the transcript should be referred to by number for a verification of the facts which he assumes or states. In this way the court can easily find and verify the facts, and, by a plain statement of the principle of law relied upon, can see the questions to be decided. But in this assignment there is no such presentation. We are invited to go to the record, and find out the points that counsel desire to raise, by looking at their exceptions to the report of the master, some 11 in number; and it is stated that in these exceptions, which we will find on certain pages of the transcript, we will find good reasons stated for them. Of course, on turning to these exceptions, which are not so difficult to find, we find that the counsel have referred to different depositions and parts of the record as it appeared in the chancery court; but where these depositions and these parts of the record are to be found in this transcript is in no way indicated, but it is left for us to hunt them up in a transcript badly gotten up and poorly indexed, and to formulate for counsel statements and propositions which either they did not have time or were not disposed to formulate for themselves. We were inclined to refuse to pass further upon this exception, but to state that the points would be passed upon if the exception was properly amended; but, in view of the short time intervening before this case will be reached by the supreme court, we have decided to briefly pass upon the points we suppose counsel intended to raise, gathering them as best we can, after an investigation of the record for ourselves.

The first exception of the complainants which it is said the chancellor erred in overruling refers to certain notes executed by T. B. Lawson, a Mr. Gudger, and M. L. Gifford, which the master charged against the administrators as assets which came, or by due diligence should have come, into the hands of the administrators. We will refer to the report of the master found on page 228, and following, of the transcript, for a full statement of these items. As to the Lawson note or notes for $200, the master reports that they were transferred and sold by Ike T. Jobe to the Citizens' Bank of Johnson City after his father's death. There is proof to support this finding, and it was concurred in by the chancellor. The master reports $400 notes executed by Mr. Gudger to Ike T. Jobe, as agent for his father, and bearing date March 20, 1890, which, with interest, amount to $604. There is proof to sustain this charge, and it is concurred in by the chancellor. The master reports one note executed by M. L. Gifford to Ike T. Jobe, as agent for his father, about March 20, 1890, and transferred and converted by Ike T. Jobe after his father's death. There is proof to sustain this charge, and it is concurred in by the chancellor, and we find that Ike T. Jobe received these notes and sums, and failed to account for them, and was properly char

ged therewith, and the exception was, therefore, properly overruled.

The second exception relates to a note executed by Robert Burrow, October 18, 1889, for the sum of $833.33. F. A. Stratton provesthat he bought such a note from Ike T. Jobe, which was indorsed by Tipton Jobe a few months after its execution,-he thinks probably before the father's death. If before, the proof shows that the father, Tipton Jobe, was in a mental condition incapacitating him for business, and that Ike T. Jobe was acting as his agent, and we think he was properly chargeable with this sum.

The seventh exception, which it is said the chancellor erroneously overruled, is found on page 266 of the transcript, and is that the master erroneously charged Ike T. Jobe with the value of one house and lot-$350-as an advancement. The chancellor concurred in this finding, and there is evidence to sustain it in the deposition of Mrs. Pendleton, found on page 39, vol. 8, of the transcript.

The ninth exception, which it is said the chancellor erroneously overruled, relates to charges against Ike T. Jobe as an advancement of the sum of $200, paid by his father, Tipton Jobe, for him, to Sanford, Chamberlain, and Albers. No reason is shown why this was erroneous, except that counsel refer to deposition of Mrs. Pendleton, who, in stating advancements made by the father to Ike T. Jobe, enumerated this item, among others, as paid for Ike Jobe by his father. Under the presumption established by law, we think that the master and chancellor were justified in holding this as an advancement, and this exception is overruled.

The tenth, eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth exceptions, which it is said the chancellor erroneously overruled, relate to charges made against Ike T. Jobe as advancements. Without going into details, we think it sufficient to say there is ample evidence in the record: to sustain these charges, especially that contained in the deposition of Mr. and Mrs. Pendleton.

The fourteenth exception referred to in this assignment of error also relates to certain charges against Ike T. Jobe as advancements. Items are set out on page 268 of the transcript, vol. 8, in the exceptions, and on page 237, transcript, vol. 8, p. 237, contained in the master's report. We find that there was evidence to sustain this finding in the report of the master, which was concurred in by the chancellor, and which is conclusive.

The eighteenth exception relates to the aggregate items charged against Ike T. Jobe as advancements, and it is said that these sums were merely debts. We think, however, that there was sufficient proof to justify the finding of the master, which was concurred in by the chancellor, and which is conclusive; and, under the presumptions of law relating to advancements, we think, in any event, the charges were correctly made.

