MAP.-Where the prosecuting witness, owner of the barn alleged to have been burned by defendants, was handed a map of his premises and used it to explain his testimony, and the court stated to the jury that the map was not introduced as substantive evidence, but simply to enable the witness to explain, there was no error. White, 171; 87 S. E. 984.

The above statute changes the common law offense of an attempt to commit arson from a misdemeanor to a felony. Stephens, 170-745.

It is not error for the court to fail to explain what is meant by the words "wilfully and wantonly" in the absence of a special prayer requesting such explanation. Barrett, 151-665; 65 S. E. 894.

There was evidence tending to prove bad blood between the owner of the barn and the defendant, growing out of a previous difficulty, with threat on the part of the defendant against the owner and another on that account, and that the barn of the other person was burned previous to the burning of the barn in question; that the barn in question was burned about 4 o'clock a. m. within 375 yards of defendant's house, in plain sight, and the fire attracted the whole neighborhood, except defendant who said he did not know of it until between nine and ten o'clock, though there was evidence that the defendant arose that morning between four and five o'clock; that there were well defined running tracks from the burnt barn to defendant's house, larger than defendant's shoe, which were followed and he was found on the other side of his house leaving it with a gun; that defendant was asked to go to the burnt barn, but hesitated, refused, and then complied, and refused to have his shoe measured, but walked off 60 or 75 yards and told a witness to come and measure the tracks, which was not done. Held, sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. Allen, 149-458; 62 S. E. 597. ·

There was evidence that there was bad blood between the prosecutor and the defendant; that a few nights after the defendant had tried to induce the witness to burn the barn the barn was burned; that on the night of the fire the defendant induced the witness to stay with him, and the next morning tracks were found showing the size and certain peculiarities of the witness's shoes, leading by a devious route from the defendant's, house to the prosecutor's barn; that the witness did not make these tracks, and the shoes thus indicated that some one had worn them during the night. Held, the evidence was sufficient to convict. Taylor, 159-465; 74 S. E. 914.

Evidence showing the motive in being previously ordered off the premises, that after the burning the defendant left the locality and passed under an assumed name, that he made false statements as to his being at a different place at the time; that upon his return to the locality he asked a witness what had taken place during his absence, and upon seeing the foreman of the owner of the barn said "Hush, don't say anything," this and other circumstances taken collectively are sufficient to convict. King, 162-580; 77 S. E. 301.

It is competent for the state, in order to show motive, to ask a witness on direct examination whether he opposed defendant's application for membership in a certain lodge. Barrett, 151-665; 65 S. E. 894.

It is error to admit in evidence before defendant had put his character at issue the answer of a witness that his reason for opposing defendant's application to join a certain lodge was that defendant had been convicted of stealing and sent to the chaingang. Barrett, 151-665; 65 S. E. 894.

PRIOR CRIME EVIDENCE.-Evidence of a prior crime, to cover up which the arson is alleged to have been committed, is inadmissible. McCall, 131-798; 42 S. E. 894.

COTTON IN RAILROAD CAR.-This statute does not embrace cotton stored in a railroad car standing on the track at a depot, whether it is thus and there secured temporarily, or to be shipped to some other place, since it is not then

"out of doors" and "on the land," and an indictment for burning bales of cotton thus secured in a car can not be sustained. Avery, 109-798; 13 S. E. 779.

EVIDENCE. On indictment for burning a gin, after evidence has been introduced tending to convict the prisoner, other evidence tending to show that the prisoner had been paid for committing the crime, and his declarations shortly before the fire that he had no money but expected to have some soon, and the fact that shortly after the fire he did have money, are competent. Green, 92-779.

On indictment for setting fire to an outhouse used as a kitchen, evidence that at the same time an attempt was made to fire the dwelling-house near it is competent where the evidence connects defendant with the latter attempt. Thompson, 97-496; 1 S. E. 921.

In such case it is competent to show threats made by defendant against the son and grandson of the owner of the house. Ib.

The objection that there is a failure of proof can not be taken after verdict, nor on motion in arrest of judgment. Ib.

Undisputed possession is sufficient proof of ownership. Ib.

