ESSAY 6.

We should judge of peoples actions by their intentions.

It is a common saying, that death acquits us of all obligations, and there are people who have adopted this opinion in various ways. Henry VIII. king of England, made an agreement with Philip, king of Spain, that he should deliver up his mortal enemy the duke of Suffolk, of the white rose, who was retired into the Low Countries; while Henry promised that he would not take away his life. But when Henry was near dying he commanded, in his will, that the duke should be executed immediately after his own death.

In that tragedy which the duke of Alva exhibited at Brussels, there were many remarkable events; among them count Aiguemond pledged his honour that count Horne might deliver himself safely to the duke; but, when he found that count Horne's life was forfeited, he insisted that his own life should be taken first for having failed in his word.

We cannot be bound for what is beyond our power and our means; and there is nothing we can seriously answer for but our will; in this are necessarily founded ail the established rules and duties of man. Thus, in these two instances, I think that Aiguemond was without doubt abfolved, even although he had survived count Horne; and that death had not discharged Henry's obligation, no more than that of the Mason mentioned by Herodotus, who, having loyally concealed during his life the secret place where the treasures were deposited belonging to his master the king of Egypt, but dying, discovered it to his children.

I have known several men who satisfied their conscience in retaining other peoples property, by intending to return it after their decease. This is not acting meritoriously, either by postponing a necessary duty, or by establishing an injury with paying so little interest and acknowledgment. The greater the inconvenience of restitution, the greater is the merit. Penitence requires some sacrifice.

Those act still more unworthily, who, having concealed their malicious intentions all their

life, reserve the declaration of their hatred till their testament. Unjust judges, who remit their power of judging till they have neither knowledge or reason. I will endeavour to guard myself as much as I am able from saying, at my death, what I did not avow openly during my life.

ESSAY 7.

ON IDLENESS.

As we see uncultivated lands, which, although naturally good and fertile, abound only with innumerable weeds; and as in order to render this ground serviceable it should be ploughed and sown with useful seeds; thus it is with certain minds, which, if they are not occupied with chosen subjects which regulate and constrain them, run wild and unruly on all sides in the vast field of imagination, and there is scarce a folly or reverie which the agitation does not produce. The soul, which has no established point, loses itself, forging chimeras which resemble the dream of a sick person.

When I lately retired to my country refidence, with a resolution to divest myself as much as possible of business, and to pass in privacy and repose the little space of time which remains to me of life; I fancied I should derive great advantage by leaving my mind at

full

full leisure to contemplate itself, especially as I flattered myself it was become more settled and mature from time and experience; for want of occupation frequently creates new ideas. But on the contrary my mind is like a horse that, having freed itself from the rider, runs more than double the way than if it had been guided; and creates so many fantastic ideas, without order and design, that I have begun to commit them to paper, in order to contemplate them, hoping, when I consider these monsters of the brain, that I shall be ashamed of their absurdity.