The eleventh exception relates to assets charged by the master as assets which came, or should have come, into the hands of the administrators, and it is said there is no proof to sustain the findings as to these items. Without going into details, it is sufficient to say that we find that there was ample proof to sustain the findings of the master and the concurrence of the chancellor upon these points.

The twelfth assignment of error is that: "The complainants having offered to introduce the deposition of I. T. Jobe, taken before the commissioners, for the purpose only of contradiction of witness E. P. Pendleton, it was error in the chancellor to hold that it should not be introduced only by consent, and, when introduced, to permit it to be looked to as proof of the fact that Ike T. Jobe got the railroad stock; and it was error, if competent to prove that fact, not to permit it to be looked to as to all its facts,"-and we are referred to the wayside bill of exceptions, which we find on page 273 of the transcript, vol. 8. This point is immaterial, because, whether this paper be considered or rejected, the result will be the same. The bill of exceptions shows: That on the trial, when the respondents read the deposition of E. P. Pendleton, in which it appeared that he stated that he was present when Ike T. Jobe's deposition was taken before the commissioners, Burch and Jennings, and that he heard him make admissions with regard to advancements made to him (Ike Jobe), is as follows, and that he stated, among other things, that "we had received a number of notes, and one of Robert, Burrow for $833.33." That complainants then offered to read the deposition of Ike T. Jobe, referred to, which is copied into the original transcript, and which was made Exhibit A to the bill of exceptions, to contradict the witness Pendleton, and especially that part of the deposition containing the following answer of Ike T. Jobe: "I appropriated a note executed by Robert Burrow to my father for $833.33, bearing date of —, under the following circumstances: My father owned a piece of property on Science Hill, which he offered for sale at the price of $4,000, and he agreed I might have all I could sell it for above that price. I sold it for $5,000 to Burrow, and the above $833.33 is all I ever received on that transaction." But, the bill of exceptions shows that the court refused to permit complainants to introduce said deposition, or any part of it, on objection made by respondent that said deposition had theretofore been ruled out, and was no part of the record in this cause, to which action of the court overruling the motion of complainants and refusing to have said deposition read, or said part of said deposition, for the purpose of contradicting the witness, complainants excepted, and tendered their bill of exceptions. Nothing more appearing than is here shown, we see no er

ror in the decree of the chancellor. It would appear from this bill of exceptions that complainants' counsel did not offer the paper, and propose to prove that it was the deposition and statement of Ike T. Jobe about which Pendleton had been testifying. If this had been done, it would have been competent, and the paper should have been admitted. But if counsel, as we infer, simply introduced a paper which we have heretofore decided was not a part of the record, assuming that the paper would prove itself, then the chancellor was not in error in ruling it out. This we take to be was what occurred. It was entirely competent to prove that the paper was the deposition taken by the commissioners, and the statements there made were the statements actually made by Jobe; but this bill of exceptions does not show that that was done, but, as we understand, the proposition simply was to read the paper as a part of the record verifying itself. For this reason there was no error in the action of the chancellor.

This disposes of all the assignments of error on this branch of the case made on behalf of the complainants, and all the assignments are overruled, and the decree of the chancellor on these points affirmed, and as to that the decree of the chancellor will be modified as above indicated.

We may next consider the assignments of error filed on behalf of H. H. Ingersoll and Carr & Reeves, relating to attorney's fees, and in the same connection the points raised on behalf of the heirs upon these questions. The original bill in the first of these consolidated causes was filed on June 23, 1890, by D. B. Farnsworth and wife, Callie R., E. P. Pendleton and wife, Hattie J., Bertie M. Jobe, now Weiler, and Ina Jobe, now Massengill, the last two being minors, who at the time sued by next friend. The suit was brought in the chancery court at Jonesboro, Tenn., against Ike T. Jobe, John A. Jobe, a minor, and Roberta Jobe, daughter of Robert Jobe, and grandchild of Tipton Jobe, deceased. The objects of this bill have been previously stated, but, we may briefly add, were mainly for the purpose of setting aside certain deeds, purporting to have been executed by Tipton Jobe, conveying his entire estate, which deeds, it was alleged, were procured to be executed by Ike T. Jobe unlawfully and fraudulently and by undue influence; the father, Tipton Jobe, at the time, as was alleged, being incapable of executing a valid conveyance. The solicitors of these complainants were H. H. Ingersoll and Carr & Reeves. The defendants answered this bill; proof was taken as to the execution of the deeds, etc., when the parties in interest agreed to refer the matters to arbitration, and a full statement of this entire litigation will be found in our first opinion filed in this case, and is referred to. But we may here briefly recapitulate by saying that, after the