The prosecutor had two tobacco barns, about fifty yards apart, the one old, the other new, and while the old one was burning defendant was seen standing by the new one, and said to a witness: "You see three men have been watching the barn all day, and it is now burning. You see how good God is; last year it was brother Windsor's barn; this year it is the Boss's, and Windsor ain't got a bit in it." The state, against the objection of defendant, in order to show the animus of defendant, was permitted to show by the prosecutor that he had a barn burned last year in which Windsor had tobacco, and that defendant then lievd in forty yards of the barn: Held, that the admission of this evidence was error, since, taken in connection with the fact that the solicitor stated that he offered the evidence to show the animus of defendant, it was an insinuation that defendant had burned the barn the year before, and comes under the rule which excludes evidence that defendant committed one crime in order to prove another. Alston, 94–930.

A witness who is not an expert may give his opinion as to the identity of tracks, and give his reasons for entering such opinion. Reitz, 83-634.

Evidence that the defendant had made threats, previous to the burning of the barn, that he would do some injury to the son of the prosecutor is competent. Rhodes, 111-647; 15 S. E. 1038.

There was evidence of threats by defendant to do injury to the property of the prosecutor; that on the night of the burning of the barn some one was seen going from the direction of the barn toward the home of the defendant, and that a short time before he had been heard to inquire about a direct way from his house to the vicinity of the building burned, but there was no other evidence to connect him with the crime: Held, that there was not evidence sufficient to go to the jury. Rhodes, 111-647; 15 S. E. 1058.

Where the evidence is that the defendant had in his possession bank notes similar to some stolen from the house when the arson was committed, and that he gave contradictory accounts of the manner in which he obtained them, an instruction that these contradictions were evidence to prove that he did not come honestly by them is not erroneous. Gillis, 15 (4 Dev.), 606.

The confessions of a prisoner, though without corroboration in any material particular, if believed by the jury, are sufficient to warrant a conviction, and the propriety of giving a caution to the jury to prevent an improper confidence in their truth must be left to the discretion of the presiding judge. Hardee, 83-619.

Evidence that defendant was mad with the superintendent of a farm is incompetent to show ill-will toward the owner of the farm. Battle, 126-1036; 35 S. E. 624.

VARIANCE.-There is no variance where the bill alleges the burning of "a certain shop and storehouse" and the proof is that defendant set fire to the "Howland workshop." Arthur, 151-653; 65 S. E. 758.

DEFINITION OF OUTHOUSE.-An "outhouse" is one that belongs to a dwelling-house situated within the curtilage, and an old building located at a crossroads and not enclosed in any way as a dwelling-house, is not an "outhouse" within the meaning of the statute. Roper, 88–656.

OWNERSHIP OF HOUSE.-The ownership of the house is properly laid in the widow of the deceased owner who has occupied and used it since her husband's death, though there are living heirs, and no dower has been allotted to her. Gailor, 71-88.

A house built for, and at one time accepted as, a dwelling-house, but untenanted at the time of the burning, is not a dwelling-house within the meaning of the statute. Clark, 52 (7 Jones), 167.

THE BURNING.-The least burning is sufficient to constitute arson; the charring of the floor to the depth of half an inch is sufficient. Sandy, 25 (3 Ired.), 570.

PUNISHMENT. One convicted of burning a gin-house can not be sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment in the penitentiary. Dunn, 86–731.

On conviction of burning a mill, the court may sentence defendant to imprisonment in the penitentiary for a term not less than five nor more than sixty years. Wright, 89-507.

(The maximum of punishment is now limited to forty years.)

Sec. 43 (3339). Crops in field.

If any person shall wilwully burn or destroy any other person's corn, cotton, wheat, barley, rye, oats, buckwheat, rice, tobacco, hay, straw, fodder, shucks or other provender in a stack, hill rick or pen, or secured in any other way out of doors, or grass or sedge standing on the land, he shall be guilty of a felony, and punished by imprisonment in the county jail or state's prison for not less than four months nor more than five years.

1885, c. 42; 1874-5, c. 133; Code, s. 985; subc. 2.

On indictment for burning stacks of oats, straw and fodder it is not necessary to allege that the stacks were "out of doors." Huskins, 126-1070; 35 S. E. 608.

Sec. 44 (3337). Bridges and buildings.

