is pleafed to make ufe of, had carried on his meditations from The Government of the Tongue, to the fprings and wheels of all its motions, thofe Thoughts that fet it a going; for then we might have expected a just difcourfe indeed upon the argument. I have little more to add, but that I am fenfible the fubject I have here undertaken might be managed after a much different manner from what it is by me; and that without running out either into the wide field of logick, or the paffions; which are diftinct arguments, both in themfelves, and from what I here intended. A man who can turn his eyes vigorously inward, and read the hidden and myfterious part of himfelf, might, no doubt, make feveral reflections thereupon, not unworthy the obfervation of the thinking world: As, that in our most abftracted refearches after truth, our notices of things are fetch'd more from extrinfick and accidental hints, than a juft and regular in quiry: quiry; and a man often falls upon a lucky Thought as cafually as printing and gun-powder were invented that if the motion of our Thoughts in compofing, &c. like that of the fun, be both quick and bright too, that yet fomething of earth, as the objects of fenfe, a fume or vapour in the head often interpofes betwixt us and the fun-fhine we enjoy'd, and eclipfes the expected difcovery: that fometimes a fudden flash of Thought breaks in upon us, but either fo faintly bright, that it but juft gilds our understanding, and then flies off, or fo plentifully, that it dazzles and overpowers our faculties, that we cannot retain it; as meats of too high a tafle are not eafily digefted by a weak ftomach: that if our Thoughts run turbid and lutulent, as the dregs and fediments of mortality will often make them do; that then they rife not up to the height of their fubject; if quick and nimble, that they feldom prove folid and weighty, as the fame ftream is rarely rapid and deep too: that the pofition of a chain of Thoughts may be eafilier banter'd than confuted, and that their fucceffion is by no means fo fortuitous a thing as unobferving men are apt to apprehend it. He might fhew particularly, and at large, how the prejudices of education, intereft, paffion, &c. pervert the fentence of the underftanding, when it fits upon its object; that hence principally derive thofe different fentiments of things and perfons, that fo much imbroil the world; and that were it not for thefe bribes that corrupt our Thoughts, all mankind would think alike here; as 'tis certain they will do in each different flate hereafter: fince truth in every thing is fill the fame, and like its Great Author, can be but one, a ftrait line that admits of none but itfelf betwixt the fame individual points, and that 'tis therefore in a confiderable meafure the obliquity of men's wills and affections that hinder their Thoughts from running parallel with it and one another. Thus Thus a man by obferving the working of his Thoughts upon all occafions, whether of fpeculation or practice; might furnish the world with fuch remarks as would carry both pleafure and profit in them, and let us more and more into the knowledge of the terra incognita of our cwn leffer world, fhew us both how we think, and how we might improve the mighty talent. And herein the genius of Ariftotle was admirably great: he read himfelf and therein all mankind in their true light and proper colours; for one man, ftript to his reafon and the due ufe of his faculties, is but the counter-part of another. His logick does not teach us to argue, nature did that before it, but reduces our arguings into rules and methods, and fhews us how we do it. Thefe reflections I have only briefly and haftily huddled together, that if they chance to fall in with any happy and obferving genius; they may fet it on work, and be the fortunate occafion of more perfect and confummate productions in this kind; and then I fhould fhould think this lame and imperfect effay infinitely better beftow'd than otherwife 'tis like to be: for I am fo fenfible of its imperfections that I could heartily wifh it in my hands again. But 'tis now out of my own power, and fo I must be content to lie at the mercy of the reader for venturing with fo fmall a force of Thought on fo great and noble an argument: for he that writes on Thoughts, writes on the pride and perfection of human nature, on that which muft yield us in a great meafure the fatisfactions or torments of the other life; Thoughts excufing or accufing their owners. He writes on that which is an unanfwerable proof of a divine, fpiritual, and immortal principle of life and motion in us: for I defy all the advocates of deifm or atheifm itfelf, to conceive matter, howsoever thinn'd or modified, capable of thinking: for no man, I am fure, if he rightly confults his own principle of Thought, can poffibly reconcile himfelf to this apprehenfion, that matter, pure matter, can think, meditate, deliberate, reflect, be |