arbitrators were selected, a large amount of proof was taken, and report made, to which there were exceptions. There was a reference, and another report, upon which the chancellor decreed. While this bill was pending, the other bill, which constitutes an integral part of this consolidated case, was filed in the chancery court at Johnson City by J. W. Boring, a creditor of the estate, alleging on information the insolvency of the estate, that the administrator had made no settlement, had filed no inventory, and was making no pretense to settle the estate, or to pay debts. This bill sought to have a settlement of the estate, and sought to reach land for the payment of debts. Under this bill, creditors filed their claims. The case at Jonesboro, after decree therein, was transferred to the chancery court at Johnson City, and, as we have heretofore held, consolidated with the Boring case. In this case there were references, decrees, and at last what was considered a final decree. There was then an appeal taken to the supreme court, and the case assigned to this court, where a final decree was rendered, adjudicating, among other things, that the causes had been consolidated; that the decrees in all cases were appealed from; that the proceedings had in the Jonesboro case under the arbitration and decree thereon were invalid and erroneous. The conveyances made by Tipton Jobe during his last days were set aside and vacated. It was held that it was not shown that creditors were entitled to subject the lands, as the record then appeared, and the cause was finally remanded to the chancery court at Johnson City, to be further proceeded with in having the necessary references, reports, and accounts, and to have the exact condition of the estate ascertained, with leave to the parties to make such amendments to the pleadings as might be deemed necessary to present all questions in issue. There was an appeal from this court to the supreme court, where, by consent, as we understand, the decree of this court was affirmed, except as to a slight modification relating to attorney's fees, and the cause was remanded to the chancery court to be proceeded with in accordance with the decree of this court. After the remand, there were various orders, references, decrees, and reports. Among other things, a petition was filed on behalf of Carr & Reeves and H. H. Ingersoll to have the amount of their fees for services rendered the married women and minors in the Farnsworth-Jobe case fixed. The special commissioner to whom the reference was had reported the amount due H. H. Ingersoll at $500, and the amount due Carr & Reeves at $1,200, and the report as to these amounts was confirmed by the chancellor over exceptions, and a decree rendered in favor of these counsel for these respective sums against D. B. Farnsworth and wife and E. P. Pendleton and wife, and said sums were declared a lien on the distributive shares of Mrs. Farnsworth

53 S.W.-51

and Mrs. Pendleton. But the court further decreed that the minor defendants who sued by the next friend in the case of Farnsworth et al. against Jobe et al. should not be held liable for any part of the fees so decreed,that is, the fees of Ingersoll and Carr & Reeves, it appearing, as the decree recites, that their next friend had submitted to a fruitless arbitration involving a major part of the labors of the solicitors, and that the services inuring to their benefit were rendered by other solicitors than those employed by their next friend. Upon this holding errors were assigned for H. H. Ingersoll and Carr & Reeves, for whom it is insisted that all the relief obtained by the minors was under the issues raised in the original bill, and that the appellants in error were the only solicitors for the minors in that case, and that there has never been a pleading filed in the cause in which the minors obtained any affirmative relief except that filed by these appellants; that, while the arbitration proceedings were set aside, the laborious work there done for all four of the complainants so developed the material facts most difficult to obtain that they were easily reproduced after the arbitration proceedings were abandoned, and that the finding that the benefit which inured to the minors was the result of the labor of other solicitors was not sustained by the record, but contradicted; that the sums fixed by the special commissioner and chancellor were shown to be reasonable, and that there was no proof to the contrary. Counsel for the Jobe heirs also assign errors to the decree of the chancellor. First. Because it is said the chancellor erred in not sustaining the exceptions filed to the commissioner's report. The exceptions were to the effect that the chancellor's decree as to the married women should have been the same as that rendered in regard to the interest of the minors, and it was averred that no valid contract could be made with a married woman, nor with the minors, for payment for legal services, but that, where such services had been rendered in good faith by the attorney, at the request of such person, and such services could be reasonably regarded as necessary, a recovery could be had on the ground of a quantum meruit for the reasonable value of such services, but that a next friend sued at his peril, and, if the suit was fruitless, he himself must pay the costs; and it was insisted that the larger portion of the services rendered were rendered infutile, and that very slight services were rendered the complainants under the bills filed, but that the recoveries finally had in behalf of the complainants in the Farnsworth case were the results of the labors of other counsel, and that, in any event, these counsel could recover no more from the married women than they could from the minors, and, if proper to charge anything upon the interest of any of the complainants, each should only have been charged with one-fifth of the entire fee; and,

