while he was crossing the bridge on foot. The question was fairly put to the jury, as to the alleged contributory negligence. The case was one for the jury. Northern Pacific Railroad Co. v. Amato,
13. The Judiciary Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. c. 517, pp. 826, 827, having provided that no appeals shall be taken from Circuit Courts to this court except as provided in that act and having repealed all acts and parts of acts relating to appeals or writs of error inconsistent with the provisions for review by appeals or writs of error contained in that act, and the joint resolution of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1115, having provided that nothing contained in that act shall be held to impair the jurisdiction of this court in respect of any case wherein the writ of error or the appeal shall have been sued out or taken to this court before July 1, 1891, it is Held, that an appeal to this court from a judgment entered in a Circuit Court November 18, 1890, appealable before July 1, 1891, could not be taken after July 1, 1891. National Exchange Bank v. Peters, 570.
14. A defendant indicted in a state court for forging discharges for money payable by a municipal corporation with intent to defraud it, pleaded in abatement to an array of the grand jury, and to the array of the traverse jury, that all the jurors were inhabitants of the municipality, but did not at that stage of the case claim in any form a right or immunity under the Constitution of the United States. After convic- tion, the defendant, by motion in arrest of judgment, and by exception to the jurisdiction of the court, objected that the proceedings were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States for the same reason, and also because the selectmen of the municipality who prepared the jury list, and took the principal part in drawing the jurors, were at the same time actively promoting this prosecution. The highest court of the State held the objections taken before verdict to be unfounded, and those after verdict to be taken too late. Held, that this court had no jurisdiction to review the judgment on writ of error. Brown v. Massachusetts, 573.
15. A judgment of a state court upon the question whether bonds of the State were sold by the governor of the State within the authority vested in him by the statute of the State under which they were issued, involves no Federal question. Sage v. Louisiana, 647.
16. The judgment of a state court in a suit to compel the funding of state bonds, that a former adverse judgment upon bonds of the same series could be pleaded as an estoppel, presents no Federal question. Adams v. Louisiana, 651.
17. Under Rev. Stat. § 914, and according to the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of Nebraska, if the petition, in an action at law in the Circuit Court of the United States held within that State, alleges the requisite citizenship of the parties, and the answer denies each and every allegation in the petition, such citizenship is put in issue, and, if
no proof or finding thereof appears of record, the judgment must be reversed for want of jurisdiction. Roberts v. Lewis, 653. See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 1; JURISDICTION, C, 1; LOCAL LAW, 1.
B. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF APPEALS.
1. By section 6 of the act of March 3, 1891, establishing Circuit Courts of Appeals, 26 Stat. 828, c. 517, the appellate jurisdiction not vested in this court was vested in the court created by that act, and the entire jurisdiction was distributed. Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 47.
2. The words "unless otherwise provided by law" in the clause in that section which provides that the Circuit Courts shall exercise appellate jurisdiction "in all cases other than those provided for in the preced- ing section of this act, unless otherwise provided by law" were inserted in order to guard against implied repeals, and are not to be construed as referring to prior laws only. 1b.
See JURISDICTION, A, 1, 12.
C. JURISDICTION OF CIRCUIT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. 1. In an action brought in the Circuit Court of the United States in Ala- bama the complaint described the plaintiff as a bank organized in accordance with the laws of the United States and as doing business in Tennessee, and the defendant as residing in the State of Alabama. The summons described the plaintiff as "a citizen of the State of Ten- nessee," and the defendant "as a citizen of the State of Alabama." The question of jurisdiction was raised for the first time in this court. Held, that although greater care should have been exercised by plaintiffs in the averments, the diverse citizenship of the parties appeared affirmatively and with sufficient distinctness on the record. Jordan v. Third National Bank, 97.
2. Under the provisions of the act of July 4, 1884, 23 Stat. 73, c. 179, the United States Circuit and District Courts for the Northern District of Texas, the Western District of Arkansas, and the District of Kansas have concurrent jurisdiction, without reference to the amount in con- troversy, and without distinction as to citizenship of the parties, over all controversies arising between the Southern Kansas Railway Com- pany and the inhabitants of the Indian nations and tribes through whose territory that railway is constructed. Southern Kansas Railway Co. v. Briscoe, 133.
3. The jurisdiction of a Federal court by reason of diverse citizenship is not defeated by the mere fact that a transfer of the plaintiff's interest was made in order, in part, to enable the purchaser to bring suit in a court of the United States, provided the transfer was absolute, and
the assignor parted with all his interest for good consideration. Craw ford v. Neal, 585.
4. Four children of S. H. P., deceased, recovered judgment in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee against a life insurance company, a corporation of New York, on a policy insuring the life of the deceased, to which judgment a writ of error was sued out, but citation issued against only one of the plain- tiffs. On this the company gave a supersedeas bond, securing the sureties by pledging or mortgaging some of its property. Proceedings were then taken in the courts of New York, under direction of the attorney general of that State, which resulted in the dissolution of that corporation, and the appointment of a receiver of its property, who, by directions of the court, appeared in this court and prosecuted the writ of error in order to release the property pledged. After sundry proceedings the judgment of the Circuit Court was eventually reversed, and the case was remanded to the Circuit Court. A new trial was had there, but without summoning in the receiver, who did not appear, and judgment was again obtained against the company. This judgment was filed in the proceedings in New York as a claim against the assets of the company in the hands of the receiver, and the claim was disallowed by the highest court of that State. Held, that the appearance of the receiver in this court for the purpose of securing a reversal of the judgment below and the release of the mortgaged property gave to the Circuit Court in Tennessee no jurisdiction over the case, after the dissolution of the corporation, which could bind the property of the company in the hands of the receiver, or prevent the receiver from showing that the judgment was invalid because rendered against a corporation which had at the time no existence, and pos- sessed no property against which the judgment could be enforced. Pendleton v. Russell, 640.
