between the plaintiff and the defendants appearing at the trial. The costs of this review should be apportioned in the same way. Reversed in part, and cause remanded. ALLEN and BURKE, JJ., concur. REED et al. v. FLOOD et al. (No. 10811.) (Supreme Court of Colorado. July 7, 1924. Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 1924.) Execution 75-Where action on judgment of justice of peace, filed in office of clerk of district court, was barred, execution could not issue on judgment. Where action on judgment of justice of the peace, filed in office of clerk of district court, was barred by statute of limitations, execution could not thereafter issue on such judgment. Department 3. the legal proposition is necessary, for by a recent decision of this court it was decided that under such a state of facts the execution may not issue. Sundin v. Frost, 71 Colo. 367, 206 P. 1071. Plaintiff, however, cites cases from other jurisdictions and Brown v. Bell, 46 Colo. 163, 103 P. 380, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1096, 133 Am. St. Rep. 54, upon which he relies, and which he says distinguish this from the Sundin Case. The difference between the Brown-Bell Case and the Sundin Case is that in the former the transcript of the justice court judgment was filed in the district court within a year after its rendition, and the judgment was then a live one, while in the Sundin Case the judgment was not filed in the district court until about 10 years after its rendition. In both cases execution was issued after the bar to an action on the judgment had fallen. The reasoning of the court in the Sundin Case, and the cases upon which reliance was there had as authority, clearly discloses that the Error to District Court, City and County of court, sitting en banc, was of the opinion Denver; Julian H. Moore, Judge. Action by A. H. Flood and another against George L. Reed and another. Judgment for plaintiffs, and defendants bring error. Affirmed. Tolles & Cobbey, of Denver (Rice W. Means, City Atty., of Denver, of counsel), for plaintiffs in error. that a judgment rendered in a justice court, though transcript thereof is within its life filed in the district court, is barred by the 6-year statute of limitation, reckoning from the day of its rendition, and not from the day of such filing, and no action thereupon may thereafter be maintained; that at the expiration of the 6-year limitation the judgment is dead, and, as the right of action George A. Carlson and W. R. Ramsey, both thereon is barred, no execution could legally of Denver, for defendants in error. CAMPBELL, J. The plaintiff Reed recovered a judgment in the justice court in May, 1910, against the defendant Flood. Within three years thereafter he filed a transcript of the judgment in the office of the clerk of the district court. In July, 1923, more than 10 years after the rendition of the judgment, Reed caused an execution on this judgment to be issued out of the district court, and the sheriff thereunder levied upon real estate in the county belonging to the defendant Flood. Flood thereupon brought an action in equity to enjoin the threatened sale, and, upon final hearing, the court made permanent the temporary injunction theretofore issued, ordered the judgment to be canceled, and satisfied and restrained further proceeding under it. The question for decision is whether an execution may be issued on a judgment of a Justice of the peace which has been filed in the office of the clerk of the district court after an action on the judgment is barred by the statute of limitation. No discussion of issue after the judgment is dormant. In the Sundin Case the court said: "The question to be determined is whether or not an execution can be issued on a judgment of a justice of the peace, filed in the office of the clerk of the district court, after the time at which an action on the judgment is barred by the statute." That is the precise question for decision here. This court in the Sundin Case not only intended to, but did. decide this very proposition, and the decision is contrary to the contention of the plaintiff in error. The writer of this opinion concurred in the decision in the Brown-Bell Case. That was a decision by a department of the court. The Sundin Case was decided by the court en banc, and until the court en banc rules otherwise the decision in the Sundin Case, being the last expression of this court, and being antagonistic to the Brown-Bell Case, must be followed. The judgment of the district court now reviewed, being based upon and following the Sundin Case, is therefore affirmed. TELLER, C. J., and SHEAFOR, J., concur. For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes (230 P.) BARTLETT et al. v. HAMMOND. (No. 10849.) (Supreme Court of Colorado. Oct. 6, 1924. Rehearing Denied Nov. 10, 1924.) 