further, that the fees allowed under the circumstances were exorbitant, and that it was an error, in any event, to declare whatever allowance should be made a lien on the interest of Mrs. Farnsworth and Mrs. Pendleton, because, it is said, these solicitors could, in no event, be entitled to a lien until a recovery was had, and that they abandoned the interest of these clients before a recovery was had; and, further, that it would be unjust to make these charges in favor of counsel a general lien upon the interest of these heirs, but that each one should only be charged with her proportion. And in support of these assignments it is further said that the final decree in the Farnsworth branch of the case obtained in the chancery court was set aside by the court of chancery appeals and the supreme court, so that nothing was recovered thereunder; and, further, that these counsel in the court of chancery appeals took a position antagonistic to these heirs, and insisted upon an affirmance of the decree of the chancellor, which would have resulted in sweeping away all of their property from them, and a sale of it to pay the debts of the estate.

This contest is one which it is, of course, unpleasant for us to decide upon, as are all such cases. We have heretofore set out in this opinion, and in the two previous opinions filed, the many complications that have arisen in this case, and the unfortunate tangle into which it drifted, and we need not here repeat this history, which can only be fully gathered, if at all, by an inspection of our former opinions, and what we have heretofore set out in this. It is true, as above shown, that these counsel who are now appellants before us in this matter were counsel who filed the original bill for the heirs, and it is further true that Messrs. Carr & Reeves acted as counsel in the arbitration matter. It is further true, as we have held, that the award of these arbitrators was void and fruitless, and the submission was invalid and illegal. It is further true that on the previous hearing of this cause by this court the results obtained in the court below under the Farnsworth case were set aside as and to the extent shown in our first opinion. And it is further true that, if the decree of the chancellor rendered in the consolidated cause before the 1st of April had been affirmed, the result would have been disastrous to the Jobe heirs, as their property would all, doubtless, have been swept away. It is true, however, that the decrees in their favor have obtained under the pleadings filed by these appellant solicitors. It is also true that Messrs. Carr & Reeves, as counsel, filed the Boring bill in the chancery court at Johnson City in favor of the creditors. On this point it is to be said that it does not appear that at that time it was known that there would be a serious conflict between the interest of the heirs and creditors, though it is true that the bill in the Boring case produced an ap

parent conflict in interest by seeking, among other things, to subject the land descended to the heirs to the payment of debts. The Farnsworth bill had been filed at Jonesboro on June 23, 1890. The Boring bill was filed on April 20, 1892, and this last bill was filed by Carr & Reeves and Jennings as solicitors for the complainant, Boring. To this bill Pendleton and wife and Farnsworth and wife filed an answer, which is signed by G. F. Lee, as their solicitor. The minor defendants answered by G. F. Lee, their solicitor and guardian at law. So far as we can see from this record, until after the appeal to the supreme court the first time, the present appellant solicitors united with other counsel in the effort to set aside the fraudulent conveyances procured by Ike T. Jobe to be made by his father, and did what they could to hold him responsible both for the benefit of the creditors and for the heirs.

We think it cannot be said that any one of the counsel were wholly to blame for the confusion in which the case has drifted, nor for the length of time the cause has remained in court. There was probably some negligence all around on this account. It would appear that the futile arbitration arrangement was entered into at the insistence of the members of the Jobe family, and that counsel yielded to their insistence. It does not appear, however, that they advised their clients that the submission was illegal. Before the arbitrators a large amount of proof was taken, some 50 or more depositions,— and much time and trouble was spent before these arbitrators, but without effect or bene fit to the clients, unless it be that in a measure the facts were there developed which were subsequently brought out in the case, and which inured to the benefit of the heirs. It appears that before these arbitrators Judge Ingersoll rendered little or no service, but that Messrs. Carr & Reeves rendered continued and arduous services. It appears that the property finally recovered for the benefit of the heirs is at present valued at from $15,000 to $18,000. Dr. Carr, in his deposition, values the services of his firm for these heirs at $1,200. It further appears that Judge Ingersoll did very little work in the chancery court, if any, in the Boring case, at Johnson City, and not a great deal in the Farnsworth case in the chancery court, though he assisted in the preparation of pleadings, and was at all times ready to render service. Judge Ingersoll filed an argument and represented these heirs on the first trial of the case on the first appeal in this court. We understand the deposition of Mr. Reeves to state that the election between the creditors and him was made after the remand of the cause by this court and by the supreme court. These solicitors, as well as Judge Ingersoll, filed written briefs and arguments on the trial of the cause before us. It is undoubtedly true that on the further trial before us they joined with other solic

itors in the insistence that the conveyances made by Tipton Jobe shortly before his death were illegal and void.

