ceptor, and his right. Indemnity to ac may prove under the commission against him, although he has been obliged to pay the bill after the act of bankruptcy'. Sect. 3.-Of nonacceptance, and the conduct which the holder must thereupon pursue. 1st, When notice of non-acceptance consequence of laches. THE inquiry into the conduct which the holder of a bill of exchange should pursue on a neglect or refusal to accept at all, or on the offer of a condition or partial acceptance, may be made under the following heads: First, When notice is requisite. Secondly, The mode of giving notice. Thirdly, The time when it must be given. Fourthly, By whom it must be given. Fifthly, To whom it should be given. Sixthly, Of the liability of the parties on receiving notice. Lastly, Of the consequences of the holder's neglect to give notice, and how waived, &c. It has already been observed, that a presentment is necessary, and for acceptance is only necessary when a bill is made payable within a certain period after sight. If, however, in that or any other case, a bill be presented, and an acceptance be refused, or only a conditional or partial acceptance be offered, notice should immediately be given to the persons to whom the holder means to resort for payment, or they will in general be totally discharged from their respective liabilities, not only on the bill of exchange, but the original consideration of it3; and it is not sufficient for the holder to wait till the time mentioned in the bill for payment has elapsed, and then to give notice of non-acceptance See post, Chap. on Bankruptcy.-Ex parte Yonge, 3 Ves. & Bea. 46. Stedman o. Mortimer, 13 East. 427. 2 Ante, 206. 3 Ante, 125, 6, 7, 8.-Bridges v. Berry, 3 Taunt. 130.-Rucker v. Hiller, 16 East. 43.-Bayl. 167. of non-acceptance as well as of non-payment'. But we have seen that 1st, When notice a bonâ fide holder, to whom a bill has been transferred is necessary. after refusal to accept, is not affected by the neglect of any previous holder in giving notice of that fact*. And if the bill were given on a wrong stamp, the neglect to present it for acceptance or give notice of the refusal may not prejudice'; and if the bill were given qnly as a collateral security, and the party delivering it were no party to it, he will not in such case be discharged from his original liability by the laches of the holder. And, as no laches can be imputed to the crown, if a bill be seized under an extent before it is due, the neglect of the officer of the crown to give notice of the dishonour, will not discharge the drawer or indorsers. The reason why the law requires the holder to give due notice of non-acceptance by the drawee is, that the anterior parties to the bill may respectively take the necessary measures to obtain payment from the parties respectively liable to them, and if notice be not given it is a presumption of law, that the drawer and indorsers are prejudiced by the omission; and it is on this principle that notice of non-acceptance and non-payment are required". From some cases to be found in the books 7 it appears to have been formerly holden, that it was incumbent on the person insisting on the want of notice, to prove that he had really sustained damage by the 1Roscow v. Hardy, 2 Campb. 458.-12 East. 434. S. C.-Blesard v. Hirst, 5 Burr. 2670.-Goodall v. Dolley, 1 T. R. 712.-Anonymous, 1 Ventr. 45.-Poth. pl. 133.-Dagglish v. Weatherby, 2 Bla. Rep. 747. per Lord Ellenborough, in Orr v. Maginnis, 7 East. 362.3 & 4 Ann. c. 9. s. 7. 2 Ante, 161, n. 1.-Selw. 4th ed. 319. 3 Ante, 75-Wilson v. Vysar, 4 Taunt. 288. *Ante, 126, 7, 8.-Warrington v. Furbor, 8 East. 242. S West on Extents, 28, 9. Whitfield. Savage, 2 Bos. & Pul. 280, 1.-Orr v. Maginnis, 7 East. 362. 7 Mogadara v. Holt, 1 Show. 318.-12 Mod. 15. S. C.-Butler v. Play, 1 Mod. 27.-Sarsfield v. Weatherby, Comb. 152.-Bickerdike . Pollman, 1T. R. 406.-Vin. Ab. tit. Bills of Exchange, M.Poth. pl. 157, 8.-Postlethw. tit. Bills of Exchange, 16, 17.