If any person, with intent to destroy the same, shall wilfully and maliciously set fire to and burn any public bridge, or private toll bridge, or the bridge of any incorporated company, or any fireengine house, or any house belonging to any county or incorporated town, used for public purposes other than the keeping of archives, documents and public papers, or any house belonging to an incorporated company and used in the business of such company; or if

any person shall wilfully and maliciously attempt to burn any of the said houses or bridges, or any of the houses or buildings mentioned in this chapter, the person so offending shall be guilty of a felony and punished by imprisonment in the state's prison or county jail, for not less than four months nor more than ten years. Code, s. 985, subc. 4; R. C., c. 34, s. 30; 1825, c. 1278.

Sec. 45 (3340). Dwelling-houses for fraudulent purposes.

If any person being the occupant of any building used as a dwelling-house, whether such person be the owner thereof or not, or, being the owner of any building designed or intended as a dwelling-house, shall wilfully and wantonly or for a fraudulent purpose set fire to such building, he shall be guilty of a felony, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state's prison or county jail, and may also be fined, in the discretion of the court. Code, s. 985; 1903, c. 665, s. 3, 1909, c. 862.

Sec. 46 (3341). Gin-house, tobacco house or stable.

Every person convicted of any wilful burning of any gin-house or tobacco house, or any part thereof, or, in the night time, of any stable containing a horse or a mule, or cattle, shall be imprisoned in the state's prison not less than two nor more than ten years. 1883, c. 17; 1868-9, c. 167, s. 5; 1903, c. 665, s. 1; Code, s. 985, subs. 2.

Sec. 47 (3344). Public buildings.

If any person shall wilfully and maliciously burn the statehouse, or any of the public offices of the state, or any court-house, jail, arsenal, clerk's office, register's office, or any house belonging to any county or incorporated town in the state, or to any incorporated company whatever, in which are kept the archives, documents, or public papers, of such county, town, or corporation, he shall, on conviction, be imprisoned in the state's prison for not less than five nor more than ten years.

Code, s. 985, subc. 3; R. C., c. 34, s. 7; 1830, c. 41, s. 1; 1868-9, c. 167, s. 5.

If any person shall wilfully set fire to any school-house, or procure the same to be done, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment in the state's prison or the county jail, and may also be fined, in the discretion of the court.

1901, c. 4, s. 28.

ARTIFICIALLY BLEACHED FLOUR.

Sec. 49. To be analyzed; labeled or branded.

That for the purpose of protecting the people of the State from imposition by the fraudulent sale of artificially bleached flour as pure high grade flour, the Board of Agriculture shall cause inspections to be made from time to time, and samples of flour offered for sale in the State obtained, and shall cause the same to be analyzed or examined by the State food chemist or other experts of the department of agriculture for the purpose of ascertaining or determining if same has been artificially bleached or sold in violation of this act. The Board of Agriculture is hereby authorized to make such publication of the results of the examination, analyses and so forth, as they may deem proper.

The food inspectors of the Department of Agriculture shall have authority, during business hours, to enter all stores, warehouses and other places where food products are stored or offered for sale for the purpose of inspection and obtaining samples of same.

If it shall appear from such inspection or examination or both that any of the provisions of this act have been violated the Commissioner of Agriculture shall certify the facts to the solicitor in the district in which the violation was committed, and furnish that officer with the facts in the case, duly authenticated by the expert, under oath, who made the examination.

Flour artificially bleached with nitrogen peroxide or chlorine or any other agent when offered for sale in North Carolina, shall have plainly marked or printed in a conspicuous place on the sack, barrel or other package, in letters not smaller than five-eighths of an inch in size the legend: "Artificially Bleached."

Before any artificially bleached flour shall be offered for sale in this State the manufacturer, dealer, agent or person who causes it to be sold or offered for sale, by sample or otherwise, within this State shall file with the Commissioner of Agriculture a statement that it is desired to offer such bleached flour for sale in North Carolina, and the name of the manufacturer or jobber and the brand name of the flour if it has such.

For the purpose of defraying expenses incurred in the enforcing of the provisions of this act, for each and every separate brand of artificially bleached flour registered and before being offered for sale in the State, the manufacturer, dealer, or agent registering same shall pay to the Commissioner of Agriculture an inspection fee of twenty-five dollars during the month of July, one thousand