We find in the record a reply to the assignment of errors filed by Messrs. Carr & Reeves. And we do find, as insisted by counsel for the Jobe heirs, that in this these counsel, Messrs. Carr & Reeves, maintained that the decree rendered in the Farnsworth case was final, and not appealed from; that there was no consolidation of the causes; that the appeal did not bring up the Farnsworth case. We find that it was further insisted by these counsel, in reply to assignments of error, on behalf of the administrator and his sureties, that there was a devastavit, but that it was immaterial whether the creditors were paid by the administrators and their bondsmen or out of the land, as decreed by the chancellor. It further appears from the deposition of Mr. Reeves that after the receiver was appointed they rendered service to him, and stood ready at all times to do so. However, we do not think this is a matter which should be included in the charge against these heirs. If counsel conceive that they are entitled to fees for services rendered the receiver, a bill should be rendered against him for such, and application made to the court for an allowance on this account, to be paid out of the funds of the receivership. A number of lawyers were examined upon this question as to the amount of fees to be allowed, and, according to the weight of their opinion, the amounts claimed, $1,200 for Carr & Reeves and $500 for Judge Ingersoll, would not be excessive. It is to be remembered, however, that the litigation is not yet ended, and that other counsel, on account of the conflicts that arose, had to be and were employed by the Jobe heirs, and will have to be paid out of the land recovered for them, or out of the proceeds of what is left. It is impossible in this part of the opinion to set out the full details of the entire case before us, so as to show the exact nature of the services rendered, but in what we have here said, and what we have heretofore said, a substantial outline is given. Upon the whole case thus presented we are of opinion as follows: We do not concur in the insistence of the present counsel on behalf of the heirs and the minor heirs that the complainants are not entitled to any lien on the final recovery in favor of the Jobe heirs. We have found that these counsel did unite with other counsel in the effort to recover the property from Ike T. Jobe, and that their efforts were joint in this respect up until the remand of this cause by this court to the chancery court on the first hearing. And in this court, on the first hearing, a decree, which was afterwards affirmed by the supreme court, was rendered in favor of the heirs adjudicating the right to recover the property conveyed to Ike T. Jobe and others, vacating and annulling those conveyances. The fact that other intricate questions remain to be settled would not, as we

think, prevail to prevent a lien from being declared on that recovery in favor of these appellants. And, indeed, we are of opinion that, even if their services had terminated before this decree in favor of the heirs of Tipton Jobe, and if for any reason they had found it necessary to retire from the case, or from their representation of the heirs, and a decree had been finally rendered in the case, these counsel should, with other counsel representing them at the time of their final recovery, have been allowed a fee, and the whole should have been declared a lien upon the recovery in favor of all counsel, the present appellants participating according to the value of their services rendered up to the time of their discharge or retirement. It could not, in our opinion, be said, even in that case, that any particular counsel had recovered for the complaining heirs, but the recovery would be the result of the work of all of them, and all should have been entitled to compensation, and secured by a lien on the recovery. We think it just, proper, and legal that the lien should be decreed both on the interest of the married women and of the minors, and should be a common lien on all of the land recovered. As to the amount that should be allowed we have had more difficulty in arriving at a conclusion satisfactory to our own minds. Some mistakes have been made in the conduct of the case, but mistakes are at times made by all lawyers; and the appellants now before us on this matter are lawyers of the highest character and standing, of undoubted energy and ability, and we see no cause to doubt their good faith. It is true, however, that we must take into consideration the rather disastrous effects, in some respects, of this protracted litigation to the property involved, and the burdens which the heirs will yet have to bear. Upon the whole matter we are of opinion that it would be reasonable and fair to allow Judge Ingersoll the sum of $500 and Messrs. Carr & Reeves the sum of $800, which will be declared secured by a lien on the property of the heirs.

To repeat, and owing to the hurry and pressure under which we have been compelled to do the work in this case, complicated as it is, and having but recently been heard, in order that it may be passed on by the supreme court, now in session, on its present call of the Washington county docket, it has been impossible for us to make this opinion as compact and systematic as we should have desired, and it is necessary to repeat in order to make a clear presentation of our views upon the matter. We find as facts, in addition to others we have set out, that Judge Ingersoll was employed by the heirs, and assisted in drawing the bill in the Farnsworth case, and did some other work in their behalf, and was ready at all times to work in their interest in the chancery court, and represented these heirs on the presentation of the case in this court and in the supreme court, and