[1853 A.D.] the Porte, and France was already talking of sending her fleet to the Dardanelles, while Russia was placing a corps d'armée on active service and despatching Prince Menshikov on a special mission to Constantinople. So far the quarrel which had occurred at the Porte was obviously one in which Great Britain had no concern. The Aberdeen ministry, however, thought it desirable that it should be represented in the crisis by a strong man at Constantinople; and it selected Lord Stratford de Redcliffe for the post, which he had filled in former years with marked ability. Lord Stratford soon discovered that Prince Menshikov was the bearer of larger demands, and that he was requiring the Porte to agree to a treaty acknowledging the right of Russia to protect the Greek church throughout the Turkish dominions. By Lord Stratford's advice the Porte-while making the requisite concession respecting the holy places-refused to grant the new demand; and Prince Menshikov thereupon withdrew from Constantinople. The rejection of Prince Menshikov's ultimatum was followed by momentous consequences. Russia-or rather her czar-resolved on the occupation of the principalities; the British ministry-though the quarrel did not directly concern Great Britain-sent a fleet to the Dardanelles and placed it under Lord Stratford's orders. Diplomacy, however, made a fresh attempt to terminate the dispute, and in July, 1853, a note was agreed upon by the four neutral powers, France, Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia, which it was decided to present to Constantinople and St. Petersburg. This note, the adoption of which would have insured peace, was accepted at St. Petersburg; at Constantinople it was, unfortunately, rejected, mainly on Lord Stratford's advice, and in opposition to his instructions from home. Instead, however, of insisting on the adoption of the note to which it had agreed, Lord Aberdeen's ministry recommended the czar to accept some amendments to it suggested by Lord Stratford, which it was disposed to regard as unimportant. It then discovered, however, that the czar attached a different meaning to the original note than it had itself applied to it, and in conjunction with France it thereupon ceased to recommend the Vienna note-as it was called-for acceptance. This decision separated the two western powers from Austria and Prussia, who were disposed to think that Russia had done all that could have been required of her in accepting the note which the four powers had agreed upon. The Crimean War In October the Porte, encouraged by the presence of the British fleet in the Bosphorus, took the bold step of summoning the Russians to evacuate the principalities. Following up this demand the Turkish troops attacked the Russian army, and inflicted on it one or two sharp defeats. The Russians retaliated by loosing their squadron from Sebastopol, and on the 30th of November it attacked and destroyed the Turkish fleet at Sinope. The massacre of Sinope-as it was rather inaccurately called in Great Britain, for it is difficult to deny that it was a legitimate act of a belligerent power-created an almost irresistible demand for war among the British people. Yielding to popular opinion, the British ministry assented to a suggestion of the French emperor that the fleets of the allied powers should enter the Black Sea and "invite" every Russian vessel to return to Sebastopol. The decision was taken at an unfortunate hour. Diplomatists, pursuing their labours at Vienna, had succeeded in drawing up a fresh note which they thought might prove acceptable both at St. Petersburg and at Constantinople. Presented almost [1854-1855 A.D.] at the moment at which the czar learned that the French and British fleets had entered the Black Sea, the Russian government, instead of considering it, withdrew its ministers from London and Paris; the French and British ambassadors were thereupon withdrawn from St. Petersburg. An ultimatum was soon afterwards addressed to Russia requiring her to evacuate the principalities, and war began. In deciding on war the British government relied on the capacity of its fleet, which was intrusted to the command of Sir Charles Napier, to strike a great blow in the Baltic. The fleet was despatched with extraordinary rejoicings, and amidst loud and confident expressions of its certain triumph. As a matter of fact, it did very little. In the south of Europe, however, the Turkish armies on the Danube, strengthened by the advice of British officers, were more successful. The Russians were forced to retire, and the principalities were evacuated. A prudent administration might possibly have succeeded in stopping the war at this point. But the temper of the country was by this time excited, and it was loudly demanding something more than a preliminary success. It was resolved to invade the Crimea and attack the great arsenal, Sebastopol, whence the Russian fleet had sailed to Sinope, and in September, 1854, the allied armies landed in the Crimea. On the 20th the Russian army, strongly posted on the banks of the Alma, was completely defeated, and it is almost certain that, if the victory had been at once followed up, Sebastopol would have fallen. The commanders of the allied armies, however, hesitated to throw themselves against the forts erected to the north of the town, and decided on the hazardous task of marching round Sebastopol and attacking it from the south. The movement was successfully carried out, but the allies again hesitated to attempt an immediate assault. The Russians, who were advised by Colonel Todleben, the only military man who attained a great reputation in the war, thus gained time to strengthen their position by earthworks; and the allies found themselves forced, with scanty preparations, to undertake a regular siege against an enemy whose force was numerically superior to their own. In the early days of the siege, indeed, the allied armies were twice in great peril. A formidable attack on the 20th October on the British position at Balaclava led to a series of encounters which displayed the bravery of British troops, but did not enhance the reputation of British commanders. A still more formidable sortie on the 5th of November was with difficulty repulsed at Inkerman. And the Russians soon afterwards found, in the climate of the country, a powerful ally. The allied armies, imperfectly organised, and badly equipped for such a campaign, suffered severely from the hardships of a Crimean winter. The whole expedition seemed likely to melt away from want and disease. PALMERSTON'S MINISTRY The terrible condition of the army, vividly described in the letters which the war correspondents of the newspapers sent home, aroused strong feelings of indignation in Great Britain. When parliament met, Mr. Roebuck gave notice that he would move for a committee of inquiry. Lord John Russellwho had already vainly urged in the cabinet that the duke of Newcastle should be superseded, and the conduct of the war intrusted to a stronger minister-resigned office. His resignation was followed by the defeat of the government, and Lord Aberdeen, thus driven from power, was succeeded by Lord Palmerston. In selecting him for the post, the queen undoubtedly placed her seal on the wish of the country to carry out the war to the bitter [1855-1856 A.D.] end. But it so happened that the formation of a new ministry was accompanied by a fresh effort to make terms of peace. Before the change of administration a conference had been decided on, and Lord Palmerston intrusted its management to Lord John Russell. While the latter was on his way to Vienna an event occurred which seemed at first to facilitate his task. The czar, worn out with disappointment, suddenly died, and was succeeded by his son Alexander. Unfortunately the conference failed, and the war went on for another year. In September, 1855, the allied troops succeeded in obtaining possession of the southern side of Sebastopol, and the emperor of the French, satisfied with this partial success, or alarmed at the expense of the war, decided on withdrawing from the struggle. The attitude of Napoleon made the conclusion of peace only a question of time. In the beginning of 1856 a congress to discuss the terms was assembled at Paris; in February hostilities were suspended, and in April a treaty was concluded. The peace set back the boundaries of Russia from the Danube to the Pruth; it secured the free navigation of the first of these rivers; it opened the Black Sea to the commercial navies of the world, closing it to vessels of war and forbidding the establishment of arsenals upon its shores. The last condition, to which Great Britain attached most importance, endured for about fourteen years. Peace without this provision could undoubtedly have been secured at Vienna, and the prolongation of the war from 1855 to 1856 only resulted in securing this arrangement for a little more than one decade.c |