1. Trial 335-Verdict against several joint tort-feasors should be single and in single sum. Since there can be no apportionment of damages between defendants, jointly liable as tort-feasors, when action is against several joint tort-feasors, if finding is against all, verdict should be single verdict against all for single sum. 2. Judgment 239-Rendition of joint judgment on separate verdicts against joint tort feasors held improper. Action by Elizabeth Hammond against Dr. S. R. Bartlett and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Reversed and remanded, with instructions. Charles R. Bosworth, of Denver, for plaintiffs in error. Tom L. Pollock and Robert Emmet Lee, both of Denver, for defendant in error. CAMPBELL, J. This is an action by Elizabeth Hammond, plaintiff below, defendant in error here, against the plaintiffs in error, defendants below, Dr. Bartlett and Mrs. Joseph, for damages for alleged negligence of the defendants arising out of an automobile collision in the city of Denver at the intersection of East Colfax avenue and the west Plaintiff roadway of Monaco boulevard. asks for actual damages for injury to her person, her automobile, for exemplary damages, and a body judgment. Each of the defendants filed a separate answer, in which the material allegations of the complaint are denied and contributory negligence of the plaintiff is alleged. In a counterclaim, each defendant asks for like damages for plain4. Municipal corporations 705 (2) - Each tiff's negligence. To each of these answers driveway of street, composed of two drive- and counterclaims plaintiff filed a separate ways with boulevard between, is separate replication, denying the charges of neglistreet as affects duty of driver in making left-gence against her, but there is no plea in eihand turn about "center of intersection." In action against joint tort-feasors, where jury brought in verdict for same amount against each defendant, court might have required joint verdict, but could not, without correcting verdicts (if it had power to do so), render a joint judgment for amount included in one verdict. 3. Trial 340(1)—Court may not correct verdict in matter of substance. Court may not correct verdict in matter of substance. Under C. L. § 1270 (f), and Municipal Code of Denver 1917, §§ 1958, 1977, 1986, as relate to vehicle drivers' duty to keep to right of center of intersection in making left-hand turn, where street consists of two roadways separated by boulevard, each roadway constitutes separate cross street, when determining point about which a left-hand turn is to be made, in view of C. L. § 1270 (h). 5. Municipal corporations 705 (2)-Vehicle driver held not to have kept to right of street intersection in making left-hand turn, and negligent as matter of law. One making left-hand turn into a cross street, which consisted of two driveways with boulevard between, who failed to keep to right of point of intersection of street on which he had approached and driveway into which he turned, held not to have kept to right of intersection, and was negligent as matter of law, in view of C. L. §§ 1270 (f), 1270 (h), and Municipal Code of Denver 1917, §§ 1958, 1977, 1986. 6. Municipal corporations 705 (2)-Defendant, traveling north on west side of street, consisting of two driveways with boulevard between, held negligent as matter of law. Defendants driving north on west driveway of street, consisting of two driveways with boulevard between, held, under C. L. § 1270 (h), and Municipal Code of Denver 1917, § 1977, negligent as matter of law, where evidence of defective condition of east driveway was insufficient to excuse their failure to use it. Department 3. Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Clarence J. Morley, Judge. ther replication of contributory negligence of either defendant. As the result of the trial, the jury returned separate verdicts against each defendant, reading: "We, the jury, find the issues herein joined for the plaintiff and against the defendant Dr. Bartlett, and assess her damages at the sum of seventeen hundred dollars and no/100 cents ($1,700.00)." "We, the jury, find the issues herein joined for the plaintiff and against the defendant Mrs. Joseph, and assess her damages at the sum of seventeen hundred dollars and no/100 cents ($1,700.00)." When the verdicts were returned by the jury, the court ordered them recorded, and they were recorded, and the defendants, and each of them, by counsel then objected to the verdicts, both as to substance and form, which objections were repeated and included in their separate motions for a new trial, after the court, without questioning the jury, and after they were discharged, assuming from the several verdicts themselves that the jury had found, and intended to find, damages of $1,700 only against both defendants, thereupon entered one joint and several judgment against both in the amount of $1,700 and costs, reading: "It is considered by the court that the said plaintiff do have and recover of and from the said defendants, Dr. S. R. Bartlett and Mrs. J. B. Joseph, and each of them, the sum of seventeen hundred dollars ($1,700), her damages so by the jury aforesaid assessed, together For other cases see same topic and KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests and Indexes with her costs in this behalf laid out and ex- overrules the objection, a writ of error will pended." lie. The real objection here, however, is that, if the court had power to change a verdict, either in substance or form, it did not The defendants have jointly sued out this writ of error. Each separate motion for a new trial has 34 grounds, and each separate assignment of errors contains 60 specifications