—Whitfeld v. Savage, 2 Bos, & Pul. 280, 1. of non-acceptance is necessary; and what excuses omis➡ sion. 1st. When notice laches of the holder; but it has been settled by later decisions, that such damage is to be presumed, and that the only excuse for the omission is the proof of the want of effects in the hands of the drawee'; and it is always presumed, till the contrary appears, that the drawer of a bill has effects in the drawee's hands, and that the indorser or assignor has given value for it, and consequently that each may have sustained a loss by the holder's neglect to give notice3, by which the chance of obtaining satisfaction from the parties liable to them, must necessarily be rendered more precarious. But if the drawer of a bill, from the time of making it to the time when it was due, had no effects in the hands of the drawee or acceptor, and the bill was drawn for the accommodation of such drawer, he is primâ facie not entitled to notice of the dishonour of the bill; nor can he object, in such case, that a fo I Bayl. 133. n. 1.-Dennis v. Morrice, 3 Esp. Rep. 158. In an action on a bill brought by an indorsee against the drawer, it appeared, that no notice had been given to the defendant of non-payment by the acceptor, to excuse which, the plaintiff offered to prove, that in fact, the defendant had not been prejudiced by the want of such notice. But Lord Kenyon said, the only case in which notice is dispensed with is, where the drawer has no cflects in the hands of the drawee. This would be extending the rule still further than ever has been done, and opening new sources of litigation, in investigating whether in fact the drawer did receive a prejudice from the want of notice or not. He rejected the evidence, and nonsuited the plaintiff. Sed vide Pothier Traité du Contrat de Change, part 1. chap. 5. num. 157, 8. 2 Per Buller, J. in Bickerdike v. Bollman, 1 T. R. 406, 409.—Tatlock v. Harris, 3 T. R. 182.—Anonymous, Ventr. 45.-Nicholson v. Gouthit, 2 Hen. Bla. 612.-Mogadara v. Holt, 1 Show. 317. 3 Legge n. Thorpe, 2 Campb.310. 12 East. 171. S. C. where the rule, principle, and inconveniences are stated; and see Walwyn v. St. Quintin, 1 Bos. & Pul. 654, 5.-Clegg v. Cotton, 3 Bos. & Pul. 241, 2.-Gale v. Walsh, 5 T. R. 239.-Poth. pl. 157.—Bickerdike 7. Bollman, 1 T. R. 405.-Goodall v. Dolley, id. 712.-Rogers v. Stephens, 2 T. R. 713.-Nicholson v. Gouthit, 2 Hen. Bla. 610.Staples v. Okines, 1 Esp. Rep. 333.-Wilkes v. Jacks, Peake's Ca. N. P. 202. The progress of the cases on this subject is also stated in Brown v. Maffey, 15 East. 216.-See also Bayl. 131, 2, 137. Bickerdike and another, assignees of Reichard v. Bollman, 1 T. R. 405. The only question upon a case reserved was, whether the bill the bankrupt had drawn in favour of the petitioning creditor, upon a man, who then, and from that time, till the bill became due, was one of the bankrupt's creditors, had discharged so much of the peti of non-acceptance what excuses omis reign bill should have been protested. In this case, 1st. When notice the drawer, being himself the real debtor, acquires no is necessary; and right of action against the acceptor by paying the bill, sion. and suffers no injury from want of notice of non-acceptance or non-payment, and therefore the laches of the holder affords him no defence". But it is no excuse for not giving notice to the indorser of a bill, that the acceptor had no effects of tioning creditors debts, no notice having been given of its dishonour to the bankrupt; and the court, after argument, were of opinion it had not, because the reason why notice is in general necessary is, that the drawer may without delay, withdraw his effects from the drawee, and that no injury may happen to him from want of notice; but where the drawer has no effects in the hands of the drawee, he cannot be injured, and is not entitled to any notice. In Brown v. Maffey, 15 East. 221. Lord Ellenborough, C. J. observed, that the doctrine of dispensing with notice of the dishonour of a bill, had grown almost entirely out of this case, and that though there might have been previous decisions to the same effect at Nisi Prius, yet none had been brought in revision before the court till this case; that decision dispensed with notice to the drawer, where he knew before-hand he had no effects in the hands of the drawee, and had no reason to expect that the bill would be paid when it became due. Goodall v. Dolley, 1 T. R. 712. In this case, upon the application for a new trial, the plaintiff's counsel offered an affidavit that the drawer had no effects in the hands of the drawee; but the court thought that made no difference, the action being brought against the payee, but by Buller, J. had the action been against the drawer I should have been willing to let in the affidavit, that would be the like case of Bickerdike v. Bollman. If the drawer has no effects in the hands of the drawee, he cannot be injured by want of notice. Legge v. Thorpe, 12 East's Rep. 171.