D. JURISDICTION OF DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. See JURISDICTION, C, 2;
LEGISLATIVE GRANTS. See STATUTE, A, 1, 2.
LIMITATION, STATUTES of.
See LOCAL Law, 7.
LIS PENDENS.
See LOCAL LAW, 6.
1. Upon the trial of this case in the District Court in Dakota, a verdict was returned, November 24, 1888, in favor of plaintiff for $12,545.43, and judgment was rendered accordingly November 26, 1888. On November 28, 1888, the court made an order by consent extending the time for serving notice of intention to move for a new trial, for motion for new trial, and for settlement of a bill of exceptions until January 28, 1889, which time was subsequently extended by order of court for reason given, to February 28, and thence again "for cause" to March 28, 1889, upon which day the following order, was entered: "The defendant having served upon plaintiff a proposed bill of excep- tions herein, the time for settlement of same is hereby extended from March 28, 1889, to April 10, 1889, and the time within which to serve notice of the intention to move for new trial, and within which to move for new trial, is hereby extended to April 13th, 1889." The time was again extended to May 31, 1889, and on the 23d day of that month the following order was entered: "The date for settling the bill of exceptions proposed by the defendant herein is hereby extended to June 29, 1889. Defendant may have until ten days after the settling of said bill within which to serve notice of intention to move for a new trial, and within which to move for a new trial in said action." This was the last order of extension. On December 14, 1889, there was filed in the office of the clerk of the District Court a notice of motion for new trial, which was as follows: "Take notice that the motion for a new trial herein will be brought on for argument before the court at chambers, at Jamestown, Dakota, on September 12, 1889, at 10 o'clock A.M., or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard." On the margin of this notice appeared this indorsement: "Hearing continued until the 21st September, 1889. Roderick Rose, Judge." The notices and motion seem to have been served September 3, 1889. The bill of exceptions was signed August 30, 1889, and filed September 3, 1889. The certificate thereto con- cluded thus: "Filed as a part of the records in this action this August 30th, 1889, (and within the time provided by law, as enlarged and extended by orders of the judge of this court)." On February 17, 1890, the judge further certified: "The above and foregoing certificate is hereby modified and corrected so as to conform to the facts and record in the case by striking out all that part of it in the two last, lines thereof preceding my signature and after the words and figures 'August 30th, 1889.'" On November 2, 1889, the State of North Dakota was admitted into the Union. Held, (1) That this bill of exceptions was not settled and filed within the time allowed by law or under any order of the court; (2) That the alleged motion for a new trial not having been filed until December 14, 1889, was not made, and no notice of intention to make it was given, within the
time allowed by law or by any order of the court; (3) That a renewal of notice and motion after the State was admitted, if it could have been made, would necessarily have been in the state court, whose jurisdiction would have attached to determine it. Glaspell v. Northern Pacific Railroad Co., 211.
2. In Illinois the filing by the plaintiff under the statute of that State (2 Starr & Curtis' Stats. 1801) of an affidavit "showing the nature of his demand and the amount due him from the defendant" does not prevent the recovery of a larger sum if a larger sum is claimed by the plead- ings and shown to be due by the evidence. Keator Lumber Co. v. Thompson, 434.
3. Interest at the rate of 8 per cent in Nebraska is not usurious. Dodge v. Tulleys, 451.
4. The right to intervene in a cause, conferred by secs. 89, 90 of the Dakota Code of Civil Procedure upon a person interested in the sub- ject of a litigation, relates to an immediate and direct interest by which the intervenor may either gain or lose by the direct legal opera- tion and effect of the judgment, and can only be exercised by leave of the court, in the exercise of its discretion; and if the request to inter- vene is made for the first time in a case which had been pending for two years, and just as it is about to be tried, it is a reasonable exer- cise of that discretion to refuse the request. Smith v. Gale, 509.
5. Since the enactment of the act of January 6, 1873, (Laws of Dakota Territory, 1872–73, pp. 63, 64,) a deed of land within Dakota executed and acknowledged without the State before a notary public having an official seal, and certified by him under his hand and official seal, is sufficient to admit the deed to record and in evidence, without further proof; and the fact that the recording officer in making the record of the deed fails to place upon the record a note of the official seal, does not affect the admissibility of the original. Ib.
6. In Dakota a person purchasing real estate in litigation from the party in possession, in good faith and without knowledge or notice of the pendency of the litigation, may acquire a good title as against the other party if no lis pendens has been filed. Ib.
7. Adverse possession of real estate in the District of Columbia, for the period designated by the Statute of Limitations in force there, confers upon the occupant a complete title upon which he can stand as fully as if he had always held the undisputed title of record. Sharon v. Tucker, 533.
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