and numerous subdivisions. In view of our conclusion that both the plaintiff and the defendants, and each of them, were guilty of negligence which directly contributed to the collision, that they were mutually at fault, and for that reason plaintiff's action, as well as defendants' counterclaims, must be dismissed, many of the questions, some important and difficult, argued ably by counsel on both sides in their briefs, require no consideration. do so. The two separate verdicts still stand as they were returned by the jury, and are so recorded. The unquestioned rule is that a judgment rendered without findings of fact by a court or a verdict of the jury is And, as said by the aufatally erroneous. thor in 33 C. J. § 106, p. 1169: "There is no principle of law more firmly established than that the judgment must follow and conform to the verdict, decision, or findings in all substantial particulars." And: "Where the verdict is joint, the judgment must be joint, unless plaintiff remits the damages as to one of the defendants, or dismisses the action as to him, or the court grants him a new trial. Where the verdict is several, the judgment must be several. The proper remedy in case a judgment does not conform to the verdict is by a motion to modify the judgment, or by appeal or writ of error." [1] 1. Notwithstanding this conclusion, which of itself sends all the parties out of court, a ruling of the trial court which involves an important question of practice should be considered before discussion is had of the vital and controlling question of their mutual negligence. When an action is against several joint tort-feasors, if the finding is against all of them, the verdict should be a single verdict against all for a single sum and not a several verdict against each defendant either in the same or separate sums. There can be no apportionment of damages as between defendants jointly liable in such a case. When the two separate verdicts were returned into court, objection thereto both as to substance and form was unsuccessfully interposed by each defendant, and renewed in a motion for, a new trial. When the verdicts were returned they were ordered by the court to be recorded, and were recorded, and the jury were dismissed and separated. The court did not at any time correct the several verdicts, either in substance or form, but, without learning from the jury their intention in returning several verdicts, instead of a single one, or in what sum they intended to find the total damages to be, assumed for itself that the intention of the jury was, and that the two several verdicts meant, a finding of $1,700 only against the two defendants, and not $1,700 against each defendant as the verdicts on their face show, and upon such assumption the court, without reforming or changing the several verdicts, rendered a single judgment for $1,700 against both defendants jointly and severally. That the proper practice was not observed, amounting to an irregularity, is beyond question. There may be, and probably are, authorities which hold that, if error, it is prejudicial to the plaintiff here, and not to the defendants who may not complain, since a joint judgment against the two for $1,700 caused no injury to either, as there was a several verdict against each in the same sum. Other authorities are that either the plaintiff or the defendant [2, 3] The defendants tried, without avail, to have the proper correction made by the trial court. A writ of error was then their only remedy. This joint judgment does not conform to the separate verdict or verdicts. It is a joint judgment rendered on two separate verdicts, and the fact that in each verdict the finding of damages is the same does not change the principle involved. The court might, before the jury was discharged, have instructed them to disregard the separate verdicts and return a joint verdict in such sum as they might find the plaintiff was entitled to as against both defendants; but it was improper for the court, without correcting these verdicts, if it had the power to do so, to render a joint judgment and insert therein the amount included in one verdict. It is not necessary here to determine whether the defendants could be heard with their objection, as matter of right, had the court, in a proper way, corrected the verdicts, since each verdict is in the same sum and the joint judgment is for only one of them. The court, however, may not correct a verdict in matter of substance; otherwise, the court could arbitrarily set aside a verdict of a jury in its entirety, and make a contrary finding in a law action for itself, and render judgment upon it Some of the authorities in point are 23 Cyc. p. 820 et seq.; City of Birmingham v. Hawkins, 196 Ala. 127, 72 So. 25; Layman v. Hendrix, 1 Ala. 212; Marriott v. Williams, 152 Cal. 705, 93 P. 875, 125 Am. St. Rep. 87; Chrudinsky v. Evans, 85 Or. 548, 167 P. 562; 38 Cyc. p. 1905 (7); Forslund v. Swenson (Neb.) 192 N. W. 649; Price v. Clapp, 119 Tenn. 425, 435, 105 S. W. 864, 123 Am. St. Rep. 730; Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Halleck, 78 Ind. App. 495, 136 N. (230 P.) Section 1986 of the Code is: "The driver of any vehicle shall before turning make sure that such movement can be executed in safety. In