-2 Campb. 310. S. C. This was an action by an indorsee against the drawer of a foreign bill, drawn upon C. B. Wyatt, payable one month after sight, of which acceptance had been refused. The declaration negatived effects in the hands of the drawee, or any consideration for the bill. It appeared, at the trial, that the defendant had no effects in Wyatt's hands, and that the latter had therefore refused acceptance; but that Wyatt was one of the executors of Weeks, and that Weeks' executors had desired the defendant to employ the payce of this bill to do some carpenter's work on Weeks' property, and the defendant drew this bill on Wyatt for the payment of the payee, Wyatt denied that he had assets to pay the bill. The only question was, whether a protest for non-acceptance were necessary; Lord Ellenborough thought not; and a verdict was given for the plaintiff; but the point was reserved, and on a rule nisi for nonsuit, and cause shewn, the whole court held that this case was governed by those of Bickerdike v. Bollman, 1 T. R. 405. and Rogers v. Stevens, 2 T. R. 713. and discharged the rule. Legge v. Thorpe, 2 Campb. 310.-12 East. 171. S. C.-see the last note. 2 Per Chambre, J. in Leach v. Hewitt, 4 Taunt. 733. of non-acceptance what excuses omission. 1st, When notice the drawer'. And although no consideration passed is necessary; and between the payee and drawer of a bill of exchange, it is not to be considered an accommodation bill as to the latter, if there was a valuable consideration as between the payee and the acceptor. So a person, who, without consideration, but without fraud, endorsed a bill, the drawer and acceptor of which proved to be fictitious persons, is entitled to due notice of the dishonour, or he will be discharged'. It has been decided, that where a bill has been drawn for the accommodation of the payee, and the drawer had no effects in the hands of the drawee, though the payee had, such drawer is not entitled to 'Wilks v. Jacks, Peake Rep. 202. In an action against the defendant, as indorser of a bill, drawn by Vaughan on Eustace and Holland, it appeared, that notice had not been given to the defendant, upon which the plaintiff offered to shew, that Vaughan had no effects in the hands of Eustace and Holland. Sed per Lord Kenyon, C. J. "That circumstance will not avail the plaintiff, the rule extends only to actions brought against the drawer; the indorser is in all cases entitled to notice, for he has no concern with the accounts between the drawer and the drawee." The plaintiff then proved a letter from the defendant, acknowledging the debt, and promising to pay, and upon that he had a verdict. 2 Scott v. Lifford, 1 Campb. 246. Payee against the drawer of a bill of exchange; the defence was, that the bill was drawn without consideration, and that the plaintiffs had received satisfaction. Agar having an acceptance due to the plaintiffs, requested it renewed, to which they consented, provided that the defendant would draw a bill upon Agar for the amount which he was to accept, and which was accordingly done. Agar also lodged policies of insurance to a large amount with the plaintiffs, by way of collateral security, upon which a certain per centage had since been awarded, due upon them. Lord Ellenborough held, that the bill was not an accommodation bill, there having been a consideration between the payees and acceptor, and that if it had been proved that the plaintiffs had received any thing upon the policies, that would pro tanto be a satisfaction, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the whole sum mentioned in the bill, and must deliver up the policies or refund the money received under them. 3 Leach v. Hewitt, 4 Taunt. 731. This was an action against the defendant, as indorser of a bill of exchange, purporting to be drawn by Rogers, Crooke, & Co. and dated from the Northampton Bank, and purporting to be accepted by Rogers & Co. Lombard Street, in favor of the defendant. It appeared, at the trial, that the defendant had indorsed the bill at the request of one Cattle, and that it had come to the hands of the plaintiff for a valuable consideration. When the bill became due, no such persons as Rogers & Co. were to be found in Lombard Street, nor the drawers at Northampton. After four days, the plaintiff found the defendant, who lived in Clerkenwell. The defence was, that he had not had due notice of the dishonour of |