascertain it." "And," he added, "it seems to me that the rule declared in Chouteau v. Webster is the more reasonable one; but I do not feel disposed to extend it still further than any case has gone yet, and make it embrace a notice sent to a member of Congress at Washington after the adjournment of Congress, and after the member had in fact left the city. The presumptions which upheld the notice during the session of Congress seem to me to have nothing to sustain or justify them after that body has adjourned. The presumption is then the other way."

82. Hill v. Norvell, 3 McLean, 583. 83. Marr v. Johnston, 9 Yerg. 1.

84. Young v. Durgin, 15 Gray, 264; Chouteau v. Webster, 6 Metc. (Mass.) 1; Wachusetts Nat. Bank v. Fairbrother (Mass.), 19 N. E. 347.

85. Shelburne Falls Nat. Bank v. Townsley, 102 Mass. 177; Bank of Louisiana v. Tournillon, 9 La. Ann. 132.

86. Bank of the United States v. Carneal, 2 Pet. 543.

87. Rand v. Reynolds, 2 Gratt. 171; Follain v. Dupre, 11 Rob. (La.) 454.