the last case there was but a single ver- street which joins another at an angle, whether dict, but the finding was against both of the it crosses the street or not." two defendants, and the damages against one of them was for one sum and against the other for a different sum. The combined sums equalled only the amount of the damages assessed by the jury, and so stated to be in the verdict, against both the defendants, and the court disregarded the attempted apportionment as surplusage, and rendered judgment on the verdict for the single sum. The reasoning of the court would make improper the action of the trial court in the instant case. 2. The collision, as stated, was at the intersection of East Colfax avenue and Monaco boulevard, at a point south of the center line of Colfax avenue and east of the center line of the west roadway of Monaco boulevard, near the southeast corner of the streets. Monaco boulevard consists of a wide parking in the center, which is set out to grass and shrubs, with a roadway on each side thereof for purpose of travel, designated, respectively, as east roadway and west roadway. The parking or parkway, apparently wider than either roadway, is not used for travel, but is ornamental only. Colfax avenue runs east and west; Monaco boulevard, north and south. At the time of the collision the plaintiff, who was driving her own automobile, was proceeding west, and she turned her car to go south from East Colfax avenue into and along the west roadway of the boulevard. The defendants at the time were in an automobile of defendant Joseph, driven by Dr. Bartlett, and were going north and on the east side of the west roadway. Neither of the cars was driven rapidly. A good view from each could be had, and the occupants of each car might have seen, if they did not see, the motion, direction, and apparent purpose of the occupants of the other. C. L. 1921, § 1270 (f), p. 498, provides: It was important, as bearing upon the care or lack of care of the plaintiff, to know the location of the meeting point of the medial lines of these two highways. The court instructed the jury as follows: "Instruction No. 5. The court instructs you that the center of an intersection means the meeting point of the medial lines of the two highways traversed, or about to be traversed, by a vehicle making a turn from one to the other of the said highways. For the purpose of determining such intersection in the case at bar you will find the meeting point of an imaginary line drawn east and west through Colfax avenue and another imaginary line drawn north and south through the center of Monaco boulevard; the center of Monaco boulevard being half the distance between the western or outer line of the west roadway of the said boulevard and the eastern or outer line of the east roadway. In other words, you are to consider the said boulevard for the purpose as one street only." [4] We think this instruction is erroneous. It will be observed the court considers that Monaco boulevard, as a highway for vehicular travel, extends from the east boundary line of the east roadway to the west boundary line of the west roadway; in other words, that it includes, for purposes of vehicular traffic, not only the separate roadways on each side of the parking, but the parkway itself. We think that, so far as concerns "center of intersection," the east and west roadways are separate highways or streets. Vehicles are not allowed to drive over and along the parkway or parking place of Monaco boulevard in either direction, and when one turns from Monaco boule"All vehicles approaching an intersection of vard into Colfax avenue he may not drive a public highway, with the intention of turn-over and along the parkway on either side ing thereat, shall in turning to the right keep of Colfax, but only into and along the east to the right of the center of such intersection, and in turning to the left shall run beyond the center of such intersection passing to the right thereof, before turning such vehicle toward the left. For the purpose of this subdivision the 'center of such intersection' shall be held to mean the meeting point of the medial lines of the two highways traversed by the vehicles making the turn." or west roadway. Vehicular traffic is re stricted to travel to the parts of the boulevard intended for travel; for those traveling north to the east roadway, and for those traveling south to the west roadway. C. L. 1921, § 1270 (h); Denver Municipal Code 1917, § 1983, p. 831. In drawing an imaginary line north and south through the center of the parking of Section 1977 of the Municipal Code of Monaco boulevard the court was not justiDenver of 1917 reads: "All moving vehicles shall be driven in a single file, except when passing another and shall keep to the right of the center of the street." Section 1958 of the Municipal Code reads: "The term 'street' shall apply to that part of the public highway intended for vehicles. The term 'street intersection' shall apply to any fied. In determining the center of intersection of the highways, so far as concerns vehicular traffic, the east roadway and the west roadway are, as stated, separate highways, irrespective of the parkway. In ascertaining the center of intersection of the west roadway of Monaco boulevard and East Colfax avenue, this imaginary line should be drawn north and south through the cen ter of the west roadway half way between, may never, in any circumstances, be driven its west and east boundary line. If the on a street in a direction prohibited by statwest roadway of Monaco boulevard is to be ute. Possibly the present laying of street considered as one highway intersecting with railway tracks in East Colfax avenue and East Colfax avenue, and the east roadway | the digging of gas mains in East Fourteenth is to be considered another highway inter- avenue in the city of Denver, whereby onesecting therewith, as we think is imperative, half or more of the width of each highway then the plaintiff was guilty of negligence on the south side is occupied by the imas matter of law. For in driving her car to provement, to the exclusion of vehicle traffic, the west, as she approached the west road- furnishes an illustration where travel in the way, she did not keep on the north side of wrong direction might not be deemed negliEast Colfax avenue, or, if she did, still she gence, or, if so, excusable or not actionable. did not, before turning to her left to go south, pass to the west of the medial imaginary line drawn north and south through the west roadway at its intersection with East Colfax avenue; but, on the contrary, according to the manifest weight of the evidence, she drove her car, as she was approaching the east boundary line of the west roadway, on the south side of East Colfax avenue, and unquestionably was on the east side of the center of the west roadway, instead of being on the west side thereof, at the time she made the turn diagonally from East Colfax avenue into the west roadway and collided with defendant's car. In other words, she disobeyed the positive directions or provisions of both the state statute and the municipal ordinances of the city of Denver, the law of the road. [6] The defendants were driving north on the west roadway, and on the east or right side, as they approached its intersection with East Colfax avenue. The law of the state and the municipal ordinance require one traveling north on Monaco boulevard, where, as here, the two roadways are divided longitudinally by a parkway, to drive on the roadway east of the parkway, and one traveling south to drive on the west roadway. This requirement has no bearing on the location of the medial line of Monaco boulevard. The defendants were thus violating the provisions of the state statute and the municipal ordinances of the city. The court properly instructed that they were negligent as a matter of law. They claim, however, that they were justified in driving north along the west roadway, because the east roadway, the one designated by law for north-bound travel, was then, though not impassable, not in fit condition for vehicle traffic because of work and repairs thereon recently made, of which the plaintiff had We But defendants' evidence in support of their excuse for failing to observe the law of the road as to direction of travel is not of such definiteness, strength, or sufficiency to justify us in setting aside the finding of the trial court that it was too weak and unsubstantial to bring the case within the claimed exemption from, or exception to, the general rule that was applied by the court. must therefore hold that the defendants were negligent as matter of law for violating the law of the road in driving in the wrong direction. It thus appears that all of these parties, at the time of the collision, were guilty of negligence as a matter of law; that they were mutually at fault. The plaintiff was not entitled to recover under her complaint, and the defendants were not entitled to recover under their counterclaims. In such circumstances the court should have ordered the complaint and the counterclaims dismissed. It properly dismissed the several counterclaims of the defendants, upon the express ground that each of them, as a matter of law, was guilty of negligence that contributed to the injury. Had the court not made the mistake of assuming, for the purpose of determining the center of intersection of the highways, that it was an imaginary line drawn through the center of the parkway, and had instructed, as would be proper, that the west roadway along which the defendants were driving was to be considered as a highway intersecting with East Colfax avenue, without respect to that portion of Monaco boulevard consisting of a parkway and an east roadway, doubtless it would have dismissed plaintiff's action, as well as defendants' counterclaims. For it is too clear from the evidence to admit of question that the plaintiff and defendants were both guilty of negligence as matter of law in driving, as they did, contrary to the provisions of the state statutes and the municipal ordinances. If they had been in a place where the law says they might lawfully be, this collision would not have happened. Because of our conclusion that, under the evidence, plaintiff has no cause of action against defendants, or either of them, and neither of the defendants has a cause of action against the plaintiff, all the parties being at fault, the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with instructions to the |